


CHAPTER II.

GROWTH OF VOLUNTARY POWER.



1. THE elements of voluntary power being assumed as (1) Spontaneity and (2) Self-conservation, we have to exemplify the connexion of these into the matured will, by a process of education.

The distinctive aptitude of the mature will is to select at once the movements necessary to attain a pleasure or relieve a pain, as when we raise to the nostrils a sweet violet, or move away from something malodorons. There is no such power possessed by us at birth.

2. The process of acquirement may be described generally as follows:—At the outset, there happens a coincidence, purely accidental, between a pleasure and a movement (of Spontaneity) that maintains and increases it; or *between a pain and a movement that alleviates or removes it*; by the link of Self-conservation, the movement bringing pleasure, or removing pain, is sustained and augmented. Should this happen repeatedly, an adhesive growth takes place, through which the feeling can afterwards command the movement.

To exemplify this position; we will now review, in order, the primitive feelings, and the volitions grafted upon them.

a. Commencing with the Muscular Feelings, we may remark upon the pleasures of Exercise. Spontaneous movements occurring in a fresh and vigorous system give pleasure; and with the pleasure there is an increased vitality extending to the movements, which are thereby sustained and increased; the pleasure as it were feeding itself. Out of the primitive force of self-conservation, we have the very effect that characterizes the will, namely, movement or action for the attainment of pleasure.

The pains of Fatigue give the obverse instance. The immediate effect of pain being abated energy, the movements will suffer their share of the abatement and come to a stand; a remedy for the evil as effectual as any resolution of the mature will.

These instances do not indicate any progress in our voluntary education. Let us next take the pains of Muscular Restraint, or of Spontaneity held in, by obstacles, as when an animal is hedged into a narrow chamber. Various writhings are the natural consequence of the confined energies; at last some one movement takes the animal to an opening, and it bolts out with explosive vehemence. When this experience is repeated several times, an association will be formed between the state of constraint and the definite movements that lead to a release; so that the proper course shall be taken at once, and without the writhings and uncertainties attending the first attempts. As soon as this association is complete, we have a step in the career of voluntary acquirement.

Proceeding now to the Sensations proper, we begin with Organic Life. Among organic acute pains generally, we may single out the instructive case of a painful contact, as with a hot or a sharp instrument. The remedy is to retract the member; and people are apt to suppose, erroneously, that we do this by instinct. Now, it is true that a painful pinch will induce, by a reflex process, a convulsive movement of the part; while, as a part of the emotional wave, there will be a stir over the whole body. But there is no certainty that the reflex movement would be the remedial one; it might be the very opposite. Supposing the limb contracted, the reflex stimulus would probably throw it out; and if the sharp point lay in the way, there might be a much worse injury. The process of education would be this. Some one movement would be found to concur with diminished pain; that movement would be sustained by the general elation of relief; other movements increasing the pain would be sapped and arrested. A single experience of this kind would go for little; a few repetitions of the suitable coincidence would initiate a contiguous association, gradually ripening into a full coherence; and the one single movement of retraction would be chosen on the instant the pain was felt. That may appear an uncertain and bungling way of attaining the power of ridding ourselves of a hot cinder; and the more likely course would seem to be the possession of an instinct under the guise of a reflex action. But if we have an instinct for one class of pains, why have we not the same for others? For example, the pain of cramp in the leg, suggests to us no remedy. Only after many fruitless movements, does there occur the one that alleviates the suffering. The fair interpretation is that we have too little experience of this pain to acquire the proper

mode of dealing with it; while the painful contacts with the skin are so numerous from the beginning of life, that our education is forced on and is early completed.

The Sensations of the Lungs may be referred to. Respiration is a reflex act, under voluntary control. The painful sensation of most frequent occurrence is that arising from deficient or impure air. The primitive effect of pain is the opposite of the remedy; for, instead of collapsing into inactivity, the lungs must be aided by increased breathing energy. How is this attained in the first instance? The only assignable means is some accidental exertion of the respiratory muscles followed by relief, and maintained by the new power accruing to the general system. The infant is in all likelihood unequal to the effort of forced breathing. This is perhaps one of the deficiencies of the uneducated will of childhood, rendering life more precarious at its early stages.

The augmented energy from pure air, suddenly encountered, would directly lead to an augmented respiration. The voluntary acquisition of the command of the lungs would, in this case, be a more apparent offshoot from the primary instinct.

Every sentient creature contracts many volitional habits in connexion with Warmth and Chillness. Animals soon learn to connect the crouching attitude with increased warmth. Other devices are fallen upon, as lying close together, and creeping into holes and shelters. I cannot say how far even the intelligent quadrupeds associate relief from chillness with a quick run. The lesson is one very much opposed to the primary effect of the sensation, which, in its character of massive pain, damps and depresses the energies.

The sensations of the Alimentary Canal are rich in voluntary associations. Sucking is said to be purely reflex in the new-born infant; swallowing is performed by involuntary muscles, and is always reflex. The child put to the nipple commences to suck by a reflex stimulus of voluntary muscles; the act being one of considerable complication, involving a co-operation of the mouth (which has to close round the nipple), the tongue (which applies itself to the opening of the nipple, making an air-tight contact), and the chest (which performs an increased inspiration, determining the flow of the milk when the tongue is pulled away). Being a conscious effect, operated by muscles all voluntary, it comes immediately under the fundamental law we are considering; the stimulus arising from the non-nutritive heightens the activity, until the point of satiety is reached, when a new and depressing sensibility

comes into play, and induces cessation. Two powers, however, are at work; the nourishment received permanently increases the active vigour; the sensation of satiety has to counterwork this, by the temporary depression due to stomachic fulness. Probably at first infants glut the stomach too much before the depression arrests their sucking activity, in the face of the general stimulation brought about by the nourishment; very frequently they are withdrawn from the breast before ceasing of themselves. So far we have a reflex act controlled by the power of self-conservation; the only supposable education is the giving over at the extreme point of satiety. But in the next stage, there is room for voluntary acquirements of a high order. The applying the mouth to the breast under the sensation of hunger is a somewhat complex arrangement; it involves an association with the sight of the breast and the nipple, as well as with movements for approaching it. In fact, we have here a branch of our education in perceiving distance, or in connecting visible magnitudes with approaching and receding movements; an education that doubtless commences in the most interesting cases, and extends itself gradually over the whole sphere of action.

In Mastication, the progress of voluntary power may be stated to advantage. The powerful sensations of relish and taste, concurring with the spontaneity of the tongue (probably the most moveable and independent member of the whole system), and prompting a continuing movement, would be the beginning of a connexion, soon ripened, between the contact of a morsel of food and the definite acts of pressing it to the palate, and moving it about. The infant is unable to masticate: a morsel put into its mouth at first usually tumbles out. But if there occur spontaneous movements of the tongue, mouth, or jaw, giving birth to a strong relish, these movements are sustained, and begin to be associated with the sensations; so that after a time there grows up a firm connexion. The favouring circumstances are these:—the sensations are powerful; and the movements are remarkable for various and isolated spontaneity: the tongue and the mouth are the organs of all others prone to detached and isolated exertions.

The operation of a sour or bitter taste presents the case from the other side. The primary effect is to suspend the action of the organs; the mere infant can do no more. The spitting out of a nauseous morsel is a complex and a later acquisition.

The voluntary command of the lower extremity of the alimentary canal is wanting in infancy, and must be preceded by an artificial sensibility in favour of the retention of the excreta.

The pleasurable and painful sensations of Smell come into relationship with the inhalation and exhalation of air by the nostrils. The initiatory coincidence is not with the action of the lungs alone, but with the closure of the mouth also. Such coincidences are necessarily rare, and all acquirements that pre-suppose them are tardy. The act of sniffing is probably not attained before the third or fourth year, and often then by the help of instruction. It would be interesting to ascertain the period of this acquirement in the dog.

The sensations of Touch serving as antecedents in volition are numerous and important. The greater number, however, are of the class of intermediate sensibilities, as in the industrial arts; smoothing a surface, for example. The two great ultimate sensibilities of Touch, are the pleasure of the soft and warm contact, and the pain of pungent irritation of the skin. Both these are operative as volitional guides and stimuli, and, in both, connexions with definite movements, unformed at first, arise in the course of our voluntary education. 15

In the human infant, and in the infancy of the lower animals, the feeling of the warm contact with the mother is unquestionably a great power; the transition from the absence to the presence of the state is second only to the stimulus of nourishment; the rise of vital activity corresponding to it is, in all likelihood, very great. Whatever movements tend to bring on or heighten this state, may expect to be encouraged by the consequent elevation of tone. Now, these movements are part of the locomotive group, which spontaneity brings into frequent play: and coincidences will readily arise between them and the attained delight of contact; the young quadruped succeeds by locomotion, the infant by thrusting out its limbs at first, and afterwards by more difficult movements, as turning in bed. If there were any one definite movement that on all occasions determined the transition from the cold naked state to the warm touch, a very few spontaneous concurrences with that movement would cement an effectual connexion. There is, however, scarcely any movement of this kind, suitable to all positions. One or two modes of attaining warmth are tolerably uniform, and therefore soon acquired; as bringing the limbs close to the body. A somewhat complicated adjustment is needed in

most circumstances, involving the external perception of the eye—namely, moving up to the warm body of the mother: the young quadruped learns the lesson in a short time; the bird is even more precocious; while the human infant is very backward, and occupies weeks or months in the acquisition.

The pungent and painful sensations of Touch include the case already touched on, the retraction of any part from the shock of pain. This remedy being a simple and nearly uniform action, of a kind ready to occur in the course of spontaneity, we may expect to find it associated with the painful feeling at a comparatively early date. So early do we find it, that we are apt to regard it as an instinct. The same class of sensations includes the discipline of the whip. As an acutely painful feeling, the smart of the whip has two conflicting effects; it irritates the nerves, causing spasmodic movements, and it depresses vital power on the whole. If the stimulation of the smart predominates in a vigorous animal, the effect of the whip would be to increase activity in general; hence if the animal is running, its speed is quickened. If the crushing effect of the pain predominates, the existing movements are arrested. Such are the primitive tendencies of an acute smart; and even in the educated animal, the application of the whip is best understood if in harmony with these. To quicken a laggard, the acute prick, not severe, is the most directly efficacious course; to quiet down a too active or prancing steed, a shock amounting to depression of power is more useful; the curb has this kind of efficacy. To make the animal fall into a particular pace, the whip is used with the effect of stimulating movements, in the hope that a variation may occur, and not merely an increase of degree: if the desired movement arise, the torment ceases; the animal being supposed to connect mentally the movement with the cessation. A certain age must be attained before a horse will answer to discipline by changing its movements under the whip, and abiding by the one that brings immunity. It must have passed several stages beyond the instinctive situation to arrive at this point. An interval has elapsed, during which the animal has learnt *consciously to seek an escape from pain*; in point of fact to generalize its experiences of particular pains and particular movements of relief, and to connect *any pain* with movements and the hope of relief. A certain progress, both physical and intellectual, is requisite to this consummation.

The pleasures and pains of Sound have little peculiarity. If a pleasant sound is heard, some movements will be found favourable to the effect, others adverse; the first are likely to be sustained, the others arrested. An animal, with the power of locomotion, runs away from a painful sound; the retreat being guided by the relief from the pain. A child learns to become still under a pleasant sound; there is a felt increase in the pleasure from the fixed attitude, and a felt diminution from restlessness.

In Sight, we have a remarkable example of sensations uniformly influenced by movements. The pleasure of light is very strong; at all events, the attraction of the eye for a light is great. Indeed, this is a case where the stimulus given to the active members appears to exceed the pleasure of the sensation; the eye is apt to remain fixed on a light even when the feeling has passed into pain, being a kind of aberration from the proper course of the will. Now, when the infant, gazing on a flame, is deprived of the sensation, by the motion of the light to one side, being at first unable to follow, for want of an established connection between the departing sensation and the requisite turn of the head, it must wait on random spontaneity for a lucky hit. Should a chance movement of the head tend to recover the flame, that movement will be sustained by the power of the stimulation; movements that lose the light would not be sustained, but rather arrested. And, inasmuch as the same movement always suits the same case—the taking of the light to one side, being a definite optical effect, and the motion of the head for regaining it being always uniform—the ground is clear for an early and rapid association between the two facts, the optical experience and the muscular movement. The situation is a very general one, applying to every kind of interesting spectacle, and involving a comprehensive volitional aptitude, the command of the visual organs at the instigation of visual pleasures. I have supposed the rotation of the head to be the first attained means of recovering objects shifted away from direct vision; but the movements of the eyes themselves will sooner or later come into play. It is evident enough, however, from the observation of children, that the power of recovering a visible thing is not arrived at during the first months.

This example, is instructive in various ways. The connexion of a pleasurable stimulus with heightened power has been hitherto assumed as not restricted to muscular movement; but as comprising, in undefined proportions, both

muscular power and the organic functions. The acute smart, in its first or enlivening stage, may be affirmed with certainty to increase muscular energy, and to diminish the healthy vital functions. Perhaps the pungent stimulus of light is mainly expended on muscular augmentation; which alone is of service in the forming of the will.


Connected with sight is another case of great interest, the adjustment of the eye to changes of distance. The guiding sensation in this case is the *distinctness* of the image; the infant must be aware of the difference between confused and clear vision, and must derive pleasure in passing from the one to the other. Under any theory of vision, Berkeleian or other, some time must elapse ere this difference be felt; everything at the outset being confused. As soon as the sense of a clear image is attained, the child may enter on the course of connecting the spontaneity of the adjusting muscles with the agreeable experience; as in other cases, a confirming association may be expected to follow soon, the movements concerned being few and uniform.

The foregoing review of the Sensations comprises several of the Appetites—Exercise, Repose, and Hunger. The feelings of approaching Sleep are very powerful, but the state is one that provides for itself, by pure physical sequence, without special education. The resistance offered when one is prevented from going to sleep, or is reluctantly awakened, is not a primitive manifestation; the child only manifests discomfort by the appropriate emotional expressions.

II 3. The second step in the growth of the Will is the uniting of movements with intermediate Ends.

This supposes that a sensation, in itself indifferent, can awaken interest, by being the constant antecedent of some pleasure. Thus the sight of the mother's breast is indifferent as mere visual sensation; but very soon allics itself in the infant mind with the gratification of being fed. This is a case of the contiguous transfer of a feeling, and is exemplified in all our powerful sensations and feelings. The lower animals are excited to their utmost activity by the sight of their food or their prey; they are sufficiently intellectual to have a recollection of their own feelings, and to have that awakened by some associated object. Granting the possession of these transferred sensibilities, which make the acquirement of what is only a means, as exciting to the activities as the final end, the process of connecting these with the movements for attain-

This further acquisition, the following out of imitation, involves a large stock of ideal representations of all possible movements, gained during our own performance of these movements, and our seeing others perform them. We have ideas of opening and closing the hand, spreading the fingers, grasping and letting loose; of putting the arms in all postures, and through varying degrees of rapidity. In acquiring those ideas we acquire also the links or connexions between them and the actual putting forth of the movements themselves; and but for these acquired links, voluntary power in its most familiar exercise would be entirely wanting. We have ideas also of the motions of our legs and feet; we form the wish to give a kick, and the power to fulfil the wish implies a link of association between the idea of the action, as a visible phenomenon, and the definite muscular stimulus for bringing the movement to pass. If no observation had ever been bestowed on the lower extremities, so as to arrive at this piece of education, the wish formed would be incompetent to create the act, notwithstanding the existence of a motive.

8. Voluntary power is consummated by the association  of movements with the idea of the Effect to be produced.

When we direct our steps across the street to a certain house, the antecedent in the mind is the idea of our entering that house. When we stir the fire, the antecedent is the idea of producing the appearance of a blazing mass, together with the sensation of warmth. When we carry the hand to the mouth, it is by virtue of a connexion between the movements and the idea of satisfying hunger and thirst. In writing, the idea of certain things to be expressed is connected directly with the required movements of the hand.

Here we have a still more advanced class of associations. In accordance with the usual course of our progressive acquirements, intermediate links disappear, and a bridge is formed directly between what were the beginning and the end of a chain. The thing that we are bent on doing is what properly engages our attention; success in that is the pleasurable motive, failure the painful motive; exertion is continued until we succeed; and an association is formed between the actions producing the end and the end itself. We come to a shut door; the idea in the mind accompanied with the state of feeling that makes the motive,—a present want, prospective relief,—is the idea of that door open. Instead of thinking first of the movement of the hand in the act of opening, and

proceeding from that to the action itself, we are carried at once from the idea of the open door to execute the movement of turning the handle.

The examples recently dwelt on have been chiefly movements guided by Sight and ideas of sight. It is scarcely necessary to do more than allude to the case of Hearing. Vocal Imitation is the association of sounds heard with movements of the organs of voice. Vocalizing to a Wish involves a sufficient adhesion between a vocal exertion and the *idea* or recollection of the sound so produced, as when a musician pitches a note and commences an air; or when a speaker gives utterance to words. These adhesions enter into the education of the individual in singing and in speaking, and are necessarily very numerous in a cultivated man or woman. Lastly, the associations are bridged over, and a link formed at once between movements of the voice and the idea of some end to be gained by its instrumentality; as in raising the voice to the shrill point for calling some one distant; or as when, without having in mind the idea of the words 'right face,' the officer of a company gives the word of command merely on the conception of the effect intended. 5.12.50

CHAPTER III

CONTROL OF FEELINGS AND THOUGHTS.

1. AS our voluntary actions ^{Show themselves} consist in putting forth muscular power, the control of Feeling and of Thought is through the muscles.

Hitherto we have seen, in the operation of the will, the exerting of definite, select, and, it may be, combined movements for the gaining of ends. We have spoken only of muscular intervention in the attainment of our wishes. We have not even entertained as questions, whether the blood can circulate more or less rapidly, or the digestion accommodate itself, in obedience to pleasure and pain. In an emotional wave, there is a participation of organic change. A shock of pain deranges the organic functions; pleasure, by the Law of Conservation, is accompanied with organic, no less than with

muscular, vigour. So far as concerns the fundamental link expressed by this law, there might be an association of organic, as well as of muscular, changes with states of pleasure and with states of pain; and often to the same good purpose: the augmentation of respiratory or of digestive vigour would directly heighten pleasure and abate pain. Notwithstanding all which facts, the muscular energies are alone selected for those definite associations with states of feeling which constitute the will. The power of movement stands alone in possessing the flexibility, the isolation, the independence, necessary for entering into the multifarious unions above detailed; and when we speak of voluntary control, we mean a control of the muscles. An explanation has, therefore, to be furnished of the stretching out of this control to feeling and to thought, which are phenomena more than muscular.

(1) CONTROL OF THE FEELINGS.

2. The physical accompaniments of a feeling are (1) diffused nerve currents, (2) organic changes, and (3) muscular movements. The intervention of the will being restricted to movements, the voluntary control of the feelings hinges on the muscular accompaniments.

Muscular diffusion being only one of three elements, we have to learn from experience whether it plays a leading, or only a subordinate part. There are various alternative suppositions. The movements may be so essential, that their arrest is the cessation of the conscious state. Or the case may be that the other manifestations are checked by the refusal of the muscles to concur. Lastly, the movements may be requisite to the full play of the feeling, but not to its existing in a less degree, or in a modified form.

Referring to the arbitration of experience, we find such facts as these. First, In a comparatively feeble excitement, the outward suppression leads, not immediately, but very soon, to the cessation of the feeling. There is at the outset a struggle, but the refusal of the muscular vent seems to be the extinction of the other effects. The feeling does not cease at once with the suppression of the movements, showing that it can subsist without these; but the stoppage of the movement being followed soon by the decay of the feeling, we infer that the other accompaniments, and especially the nerve currents, are checked and gradually extinguished under the muscular arrest. A shock of surprise, for example, if not

very powerful, can soon be quieted by repressing all the movements of expression. It is to be observed, however, that this is an emotion peculiarly muscular in its diffusion; the remark being far less true of the emotions that strongly affect the organic functions, as fear, tenderness, and pains generally.

Secondly, In strong feelings, the muscular repression appears not merely to fail, but to augment the consciousness of the feeling, as if the nervous currents were intensified by resistance. A certain impetus has been given, and must find a vent, and, if restrained outwardly, it seems to be more violent inwardly. We are familiar with such sayings as the mind 'preying upon itself,' for want of objective display, the need of an outlet to the surcharged emotions, the venting of joy, or grief, and the like.

The analogy of the weaker feelings makes it probable that, even with the stronger, muscular resistance would ultimately quell the interior currents of the brain, together with the mental excitement. The difficulty is to find a motive sufficient to overcome the stimulus of a strong emotion. It may seem better to give way at once than to make an ineffectual resistance. A burst of anger might be suppressed by a strong muscular effort; but the motive must be either powerful in itself, or aided by a habit of control.

Thirdly, There is a certain tendency in the muscular expression of a feeling to induce the feeling, through the connexion established, either naturally or by association, between this and the other portions of the physical circles of effects (SYMPATHY, § 2). This supposes that there is no intense pre-occupation of the brain and mind; we could not force hilarious joy upon a depressed system. Besides, it may be our wish merely to counterfeit, before others, an emotion that we do not wish to feel, as happens more or less with the player on the stage.

3. The voluntary command of the muscles, as attained in the manner already described, is adequate to suppress their movements under emotion.

When the will has reached the summit of general command, as indicated in the preceding chapter, it is fit for any mode of exertion that can be represented to the mind; the mere visible idea of the movement to be effected will single out the reality. The mature volition is thus competent to whatever efforts may be necessary for directing any of the

muscles to move, or for restraining their movement; all which is applicable to the present case.

But long prior to this consummation, an education for suppressing the feelings, or at least the manifestation of them, is usually entered on. It is desired, for example, to cause a child to restrain inordinate crying, at an age when few voluntary links have been forged, and when recourse must be had to the primitive starting point of all volition. In the very early stages, the absence of definite connexions between the pleasurable feeling and the suppression, and between the painful feeling and the indulgence, will lead to a great many fruitless attempts, as in all the beginnings of volition. A few successful coincidences will go far to fill up the blankness of the union between the motive impulses and the feelings in the special case; and the progress may then be rapid. The remaining difficulty will be the violence of the emotional wave, which may go beyond the motive power of available pleasure or admissible pain, even although the link of connexion between these and the definite impulses is sufficiently plain. This, however, is the difficulty all through life, in the control of the more intense paroxysms of emotion, and has nothing to do with the immaturity of the volitional links between pleasurable or painful motives and the actions suggested for securing the pleasure and banishing the pain.

The case is precisely analogous to the breaking in of colts, or the training of young dogs; the want of determinate connexions gives much trouble in the commencing stages; and as the deficiency is made up, the education proceeds apace.

(2) COMMAND OF THE THOUGHTS.

4. It has been already considered (COMPOUND ASSOCIATION, § 8) in what way the will can influence the train of thoughts. The effect is due to the control of Attention.

We cannot, by mere will, command one set of ideas to arise rather than another, or make up for a feeble bond of adhesion; the forces of association are independent of volition. But the will can control some of the conditions of intellectual recovery: one of which is the directing of the attention to one thing present rather than to another. In solving a geometrical problem, it is necessary to recall various theorems previously learnt; for that purpose, the attention is kept fixed upon the diagrammatic construction representing

the problem, and is turned away from all other things; in which attitude, the ideas suggested by contiguity and by similarity, are geometrical ideas more or less allied to the case in hand.

The case now supposed is an exercise of voluntary attention upon the muscles that guide the exercise of vision. The turning the eyes upon one part of the field of view, and not upon another, is a mode of voluntary control in no respect peculiar.

5. The command of the Attention passes beyond the senses to the ideas or thoughts. Of various objects coming into recollection, we can ponder upon one to the neglect of the rest. The will has power over muscular movements in *idea*.

It is a fact, that we can concentrate mental, no less than bodily, attention. When memory brings before us a string of facts, we can detain one and let the rest drop out of mind. Reviving our knowledge of a place, we are not obliged to go over the whole of it at an equal rate; we are able, and are usually disposed, to dwell upon some features, and thereby to stop the current of farther resuscitation.

In all this, the will seems to transcend the usual limits assigned to it, namely, the prompting of the voluntary muscles. Indeed, the fact would be wholly anomalous and inexplicable, but for the local identity of actual and of ideal movements (CONTIGUITY, § 11); and even with that local identity, it is only from experience that we could be aware that voluntary control could enter the sphere of the ideal. When we are tracing a mountain in recollection, we are, in everything but the muscular contractions of the eye or the head, repeating the same currents, and re-animating the same nervous tracks, as in the survey of the actual mountain; and, on the spur of a motive, we detain the mental gaze upon the top, the sides, the contour, the vegetation, exactly as in the real presence.

6. This part of voluntary control has its stages of growth, like the rest; and enters as an all-important element into our intellectual or thinking aptitudes.

Two courses may be assigned for the acquisition of this higher control. It may follow, at some distance, the command of the corresponding actual movements; or it may have to pass through an independent route, beginning with spon-

taneity, and guided by the influence of pleasure and pain, under the Law of Conservation. In all probability, the first supposition is the correct one. We seem gradually to contract the power of mental concentration, after having attained the command of the senses,—the ability to direct the eye wherever we please, or to listen to one sound to the disregard of others. Having the full outward command, a certain share abides with us, when we pass from realities to ideas, from the sight of a building to the thought of it. The ability thus possessed is doubtless strengthened by exercise in the special domain of the ideal; a wide difference exists between the man that has seldom put forth the power of mental concentration, and him that has been in the constant practice of it.

Howsoever attained, the use of this power in intellectual production is great and conspicuous. Profuse reproduction, the result of observation and retentiveness, is of little avail for any valuable purpose, whether scientific, artistic, or practical, unless there be a power of selection, detention, and control, on the spur of the end to be achieved. By such power of fixing attention, both on actual objects, and on the ideas arising by mental suggestion, we can make up for natural deficiencies, and, both in acquirements and in production, can pass over more highly gifted, but less resolute competitors. When the motives are naturally strong, and fortified by habit, we do not allow the attention, either bodily or mental, to wander, or to follow the lead of chance reproduction, as in a dream or reverie; our definite purpose, whether to lay up a store of words, to master a principle, to solve a problem, to polish a work of taste, to construct a mechanical device, or to reconcile a clash of other men's wills, keeps the mind fixed upon whatever likely thoughts arise, and withdraws us at once from what is seen to have no bearing on the work.

When what is meant by 'plodding industry,' 'steadiness,' 'application,' 'patience,' is opposed to natural brilliancy, facility, or abundance of ideas, it is, in other words, force of will displayed in mental concentration, as against the forces of mere intellectual reproduction; two distinct parts of our constitution, following different laws, and unequally manifested in different individuals.

7. The voluntary command of the Thoughts has been, formerly shown to enter into Constructive Association.

In the illustrations under the preceding head, 'constructiveness' has been involved; but it deserves a more special

mention. The distinguishing feature of the process is a voluntary selection, adaptation, and combination, to suit some end; the motive force of this end is the active stimulus, and the agreement with it, the guide or touchstone of all suggestions. In verbal constructiveness, for example, a certain meaning is to be conveyed to another person; a number of words spring up by memory, related to that meaning, but demanding to be selected, arranged, qualified, in order to suit it exactly. The revival of past trains of language through contiguity and similarity, or a combination of contiguities and similarities, provides the separate elements; the will puts them together, under the sense of suitability; so long as that sense is dissatisfied, selection and adjustment must go on; when the satisfying point is reached, the constructive efforts cease.

- A. / 8. The command of the Thoughts ^{is a practical function} is an adjunct in the control of the Feelings.

The command over the thoughts is an exceedingly powerful adjunct in the control of the Feelings; being probably more efficacious than the voluntary sway of the muscular manifestations. Our emotions are more or less associated with objects, circumstances, and occasions, and spring up when these are present either in reality, or in idea; affection is awakened at the sight or thought of what is lovely, or endeared to us; fear is apt to arise when perils are brought to view. In this connexion lies the power of the orator and the poet to stir up the emotions of men. Now, we may ourselves, by force of will, entertain one class of thoughts, and disregard or banish another class. When a person has roused our anger by an injury, we can turn our thoughts upon the same person's conduct on other occasions, when of a nature to inspire love, admiration, or esteem; the consequence of such a diversion of the ideas will be to suppress the angry feeling by its opposite.

A fit of hilarious levity is difficult to quench by mere voluntary suppression of the muscular movements; the more so that the diaphragm is a muscle not so well under command as the muscles of the limbs. A more powerful instrument in such a case would be the turning of the thoughts upon some serious or indifferent matter; and especially a painful or depressing subject. Persons guilty of levity during a religious address are usually reminded of the terrors of the unknown world.

The conquering of one strong feeling by exciting another, was designated by Thomas Chalmers, 'the expulsive power of a new affection,' and was much descanted on by him as an instrumentality of moral improvement. When a wrong taste was to be combated, he recommended the process of displacing it by the culture of something higher and better; as in substituting for the excitement of the theatre, or the alehouse, intellectual and other attractions.

Without the assistance of a new emotion, we may subdue or modify a present feeling, by carrying the attention away from all the thoughts or trains of ideas that cluster about it, and give it support. If we have strength of motive enough for diverting the mind from the thoughts of an alarming danger to some entirely different subject, the state of terror will subside.

The command of the thoughts requisite for such diversions is a high and uncommon gift or attainment, one of the most distinguishing examples of force of will, or of power of motive. There is a limit to the control thus exercised; no amount of stimulus will so change the current of ideas as to make joy at once supervene upon a shock of depression. Still, by a not unattainable strength of motive, and the assistance of habit, one can so far restrain the outbursts of emotion, as to make some approach to equanimity of life.

9. The reciprocal case—the power of the Feelings to command the Thoughts—is partly of the nature of Will, partly independent of the will. B

When under a pleasurable feeling, we cling to all the thoughts, images, and recollections that chime in with, and sustain it—as in a fit of affection, of self-complacency, or of revenge—the case is one of volition pure and simple. By the direct operation of the fundamental power of self-conservation, every activity bringing pleasure is maintained and increased; and the exercise of attention, whether upon the things of sense or upon the stream of thought, is included in the principle. So, on the obverse side, a painful feeling ought to banish all the objects and ideas that tend to cherish it, just as we should remove a hot iron or a stinging nettle from the naked foot; and this, too, happens to a great extent: a self-complacent man banishes from his mind all the incidents that discord with his pretensions; an engrossed lover will not entertain the thought of obstacles and inevitable separation. In both these cases, the law of the will is fairly and strictly

exemplified. And if there were no other influence at work, if the feelings had no other mode of operating, we should find ourselves always detaining thoughts, according as they give us pleasure, and turning our back upon such as produce pain, with an energy corresponding to the pain.

But we have formerly remarked, and must presently notice still more particularly, that the feelings have another property, the property of detaining every idea in alliance with them, whether pleasurable or painful, in proportion to their intensity; so that states of excitement, both painful and neutral, cause thoughts and images to persist in the mind by a power apart from the proper course of the will. A disgusting spectacle cannot be at once banished from the recollection, merely because it gives pain; if the will were the only power in the case, the object would be discarded and forgotten with promptitude. But the very fact that it has caused an intense or strong feeling gives it a persistence, in spite of the will. So any powerful shock, characterized neither by pleasure nor by pain, detains the mind upon the cause of it for a considerable time, and engrains it as a durable recollection, not because the shock was pleasurable, but merely because it was strong. The natural course of the will is pursued at the same time; it co-operates in the detention of the pleasurable, and in reducing the persistence of the painful; but it is not the sole or the dominant condition in either. 17-12-68

CHAPTER IV.

MOTIVES, OR ENDS.

1. FROM the nature or definition of Will, pure and proper, the Motives, or Ends of action, are our Pleasures and Pains.

In the Feelings, as formerly laid out, if the enumeration be complete, there ought to be found all the ultimate motive or ends of human action. The pleasures and pains of the various Senses (with the Muscular feelings), and of the Emotions,—embracing our whole susceptibility to happiness or misery,—are, in the last resort, the stimulants of our Causes.

activity, the objects of pursuit and avoidance. The actual presence of any one of the list of pleasures, set forth under the different departments of Feelings, urges to action for its continuance; the presence of any one of the included pains is a signal to action for its abatement. The final classification of Motives, therefore, is the classification of pleasurable and painful feelings.

If we were to recapitulate what has been gone over, under the Senses and the Emotions, we should refer to the pleasures of Muscular Exercise and Repose, and the pains of Fatigue and of Restrained action; the great variety of pleasurable and painful susceptibilities connected with Organic Life—including such powerful solicitations as Thirst, and Hunger, and the whole catalogue of painful Diseases, with the reactionary condition named Health; the numerous stimulations, pleasurable and painful, of the Five Senses—Tastes, Colours, Tonches, Sounds, Sights; the long array of the Special Emotions, containing potent charms and dread aversions—Novelty, Liberty, Tender and Sexual Emotion, Self-complacency and Approbation, with their opposites; the elation of Power and the depression of Impotence and Littleness, the Interest of Plot and Pursuit, the attractions of Knowledge, and the variegated excitements of Fine Art.

12. The elementary pleasures and pains incite us to action, when only in *prospect*; which implies an ideal persistence approaching to the power of actuality.

The property of intellectual or ideal retention belongs more or less to all the feelings of the mind; and has been usually adverted to in the description of each. The pain of over-fatigue is remembered after the occasion, and has a power to deter from the repetition of the actual state.

The circumstances regulating the ideal persistence of pleasures and pains, so as to give them an efficacy as motives, are principally these:—

(1) Their mere Strength, or Degree. It is a law of our intellectual nature that, other things being the same, the more vivid the present consciousness, the more it will persist or be remembered. This applies to pleasures, to pains, and to neutral excitement. A strong pleasure is better remembered than a weak; a greater pain is employed in punishment, because a less, being insufficiently remembered, is ineffectual to deter from crime. Our labours are directed, in the first place, to the causes of our great pleasures and our great pains, be-

cause these are more tenaciously held in the memory, and less liable to be overborne by the pressure of the actual. The acute sensual pleasures, affection, praise, power, æsthetic charm, are strongly worked for, because strongly felt, and strongly remembered; the more intense pains of disease, privation, disgrace, have an abiding efficacy because of their strength.

(2) Continuance and Repetition. The longer a pleasure is continued, and the oftener it is repeated, the better is it retained in absence as a motive to the will. It is the same with emotional states as it is with intellectual—with pain as with language, iteration gives intellectual persistence. A single attack of acute pain does not leave the intense precautionary motive generated by a series of attacks. Age and experience acquire moral wisdom, as well as intellectual; strength of motive as well as extent and clearness of intellectual vision. After repeated failures, we give up a chase, in spite of its allurements; not merely because our hopes are weakened, but also because our recollection is strengthened, by the repetition. Pleasures seldom tasted may not take their proper rank with us, in our habitual pursuits; we do not work for them in proportion to what we should actually gain by their fruition.

It necessarily happens that distance of time allows the memory of pleasure and pain to fade into imbecility of motive. A pleasure long past is deprived of its ideal enticement; a pain of old date has lost its volitional sting.

(3) Intellectual Rank. The feelings have a natural scale of intellectual persistency, commencing from the organic or physical sensibilities, and rising to the higher senses, and the more refined emotions. The sensations of hearing and sight; the pleasures of tender feeling, of complacency, of intellect, of Fine Art; the pains of grief and of remorse,—are in their nature more abiding as motives than muscular exercise, or occasional indigestion.

(4) Special Endowment for the memory of Pleasure and Pain. It is constituted by nature more retentive of pleasures and pains than others; just as there are differences in the memory for language or for spectacle. A superior degree of prudence, under circumstances in other respects the same, is resolvable into this fact. No one is unmoved by a present delight, or a present suffering; but when the reality is vanished, the recollection will be stronger in one man than in another—that is, will be more powerful to cope with the new and present urgencies that

pant to the proof our memory given motives. The pains of incautious living are, in some minds, blotted out as soon as they are past; in others, they are retained with almost undiminished force. Both Prudence, and the Power of Sympathy with others, presuppose the tenacious memory for pleasures and pains; in other words, they are fully accounted for by assuming that speciality. Virtue, although not Knowledge, as Sokrates maintained, reposes on a property allied to Intellect, a mode of our Retentiveness, the subject matter being, not the intellectual elements commonly recognized, but pleasures and pains. *in the individual*

It is not easy to refer this special mode of Retentiveness to any local endowment, as we connect the memory for colour with a great development of the optical sensibility. (Most probably, the power is allied to the Subjectivity of the character; the tendency to dwell upon subject states, as opposed to the engrossment of objectivity. *of recollection*)

Prudential forethought and precaution in special things may be best referred to the greater strength and repetition of the feelings; as when a man is careful of his substance and not of his reputation; or the converse. On whatever subjects we feel most acutely, we best remember our feelings, and yield to them as motives of pursuit and avoidance. It is unnecessary to invoke, for such differences, a general retentiveness for pleasures and pains.

(5) In the effective recollection of feelings, for the purposes of the will, we are aided by collateral associations. Any strong pleasure gives impressiveness to all the acts and sensations that concurred with it; and these having their own independent persistency, as actions or as object states, aid in recovering the pleasure. Every one remembers the spot, and the occupation of the moment, when some joyful news was communicated. The patient in a surgical operation retains mentally the indelible stamp of the room and the surgeon's preparations. One part of the complex experience, so impressed, buoys up the rest. *helps recall*

It is scarcely necessary to add that the motive power of a feeling of recent occurrence partakes of the effectiveness of the actuality. *✓*

3, We direct our labours to many things that, though only of the nature of Means, attain by association all the force of our ultimate ends of pursuit. Such are Money, Bodily Strength, Knowledge, Formalities, and Virtues. *✓*

When any one object is constantly associated with a primary end of life, it acquires in our mind all the importance of the end; fields, and springs of water, are prized with the avidity belonging to the necessities of life. The great comprehensive means, termed wealth or Money, when its powers are understood, is aimed at according to the sum of the gratifications that it can bring, and of the pains that it can ward off, to ourselves and to the sharers in our sympathies. Such at least is the ideal of a well-balanced mind; for few persons follow this or any other end, mediate or ultimate, according to its precise value.

We have seen that a memory unfaithful to pleasure and pain misguides us in our voluntary pursuit of ends; not merely allowing the present to lord it over the future, but evincing partiality or preference as between things equally absent and ideal. The intervention of the associated ends leads to new disturbances in our estimate, and in the corresponding pursuit. The case of Money exemplifies these disturbing causes. In it, we have the curious fact of a means converted into a final end.

When anything has long been an object of solicitude from its bearing on the ultimate susceptibilities of the mind, the pleasure of its attainment corresponds to its influence on those susceptibilities. Without proceeding to realize the purchasable delights of money, we have already a thrill of enjoyment in the acquisition of it; the more so if we have felt such pains as physical privation, toil, impotence, indignity, tastes forbidden, with the aggravation of multiplied fears. The sense of being delivered from all this incubus, is a rebound, delightful in itself, before proceeding to convert the means into the final ends. Many *ideal* pains are banished at once by the possession of the instrument unused. There arises in minds prone to the exaggeration of fear, a reluctance to part with this wonderful sense of protection; which alone would suggest the keeping, rather than the spending, of money. When we add the feeling of superiority over others attaching to the possession and the *possible* employment of money, and farther the growth of a species of affection towards what has long occupied the energies, and given thrills of delight, we shall understand the process of inversion whereby a means becomes a final end. We should also take into account, in the case of money, its definite and numerical character, giving a charm to the arithmetical mind, and enabling the possessor to form a precise estimate of his gains and his total.

Similar observations apply to the other associated ends. Health is nothing in itself; it is a great deal as a means to happiness. To this extent, and no farther, the rational mind will pursue it; we should only be losers, if, in seeking health, we surrendered the things that make life agreeable. The prevailing error, however, is the other way. The retentiveness for the pains and discomforts of ill-health, and for the enjoyments thereby forfeited, is not good enough in the mass of men; and needs to be re-inforced by incultation and reflection.

Like Money, Knowledge is liable to become an end in itself. Principally valuable as guidance in the various operations of life, as removing the stumbling blocks, and the terrors of ignorance, it contracts in some minds an independent charm, and gathers round it so many pleasing associations as to be a satisfying end of pursuit. The knowledge of many Languages is an immense toil and an incumbrance; but the sense of the end to be served gives them a value, which some minds feel in an exaggerated degree.

The Formalities of Law, of Business, and of Science are indispensable as means, worthless as ends. Not unfrequently, persons become enamoured of them to such an extent as to sacrifice the real ends on their account. The explanation is much the same as already given for the love of money.

Justice and Truth are generally held to be ends in themselves; but when we enquire more minutely into their bearings, we find that their importance is sufficiently justified by their instrumentality to other ends. If Justice were perfectly indifferent to human happiness, no nation would maintain Judges and Law Courts; and if Truth were of no more service than falsehood, Science would be unknown. But as both these qualities are entwined with human welfare at every turning, it being impossible for the human race to exist without some regard to them, we cannot wonder that they attract our solicitude, and that we have a lively satisfaction in contemplating their triumph. The emotion of terror attaches us strongly, perhaps even in an exaggerated degree, to the Security conferred by Justice, among other good social arrangements; and we sometimes cling to a mere figment because it once represented this great attribute.

4. The Motives to the Will are ~~swayed~~ ^{directed} and biassed by the Persistence of Ideas. *swayed*

Allusion has repeatedly been made to the intellectual property of all feelings, whereby they persist in the mind, and

give persistence to the ideas and objects related to them. According to the degree of the excitement, and irrespective of its *quality*—as pleasure, pain, or neutral feeling—is the hold that it takes of the present consciousness, and imparts to the thoughts allied with it. The germ of the property is seen in the stimulation of the senses, more particularly sight, as when we involuntarily keep the eye fixed upon a light, even painfully intense. The infatuation of the moth is the crowning instance of the power of sensation, as such, to detain and control the movements; for although the distant flame may not be painfully intense, the singed body ought to neutralize any pleasure that the light can give.

A pleasurable feeling, besides moving the will, detains the thoughts, not simply as pleasure, but as excitement. This would be all right, if every such state were purely and solely pleasurable. But when we examine closely our very best pleasures, we find that, in all of them, more or less, the drops of pure delight are mingled with a quantity of mere excitement. Any great pleasure is sure to leave behind it an enduring state of neutral feeling, the pleasurable part of the wave subsiding long before the general tremor has ceased. But while there is excitement, there is detention and occupation of mind, and the exclusion of unrelated subjects and ideas. In an agreeable marvel, there is a small burst of genuine pleasure, but a still wider and more lasting state of excitement.

Hence our pleasurable emotions are all liable to detain the mind unduly, as regards our proper gratification. Thus, the pleasures of the tender emotion, if at all strong, are surrounded with an atmosphere of still stronger excitement; and the objects of our affection are apt to persist in the mind beyond the degree of the pleasure they give us, although in some proportion to that pleasure. The mind of the mother is arrested and held partly by the strong pleasures of maternity, and partly by the 'Fixed Idea' consequent on the still greater amount of agitation that she passes through. In the sexual feelings, there is the like mixture of pleasure and fixed idea, carrying the mind beyond the estimate of pleasure and pain, to the state named 'passion.' The pleasures of Power and Ambition are liable to the same inflammatory and passionate mixture. A man may be highly susceptible to the delights of power, without being passionately so, if he is moved solely by the strict value of that pleasure, and not by the engrossing power of the excitement so apt to invest any

activity, burst out incontinently at those moments, unless withheld by very powerful motives. This is one of the impulses that require a severe discipline, in the shape of strong counter-motives. The force of the spontaneity and the force of the counter-motives are then measured against each other, and we call the one that succeeds stronger, having no other criterion of comparative strength.

When the activity is unduly stimulated, as by drugs, by pungent sensations, or by quick movements, it is so much the greater a power, and needs a greater motive to curb it. We see this in the restlessness of children in their violent sports; the natural activity is heightened by stimulation, and made harder to resist; quiescence is doubly repugnant.

A periodical tendency to action, the result of habit, would operate in the same way; as this is sometimes in opposition to the other motives, there is conflict, and the successful side is called the stronger.

3. Exhaustion, and natural inaction of the powers, are a bar to the influence of Motives.

This is the same fact in obverse. When the system is exhausted or physically indisposed,—its spontaneity and available energy past,—a more than ordinary motive is required to bring on exertion. The jaded horse needs more spurring. The exhausted mountain guide can be got to proceed only by the promise of an extra fee. Napoleon took his men across the Alps by plying them with the rattle of the drums when everything else failed.

4. In the conflicts of Opposing Volitions, properly so called, we may consider first the case of two Motives in the Actual.

Two actual pains or pleasures sometimes incite in opposite ways. An animal may be fatigued and also hungry; the one state prompting to rest, the other to exertion. We judge of the stronger motive by the result. A person may feel the pain of indoor confinement, but may decline the disagreeable alternative of cold and wet. In company, we may be solicited by spectacle, by music, by conversation; one gains the day, and is pronounced the greater pleasure, or at least the stronger motive.

One might continue, without end, to cite these conflicts of actual sensation or emotion, appending the uniform conclusion that the upshot is the test of the stronger motive. The instruc-

tion derivable from each observation of this kind is a fact in the character of the person, or the animal, observed; we find out the preferences, or comparative susceptibility of different persons, or of the same person at different times.

We are to presume, in the absence of any indications to the contrary, that the stronger motive in the shape of actual and present sensation or emotion, is the greater pleasure, or the smaller pain. Pleasure and pain, in the actual or real experience, are to be held as identical with motive power. If a man is laid hold of and detained by music, we must suppose that he is pleased to that extent. The disturbances and anomalies of the will scarcely begin to tell in the actual feeling. Any one crossing the street direct, through dirty pools, is inferred to have less pain from being splashed than from being delayed.

This remark is of importance in furnishing us with a clue to the pleasures and pains of other beings. The voluntary preferences of individuals, when two actual pleasures or pains are weighed together, show which is the greater in their case. An object that weighs as nothing in stimulating the will for attainment, is to be held as giving no pleasure; if, on the other hand, it never moves to aversion or avoidance, it is not a source of pain. The pleasures and pains of men and of animals are indicated with considerable fidelity by their voluntary conduct, and especially when the comparison is made upon the present or the actual experience. We have few means of judging of the feelings of the lower animals; they have but a narrow range of emotional expression; and we are driven mainly to the study of their actions in pursuit or avoidance. We can see that a dog relishes a meal, and runs from a whipping. The lower we descend, the more do we lose the criterion of emotional expression, and depend upon the preference of action. There may be a certain ambiguity even in this test; the influence of light, for example, works to the extent of fascination, and so may other feelings. Probably this is an exceptional case; at all events, if the test of the will is invalid, we have nothing beyond it to appeal to.

There are certain allowances that we can easily make in the application of the will as a test of strength of feeling. We should observe the influence of a motive under all variety of states, as to vigour, rest, nourishment, so as to eliminate difference in the active organs. We should weigh each motive against every other, and thus check our estimate by

cross comparisons; in this way, we can establish for each individual a scale of preferences, and obtain a diagnosis of emotional character.

The comparison of one person with another requires an estimate to be made of the active disposition as a whole, or the proneness to active exertion generally. This may be gathered from the spontaneity, from the disposition to act for the sake of acting, and from all cases where we have an independent clue to the strength of a motive, as pleasure or pain. Two persons may be equally pained by an acute ailment; while the one bestirs himself for relief and the other remains idle. If we except a greater proneness in some organs than in others, as vocal exuberance combined with general sluggishness, the active disposition is a single fact, a unity or totality; the feelings are many and unequal. One statement will give the volitional character as a whole; the estimates of the motives are as numerous as our distinct sensibilities.

5. When the conflict is between the Actual and the Ideal, the result depends on the more or less vivid recollection of pleasure and pain. ✓ VII

This opens up a much wider sphere of conflict. Our voluntary determinations are most frequently the preference of an actual feeling to an ideal one, or the converse. We refuse a pleasurable relish, because of subsequent organic pains abiding in the recollection. An ideal motive owes its power not to the strength of the original feeling alone, but to that coupled with all the circumstances tending to make it persist in the memory. A young man and an old may be equally pained by an overdose of alcohol, but the elder has the best recollection of the pain, while the younger has the farther disadvantage of a keener present delight. Yet, when the natural endowment favours the retentiveness of pain and pleasure, we shall find youth temperate, and age a victim to present allurements. In this class of examples, the conditions are various and often perplexing. Suppose the case of a thief by profession, whose prospects in life are infamy and penal servitude. There are the following alternative explanations of his choice. His mental peculiarities may be assumed to be, the usual liking for the common enjoyments of life; an aversion to industry; a small ideal estimate of the yet unexperienced pains of punishment; and perhaps, also, a sanguine temperament that under-estimates the probabilities of capture. Suppose him to pass through a first imprisonment. A new

and powerful motive is now introduced, an ideal repugnance, which ought to have great strength, if the punishment has told upon him. Should he not be reformed by the experience, we must assume the motives already stated at a still higher figure. We must also suppose, what is probably true of the criminal class generally, a low retentiveness for good and evil—the analytic expression of Imprudence; perhaps the most radically incurable of all natural defects.

The theory of Prison Discipline is based on such considerations as the following. In short imprisonments, the pains should be acute, so as to abide in the memory, and engender an intense repugnance. Loss of liberty, solitude and seclusion, regular work, and unstimulating food can be borne, for a short period, if there is little sense of the indignity and shame of going to jail. A brief confinement is the mild corrective suited to a first offence; which failing, there is needed an advance in severity. Recourse should next be had to the acute inflictions; which are principally whipping and muscular pains. The muscular pains are administered in various forms; as the tread wheel, the crank, extra drill, shot drill, and a newly devised punishment, introduced into the Scotch prisons, and said to be very deterring—the guard bed. With a view to increase the impressiveness of these severe applications, they should not be continued daily, but remitted for a few days; the mind having leisure in the interval to contemplate alike the past and the future, while the body is refreshed for the new infliction.

Long imprisonment and penal servitude are made deterring chiefly through the deprivation of liberty; to which are added, the withdrawing of the subject from the means of crime, and the inuring to a life of labour. Perhaps the defect of the system is the too even tenor of life, which does not impress the imagination of the depraved class with sufficient force. Occasional acute inflictions, would very much deepen the salutary dread of the condition; and are not uncalled for in the case of hardened criminals. The convict's yearly or half-yearly anti-holiday, would impart additional horror and gloom to his solitary reflections, and might have a greater influence on the minds of the beginners in crime.

6. The Intermediate Ends—Money, Health, Knowledge, Power, Society, Justice, &c.—enter, as motives, into conflict with the ultimate ends, Actual or Ideal, and with one another.

It has been seen what circumstances govern the motive force of the intermediate ends; the value of the ultimate pleasures and pains involved being only one, although the properly rational, estimate of their worth. These ends have all a certain motive power in every intelligent mind, sometimes too little and sometimes too great. When present ease and gratification is confronted with prospective wealth, or knowledge, or position, we see which is the stronger. Great relish for actual ease and pleasure; great repugnance to money-getting exertion; a feeble memory for the pleasures that money can purchase, or the pains it can relieve; the absence of occasions of fear and solicitude in connexion with penury; no affectionate interest contracted with wealth, through the pursuit of it—would constitute a character too little moved to the acquisition of money fortune, as a reversed state of the motives might lead to an excessive pursuit.

It is a rule, easily explicable on the principles laid down, that intermediate ends,—Wealth, Health, Knowledge, &c.—are too weak in early life, while in advancing years, they become too strong, in fact superseding the final ends. One reason of this last effect is that the ultimate pleasures of sense count for less in later life, while ideal gratifications, original or acquired, count for more; money and knowledge, having contracted a factitious interest of the ideal kind, are still sought for that, when the primary interests have ceased; and the more so, that the active pursuit in their service, has become a habit, and a necessity.

7. The Persistence of Ideas, through emotional excitement, counts in the conflict of Motives, and constitutes a class of Impassioned or Exaggerated Ends.

Undue persistence of ideas is most strongly exemplified in Fear. Any evil consequence that has been able to rouse our alarms, acquires an excessive fixity of tenure, and overweighs in the conflict of motives. This has been seen to be one of the exaggerating conditions of avarice. So, from having been a witness of revolutions, a susceptible mind takes on a morbid dread of anarchy and a revulsion to change. The care of health may assume the character of a morbid fixed idea, curtailing liberty and enjoyment to an absurd degree. The apprehensions of maternal feeling are apt to be exaggerated.

Vanity, Dignity, love of Power, are often found in the impassioned form, in weak minds. The extreme case of the fixed

idea in general, and of the morbid predominance of these ideas in particular, occurs in the insane.

Sympathy, in its pure and fundamental character, is the possession of an idea, followed out irrespective of pleasure or pain, although these are more or less attached to its usual exercise. In the conflict of motives, this principle of action plays an important part; its predominance is the foremost motive to virtuous conduct. It subsists upon a vivid perception of the pain or misery of others; a perception more or less acute by nature or by education, and susceptible of being inflamed by oratory. The sympathies of individuals are generally partial or select; powerful to some modes of misery and inert to others. The conflicts of sympathy are with the purely egotistic pleasures of each individual; these last, when unnaturally strong, as in the child, are unequally met by the sympathetic impulses.

CHAPTER VI.

DELIBERATION.—RESOLUTION.—EFFORT.

1. IN the prolonged weighing of motives, termed DELIBERATION, the suspense is a voluntary act, prompted by the remembered pains of acting too quickly.

Among our painful experiences, is the evil effect of acting hastily on the first motive that arises. At an early stage of education, we gratify hunger with whatever looks like food; we give to him that asketh, and believe whatever any one tells us. After a little time, we discover that the fruit of such impulses is often bad; that other motives, such as might change our conduct, would arise to our minds if we refrained from immediate action, and gave time to the intellect to suggest them. A deterring motive of the Intermediate class is thus created, and at its instigation, we fall into the attitude called Deliberation, which consists in pausing, waiting, ruminating, till other considerations rise to the view, and are confronted with one another, and with the first impulse.

We have, in this case, a conflict between some present impulse, some pleasure or pain, actual or ideal, that has risen before the mind, and the highly intellectual or ideal pain con-

stituted by former experience of the pains of immediately giving way to a motive stimulus. The deliberating impulse is the creature of education, growing with repeated examples of mischief, and at last triumphant in all conflicts with hasty promptings.

The same experience that induces delay, to give time for all the motives that arise, farther urges us not to protract the suspense too long. We know what amount of deliberation will ordinarily suffice to get out both sides of a case; to allow less and to allow more are mischievous, and the prospect of the mischief deters from the one and from the other. Most people defer answering an important letter, for at least one day; perhaps the case is so complicated that more time is required; which being given, the evils of protracting the decision come into play; action then ensues on the side where strength of impulse prevails.

Another source of evil is the undue impressiveness of the motive last suggested. Every consideration occurring to the mind is strongest at the moment of being first presented; if we act at that moment, we are apt to give too much weight to the new and too little to the old. Aware, by experience, of this danger also, we hold back till every motive has cooled down, as it were, from the first heat, and until all are nearly on an equal footing. In proportion as we are impressed, by experience, with this evil, does it abide with us, as a deterring motive, leading to voluntary suspense. A sudden thought, bursting on the view, has something of the dangerous predominance of an actual pleasure or pain; we are, however, taught the painful consequences thence arising; and if our memory for evil is adequate and just, we bridle in the mistaken activity that we are impelled to.

When opposing motives are numerous, it is a matter of real difficulty for the coolest mind to estimate them correctly. As an artificial help in such an emergency, Franklin, in a letter to Priestley, recommends the writing them down in two columns, so as to balance them piecemeal. When one, on one side, is felt to be about equal to one or two on the other, these are struck out, the complication being to that extent lessened. The repetition of this neutralizing and deleting process leaves the opposing sides at last so much reduced, that the comparison is safe and easy.

Another artificial precaution of some value in deliberating on a complicated matter, consists in keeping the deliberation open for a length of time, say a month, and recording the im-

pression of every day. . At the end of the time, the decisions on each side being summed up, the majority would testify, in all probability, to the strongest on the whole. The lapse of time would allow all considerations within our reach to come forward and have their weight, while the matter would be viewed under a considerable variety of circumstances and of mental temper.

A farther difficulty also suggested to the man of experience and reflection, and influencing the deliberative process, is the inability to judge of untried situations. What one has gone through needs only to be fairly remembered; but what is absolutely strange demands a careful constructive operation. Although the young cannot be made to see this, it comes home to advancing years. The sense of the resulting mistakes is a prompting of the nature of Ideal pain, to take the precautions of interrogating others, and referring to our own experience in the situations most nearly analogous. Choosing a profession, entering into a partnership, emigrating to another country, contracting the matrimonial tie, are all more or less haphazard in their consequences; they are less so, according as the individual has been taught by good and ill fortune how to deliberate.

✓ 2. The Deliberative process is in conformity with the theory of the Will, contained in the previous chapters.

✓ In Deliberation, there is no suspension of the action of motives, but merely the addition of a new motive, the ideal evil of hasty action. Every pleasure or pain bearing on the occasion has its full weight, in accordance with the circumstances already described; and the action is always strictly the result of the total of motives.

✓ It is in the deliberative situation that we are supposed to exert that mysterious power called the 'freedom' of the will, 'free choice,' 'moral liberty.' The only real fact underlying these expressions is the circumstance that we seldom act out a present motive. One may feel hunger, but may not follow out the prompting on the instant. Each human being has a large reserve, a permanent stock of motive power, being the totalized ends of life; a total that operates along with every actual stimulation, and quashes a great many passing motives. This reservoir of ideal ends is sometimes spoken of as the 'self' or 'ego' of the individual, the grand controlling principle; when it has full course we are said to be 'free;' when it is baffled by some transitory impulse or passion, we are said

to be 'enslaved.' Now, Deliberation has the effect of bringing us under the sway of our interests on the whole, but does not thereby make us act without a motive. There is no intervening entity to determine whether the motive shall bring forth the act; a motive may be arrested, but only through the might of a stronger.

In metaphysical theory, it is often taken for granted that deliberation, or choice, is the type, representative, or essential feature of the Will. This is not the fact. The most general and essential attribute of the will, is to act at once on a motive, as when one seeks shelter from a shower; it is an exception, although of frequent occurrence, to stop and deliberate, that is, to suspend action, until an intellectual process has time given to it, to bring forward ideal motives which may possibly conflict with the actual, and change the result.

2. 3. When the action suggested by a motive, or a concurrence of motives, cannot immediately commence, the intervening attitude is called RESOLUTION.

Besides the deliberate suspense, necessary for avoiding the known evils of precipitate volition, there may be a farther arrest of action. Many of our voluntary decisions are come to, before the time for acting commences. We deliberate to-day, what shall be done to-morrow, or next week, or next year. A name is required to indicate this situation of having ceased to deliberate without having begun to act. We call it RESOLUTION. If action followed at once on motive, there would be neither Deliberation nor Resolution; if it followed after such adequate comparison and balancing of motives, as experience testifies to be enough for precaution against haste, there would be no Resolution.

The state thus denominated is not a state of absolute quiescence or indifference. There is an activity engendered at once, the preliminary to the proper action; an attitude of waiting and watching the time and circumstances for commencing the course decreed. We are moved by health and pleasure to contrive a holiday; we know that to rush off at once under these very strong motives would probably entail misery. We suspend and deliberate; after allowing sufficient space for all motives to assemble and be heard, the result is in favour of the first suggestion. The interval that still divides us from the actual movement, is the interval of resolution, or preliminary volition.

In the state of resolution, we are liable to changes of

motive, inducing us to abandon the course resolved on. We have not, perhaps, at the time of ceasing to deliberate, had the motives fully before us; we may not have counted sufficiently with the toil and opposition and inconveniences that we should encounter, all which may come to the view afterwards, and reverse our decision. Hence we often abandon our resolutions either before action commences, or after commencing and grappling with the real difficulties. All this only shows that the deliberative process had been too hurriedly concluded. Irresolution is a sign either of want of deliberation, or of undue susceptibility to a present and actual motive. The resolute man is he that, in the first place, allows an ample deliberative suspense, and, in the second place, is under the power of the permanent or ideal motives, which is what we mean by steadiness of purpose.

We make resolutions for our whole lives, which necessarily run many risks of being broken. It is not merely through insufficient deliberation and infirmity of purpose, that we depart from such resolutions, but also from the occurrence of new motives, better insight, and altered circumstances.

We exist from day to day under a host of resolutions. Few of our actions are either *pro re nata*, or the result of a deliberation at once executed. We go forth every morning to fulfil 'engagements,' that is, carry out resolutions. The creature of impulse is he that does not retain the permanent motives embodied in his engagements or resolutions, but gives way to the spur of the occasion, as when the boy sent on an errand, loiters to play marbles.

For the same reason as above stated, with regard to deliberation, namely, familiarity of occurrence, we are apt to consider resolution as, not an incident, but an essential of the Will. In both cases, setting up an occasional property as the main property of a thing. The typical will neither deliberates nor resolves, but passes, without interval, from a motive state to an action. The superior intelligence of the higher beings induces upon this primitive link a series of artificial suspenses, not exceptions to the general law of the will, but complications of it; and the complicated modes are so common, and moreover so prominent and noticeable, that we fancy at last, that they are necessary to the very existence—a part, if not the whole essence, of will.

3. 4. If, with a strong motive, there is weakness or insufficiency of the active organs, we have the peculiar consciousness, named EFFORT.

When we are moved to an exertion that we are fully equal to, we have a muscular feeling that is pleasurable or else indifferent; in either case, we say that the act costs no effort. As we approach the limits of our strength, the feeling gradually inclines to pain. The interval between easy performance and total inability, is marked by the presence of this familiar experience; the greater the pain, the greater is said to be the effort. As all pain is a motive to desist from whatever exercise is causing it, we should not continue to act, but for the pressure of some still stronger motive. In such cases, there is the necessity for an increasing stimulus, as the pain of the action increases. The state of effort, therefore, may be described as a muscular pain joined to the pain of a conflict of motives. On occasion of excessive exercise, and during spasm, we may have the organic pain of muscle besides.

5. The consciousness of Effort, like Deliberation and Resolution, is an accident, and not an essential, of the Will.

It is the nature of a voluntary act to be accompanied with consciousness. The feeling that constitutes the motive is one form; to which is added the consciousness of active exertion, which varies with the condition of the organs as compared with the demand made upon them; one of its phases being the state of effort. We are not entitled to include, in the essence of Will, the consciousness of Effort, any more than we can include the delight of exercise when the organs are fresh.* 19, 20, 21.

* It has been maintained (Herschell's Astronomy, chap. viii.), that the consciousness of effort accompanying voluntary action is the proof that *mind* is the real source of voluntary power, and, by analogy, the source of all the powers of nature—as gravity and all other *prime movers*. This doctrine is liable to very strong objections.

First, As now stated, the consciousness of effort does not accompany all voluntary actions, but only that class where the active power is not fully equal to the work.

Secondly, Although some kind of consciousness accompanies voluntary power, there are also present a series of physical changes, and a physical expenditure, corresponding in amount to the work to be done. A certain amount of food, digested, assimilated, and consumed, is demanded for every voluntary exertion, and in greater quantity as the exertion is greater. In a deficiency of food, or in an exhausted condition

CHAPTER VII.

DESIRE.

✓ 1. DESIRE is the ^{feeling} state of mind where there is a motive to act—some pleasure or pain, actual or ideal—without the ability. It is thus another of the states of interval, or suspense, between motive and execution.

When a pleasure prompts us to work for its continuance or increase, and when we at once follow the prompting, there is no place for desire. So with pain. Going out into the open air, we encounter a painful chill; we turn back and put on extra clothing; the pain has induced a remedy by the primordial stimulus of the will, guided by our acquired aptitudes. Walking at a distance from home, the air suddenly cools to the chilling point. We have no remedy at hand. The condition thus arising, a motive without the power of acting, is Desire.

✓ 2. In Desire, there is the presence of some motive, a pleasure or a pain, and a state of conflict, in itself painful.

The motive may be some present pleasure, which urges to action for its continuance or increase. It may be some pleasure conceived in idea, with a prompting to attain it in the reality, as the pleasure of a summer tour. It may be a present pain moving us to obtain mitigation or relief; or a

of the active members, the most intense consciousness, whether of effort or any other mode, is unable to bring forth voluntary or mechanical energy. With abundance of food, and good material conditions of the system, force will be exerted with or without the antecedent of consciousness.

Thirdly, The animal frame is the constant theatre of mechanical movements that are entirely withdrawn from consciousness. Such are the movements of the lungs, the heart, and the intestines; these the consciousness neither helps nor retards.

Fourthly, When voluntary actions become habitual, they are less and less associated with consciousness: approaching to the condition of the reflex or automatic actions last noticed.

Thus, whenever mind is a source of power, it is in conjunction with a material expenditure, such as would give rise to mechanical or other energy without the concurrence of mind; while, of the animal forces themselves, a considerable portion is entirely dissociated from mind or consciousness.

pending but future pain, ideally conceived, with a spur to prevent its becoming actual. So far as the motive itself is concerned, we may be under either pleasure or pain. But in so far as there is inability to obey the dictates of the motive, there is a pain of the nature of conflict; which must attach to every form of desire, although in certain cases neutralized by pleasurable accompaniments.

3. There are various modes of escape from the conflict, and unrest, of Desire.

The first is *forced quiescence*; to which are given the familiar names—endurance, resignation, fortitude, patience, contentment.

This is a voluntary exertion prompted by the pain of the conflict. It means the putting forth of a volition to restrain the motive force of desire, to deprive the state of its volitional urgency. If the motive is a present pleasure, the will can oppose the urgency to add to it, and so bring on the condition of serene and satisfying enjoyments; if a present pain, the restraint of the motive urgency ends in the state called endurance, patience, resignation; a remarkable form of consciousness, where pain, by a neutralizing volition, is reduced to the state of a feeling possessed of only emotional and intellectual characteristics.

The self-restraint, implied under endurance, coerces all the movements and inward springs of movement, that, but for such coercion, would be exerted with a view to relief, even although fruitless. The same volition may likewise suppress the diffusive manifestations and gesticulative outburst of strong feeling. Both are comprised in the renowned endurance of the old Spartan, or of the Indian under torture. As a remedial operation, such a vigorous suppressive effort, in the case of physical pain, can directly do little but save the muscular organs from exhaustion; indirectly it will stamp the pain on the memory by leaving the present consciousness to taste its utmost bitterness; so that the present endurance in that form may be favorable to future precaution. When the pain is ideal or imaginary, or the result of artificial stimulation, as when one frets at not having the good fortune of others around, the forced quiescence eventually works a cure. Also, in the case of pleasure craving for increase, the suppressive volition is of admirable efficacy; it takes away the marring ingredient from a real delight, which is then enjoyed in purity. In these two last instances, we can understand the value of

In this way, pleasing sights and sounds, forbidden to the senses, may still have a charm in imagination; and the ideal pursuit of them would enhance the pleasure. Still more are the pleasures of affection, complacency, power, revenge, knowledge, fit to be the subject of ideal longings and pursuit. These emotions can all be to some extent indulged in absence, so as to make us feel something of their warmth and elation. It is not in vain, therefore, that we sustain an ideal pursuit in favour of some object of love, some future of renown, some goal of accomplishment, some inaccessible height of moral excellence. The day-dreamer, whose ideal emotions are well supported, by the means formerly described, has moments of great enjoyment, although still liable to the pains of conflict, and to the equally painful exhaustion following on ideal excitement.

If a pleasure in memory or in imagination were as good as the reality, there would be no pursuit either actual or ideal, and no desire. Or if the reality had some painful experiences enough to do away with the superiority of the actual, we should be free from the urgency of motives to the will. Many occasions of pleasure exemplify one or other of these two positions; evenings in society, public entertainments, dignified pursuits, and the like. We may have a pleasure in thinking of places where we have formerly been, with a total absence of desire to return.

The spur of an ideal pleasure consists, partly in the perennial tendency of pleasure to seek for increase, and partly in the pain arising from a consciousness of the inferiority of the ideal to the actual. This pain is at its maximum in regard to the pleasures of organic life and of the inferior senses; and at its minimum in the pleasures termed elevating and refined.

5. The Provocatives of Desire are, in the first place, the actual *wants or deficiencies of the system*, and secondly, the *experience of pleasure*.

The first class correspond with the Appetites, and with those artificial cravings of the system generated by physical habits. We pass through a round of natural wants, for food, exercise, &c., and when each finds its gratification at hand, there is no room for desire. An interval or delay brings on the state of craving or longing, with the alternative outlets now described.

If we set aside the Appetites, the main provocative of

Desire is the experience of pleasure. When any pleasure has once been tasted, the recollection is afterwards a motive to regain it. The infant has no craving but for the breast; desire comes in with new pleasures. It is from enjoying the actual, that we come to desire the pleasures of sound, of spectacle, and of all the higher emotions. Sexuality is founded on an appetite, but the other pleasing emotions are brought, by a course of experience, to the longing pitch. Intense as is the feeling of maternity, no animal or human being preconceives it. The emotions of wonder, of complacency, of ambition, of revenge, of curiosity, of fine art, must be gratified in order to be evoked as permanent longings. Experience is necessary to temptation in this class of delights. A being solitary from birth would have no craving for society.

Even as regards Appetite, experience gives a definite aim to the longings, directing them upon the objects known as the means of their gratification. We crave for certain things that have always satisfied hunger, and for a known place suited to repose. This easy transition, effected by association, misled Butler into supposing that our appetites are not selfish; they do not go direct to the removal of pain and the bestowal of pleasure, but centre in a number of special objects.

A higher complication arises when we contemplate the appearances of enjoyment in others, and are led to crave for participation. We must still have a basis of personal knowledge; but when out of a very narrow experience of the good things of life, we venture to conceive the happiness of the children of fortune, our estimate is likely to be erroneous, and to be biassed by the feelings that control the imagination. How this bias works, is explained by the analysis of the ideal or imaginative faculty (Book II., chap. iv., § 15).

6. As all our pleasures and pains have the volitional property, that is, incite to action, so they all give birth to desire; from which circumstance, some feelings carry the fact of Desire in their names. Such are Avarice, Ambition, Curiosity.

This has very generally led to the including of Desire, as a phenomenon, in the classification of the feelings. In every desire, there is a pleasure or pain, but the fact itself is properly an aspect of volition or the Will.

7. As in actual volition, so in Desire, we may have the disturbing effect of the Fixed Idea.

Nothing is more common than a persistent idea giving origin to the conflicts, and the day dreams, and all the outgoings of Desire. The examples already given of the fixed idea in the motives of the will, have their prolongation and expansion in ideal longings, when pursuit is impossible. Such are the day-dreams of wealth, ambition, affection, future happiness.

8. Desire is incorrectly represented as a constant and necessary prelude of volition.

Like Deliberation and Resolution, the state of Desiro has now been shown to be a transformation of the will proper, undergone in circumstances where the act does not immediately follow the motive. There remains a farther example of the same peculiarity, forming the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

BELIEF.

1. THE mental state termed BELIEF, while involving the Intellect and the Feelings, is, in its essential import, related to Activity, or the Will.

In believing that the sun will rise to-morrow, that next winter will be cold, that alcohol stimulates, that such a one is to be trusted, that Turkey is ill-governed, that free trade increases the wealth of nations, that human life is full of vicissitudes,—in what state of mind are we? a state purely intellectual, or intellectual and something besides? In all these affirmations there is an intellectual conception, but so there is in many things that we do not believe. We may understand the meaning of a proposition, we may conceive it with the utmost vividness, and yet not believe it. We may have an exact intellectual comprehension of the statement that the moon is only one hundred miles distant from the earth; but without any accompanying belief.

It is next to be seen, if a feeling, or emotion, added to the intellectual conception, will amount to the believing state. Suppose us to conceive and contemplate the approaching sum-

mer as beautiful and genial beyond all the summers of the century, we should have much pleasure in this contemplation, but the pleasure (although, as will be seen, a predisposing cause) does not constitute the belief. There is, thus, nothing either in Intellect or in Feeling, to impart the essence of Belief.

✓ In the practice of every day life, we are accustomed to test men's belief by action, 'faith by works.' If a politician declares free trade to be good, and yet will not allow it to be acted on (there being no extraneous barriers in the way), people say he does not believe his own assertion. A general affirming that he was stronger and better entrenched than the enemy, and yet acting as if he were weaker, would be held as believing not what he affirmed, but what he acted on. A capitalist that withdraws his money from foreign governments, and invests it at a smaller interest in the English funds, is treated as having lost faith or confidence in the stability of the foreign powers. Any one pretending to believe in a future life of rewards and punishments, and acting precisely as if there were no such life, is justly set down as destitute of belief in the doctrine.

✓ 2. The relation of Belief to Activity is expressed by saying, that *what we believe we act upon*.

The instances above given, point to this and to no other conclusion. The difference between¹ mere conceiving or imagining, with or without strong feeling, and² belief, is acting, or being prepared to act, when the occasion arises. The belief that a sovereign is worth twenty shillings, is shown by the readiness to take the sovereign in exchange for the shillings; the belief that a sovereign is light is shown by refusing to take it as the equivalent of twenty shillings.

✓ The definition will be best elucidated by the apparent exceptions.

✓ (1) We often have a genuine belief, and yet do not act upon it. One may have the conviction strongly that abstinence from stimulants would favour health and happiness, and yet go on taking stimulants. And there are many parallels in the conduct of human beings. The case, however, is no real exception. Belief is a motive, or an inducement to act, but it may be overpowered by a stronger motive—a present pleasure, or relief from a present pain. We are inclined to act where we believe, but not always with an omnipotent strength of impulse. Belief is an active state, with different degrees of force; it is said to be strong or to be weak. It is

strong when it carries us against a powerful counter impulse, weak when overpowered by an impulse not strong. Yet if it ever induces us to act at all, if it vanquishes the smallest resistance, it is belief. The believer in a future life may do very little in consequence of that belief; he may never act in the face of a strong opposition; but if he does anything at all that he would not otherwise do, if he incurs the smallest present sacrifice, he is admitted to have a real, though feeble, belief.

(2) The second apparent exception is furnished by the cases where we believe things that we never can have any occasion to act upon. Some philosophers of the present day believe that the sun is radiating away his heat, and will in some inconceivably long period cool down far below zero of Fahrenheit. Any fact more completely out of the active sphere of those philosophers could not be suggested to the human mind. It is the same with the alleged past history of the universe, ^{sidereal and geological}. An astronomer has many decided convictions in connexion with the remote nebulae of the firmament. Even the long past events of human history, the exploits of Epaminondas, and the invasion of Britain by the Romans, are beyond our sphere of action, and are yet believed by us. And as regards the still existing arrangements of things, many men that will never cross the Sahara desert, believe what is told of its surface, of its burning days and chilling nights.

It is not hard to trace a reference to action in every one of these beliefs. Take the last-named first. When we believe the testimony of travellers as to the Sahara, we view that testimony as the same in kind with what we are accustomed to act upon. A traveller in Africa has also passed through France, and has perhaps told us many things respecting that country, and we have acted on his information. He has also told us of Sahara, and we have fallen into the same mental attitude in this case, although we may not have the same occasion to act it out. We express the attitude by saying, that if we went to Africa, we would do certain things in consequence of the information.

As regards the past, we believe history in two ways. The first use is analogous to what has been stated, namely, when we put the testimony to historical events on the same footing as the testimony that we now act upon. Another way, is when we form theories or doctrines of human affairs, reposing in part on those past events, and carry these doctrines into operation in our present practice.

The belief in sidereal phenomena immeasurably remote in space and in time, is a recognition of the *scientific method* employed upon these phenomena. The navigator sails the seas upon the faith of observations of the same nature as those applied to the distant stars and nebulae. If an astronomer propounded doctrines as to the nebulae, founded upon observations of a kind that would not be trusted in navigation or in the prediction of eclipses, we should be in a perceptibly different state of mind respecting such doctrines, and that state of mind is not improperly styled disbelief.

(3) In many notorious instances our belief is determined by the strength of our feelings, which may be alleged as a proof that it is grounded on the emotional part of our nature. The fact is admitted, but not the inference. It will be afterwards seen in what ways the feelings operate upon the belief, without themselves constituting the state of believing.

(4) Very frequently, belief is engendered by a purely intellectual process. Thus, when a proposition in geometry is first propounded to us, we may understand its purport without believing it; but, by going through a chain of reasoning or demonstration, an operation wholly of the intellect, we pass into a state of entire conviction. So with the thousands of cases where we are led into belief by mere argument, proof, or intellectual enlightenment; in all which, there is the appearance of an intellectual origin of belief.

The same conclusion is suggested by another set of facts, namely, our believing from the testimony of our senses, or personal experience; for perception by the senses is admitted to be a function of the intellect. It is by such an operation that we believe in gravity, in the connexion of sunrise with light and heat, and so on.

So, when we receive and adjudicate on the testimony of others, we are performing a function strictly intellectual.

Led seemingly by such facts as these, metaphysicians have been almost, if not altogether, unanimous in enrolling Belief among the intellectual powers. Nevertheless, it may be affirmed, that intellect alone will not constitute Belief, any more than it will constitute Volition. The reasonings of the Geometer do not create the state of belief, they merely bring affirmations under an already-formed belief, the belief in the axioms of the science. Unless that belief can be shown to be an intellectual product, the faith in demonstrative truth is not based in intellect. The precise function of our intelligence in believing will be shown in what follows. 18-11-1871

3. Belief is a growth or development of the Will, under the pursuit of intermediate ends.

When a voluntary action ^(as) at once brings a pleasure or ^(as) dismisses a pain, as in masticating food in the month, we experience the primitive course of the will; there is an absence *Simple case* alike of deliberation, of resolution, of desire, and of belief. By a fiction, one might maintain that we are believing that the monthful of food is pleasant, just as one might say that we choose, desire, and resolve to masticate and swallow the bolus; *with* but in point of fact, such designations would never have come into existence had all volition been of this primordial type. It is the occurrence of a middle or intermediate state between the motive and the felt gratification that makes these various phases to appear.

Belief is shown when we are performing intermediate or associated actions. When we put forth the hand to seize an orange, peel it, and bring it to the month, we perform a number of actions, in themselves barren and unprofitable, and stimulated by a pleasure to follow, which pleasure at present exists as the ideal motive. In this situation, there is a fact or phenomenon, not expressed by any of the other names for what fills the void of a suspended volition; there may be present deliberation, resolution, and desire; yet something still remains. For example, in taking these steps to enjoy the sweetness of the orange juices, we may have passed through the phase of Desire; previous experience of the pleasure has given us an idea of it, accompanied by longing for perfect fruition. We may also have passed through a Deliberation and a Resolution. But what is not yet expressed, is our assuming that the actions now entered on will bring the state desired, and our maintaining a degree of voluntary exertion as energetic as if the pleasure were actually tasted. When we act for an intermediate end, as strongly as we should for the aetnal end, we are in a very peculiar situation, not implied in desire, however strong, nor in deliberation, nor in resolution, and deserving to be signalized by a name. The principal designation is Belief; the synonymes are faith, trust, credit, credence, confidence, assurance, security, reliance, certainty, dependence, anticipation, expectation.

The state is known to vary in degree. Having formed a desire, and having, if need be, deliberated and resolved, we may pursue the intermediate ends, either with all the energy that the ultimate consciousness would prompt, or, what is very

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common, with less than that energy; perhaps with three-fourths, with one-half, or with one-fourth the amount. This difference need have no connexion with the intensity of desire, or with the processes of deliberation or of resolution; it relates to a fact that has a separate standing in the mind; and the circumstances affecting it call for a special investigation.

4. Belief always contains an intellectual element, there being, in its least developed form, an Association of Means and End.

The very fact of working for an intermediate end, with the view to some remote or final end, implies an intellectual conception of both, and the association of the one with the other. The lamb running to its ewe mother for milk and warmth, has an intellectual train fixed in its mind—an idea of warmth and repletion associated with the idea or characteristic picture of its mother. All the actions of human beings for remote ends are based on the mental trains connecting the intermediate with the final.

We may properly describe these trains as a knowledge of natural facts, or of the order of the world, which all creatures that can do one thing for the sake of another, must possess to some degree. Every animal with a home, and able to leave it and to return, knows a little geography. The more extensive this knowledge, the greater the *power* of gaining ends. The stag knowing ten different pools to drink from, is so much better provided than when it knew but one.

Experience of nature, therefore, laid up in the memory, must enter into every situation where we exert belief. Nay, more. Such experience is, properly speaking, the *just ground of believing*, the condition in whose absence there ought to be no belief; and the greater the experience, the greater should be the believing energy. But if we find, in point of fact, that belief does not accord with experience, we must admit that there is some other spring of confidence than the natural conjunctions or successions, repeated before the view, and fixed in the mind by the force of contiguous association.

5. The mental foundations of Belief are to be sought (1) in our Activity, (2) in the Intellectual Associations of our Experience, and (3) in the Feelings.

It is here affirmed, not only that Belief in its essence is an active state, but that its foremost generating cause is the Activity of the system, to which are added influences Intellectual and Emotional.

(1) The Spontaneity of the moving organs is a source of action, the system being fresh, and there being no hindrance. Secondly, the additional Pleasure of Exercise is a farther prompting to activity. Thirdly, the Memory of this pleasure is a motive to begin acting with a view to the fruition of it; the operation of the will being enlarged by an intellectual bond. These three facts sum up the active tendency of volition; the two first are impulses of pure activity; the third is supported by the retentive function of the intellect.

Under these forces, one or more, we commence action, and, so long as there is no check, we continue till overtaken by exhaustion. We have no hesitation, doubt, or uncertainty; while yet ignorant of what belief means, we act precisely like a person in the highest state of confidence. Belief can do no more than produce unhesitating action, and we are already placed at this point.

Suppose now that we experience a check, as when our activity brings us pain. This is an arrest upon our present movements; and the memory of it has also a certain deterring effect. We do not again proceed in that track with the full force of our spontaneous and volitional urgencies; there is an element of repugnance that weakens, if it does not destroy, the active tendency. The young animal at first roams everywhere; in some one track it falls into a snare, and with difficulty escapes; it avoids that route in future; but as regards all others, it goes on as before. The primitive tendency to move freely in every direction is here broken in upon by a hostile experience; with respect to which there is in future an anticipation of danger, a state of belief in coming evil. Repeated experiences would confirm this deviation from the rule of immunity; but before any experience, the rule was proceeded on. *act*

We can now understand what there is instinctive in the act of believing, and can account for the natural or primitive credulity of the mind. The mere disposition to act, growing out of our active endowments, carries belief with it; experience enlightening the intellect, does not create this active disposition, but merely causes it to be increased by the memory of attained fruition. A stronger natural spontaneity would make a stronger belief, experience remaining the same. Whatever course is entered on is believed in, until a check arise; a repeated check neutralizes the spontaneous and voluntary agency, destroying alike action and belief.

The phenomena of credulity and mistaken beliefs are in accordance with the active origin of the state. We strongly believe that whatever has been in the past will always be in the future, exactly as we have found it in an unbroken experience, however small; that is, we are disposed to act in any direction where we have never been checked. It does not need a long-continued iteration, amounting to indissoluble association, to generate a belief: a single instance under a motive to act is enough. The infant soon shows a belief in the mother's breasts; and if it could speculate on the future, it would believe in being fed in that manner to all eternity. The belief begins to be broken through when it gets spoon meat; and the anticipation is now partitioned, but still energetic in holding that the future will resemble the past in the precise manner already experienced.

There is thus generated, from the department of our Activity, a tendency, so wide as to be an important law of the mind, to proceed upon any unbroken experience with the whole energy of our active nature, and, accordingly, to believe, with a vigour corresponding to our natural activity, that what is uncontradicted is universal and eternal. Experience adds the force of habit to the inborn energy, and hence the tenacity of all early beliefs. Human nature everywhere believes that its own experience is the measure of all men's experience everywhere and in every time. Each one of us believes at first that every other person is made, and feels, like ourselves; and it takes a long education to abate the sweeping generalization, which in no one is ever entirely overcome. If belief were generated by the growth of an intellectual bond of experienced conjunctions, we should not form any judgment as to other men's feelings, until old enough to perform a difficult scientific operation of analogical reasoning; we should say absolutely nothing about the distant, the past, and the future, where our experience is null: we might believe that the water from a known well slakes our thirst, but we should not believe that the same water would slake the thirst of other persons who had not tried it, nor that any other water would slake our own thirst. It is the active energy of the mind that makes the 'anticipation of nature' so severely commented on by Bacon, as the parent of all error. This anticipation, corrected and reduced to the standard of experience, is the belief in the uniformity of nature.

We labour under a natural inability or disqualification to

conceive anything different from our most limited experience; but there is no necessity that we should still persist in assuming that what is absolutely unknown is exactly like what we know. Such intrinsic forwardness is not a quality of the intellect, it is the incontinence of our active nature. ^{Immediate} ^{Griffin} As we act first and feel afterwards; so we believe first and prove afterwards; not to be contradicted is to us sufficient proof. The impetus to generalize is born of our activity, and we are fortunate if we ever learn to apply to it the corrections of subsequent experience. An ordinary person, by no means unintelligent or uncultivated, happening to know one Frenchman, would (unhesitatingly) attribute to the whole French ^{Prosa} nation the mental peculiarities of that one individual. As regards many of our convictions, the strength is in the inverse ratio of the believer's experience.

6. (2) The second source of Belief is Intellectual Association.

The frequent experience of a succession leaves a firm association of the several steps, and the one suggests readily all the rest. This enters into belief, and augments in some degree the active tendency to proceed in a certain course. The successive acts of plucking an apple, putting it in the mouth, and chewing it, are followed by an agreeable sensation: and the whole train is by repetition firmly fixed in the mind. The main source of the energy shown in these intermediate acts is still the activity—partly spontaneous, partly volitional under the ideal motive of the sweetness. Yet the facility of passing intellectually from one step to another, through the strength of the association, counts as an addition to the strength of the impetus that carries us along through the series of acts. On a principle already expounded, the idea of an act has a certain efficacy in realizing it; and a secure association, bringing on the ideas, would help to bring on the actions: It may be safely maintained, however, that no mere association of ideas would set the activity in motion, or constitute the active disposition, called belief. A very strong association between 'apple' and 'sweetness,' generated by hearing the words often joined together (as from the 'dulce ^{Sweet} pomum' of the Latin Grammar), would make the one word suggest the other, and the corresponding ideas likewise suggest each other; but the taking action upon them still requires an active bent of the organs, growing out of the causes of our activity—spontaneity and a motive; and, until

these are brought into play, there is no action and no active disposition, or belief.

When we have been disciplined to consult observation and experience before making affirmations respecting things distant in place or time, instead of generalizing haphazard, we import very extensive intellectual operations into the settlement of our beliefs; but these intellectual processes do not constitute the attitude of believing. They are set agoing by motives to the will—by the failures and checks encountered in proceeding on too narrow grounds; and when we have attained the improved knowledge, we follow it out into practice by virtue of voluntary determinations, whose course has been cleared by the higher flight of intelligence; yet there is nothing in mere intellect that would make us act, or contemplate action, and therefore nothing that makes us believe.

It is illustrative and interesting to note who are the *decided* characters in life—the men prompt and unhesitating in action on all occasions. They are men distinguished, not for intelligence, but for the active endowment; a profuse spontaneity lending itself to motives few and strong. Intelligence in excess paralyzes action, reducing it in quantity, although no doubt improving it in *quality*—in successful adaptation to ends.

7. (3) The third source or foundation of Belief is the Feelings.

We have already taken account of the influence of the Feelings in generating belief, and we need only to re-state in summary the manner of the operation.

We may first recall the two tests of belief—(1) the energy of pursuit of the intermediate ends, the final end not being in the grasp, and (2) the elation of mind through the mere prospect of the final end (when that is something agreeable). In both these aspects, belief is affected by feeling.

If the final end is a pleasure, and strongly realized in idea, the energy of pursuit is proportionably strong, and the conviction is strong, as shown by the obstacles surmounted not merely in the shape of resistance, but in the shape of total want of evidence. An object intensely desired is followed out with excessive credulity as to the chances of attainment.

There is another mode of strengthening the believing attitude by pleasure. Irrespective of the contemplation of the end, which is necessarily pleasure (whether direct, or indirect, as relief from pain), there may be other causes of pleasure operating at the moment to impart elation or buoyancy

of tone. Such elation strengthens the believing temper, with respect to whatever is in hand. A traveller in quest of new regions is subject to alternations of confidence according to the states of mind that he passes through, from whatever cause. He is more sanguine when he is refreshed and vigorous, when the day is balmy, or the scenery cheerful, there being no real accession of evidence through any of these circumstances.

That a higher mood of enjoyment should be a higher mood of belief is evident on both aspects of belief. In the first place, whatever action is present is more vigorously pursued, with which vigour of pursuit the state of confidence is implicated. And, in the second place, as regards the cheering ideal foretaste of the final end, anything that improves the elation of tone has the very same effect as the improved prospect of the end would have, such improved prospect meaning a stronger belief. What we want from a strong assurance is mental comfort, and if the comfort arises concurrently with the belief, we have the thing wished, and the belief is for the moment made up by an adventitious or accidental mixture.

In some forms of Belief, as in Religion, the cheering circumstance is the prominent fact. Such belief is valued as a tonic to the mind, like any form of pleasure; the belief and the elation are convertible facts. Hence, when the belief is feeble, any accession of a joyful mood will be seen to strengthen the belief, while the opposite state will be supposed to weaken it; the fact being that the two influences conspire together, and we may, if we please, put both to the account of one, especially if the source of the other is hidden or unseen.

The cultivation of these last named beliefs is purely emotional, and consists in strengthening the associations of feeling in the mind; the ease is in all respects identical with the growth of an affection. With any strong affection, there is implicated a corresponding strength of belief.

More strength of excitement, of the neutral kind, will control belief as it controls the will, by the force of the persisting idea. Whatever end very much inflames the mind, will be impressed according to the strength of the excitement, and irrespective of the pleasure or the pain of it, and, in determining to action, will constitute belief in whatever appears as the intermediate instrument. A very slight and casual association will be taken up and assumed as a cause. The mother having lost a child will conceive a repugnance to a certain thing associated in her mind with the child's death; she will keep aloof from that thing with the whole force of her will to

save her other children; which is tantamount to believing in a connexion of cause and effect between the two facts. The influence of the feelings thus serves to confirm an intellectual link, perhaps only once experienced, into a strong association, such as a great many counter experiences may not be able to dissolve.

Lastly, the power of the feelings to command the presence of one class of thoughts, and banish all of a hostile kind from the view, necessarily operates in belief as in action. A fright fastens the thoughts upon the circumstances of alarm, and renders one unable to hold in the view such as could neutralize the terror. There are considerations within reach that would prevent us believing in the worst, but they cannot make their appearance; the well-timed reminder of them by the agency of a friend, is then an invaluable substitute for the paralyzed operation of our own intelligence.

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§. The Belief in the order of the World, or the course of Nature, varies in character, in different persons, according to the relative predominance of the three causes enumerated.

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All belief implicates the order of the world; or the connexion between one thing and another thing, such that the one can be employed as a means to secure the other as an end. We believe that a rushing stream is a prime mover; that vegetation needs rain and sunshine; that animals are produced from their own kind; that the body is strengthened by exercise.

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The chief source of belief is unobstructed activity. A single experiment is enough to constitute belief; what we have done successfully once, we are ready to do again, without the smallest hesitation. Repetition may strengthen the tendency, but five repetitions do not give five times the conviction of one; it would be nearer the mark to say, that, apart from our educated tests of truth, fifty repetitions might perhaps double the strength of conviction of the first. We are all faith at the outset; we become sceptics by experience, that is, by encountering checks and exceptions. We begin with unbounded credulity, and are gradually educated into a more limited reliance.

Our belief in the physical laws is our primitive spontaneity contracted to the bounds of experience. Of this kind, is our faith in gravity, heat, light, and so on. Our trials are greatly simplified by the guidance of those that have gone before us.

As regards the more ordinary phenomena, we soon fall into the right channels of acting; an animal learns in a short time from what height it can jump with safety.

The long catalogue of perverted, extravagant, erratic beliefs, can in most instances be accounted for by some unusual degree of feeling, whether pleasure, pain, or mere excitement. We are hard to convince that anything we like can do us any mischief; this is strength of pleasurable feeling, operating through desire, and barring out from the thoughts the hostile experience. We believe in the wisdom and other merits of the persons that we love or admire; another of the many instances of the power of feeling. We have at first unlimited faith in testimony; whatever is told us is presumed, as a matter of course, to be true, just as what we find on a first trial, is expected to hold always. Experience has to limit this sweeping confidence; and if likings and dislikings are kept under, and remembered facts are alone trusted to, we acquire what is called a rational belief in testimony, namely, a belief proportioned to the absence of contradictory facts.

Our belief is influenced by our fellow beings in obvious ways. Sympathy and Imitation make us adopt the actions and the feelings of those about us; and the effect of society does not stop here, but goes the length of compulsion. By these combined influences, we are educated in all beliefs that transcend our own experience, and swayed even in what falls under our observation.

A mere intellectual statement, often repeated, disposes us to credence, but does not amount to the state of belief, till we have occasion to take some action upon it; and the real force of the state arises when our action receives some confirmation. We are in a very loose state of mind as regards many floating doctrines, such as the recondite assertions of science, and the higher mysteries of the supernatural. Should we make a single experiment for ourselves, and find it accord with what has been affirmed, we are at once elevated into confidence, perhaps even beyond the actual truth; the untutored mind knowing nothing of the repetitions and precautions necessary to establish a fact.

The superstitious beliefs of unenlightened ages,—astrology, alchemy, witchcraft,—and the perversions of scientific truth in early philosophy from the various strong emotions, are all explicable upon the influence of feeling in the originators, with the subsequent addition of authority and imitation.

9. Belief is opposed, not by Disbelief, but by DOUBT.

As mental attitudes, Belief and Disbelief are the same. We cannot believe one thing without disbelieving some other thing; if we believe that the sun is risen, we must disbelieve that he is below the horizon.

When we are unable to obtain a conviction, one way or other, we are said to *doubt*, to be in a state of uncertainty, or suspense. If the thing concerns us little, we are indifferent to this absence of the means of conviction. The condition of doubt is manifested in its true character, as a distressing experience, when we are obliged to act and are yet uncertain as to the course. The connexion of means and end does not command our belief or assurance; there are opposing suggestions or appearances, more or less evenly balanced; or there is nothing to go upon in either way. Hence we are in danger of being balked in our ends; and, in addition, have all the vacillation of a conflict. In matters of great import, doubt is the name for unspeakable misery.

✓ Doubt and Fear, although distinguishable, run very closely together. Doubt, in its painful and distressing form, is precisely the state of Fear. A cause of fear deepens the condition of doubt; circumstances of doubt will intensify fear. The same temperament is victorious alike over doubt and fear; the active disposition has been seen to be a spring of courage.

10. The opposing designations HOPE and DESPONDENCY signify phases of Belief. *Strong belief, weak belief*

Hope expresses belief in its cheering or elating aspect, being the confidence in future good, the belief that some agreeable end is more or less certain in its arrival. It farther denotes something less than total or complete assurance, or rather it is considered as ranging in compass from the smallest degree of confidence that can have any elating effect, up to the highest point when prospect is on a level with possession. Hence, in expressing hope, we usually append an epithet of degree; we have good hopes of a prosperous commercial year, we have faint hopes of the next harvest.

The opposite of Hope is not Fear, but Despondency, the belief in coming evil, a condition of mind the more depressing as the belief is stronger. An army over-matched is despondent; that is, believes in impending defeat. The state of Fear very readily supervenes; but there may be despondency, with the absence of fear proper. The extreme of Despondency is Despair.

When the hope or the despondency can be based on certain evidence, or on probable evidence as entertained by a highly disciplined judgment, they are comparatively little affected by extraneous agencies of elation or depression. But in matters of probable evidence, and in minds of little stability, the state of hope or despondency fluctuates with the influences that raise or depress the general tone. Every thing already said, of Belief in general, is true of belief under the name of Hope. 21/12/88.

CHAPTER IX.

THE MORAL HABITS.

1. THE Moral Habits are the acquirements relating to Feelings and Volitions.

Besides the intellectual acquirements properly so called, as Language, Science, &c., we have a series of growths consisting in the increase or diminution of the feelings, and in modifications of the strength of the will, whereby some motives gain and others lose in practical efficacy. We speak of habits of Courage, Fortitude, Command of Temper, meaning that those qualities have attained, through education, a degree not attaching to them naturally. *originally*

2. The Moral Acquirements come under the general conditions of Retentiveness.

In heightening, or in detracting from, the natural strength of feelings and volitions, we are aided by all the circumstances enumerated in regard to the attainments of the intellect.

In the first place, a certain *repetition* is necessary, greater or less according to the change that has to be effected, and to the absence of other favouring circumstances. The moral education seldom reaches maturity till a late period of life.

In the second place, the mind may be more or less concentrated on the acquisition. Apart from the amount of repetition, moral progress depends greatly on the bent of the learner towards the special acquisition. If we are striving *con amore* to attain any important habitude, such as the Command of the Attention, the currents of the brain are excluded from all other objects.

sively set in this one direction, instead of being divided with other engrossments. A less efficient, although still a powerful, stimulus, is the application of pain.

In the third place, individuals differ in the power of Retentiveness or Adhesiveness, as a whole; rendering them apt as learners generally.

There are also local endowments leading to a special retentiveness in matters of knowledge; as when the good natural ear brings about rapid musical attainments. It might be over-refining to attempt to carry this supposition into the domain of the feelings.

3. The conditions *that help us to acquire* special to the Moral Acquirements are, first, an Initiative, and, secondly, a Gradual Exposure in cases of conflict.

As a large and important branch of moral acquisition consists in strengthening one power to overcome another, it is of great advantage to have an uninterrupted series of successes: which can only be secured by strongly backing at first the motive to be strengthened, and by never giving it too much to do. Defeats should be avoided, especially in the early stages.

4. We may begin the detail by adverting to the voluntary control of Sense and Appetite.

We have seen, in the conflict of Motives, the sensations and the appetites resisted by ideal considerations, that is, by good and evil in the distance. Now, this control depends, at first, on the relative strength of Appetite and of the Memory of good and evil; eventually, however, repeated action in one way, either in indulging or in thwarting the appetite, brings into play Retentiveness, or habit, as an additional force on the prevailing side.

Take, as an example; the endurance of cold, for purposes of healthy stimulation, as in habitual cold bathing and exposure to weather. There is a conflict of volition between present sensation, and good and evil in the distance. The ideal motive may be at first too weak, and may need strengthening; for which end, it is desired to superadd the force of habit. The commencement demands an Initiative. Some cause from without should induce the regular and systematic exposure of the body to cold water and cold air. At the early stages, there may be felt a revulsion at the process. Repetition, if steady, has a twofold effect; it lowers

the painful sensibility, and increases the tendency to perform the actions as the appointed time comes round. Now, with a view to the more speedy attainment of these two ends, there should never be any intermission, or giving way; and the shock encountered should not be of such an extreme kind, as would make an insurmountable aversion. Hence, an adequate initiative should concur with a gradation of the exposure; with these two conditions, the progress of the habit is steady and sure. The subject of the experiment can, after a time, be left to the ordinary motives; the moral education being complete. *Graduated severity*

A parallel illustration applies to the whole department of Temperance or control of Appetite.

Under the present head, we may notice the Command of the Attention, as against the diversions and sollicitations of outward things. The infant is at the mercy of every sight and every sound, and has no power of consecutive attention, unless under some one sensation stronger than any of the rest. Early education has to reclaim the wandering and volatile gaze. The child is set to a short lesson, in the first instance, under a sufficient pressure from without to maintain the attention during that time, and in spite of casual diversions. The demand for concentration is increased slowly, never exceeding what the combined force of the initiative and the acquired bent can achieve.

Belonging to various situations and occupations is the habit of becoming indifferent to noise and to the distraction of spectacle, as in the bustle of towns and places of business. The ability to seclude the attention in the midst of noise may be acquired, if the conditions can be complied with. There must be to commence with some power sufficient to divert the mind from the noise for certain periods of time; during every such period a lesson is taken, and, by sufficient repetition, the power of indifference may become complete for all circumstances. The inuring process, while succeeding in most instances, entirely fails in some; the reason being that the sensitiveness cannot by any influence be sufficiently overcome to make a beginning. If these susceptible minds, instead of being at once immersed in the uproar, could be subjected to a steadily increasing noise, they might be hardened at last.

25. Culture applied to the Special Emotions may embrace (1) the Emotional susceptibility on the whole, and (2) the Emotions singly. ✓

(1) There is in each person a certain Emotional constitution, or natural proneness to Emotion generally; shown in the amount of emotional fervour and display. This may be increased or diminished by cultivation, at the expense of the two other departments of the mind. By sympathy, stimulation, and encouragement, by occupying the mind with emotional exercises, the department acquires more than its natural dimensions, while Volition and Intellect are proportionably shrivelled. If, besides the positive encouragement of the emotional side, there are positive discouragements to exerting Will and Intelligence, the work of re-adjustment will go on still faster.

There are nations whose character is highly emotional in comparison with others; at the head of the scale in Europe, we may place the Italians, after which come the French, Germans, English. An English child domesticated in Rome or Florence, would contract something of the Italian fervour; an Italian child, reared in the north of Scotland, would be rendered more volitional or intellectual, and less emotional.

The leading displays of Emotion generally are, ¹the susceptibility to Amusement, ²great Sociability, ³devotion to Fine Art, ⁴the warmer modes of Religious sentiment, and ⁵an emotional colouring impressed on scientific doctrines.

(2) Any single emotion may be made more or less copious. Much important discipline is involved in the encouragement or repression of individual emotions.

For example, the pleasure of Liberty, with the pain of Constraint, needs to be surmounted in many ways, being opposed to Industry, to Obedience or submission, and to the checks and obstructions of one's lot. No better example can be given of the power of habituation; while the manner of attaining it is in full accordance with the general rules. The dislike to restraints may be completely overcome, and with it the pleasurable rebound of liberty. When this is the case, we shall find that the initiative has been all-powerful to secure unbroken submission. In every well-ordered mind, there are numerous instances of restraints, at first painful, now utterly indifferent; scarcely any pleasure would be felt in breaking out from them. The old soldier has contracted a punctuality and an obedience, so thorough as to be mechanical; he neither feels the pang of constraint, nor would he rejoice in being set free from the obligation.

We have, in the case of Terror, a valuable illustration of the imperative nature of a gradual habituation. With a view

to impart a certain degree of courage to a timid constitution, it is above all things necessary to avoid a severe fright. A gentle and graduated exposure to occasions of alarm might do much to establish courage by habit, all other circumstances being favourable; a single giving way is a serious loss of ground.

The developments of the Tender Feeling include an extensive course of habitnation. Irrespective of the associations that connect it with special objects, constituting the affections, the indulgence of tender feeling increases the power of the emotion as a whole.

The Emotion of Self-tenderness, or Self-complacency, being a special direction of the general feeling, is amenable to culture or restraint. The initiative in the case must be the individual's own volition, it being impracticable for others to control, otherwise than by example or moral suasion, an emotion that works unseen.

The Emotion of Approbation, Praise, Glory, may be repressed by control, and its repression rendered habitual. It is a part of every one's experience to share in unmerited reproaches: and public men more especially have to contract a settled indifference to abuse. This is one of the cases where the system adjusts itself by the operation of Relativity. As praise and censure are felt in their highest force only while fresh, they are dependent on the occurrence of new occasions.

It is almost, if not altogether, a contradictory aim to become indifferent to blame, while fostering the pleasure of praise. We may acquire by habit a certain amount of indifference to other men's opinions, favourable or unfavourable, surrendering the pleasure as well as surmounting the pain. There is another course somewhat less sweeping: namely, to acquire a settled disesteem, or contempt, of certain individuals, whose censure thereby loses its force; while we retain a susceptibility to the opinion of others disposed to praise more than to blame us.

The Emotion of Power, being in its unbridled gratification so mischievous, is subjected to control on moral grounds. To attain habits of moderation in regard to this craving, a man must be himself impressed with the evils of it, so as to put forth a commanding volition, and thereby initiate a habitual coercion.

The outbursts of Irascibility have to be checked by voluntary control confirmed into habit. The education of

See

the young comprises this department. The value of the initiative is fully manifested in this case. External influence, according to an ideal mixture of firmness and conciliation, is most happily employed in restraining the childish ebullitions of temper, so as to mature an early habit of coolness and suppression. It is more difficult to reach the deep-seated pleasure of malevolence than to check the incontinent paroxysms most usually identified with irascibility. A man may be exacting, jealous, revengeful, without showing fits of ill temper.

The department of Plot-interest may be pandered to by incontinent amusement, or restrained by self-command and by early discipline. A great indulgence in the amusements described under this head is a test of the Emotional nature as a whole.

The Emotions of Intellect are cherished or suppressed by the same causes as the intellect itself.

On the cultivation of Taste there is nothing new to be said. The transformation of a human being, born with a deficient sensibility, into an artistic nature, expresses perhaps the very utmost stretch that culture can effect, every circumstance being supposed favourable. There must be a great starving down of the predominating elements of the character, to bring forward this single feature from its low, to a high, estate.

The Moral Feelings exemplify in the most interesting case of all, the same general considerations. When the elements of the moral sentiment are known, the manner of its development and its confirmation into habit are sufficiently plain; but the importance of the subject deserves a separate chapter.

6. Certain Habits may be specified under the Activity or the Will. *grow up*

(1) In connexion with the active organs, we contract habits of invigoration and endurance, as the result of practice. Whatever organ is steadily employed—the arm, the hand, the voice—attains greater strength and persistence, provided the habituation is gradual, and the demands never too great. Still, we must not forget, that such a strengthening process, if carried far, will usurp so much of the nutrition of the system, as seriously to impair other functions either bodily or mental. As regards physical expenditure, the intellect is our most costly function.

To evolve a larger quantity of spontaneous action than belongs to the constitution by nature, is one of the possible

ways of re-distributing the powers of the system. A languid, inactive temperament may be spurred up to greater energy, by surrendering some other point of superiority; as when a man whose *forte* is intelligence enters the army, or other active profession.

(2) The habit of Endurance, as connected with Desire, might be advantageously dwelt upon. There are instances, where endurance is made habitual, under an outward initiative, as in apprenticeship to work. In other cases, it is the will's own resolution, under motives of good and evil. If a certain degree of steadiness can be maintained in bearing up against any endurable pain, the reward will follow in abatement of the effort or struggle.

7. The voluntary control of the Intellectual trains may pass into Habit.

There are two special modes of voluntary control of the trains of thought, and, in both, practice leads to habit.

(1) Mental concentration, as against digressions, wanderings, reveries, may be commanded by motive; and, if initiated adequately and maintained persistently, may acquire the ease that habituation gives. *pro*

(2) The power of dismissing a subject from the mind is an exercise of will in opposition to intellectual persistence, and is difficult according as that persistence is inflamed by feeling. At first a severe or impracticable effort, it is eventually commanded by men trained to intellectual professions, and is essential to the despatch of multifarious business.

It is important to repeat, that many of the acquisitions, detailed in this chapter, are vast changes, amounting almost to a reconstruction of the human character; and that, to render them possible, the conditions of plastic growth must be present in an unusually favourable degree. Bodily health and nourishment, exemption from fatigues, worry and harassment, absence of heavy drafts upon the plastic power by other acquisitions, together with the special conditions more particularly urged in this chapter, must conspire with a constitutional endowment of Retentiveness, to operate these great moral revolutions. *produce*

CHAPTER X.

1. PRUDENCE.²—DUTY.³—MORAL INABILITY.

✓ 1. HUMAN Pursuit, as a whole, is divided, for important practical reasons, into two great departments.

✓ The first embraces the highest and most comprehensive regard to Self; and is designated PRUDENCE, Self-Love, the search after Happiness. It is opposed or thwarted mainly by the urgency of present good or evil, and by fixed ideas.

Happiness is made up of the total of our pleasures, diminished by the total of our pains; and the endeavour after it resolves itself into seeking the one and avoiding the other. There is a complicated mixture of good and evil always in the distance, and even in the absence of moral weakness, we should find the problem of our greatest happiness on the whole, one of considerable perplexity.

✓ The influences on the side of Prudence are these:—

✓ (1) The natural aptitude, so often alluded to, for remembering good and evil, by which the future interests are powerfully represented in the conflict with present or actual pleasure and pain.

✓ (2) The influences brought to bear upon the mind, especially in early years, in the way of authority, example, warning, instruction; all which, if happily administered, may both supply motives and build up habits, such as to counteract the strong solicitations of present appetite or emotion.

✓ (3) The acquired knowledge, referring to the good and evil consequences of action. A full acquaintance with the laws of our own bodies and minds, with the ongoings of society, and with the order of nature generally, counts on the side of prudence by making us aware of the less obvious tendencies of conduct.

✓ (4) The floating opinion of those around us, the public inculcation of virtuous conduct, and the whole literature of moral suasion, backed by the display of approved examples, go a great way to form the prudential character of the mature individual.

Although the proper function of public opinion is to mould us to *duty*, as contrasted with mere prudence, yet in no country, has society refrained from both teaching and even compelling prudential conduct, according to approved standards.

(5) The reflections of the individual mind, frequently and earnestly turned upon what is best in the long run, are a powerful adjunct to the building up of a prudential character. The more we allow ourselves to dwell upon past errors, the more we increase their deterring force in the future. Moreover, a certain deliberative habit is necessary to carrying out wisely any end of pursuit, and most of all the pursuit of the end that includes and reconciles so many ends.

2. The second department of pursuit comprises the regard to others, and is named DUTY. It is warred against not only by the forces inimical to Prudence, but also occasionally by Prudence itself.

That, in the pursuit of our happiness, we shall not infringe on the happiness of others, is Duty, in its most imperative form. How far we shall make positive contributions to the good of our fellows is less definitely settled.

The following are the prominent influences in favour of Duty.

I.—The Sympathetic part of our nature has already been pointed out as the chief fountain of disinterested action. By virtue of sympathy, we are restrained from hurting other sentient beings; and the stronger the sympathy, the greater the restraint. In many instances, we abandon pleasures, and incur pains, rather than give pain to some one that has engaged our sympathy.

Sympathy is, in its foundation, a natural endowment, very feebly manifested in the lower races. It differs greatly among individuals of the same race; and may be much improved by education. Its main condition is the giving heed or attention to the feelings of others, instead of being wholly and at all times absorbed with what concerns ourselves alone; and this attention may be prompted by instructors and confirmed into habit.

II.—No amount of sympathy ever yet manifested by human beings would be enough to protect one man from another. The largest part of the check consists in the application of Prudential or self-regarding motives.

(1) Punishment, or the deliberate infliction of pain, in the

name of the collective mass of beings making a society, is the foremost incentive to Duty, considered as abstinence from injuring others. Not only is this the chief deterring instrument, it is also the means of settling and defining what duty is. Society prescribes the acts that are held to be injurious, and does not leave the point to the option of the individual citizen. Our own sympathies might take a different direction, inducing us to abstain from what the society enjoins, and do what society forbids; but we are not permitted to exercise our own discretion in the matter. Hence duty is the line chalked out by public authority, or law, and indicated by penalty or punishment.

The penalties of law are thus of a two-fold importance in the matter of duty; they both ¹teach and ²enforce it. The frequent practice of abstaining from punishable acts generates the most important of all our active states, the aversion to whatever is forbidden in this form. Such aversion is Conscience in its most general type.

(2) The sense of our personal interest in establishing a systematic abstinence from injury on the part of one man to another, is a strong motive of the prudential kind. A very little reflection teaches us that unless each person consents of his own accord to abstain from molesting his neighbour, he is not safe himself; and that the best thing for all is a mutual understanding, or compact of non-interference, observed by each. No society can exist unless a considerable majority of its members are disposed to enter into, and to observe, such a compact. Punishment could not be applied to a whole community; it is practicable only when the majority are voluntary in their own obedience, and strong enough to coerce the breakers of the compact.

It may be fairly doubted whether the most enlightened prudence would be enough of itself to maintain social obedience. At all events, self-love will do little or nothing for improving the condition of society; to the pure self-seeker, posterity weighs as nothing. Nor would self-love easily allow of that temporary expenditure that is repayed by the affection of others; a certain amount of natural generosity is necessary to reap this kind of gratification.

The average constitution of civilized man is a certain mixture of the prudential and the sympathetic; both elements are present, and neither is very powerful. Individuals are to be found prudential in the extreme, with little sympathy, and sympathetic in the extreme with little prudence; but an or-

dinary man has a moderate share of both. The performance of duty is secured in part by the self-regarding motives, and in part by the sympathetic or generous impulses, which prompt a certain amount of abstinence from injury and of self-sacrifice. *Those considerations or causes wh. make us so*

3. The supporting adjuncts of prudence are also applicable to strengthening the motives of Duty.

The arts of moral discipline and moral suasion, in other words, the means of inculcating the conduct prescribed by society as binding on all citizens, are numerous and well known. Early inculcation, and example, together with the use of punishment; the force of the public sentiment concurring with the power of the magistrate; the systematic reminders of the religious and moral teacher; the insinuating lessons of polite literature; and, not least, the mind's own habits of reflection upon duty;—are efficacious in bringing forward both the sympathetic and the self-regarding motives to abstain from the conduct forbidden by the social authority.

4. MORAL INABILITY expresses the insufficiency of ordinary motives, but not of all motives.

The child that cannot resist the temptation of sweets, the confirmed drunkard, the incorrigible thief, are spoken of as labouring under moral inability to comply with the behests of prudence and of duty. The meaning is, that the motives on one side are not adequately encountered by motives on the other side. It is not implied that motives might not be found strong enough to change the conduct in all cases. Still less is it implied that the link of uniform causation in the case of motive and action is irregular and uncertain.

There are states of mind, wherein all motives lose their power. An inability to remember or realize the consequences of actions; or a morbid delusion such as to pervert the trains of thought, will render a human being no longer amenable to the strongest motives; the inability then ceases to be moral. This is the state of insanity, and irresponsibility.

There is a middle condition between the sane and the properly insane, where motives have not lost their force, but where the severest sanctions of society, although present to the mind, are unequal to the passion of the moment. Such passionate fits may occur, under extraordinary circumstances, to persons accounted sane and responsible for their actions; if

they occur to any one frequently, and under slight provocation, they constitute a degree of moral inability verging on the irresponsible.

In criminal procedure, a man is accounted responsible, if motives still continue to have power over him. There is no other general rule. It is requisite, in order to sustain the plea of irresponsibility or insanity, that the accused should not only be, but appear to the world generally to be, beyond the influence of motives.

CHAPTER XI.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

✓ 1. THE exposition of the Will has proceeded on the Uniformity of Sequence between motive and action.

✓ Throughout the foregoing chapters, it is either openly affirmed or tacitly supposed, that the same motive, in the same circumstances, will be followed by the same action. The uniformity of sequence, admitted to prevail in the physical world, is held to exist in the mental world, although the terms of the sequence are of a different character, as involving states of the subjective consciousness. Without this assumption, the whole superstructure of the theory of volition would be the baseless fabric of a vision. In so far as that theory has appeared to tally with the known facts and experience of human conduct, it vouches for the existence of law in the department of voluntary action.

✓ Apart from the speculations and inductions of mental science, the practice of mankind, in the furtherance of their interests, assumes the principle of uniformity. No one ever supposes, either that human actions arise without motive, or that the same motives operate differently in the same circumstances. Hunger always impels to the search for food; tender

feeling seeks objects of affection; anger leads to acts of revenge. If there be any interruption to these sequences, it is not put down to failure of the motives, but to the co-existence of others more powerful.

The operations of trade, of government, of human intercourse generally, would be impracticable without a reign of law in the actions of human beings. The master has to assure that wages will secure service; the sovereign power would have no basis but for the deterring operation of punishment. Such a thing as *character*, or the prediction of a man's future conduct from the past, would be unknown. We could no more subsist upon uncertainty in the moral world, than we could live on a planet where gravitation was liable to fits of intermission.

If it be true that by the side of all mental phenomena there runs a line of physical causation, the interruption of the mental sequences would imply irregularity in the physical. The two worlds must stand or fall together.

The prediction of human conduct is not less sure than the prediction of physical phenomena. The training of the mind is subject to no more uncertainty than the training of the body. The difficulty in both cases is the same, the complication and obscurity of the agents at work; and there are many instances where the mental is the more predicable of the two.

The universality of the law of causation has been denied both in ancient and in modern times; but the denial has not been restricted to the domain of mind. Sokrates divided knowledge into the *divine* and the *human*. Under the *divine*, he ranked Astronomy and Physical Philosophy generally, a department that was beyond the reach of human study, and reserved by the gods for their own special control, it being a profanity on the part of human beings to enquire by what laws, or on what principles, the department was regulated. The only course permitted was to approach the deities, and to ascertain their will and pleasure, by oracles and sacrifices. The *human* department included the peculiarly Sokratic enquiries respecting just and unjust, honourable and base, piety and impiety, sobriety, temperance, courage, the government of a state, and such like matters; on all these things, it was proper and imperative to make observations and enquiries, and to be guided in our conduct by the conclusions of our own intelligence.

A modern doctrine, qualifying the law of universal causation, is seen in the theory of a particular providence expounded by Thomas Chalmers and others. It is maintained that the Deity, while observing a strict regularity in all the phenomena that are

patent and understood, as the motions of the planets, the flow of the tides, the descent of rivers, may in the unexplained mysteries introduce deviations, as in the vicissitudes of the weather, the recovery of a sick man, or in turning the scale of a complicated deliberation of the mind.

In such theories, it is to be observed, that the exception to law is not confined to the mental world, but embraces, to an equal, if not to a greater, extent, the physical world.

2. The perplexity of the question of Free-will is mainly owing to the inaptness of the terms to express the facts.

The idea of 'freedom' as attaching to the human will appears as early as the writings of the Stoics. The virtuous man was said to be *free*, and the vicious man a *slave*; the intention of the metaphor being not to explain voluntary action, but to attach an elevating and ennobling attribute to virtue. Socrates had used the same figure to contrast the inquirers into what he considered the proper departments of human study (justice, piety, &c.), with those that knew nothing of such subjects.

The epithets 'free' and 'slave,' as applied the one to the virtuous, the other to the vicious man, occur largely in the writings of Philo Judæus, through whom they probably extended to Christian Theology. As regards appropriateness in everything but the associations of dignity and indignity, no metaphors could have been more unhappy. So far as the idea of subjection is concerned, the virtuous man is the greater slave of the two; the more virtuous he is, the more he submits himself to authority and restraints of every description; while the thoroughly vicious man emancipates himself from every obligation, and is only rendered a slave at last when his fellows will tolerate him no longer. The true type of freedom is an unpunished villain, or a successful usurper.

✓ The modern doctrine of Free-will, as opposed to Necessity, first assumed prominence and importance in connexion with the theory of Original Sin, and the Predestinarian views of St. Augustin. In a later age, it was disputed between Arminians and Calvinists.

✓ The capital objection to Free-will, is the unsuitability, irrelevance, or impropriety of the metaphor 'freedom' in the question of the sequence of motive and act in volition. The proper meaning of 'free' is the absence of every every sentient being, under a motive to act, with by any other being, is to all intents free; the fox impelled

by hunger, and proceeding unmolested to a poultry yard, is a free agent. Free trade, free soil, free press, have all intelligible significations; but the question whether, without any reference to outward compulsion, a man in following the bent of his own motives, is free, or is necessitated by his motives, has no relevance. If necessity means that every time a wish arises in the mind, it is gratified without fail; that there is no bar whatever to the realizing of every conceived pleasure, and the extinction of every nascent pain; such necessity is also the acme of freedom. The unflinching sequence of motive and act, of desire and fulfilment, may be called necessity, but it is also perfect bliss; what we term freedom is but a means to such a consummation.

The speciality of voluntary action, as compared with the powers of the inanimate world, is that the antecedent and the consequent are conscious or mental states (coupled of course with bodily states). When a sentient creature is conscious of a pleasure or pain, real or ideal, and follows that up with a conscious exercise of its muscles, we have the fact of volition; a fact very different from the motion of running water, or of a shooting star, and requiring to be described in phraseology embodying mental facts as well as physical. But neither 'freedom' nor 'necessity' is the word for expressing what happens. There are always present two distinct phenomena, which have to be represented for what they are, a phenomenon of mind conjoined with a fact of body. The two phenomena are successive in time; the feeling first, the movement second. Our mental life contains a great many of these successions—pleasures followed by actions, and pains followed by actions. Not unfrequently two, three, or four feelings occur together, conspiring or conflicting with one another; and then the action is not what was wont to follow one feeling by itself, but is a resultant of the several feelings. Practically, this is a puzzle to the spectator, who cannot make due allowances for the plurality of impulses; but it makes no more difference to the phenomenon, than the difference between a stone falling perpendicular under the one force of the earth's gravity, and the moon impelled by a concurrence of forces calculable only by high mathematics.

We do not convert mental sequences into pure material laws, by calling them sequences, and maintaining them (on evidence of fact) to be uniform in their working. Even, if we did make this blundering conversion, the remedy would not lie in the use of the word 'free.' We might with equal

appropriateness. describe the stone as free to fall, the moon as free to deviate under solar disturbance; for the stone might be restrained, and the moon somehow compelled to keep to an ellipse. Such phraseology would be obviously unmeaning and absurd, but not a whit more so, than in the application to the mental sequence of voluntary action.*

3. On the doctrine of the uniform sequence of motive and action, meanings can be assigned to the several terms Choice, Deliberation, Self-Determination, Moral Agency, Responsibility.

These terms are supposed to involve, more or less, the Liberty of the Will, and to be inexplicable on any other theory. They may all be explained, however, without the mysticism of Free-will.

Choice. When a person chooses one thing out of several presented, the choice is said to involve liberty or freedom. The simple fact is that each one of the objects has a certain attraction; while that fixed upon is presumed to have the greatest attraction of any. There are three dishes before one

* As it may seem an unlikely and overstrained hypothesis to represent men of the highest enlightenment as entangled in a mere verbal inaccuracy, a few parallel cases may be presented to the student.

The Eleatic Zeno endeavoured to demonstrate the impossibility of motion. He said that a body must move either in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not; but in neither case is motion possible; for on the first supposition the body leaves its place, and the second is absurd. Here is a plain fact contradicted by what has seemed to many an unanswerable demonstration. The real answer is that the language contradicts itself; motion is incompatible with the phrase *in a place*; the fact is properly expressed by *change of place*. Introduce this definition and the puzzle is at an end; retain the incompatible expression *in a place*, and there is an insoluble mystery. By a similar ingenuity in quibbling upon the word Infinite, the same philosopher reasoned that if Achilles and a Tortoise were to begin a race, Achilles would never beat the tortoise.

In the Philebus of Plato, there is a mystical theory wrought up through the application of the terms 'true' and 'false' to pleasures and pains. Truth and falsehood are properties belonging only to affirmations or beliefs; their employment to qualify pleasure and pain can only produce the nonsensical or absurd. As well might a pleasure be called round or square, wet or dry.

Many absurd questions have arisen through misapplying the attributes of the Extended or Object World, to the Subject Mind. If we were to ask how many pure spirits could stand on the point of a needle, or be contained in a cubical space, we should be guilty of the fallacy of irrelevant predication. The schoolmen debated whether the mind was in every part of the body, or only in the whole; the question is insoluble, because unreal. It is not an intelligible proposition, but a jargon.

at table; the one partaken of is what the individual likes best on the whole. This is the entire signification of choice. *Liberty* of choice has no meaning or application, unless with reference to some prohibition from without; the child who is not allowed to eat but of one dish, has no liberty of choice. In the absence of prohibition, the decision follows the strongest motive; being in fact the only test of strength of motive on the whole. One may choose the dish that gives least present gratification, but if so, there must be some other motive of good or evil in the distance. Any supposition of our acting without adequate motive leads at once to a self-contradiction; for we always judge of strength of motive by the action that prevails.

Deliberation. This word has already been explained at length, on the Motive theory of the Will. There is nothing implied under it that would countenance the employment of the unfortunate metaphor 'freedom.' When we are subjected to two opposing motives, several things may happen. We may decide at once, which shows that one is stronger than the other; we come upon three branching roads, and follow the one on the right, showing a decided preponderance of motive in that direction. This is simple choice without deliberative suspense. The second possibility is suspended action. This shows either that the motives are equally balanced, causing indecision, or that the deliberative veto is in exercise, whose motive is the experienced evils of hasty action in cases of distracting motives. After a time, the veto is withdrawn, the judgment being satisfied that sufficient comparison of opposing solicitations has been allowed; action ensues, and testifies which motive has in the end proved the strongest.

There is no relevant application of the term 'freedom' in any part of this process, unless on the supposition of being driven into action, by a power from without. A traveller with a brigand's pistol at his ear has no liberty of deliberation, or of anything else. An assembly surrounded with an armed force has lost its freedom. A mind exempt from all such compulsion is under the play of various motives, and at last decides; some one or more of the motives is thereby demonstrated superior to the others.

Self-determination. There is supposed to be implied in this word some peculiarity not fully expressed by the sequence of motive and action. A certain entity called 'self,' irresolvable into motive, is believed to interfere in voluntary action.

But, as with the other terms, self-determination has no intelligible meaning, except as opposed to compulsion from without. If a man's conduct follows the motives of his own mind, instead of being dictated by another man, he possesses self-determination in the proper sense of the word. It is not requisite that he should act otherwise than from sufficient motives, in order to be self-determined. 'Self' in the matter of action, is only the sum of the feelings, pleasurable and painful, actual and ideal, that impel the conduct, together with the various activities impelled.

Self-determination may be used to indicate an important difference in our motives, the difference between the *permanent* interests and the *temporary* solicitations. He that submits to the first class is considered to be more particularly self-determined, than he that gives way to the temporary and passing motives. The distinction is real and important, and has been fully accounted for in the exposition of the Will. To neutralize, by internal resources, the fleeting actualities of pleasure and pain, is a great display of moral power, but has no bearing upon the supposed 'freedom' of the will. It is a fact of character, exactly expressed by the acquired strength of the ideal motives, which strength is shown by the fact of superiority to the present and the actual. Rigorous constancy is the glory of the character; the higher the constancy, the predictability, of the agent, the higher the excellence attained.

The collective 'I' or 'self' can be nothing different from the Feelings, Actions, and Intelligence of the individual; unless, indeed, the threefold classification of the mind be incomplete. But so long as human conduct can be accounted for by assigning certain Sensibilities to pleasure and pain, an Active machinery, and an Intelligence, we need not assume anything else to make up the 'I' or 'self.' When 'I' walk in the fields, there is nothing but a certain motive, founded in my feelings, operating upon my active organs; the sequence of these two portions of self gives the whole fact. The mode of expression 'I walk' does not alter the nature of the phenomenon.

Self-determination may put on an appearance of evading or contradicting the sequence of the will; as when a man departs from his usual line of conduct in order to puzzle or mystify spectators. It is, however, very obvious that the suspension of the person's usual conduct is still not without motive; there is a sufficiency of motive in the feelings of pride or satisfaction, in baulking the curiosity, or in overthrowing the calculations, of other persons.

The word 'Spontaneity' is a synonym for self-determination, but comes no nearer to a justification of the absurd metaphor. We have seen one important meaning of the word, in the doctrine of the inherent activity of the animal system, as contrasted with the activity stimulated by sense. The more common meaning is the same as above described, and has a tacit reference to the absence of compulsion, or even of suggestion or prompting, from without. The witness of a crime, in giving information without being summoned, acts spontaneously.

Moral Agency. The word 'moral' is ambiguous. As opposed to physical or material, it means mental, belonging to mind; in which signification, a moral agent is a voluntary agent, a being whose actions are impelled by its feelings.

It is no part of moral agency, in this sense, that there should be any suspension of the usual course of motives; it is necessary only that the individual being should feel pleasure and pain, and act with reference to those feelings. Every creature possessing mind is a moral agent.

In the second meaning, moral is opposed to immoral, or wrong, and is the same as 'right.' This is a much narrower signification. When Moral Philosophy is restricted to mean Ethical philosophy, or Duty, 'Moral' means appertaining to right and wrong, to duty, morality.

In this sense, a moral agent is one that acts according to right or duty, or else one whose actions are made amenable to a standard of right and wrong. The brutes are not moral agents in this signification, although they are in the preceding; no more are children, or the insane.

The circumstances that explain moral agency, in the narrower and more dignified application of the word, appear best in connexion with the word next to be commented on.

Responsibility, Accountability. A moral agent is usually said to be a responsible or accountable agent. The word responsibility is, properly speaking, figurative; by what is called 'metonymy,' the fact intended to be expressed is denoted by one of the adjuncts. A whole train of circumstances is supposed, of which only one is named. There are assumed (1) Law, or Authority, (2) actual or possible Disobedience, (3) an Accusation brought against the person disobeying, (4) the Answer to this accusation, and (5) the infliction of Punishment, in case the answer is deemed insufficient to purge the accusation.

It is hard at a first glance to see what connexion a supposed freedom of action has to do with any part of this process. According to the motive theory of the will, all is plain and straightforward. Assume the existence of Law, and everything follows by a natural course. To ensure obedience to law there must be some pain inflicted on the disobedient, sufficient, and no more than sufficient, to deter from disobedience. Whoever is placed under the law, is liable to the penalty of disobeying it; but in all countries, ever so little civilized, certain forms are gone through to ensure the guilt of every one accused of disobedience, to which the words Responsibility, Accountability, are strictly applicable; after these forms are satisfied, and the guilt established, the penalty is inflicted.

Endless puzzles are foisted into a very simple process, the moment the word 'freedom' is mentioned. It is said, that it would not be right to punish a man unless he were a free agent; a truism, if by freedom is meant only the absence of outward compulsion; in any other sense, a piece of absurdity. If it is expedient to place restrictions upon the conduct of sentient beings, and if the threatening of pain operates to arrest such conduct, the case for punishment is made out. We must justify the institution of Law, to begin with, and the tendency of pain to prevent the actions that bring it on, in the next place. The first postulate is Human Society; the second is the connexion (which must be uniform) between pain and action for avoiding it. Granting these two postulates, Punishability (carrying with it, in a well constituted society, Responsibility), is amply vindicated.

Whatever be the view taken of the ends of Punishment, it supposes the theory of the will as here contended for, namely, a uniform connexion between motive and act. Unless pain, present or prospective, impels human beings to avoid whatever brings it, and to perform whatever delivers from it, punishment has no relevance, whether the end be the benefit of the society, or the benefit of the offender, or both together.*

* The question has been debated, 'Is a man responsible for his Belief;' in other words, Is society justified in punishing men for their opinions? The two criteria of punishability will indicate the solution. In the first place, ought there to be Laws declaring that all citizens shall believe certain things? Secondly, will pains and penalties influence a man's belief, in the same way that they can influence actions? The answer to the first question, is another question, 'Shall there be Toleration of all opinions?' The answer to the second is, that penalties are

Another factitious difficulty originated in relation to punishment is the argument of the Owenites, 'that a man's actions are the result of his character, and he is not the author of his character: instead of punishing criminals, therefore, society should give them a better education.' The answer to which is, that society should do its best to educate all citizens to do right; but what if this education consists mainly in Punishment? Withdraw the power of punishing, and there is left no conceivable instrument of moral education. It is true that a good moral discipline is not wholly made up of punishment; the wise and benevolent parent does something, by the methods of allurement and kindness, to form the virtuous dispositions of the child. Still, we may ask, was ever any human being educated to the sense of right and wrong without the dread of pain accompanying forbidden actions? It may be affirmed, with safety, that punishment, or retribution in some form, is one-half of the motive power to virtue in the very best of human beings, while it is more than three-fourths in the mass of mankind.

Another awkward form of expression connected with the subject is, that 'we can improve our character if we will.' This seems contradictory to the motive theory of the Will, which makes man, as it were, the creature of circumstances. There is in the language, however, merely an example of the snares that we may get ourselves into, through seizing a question by the wrong end. Our character is improvable, when there are present to our minds motives to improve it; it is not improvable without such motives. No character is ever improved without an apposite train of motives—either the punishment renounced by the Owenite, or certain feelings of another kind, such as affections, sympathies, lofty ideals, and so on. To present these motives to the mind of any one is to employ the engines of improvement. To say to a man, you can improve if you will, is to employ a nonsensical formula; under cover of which, however, may lie some genuine motive power. For the speaker is, at the same time, intimating his own strong wish that his hearer should improve; he is presenting to the hearer's mind the IDEA of improvement: and probably, along with that, a number of fortifying considerations, all of the nature of proper motives.

able to control beliefs, with a slight qualification. They can put a stop to the *profession* of any opinion; and in matters of doubtful speculation, they can so dispose the course of education and enquiry, that the mass of mankind shall firmly believe whatever the State dictates.

The word 'will,' in such expressions as the above, is a fiction thrust into the phenomenon of volition, like the word 'power' in cause and effect generally. To express causation we need only name one thing, the antecedent, or cause, and another thing, the effect; a flying cannon shot is a cause, the tumbling down of a wall is the effect. But people sometimes allow themselves the use of the additional word 'power' to complete, as they suppose, the statement; the cannon ball in motion has the 'power' to batter walls; a pure expletive, or pleonasm, whose tendency is to create a mystical or fictitious agency, in addition to the real agent, the moving ball. .

To say we can be virtuous if we like, is about the worst way of expressing the simple fact, namely, that virtuous acts and a virtuous character are the consequence of certain appropriate motives or antecedents. Whoever wishes to make another person virtuous can proceed direct to the mark by supplying the known antecedents, not omitting penalties; whoever wishes to make himself virtuous, has, in the very act of wishing, a present motive, which will go a certain way to produce the effect.

The use of the phrase 'you can if you will,' besides acting as a cover for real motives, is a sort of appeal to the pride or dignity of a human being, and in that circumstance, may not be without some Rhetorical efficiency; insinuated praise is an oratorical weapon. As Rhetoric, the language may have some justification; the disaster is that the Rhetoric should be taken for good science and logic. The whole series of phrases connected with Will-Freedom, Choice, Deliberation, Self-Determination, Power to act if we will—are contrived to foster in us a feeling of artificial importance and dignity, by assimilating the too humble sequence of motive and act to the illustrious functions of the Judge, the Sovereign, the Umpire.

HISTORY OF THE FREE-WILL CONTROVERSY.

✓ PLATO makes the distinction of voluntary and involuntary (*ἐκούσιος* and *ἀκούσιος*); but he does not ask whether the will is self-determined or whether it is necessitated.

ARISTOTLE'S doctrine of the Voluntary and Involuntary, as contained in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book III., is fully given in the abstract of that work (ETHICAL SYSTEMS, Aristotle). The misleading terms—Liberty and Necessity—had not in his time found their way into the subject; and he discusses the motives to the will from a practical and inductive point of view.

The STOICS and EPICUREANS, like Aristotle, can hardly be regarded as contributing to the history of the proper Free-will

controversy, and their views are best given in connexion with their ethical doctrines (ETHICAL SYSTEMS, The Stoics, and The Epicureans).

From PLOTINUS we learn how the problem of freedom was understood by the NEO-PLATONISTS. Will (*Θέλησις*) is not a faculty of the soul but its essential attribute. It is not the same thing as liberty. Voluntary action (*τὸ ἐκούσιον*) is power to act accompanied by a consciousness of what is done. Liberty is when the power to act is not impeded by any external restraint. Thus killing a man unconsciously is a free act, but not voluntary. Liberty in man consists in being able to live a pure and perfect life, conformably to the nature of the soul. The nature of every creature tends necessarily towards its good; whatever diverts it from this end is involuntary; whatever leads it thither is voluntary. Freedom is thus made to consist in independence of external causes. Plotinus does not therefore touch the peculiar problem of the will, whether the will is necessarily determined by motives; but merely expands the popular notion that freedom is to follow persistently what is good, and slavery to follow what is bad. We speak of slaves to sin, more rarely of slaves to holiness; yet, from the point of view of necessity, both expressions are equally correct, or equally incorrect.

The Christian Apologists of the second century insist strongly on what they call the freedom of the will. In opposition to the fatalism of the Stoics, and the apathy of the Epicureans, they laid great stress upon man's power to judge and act for himself. JUSTIN MARTYR (A.D. 150) attacks the Stoical doctrine of Fate. It is opposed to their own moral teaching, and overlooks the power of the demons. It is by free choice that men do right or wrong, and it is by the power of the demons that earnest men, like Sokrates, suffer, while Sardanapalus and Epicurus live in abundance and glory. The Stoics maintained that all things took place according to the necessity of Fate. Justin pointed out the dilemma in which this doctrine held them. If everything be derived from fate, wickedness is, and so God or fate is the cause of sin. The alternative is, that there is no real difference between virtue and vice, which is contrary to all sound sense and reason.

TERTULLIAN (160-220) in his paper against Marcion, vindicates the freedom of the will. Could not God have prevented the entrance of sin? And if he could, why did he not? Tertullian answers that evil arose, not from God, but from man. Man was left free to choose good or evil, life or death. But should not God have withheld this fatal gift? Nay, in bestowing liberty, was he not responsible for the consequent fall? Tertullian answers very rhetorically, what could be better than to make man in the image of God? It would be strange if man, the lord of others, should himself be a slave. This argument illustrates the use that the theory of free-will has been put to by theologians. It has been regarded as a door of escape from the awful dilemma that, in all ages, staggers piety, and strikes reason dumb: If God

was willing that evil should be, he is not good; if he was unwilling, then he is not Almighty. This imports into the discussion an apparently insoluble contradiction, and necessarily leads to bewilderment and mystery. Admitting that our volitions are subject to the law of causation, it is possible and easy to vindicate human justice; it is possible even, to a certain extent, to vindicate divine justice. For since we are imperfect and in need of moral discipline, we must see that punishment is eminently calculated to effect our improvement. Why we were not made perfect at once, why the pursuit of happiness should be so arduous—it belongs not to any theory of the will to explain.

ST. AUGUSTIN, Bishop of Hippo (353-429), is as warm as Tertullian on the other side. He is the author of a complete scheme of Predestination that continued with little variation to the close of the theological discussion of Free Will. His views underwent several changes in the course of his life, but the shape they finally took remains identified with the doctrine of Predestination. The foundation of his views was his theory of grace and faith. He affirmed the total inability of man to accomplish any good works. Good works, the smallest as well as the greatest, come wholly from God. Grace attracts the corrupt will of man, and with an irresistible necessity awakens him to the need of redemption and to faith. This grace is bestowed not for merit, but of God's free gift. The will is determined and controlled by the agency of God, in consequence of what he has foreordained. The Elect were chosen, not because it was foreseen that they would believe and become holy (as most of the earlier fathers held), but in order that they might be made holy. Augustin thus clearly distinguishes his doctrine from that of mere foreknowledge. He holds that some were chosen to eternal life, and others were predestined to everlasting punishment. 'Whom he teaches, he teaches of his mercy; whom he does not teach, he does not teach because of judgment.' This doctrine seems to make God unjust. He foreordains that a man shall sin, and for this sin consigns him to eternal torments. Augustin's solution of the difficulty turns upon the doctrine of original sin. In Adam all men sinned, and rendered themselves justly liable to endless punishment. Adam's sin was the sin of every one of us. But Adam had free-will; it was in his own power to fix his destiny; he chose evil and death, and by his choice we all are irrevocably committed. God is not therefore the cause of that sin and consequent ruin; he cannot be accused of injustice in leaving us in the state to which we have *constructively*, as lawyers would say, brought ourselves. The origin of evil is thus placed in the free-will of Adam, not in the decree of God. As this reasoning, even if conclusive, seems more fitted to silence than to convince, Augustin feels the necessity of advancing a step farther. In his tract on Grace and Free-will, he observes, that God moves men's hearts towards good works of his mercy; towards bad according to their deserts, by a judgment in part made known, in part mysterious, but always just. He does not elec-

men according to any merit they possess, but according to a hidden judgment. Let not injustice be attributed to God, who is the fountain of wisdom and justice. When he permits men to be seduced or hardened, believe that it is on account of their demerits; in those whom he mercifully saves, behold the grace of God rendering good for evil.

While Augustin's doctrine of Predestination seems to have left no place for free-will, we yet find warnings that in defending grace, free-will must not be given up, nor in defending free-will must grace be given up. It seems difficult to attribute any meaning to free-will in such passages. How is the existence of irresistible grace compatible with free self-determination! Again, he tells us that by the fall man lost both himself and his free will; that the will is truly free, when it is not the slave of vice or sin. Also, free-will is given to man, so that punishment for sin, both by divine and human law, is just. Neander observes that Augustin has confounded the conception of freedom, as a certain stage of moral development, and freedom from the determination of motives—a faculty possessed by all rational minds. Mozley says, after carefully examining the language of Augustin, that free-will means, with him, mere voluntary action, such as is admitted by all necessitarians; that the will (except perhaps Adam's) has no self-determining power, but is determined to evil and to good respectively, by original sin and by grace.

AQUINAS. Aquinas is a follower of Augustin in the doctrine of original sin, irresistible grace, and predestination. '*Præscientia meritorum non est causa vel ratio prædestinationis.*' The doctrines of the church were to the schoolmen, what the acts of the legislature are to lawyers. They were subjects of deduction and argument, but not themselves to be questioned. But there is endless opportunity for ingenious interpretation in reconciling the doctrines with truth, or the laws with justice. It is, therefore, interesting to observe how Aquinas endeavoured to evade the consequences of a doctrine that he was not permitted to deny.

(1) In the first place, the number of the reprobate was made as small as possible, as though that would lighten the difficulty. Perhaps, he says, the angels that did not fall with Satan, were more numerous than all the damned—men and devils together.

(2) The difference between eternal happiness and misery *propter* amounts merely to degrees of good. According to Aquinas, there are two kinds of happiness; one is natural and attainable by mere human effort; the other is spiritual. There is a corresponding distinction in virtue. There is a goodness in the world sufficient to attain natural happiness, as well as grace to attain spiritual happiness. Those kinds of goodness have their source respectively in Reason, and in God. The difference between those conditions is not one of good and evil, but of higher and lower good. Aquinas does not venture, further than by hints, to apply this theory of happiness to predestination and reprobation, except in one case. In favour of infants dying in original sin, he euden-

vours, by an ingenious feat of interpretation, to extract the sting from eternal punishment.

(3) Infants dying in original sin, are under the divine wrath due to that sin. However hard this conclusion may seem, it is unavoidable; infants are condemned not for actual, but for constructive, sin. But Augustin had said that the punishment of infants in hell was the mildest possible—*omnium esse mitissimam*. Aquinas then asks, if it was a *sensible* (or corporeal) punishment? No, for then it would not be the mildest possible. Did it involve affliction of soul? No, for that could arise only either from *culpa* or from *pœna*. If it arose from *culpa*, that implied the presence of an accusing conscience, and it would not be the mildest. Nor could it arise from *pœna*, which implied actual sin, or a will in opposition to the will of God. What then was the punishment of infants? It was the want of Divine Vision—the object that the supernatural faculties sought. 'In the other goods to which nature tends upon her own principles, those condemned for original sin will sustain no detriment.' The only difficulty now was a saying of St. Chrysostom's, that the loss of Divine Vision was the severest part of the punishment of the damned. Aquinas answers, that it is no pain to a well-ordered mind to want what its nature is not adapted to, provided the want does not arise from any fault of its own. The infants will rejoice in their lot, not repining because they are not angels. This reasoning, though confined by Aquinas to the case of infants, yet applies logically to the good, moral man, whose fault is substantially (unless a very technical view of sin be adopted) the sin of our first parents.*

✓ CALVIN popularized the predestinarian views of St. Augustin. He accepts them in all their rigour, excluding every softening modification. He rejects the subtlety of Thomas Aquinas, that God predestinates man to glory, according to his merit, inasmuch as he decreed to bestow upon him the grace by which he merits glory. He held that God foreordained some to heaven, and others to hell, not for any merit or demerit, but simply because it was his will so to do. The fall of Adam was not to be attributed to free will, but to the divine decree.

§ The opponent of Augustin was PELAGIUS, who claimed for man complete freedom of self-determination and ascribed to God only

* Mozley's *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, p. 302. We may subjoin some distinctions taken in regard to Freedom and Necessity. Peter Lombard says that three kinds of liberty must be discriminated:—(1) Freedom from necessity, which is possessed by God, since he cannot be coerced, and which, in man, is not affected by the fall; (2) freedom from sin, which was lost by the fall; (3) freedom from misery. Thomas Aquinas marks the following kinds of necessity:—(1) Natural, Absolute, or Intrinsic Necessity—that which cannot but be—is either *material* (e.g. *quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi*) or *formal* (e.g. that the angles in a triangle are equal to two right angles). (2) Extrinsic Necessity is either of *means to ends* (as that food is necessary to life), or of *compulsion*, which last alone excludes will. Aquinas makes much of the

foreknowledge of what men, '*per liberæ voluntatis arbitrium*,' would elect to do. After the time of Calvin, at the beginning of the 17th century, this view was again strongly advocated by ARMINIUS in Holland; and thenceforth the opposed tenets, in the theological phase of the question, have passed under the names of Calvinism and Arminianism.

The philosophical aspect begins to be more exclusively considered with the names that follow.

HOBBS. Hobbes's opinion on the Free-will controversy is given very clearly and concisely in a short tract on 'Liberty and Necessity,' written in answer to another by Bishop Bramhall. He gives first his opinion, under several heads, and afterwards assigns his reasons.

(1) When it occurs to a man to do or not to do a certain action, and he has no time, or no occasion, to *deliberate*, 'the doing it or abstaining necessarily follow the present thought he hath of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself.' In anger, the action follows the idea of revenge, in fear that of escape. Such actions are voluntary; for a voluntary action is one that follows immediately the last appetite (Hobbes's phrase for volition). Rash actions are strictly voluntary, and therefore punishable, 'For no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not.'

(2) *Deliberation* means considering whether it would be better to do the action or abstain, by imagining the consequences of it, both good and evil. This alternate imagination of good and evil consequences is the same as alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action.

(3) In deliberation, that is, the succession of contrary appetites, the last is the Will, and immediately precedes the doing of the action. All the appetites, prior to the last, are mere intentions or inclinations.

(4) An action is voluntary, if done upon deliberation, that is, upon choice and election. The meaning of *free*, as applied to a voluntary agent, is that he has not made an end of deliberating.

(5) '*Liberty* is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature of the agent.' [This means free-

difference between *judicium* and *ratio*. Brutes have not freedom; the sheep avoids a wolf, not *ex collatione gradum rationis*, but by natural instinct. But man has *ratio*, and *ratio* in contingent matters is concerned with opposites, and is not bound to follow any one. Inasmuch as man has *ratio*, he is not tied to one course. Will is related to free-will as *intellectus* is to *ratio*. *Intellectus* involves a mere apprehension of anything, as where principles are known of themselves without any effort; but to reason is *deinire ex uno in contrarium alterum*. In like manner, will (*velle*) is simply the desire of anything for its own sake; free-will (*liberum velle*) is the desire of anything as a means to an end. The end is related to the means, as a principle is to the conclusion dependent upon it.

dom from compulsion; Hobbes does not allow necessity to be a true contrast to freedom.]

✓ (6) Nothing begins from itself. Hence, when an appetite or will arises, the cause is not the will itself, but something else, not in one's own disposing. The will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions, other things (than the will itself) are the cause of the will, therefore all voluntary actions have necessary causes; in other words, are necessitated.

✓ (7) A sufficient or necessary cause is that which alone produces the effect. This is merely an identical proposition, to show that whatever is produced, is produced necessarily. The cause being given, the effect necessarily follows.

(8) The ordinary definition of a free agent, as that which, 'when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it,' is contradictory and nonsensical.

For the truth of the five first positions, Hobbes appeals to every one's reflection and experience. The sixth position is, that nothing can begin *without a cause*. Now, there must be some special reason why a thing begins, when it does begin, rather than sooner or later; or else the thing must be eternal. The seventh point is, that events have *necessary causes*, if they have *sufficient causes*, that is, in fact, if they have causes at all. From these principles it follows that there is no freedom from necessity. He adds, as an *argumentum ad hominem* to the bishop, that if necessity be denied, the decrees and prescience of God will be left without foundation.

✓ DESCARTES, in his Fourth Meditation, gives a definition of Will and Freedom. 'The power of will consists only in this, that we are able to do or not to do the same thing, or rather in this *that we are not determined to do by the* greater as we are more inclined towards truth or goodness. Indifference, not moving for want of a reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and manifests a lack of knowledge rather than perfection of will.

✓ In itself, Freedom is the same in man as in God, but it is exercised under different conditions. The will of God must have been indifferent from all eternity, as there was no antecedent idea of truth or good to determine it. It was from his almighty power that truth and good first arose. But man is differently situated: goodness has been established by God, and towards it the will cannot but tend. We are most free when the perfect knowledge of an object drives us to pursue it.

✓ In answer to Hobbes, Descartes adduces the evidence of consciousness. However difficult it may be to reconcile *foreordination* with liberty, we have an internal feeling that the voluntary and the free are the same. This seems to indicate an anxiety to

establish the internal fact, while otherwise willing to give up a liberty of indifference.

Theologically, he maintains a stringent theory of Providence. The perfection of God required that the least thought in us should have been pre-determined from all eternity. The decrees of God are unchangeable, and prayer has an efficacy only because the prayer is decreed together with the answer.

LOCKE was led in his chapter on Power (although it formed no part of his original plan), to investigate the nature of the will. He purposely avoided the metaphysical controversies regarding predestination and providence, refusing to deal with any supposed 'consequences,' and rigorously confining himself to the question—What is the nature of the liberty possessed by men? The opinion of so acute and impartial a mind upon the bare facts of the case, must be taken as a near approach to the testimony of consciousness. Like Aristotle, he draws the distinction between voluntary and involuntary, but does not separate the voluntary from the *freely* voluntary.* He recognizes a meaning in liberty as opposed to coercion, but not as opposed to necessity. He defines freedom as 'our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will.' This is the very definition contended for by Hobbes, and afterwards expressly adopted by the necessitarian Collins.

In Book II., Chap. XXI., he discusses the idea of Power. He enters at length into the nature of Will, and handles first the doctrine of Free-will, and next the motives to the will. As regards Freedom, he endeavours to extricate the question from the confused modes of expressing it. The true question is not whether the will is free, but whether the man is free. Liberty is the power to do or to forbear doing any particular action, according to the preference or direction of one's own mind.† A man is free, if his actions follow his mental motives—pleasures and pains; he is not free, when anything external to him forbids the actions so moved. Volition is an act of the mind exerting the dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, but is an operation better understood by any one's self-reflection, than by all the words employed to describe it. It is not to be confounded with desire; we may will to produce an effect that we do not desire.

With reference to the motive power, Locke resolves it into the *uneasiness* of the state of Desire. Hunger, thirst, and sex, are modes of uneasiness. When good determines the will, it operates first by creating a sense of uneasiness from the want of it. We find that the greatest prospects of good, as the joys of heaven,

* B. II. Chap. XXI., § 11.

† Locke asks the further question—whether a man is as free to will, as he is free to do what he wills. Of two courses, is he free to will whichever he pleases? This question involves an absurdity. They that make a question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that; and so on *in infinitum*.

have a comparatively feeble motive power; while a bodily pain, violent love, passion, or revenge, can keep the will steady and intent. In a conflict, the will is urged by the greatest present uneasiness.

Looking at the innumerable solicitations to the will, and the way that our desires rise and fall by the working of our thoughts, Locke adds another condition of our Liberty of willing—namely, the power of suspending the prosecution of a desire, to give opportunity to examine all the consequences of the act: it is not a fault, but a perfection in our nature, to act on the final result of a fair examination. The constant determination towards our own happiness is no abridgment of liberty. A man could not be free, if his will were determined by anything but his own desire, guided by his own judgment.

SPINOZA denied free-will, because it was inconsistent with the nature of God, and with the laws to which human actions are subject. In a certain sense, God has freedom, as acting from a necessity inherent in his nature. But man has not even this freedom; his actions are determined by God. There is nothing really contingent. Contingency, free determination, disorder, chance, lie only in our ignorance.

The supposed consciousness of freedom arises from a forgetfulness of the causes that dispose us to will and desire. Volitions are the varying appetites of the soul. When there is a conflict of passions, men hardly know what they wish; but, in the absence of passion, the least impulse one way or another determines them. A volition implies memory, but memory is not in our power, so then volition cannot be. In dreams we make decisions as if awake, with the same consciousness of freedom; are those fantastic decisions to be considered free? Those who fancy that their soul decides freely, dream with their eyes open. Another explanation is that the undetermined will is the universal will abstracted from particular volitions. Although every actual volition has a cause, yet this abstract will is thought of as undetermined, for determinism is no part of the conception of volition.

God is not the author of evil, because evil is nothing positive. Everything that is, is perfect. Any imperfection arises from our habit of forming abstract ideas, and judging of things thereby as if they were all susceptible of the perfection that belongs to the definition, and were imperfect in so far as they fell short of it. But the good and the bad are not on an equality, although they both express in their way the will of God. The good have more perfection in being more closely allied to God.

The necessity of evil does not render punishment unjust. The wicked, although necessarily wicked, are none the less on that account to be feared and destroyed. A wicked man may be excusable, but this does not affect the treatment he must receive; a man bitten by a mad dog is not blameworthy, but people have a right to put him to death.

COLLINS has explained and defended the necessitarian doctrine

in 'A Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty.' He accepts I
he wills

have defined it in such a way as not to contradict necessity, or have conceded so much as to leave themselves no ground to stand upon. On the other hand, experience testifies that we are necessary agents, that our volitions are determined by causes; and even the supporters of free-will acknowledge that we do not prefer the worse, in other words, do not follow the weaker motive. (2) Whatever has a beginning has a cause, and every cause is a necessary cause. The doctrine of free-will is, therefore, a contradiction of the law of causality. (3) Liberty is an imperfection, and necessity an advantage and perfection. It is no perfection to be able to choose one out of two or more indifferent things. Angels are more perfect than men, because they are necessarily determined to prefer good to evil. (4) The decrees of God are necessary causes of events. Foreordination and liberty are mutually subversive. (5) If man were not a necessary agent, determined by pleasure and pain, there would be no foundation for rewards and punishment.

LEIBNITZ. 1. *The Nature of Liberty and Necessity.* Necessity is of two kinds—hypothetical and absolute. Hypothetical necessity is that laid upon future contingents by God's foreknowledge. This does not derogate from liberty. God's choice of the present from among possible worlds did not change, but only actualized, the free natures of his creatures. There is another distinction. Logical, Metaphysical, or Mathematical necessity depends upon the law of *Identity* or *Contradiction*; while moral necessity depends on the law of *Sufficient Reason*, and is simply the mind choosing the best, or following the strongest inclination. The principle of sufficient Reason affirms that every event has certain conditions, constituting the reason why it exists. God's perfect nature requires that he should not act without reason, nor prefer a weaker reason to a stronger. This necessity is compatible with freedom in God; so also in us. Motives do not impose upon us any absolute necessity, more than upon him. Without an inclination to good, choice would be mere blind chance. In things absolutely indifferent, there can be no choice, election, or will; since choice must be founded on some reason or principle. A will, acting without any motive, is a fiction, chimerical and self-contradictory.

2. *Necessity and Fatalism.* To the objection that necessity is identical with Fatalism, Leibnitz answers by distinguishing three kinds of fatalism. There is a Mohammedan fatalism, which supposes that if the effect is pre-determined, it happens without the cause. The fatalism of the Stoics taught men to be quiescent, for they were powerless to resist the course of things. There is a third kind of fatalism accepted by all Christians, admitting a certain destiny of things regulated by the providence of God.

3. *The influence of motives.* Leibnitz compared the will to a balance, and motives to the weights in the scales. This simile was taken from Bayle to illustrate the inactivity of the will, when under the pressure of equal motives, and of its action when one preponderated. Clarke objected to it on the ground that a balance is passive, while men are active beings. Leibnitz answered that the principle of sufficient reason was common to both agents and patients. He admits, however, that, strictly speaking, motives do not act on the mind as weights in a balance; they are rather dispositions in virtue of which the mind acts. To say that the mind can prefer a weak motive to a strong one, implies that it has other dispositions than motives, by virtue of which it can accept or reject the motives; whereas motives include all dispositions to act. The fear of a great pain weighs down the expectation of a pleasure. In the conflict of two passions, the stronger is victorious, unless the other is aided by reason or by some concurring passion. But generally a conflict of motives involves more than two; so that a better comparison than the balance would be, a force tending in many directions, and acting in the line of least resistance. Air compressed in a glass receiver, finds its way out where the glass is weakest.

SAMUEL CLARKE affirmed the existence of a power of self-motion or self-determination, which, in all animate agents, is spontaneity, in moral agents, is liberty. It is a great error to regard the mind as passive, like a balance. 'A free agent, when there is more than one perfectly reasonable way of acting, has still within itself, by virtue of its self-motive principle, a power of acting; and it may have strong reasons not to forbear acting, when yet there may be no possible reason for preferring one way to another.' Leibnitz pointed out the contradiction here, for if the mind has good reasons, there is no indifference. A man never has a sufficient reason for acting, when he has not a sufficient reason to act in a definite manner. No action can be general or abstracted from its circumstances, but must always be executed in some particular manner.

Clarke stakes the whole controversy upon the existence of this self-moving faculty. If man has not this power, then every human action is produced by some extrinsic cause; either the motive, or some subtle matter, or some other being. If it be a motive, then either abstract notions (i.e. motives) have a real subsistence (i.e. are substances), or else what is not a substance can put a body in motion. It is unnecessary to follow him in the other alternatives.

With reference to the action of motives, Clarke says the question is not whether a good or wise being cannot do evil or act unwisely, but whether the immediate physical cause of action be some sufficient reason acting on the agent, or the agent himself. This theory of self-motion has been severely criticized by Sir W. Hamilton. Clarke's definition, he observes, amounts only to the liberty of spontaneity, and not to liberty from necessity. Now, 'the greatest spontaneity is the greatest necessity.'

JONATHAN EDWARDS vindicates the doctrine of philosophical necessity in his work on the 'Freedom of the Will' (1754) in the interest of Calvinistic theology. His treatise, however, consists almost exclusively of philosophical arguments.

1. Edwards's own view. The will is that by which the mind chooses anything; and we are so constituted that on the mind choosing or wishing a movement of the body, the movement follows. The Will is determined by the strongest motive, and the strongest motive is the greatest apparent good. [By motive, he means the whole of what acts on the will.] Necessity is only a full and fixed connection between things; moral necessity is simply the fixed connexion between motives and volitions. Liberty is a power to do as one pleases; it is opposed to constraint and restraint. The other meanings ascribed to liberty are: (1) a Self-determining power, whereby the will causes its own volitions; (2) Indifference, or that, previous to volition, the mind is in equilibrium; (3) Contingence, the denial of any fixed connection between motives and volitions. These conceptions of liberty he proceeds to refute.

2. *Self-determination* is inconsistent and inconceivable. If the will determines its own acts, it doubtless does so in the same way in which it produces bodily movements—by acts of volition. Hence every free volition is preceded by a prior volition; and if this prior volition be free, it must be preceded by a prior volition, and so on *in infinitum*. Hence arises a contradiction. The first act of a series cannot be free, for it must have another before it; if the first act is not free, none of the subsequent acts can be free. It may be urged in reply, that there is no prior act determining a free volition, but that the act of determining is the same with the act of willing. The effect of this reply is, that the free volition is determined by nothing; it is entirely uncaused. Instead, therefore, of saying the will is self-determined, the proper expression would be *indetermined*. Indeterminism thus affirms that our volitions do not arise from any causes. It therefore contradicts the law of causality. Cause is sometimes defined as that which has a positive efficiency to produce an effect; but, in this sense, the absence of the sun would not be the cause of the fall of dew. A cause is the reason or ground why an event happens so and not otherwise; it is an antecedent firmly conjoined with its consequent. In this sense, everything that begins to be, must have a cause. This is a dictate of common sense, and the basis of all reasoning on things past, present, and to come. If things may exist without a cause, there is no possible proof for the existence of God. Nay more, we could be sure of nothing but what was present to our consciousness.

Indeterminism is sometimes made to depend on the active nature of the soul. Material events may require causes, but volitions do not depend on causes, or rather (for the sake of verbally saving causality) the soul is the cause of its volitions. Edwards answers, that this may explain why the soul acts at all, but not

why it acts in a particular manner. And, unless the soul produce diverse acts, it cannot produce diverse effects, otherwise the same cause, in the same circumstances, would produce different effect at different times. In order, however, to demonstrate the futility of the argument drawn from the activity of the soul, it is necessary to examine carefully the notions of *Action* and *Passion*. It is said, by Dr. Clarke, that a necessary agent is a self-contradiction. Action excludes a moving cause, because to be an effect is to be passive. This is to build a demonstration on an arbitrary definition of a word. Edwards sums up the contradictions involved in the notion of activity as follows:—‘To their notion of action, these things are essential—viz., That it should be necessary, and not necessary; that it should be from a cause, and no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice or design, and not the fruit of choice or design; that it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring immediately out of indifference, and yet be the effect of preponderation; that it should be self-originated, and also have its original from something else.’ Absurd and inconsistent with itself, this metaphysical idea of action is entirely different from the common notion. The usual meaning of action is bodily movement: less strictly, heat is said to act upon wax. According to usage, action never means self-determination. Action may have a cause other than the agent, as easily as life may have a cause other than the living being. The same thing may be both cause and effect in respect of different objects. Metaphysicians have changed the meaning of the words ‘action’ and ‘necessity,’ but keep up the old attributes in spite of the new and distinct application of the term.

3. *Liberty of Indifference*. The will is alleged to be able to choose between two things equally attractive to the mind. But there never is such a perfect equality. Suppose I wish to touch any one spot on a chess-board, I generally accomplish it by some such steps as the following:—I make first a general resolution to touch some one, then determine to select one by chance—to touch what is nearest or most in the eye at some moment, and lastly I fix upon some one selected under those conditions. But at no step is there any equilibrium of motives. Among several objects, some one will catch the eye; ideas are not equally strong in the mind at one moment, or if so, they do not long continue. It must be kept distinctly in view, that what the will is more immediately concerned with, is not the objects, but the acts to be done concerning them. The objects may appear equal, but among the acts to be done affecting them, one may be decidedly preferable.

If indifference is regarded as essential to liberty, several absurd consequences follow. Indifference is often sinful. It is a state in which a man is as ready to choose, as to avoid, sin. It is destroyed by the presence of any habitual bias, and such bias can be neither virtuous nor vicious. The nearer habits of virtue are

to infallibility, the less are they free and praiseworthy. Indifference is inconsistent with regarding any disposition or quality of mind as either virtuous or vicious. So in proportion to the strength of a motive, liberty is destroyed. Hence moral suasion is opposed to freedom. Finally, a choice without motive, and for no end, can have neither prudence nor wisdom in it.

4. *Contingence* is involved in liberty. But this cannot be, for no event happens without a cause. Hence events are necessarily connected with their causes, by which, however, Edwards means only that they invariably follow their causes. His definition of cause is correct; his only error was in retaining the word 'necessity' with its irrelevant and misleading associations.

5. *The influence of motives.* It is generally allowed that no volition takes place without a motive; but the mind, it is alleged, has the power of complying with the motive or not. This is a plain contradiction. How can the mind determine what motives shall influence it, and yet the motives be the ground or reason of its determination? Again, it is urged that volition does not follow the strongest motive. If not, then it must follow the weaker, that is, *pro tanto*, it acts without any motive. This is to contradict the law of cause and effect, and was, Edwards conceived, a perfect *reductio ad absurdum*. He did not anticipate that any one would impugn the universality of cause and effect.

6. *Foreknowledge.* The great point that Edwards sought to establish was that pre-science involved as much necessity as predestination, and that, therefore, the extreme position of the Calvinists was as tenable as any that could be taken up by a theist. In the first place, it is evident from Scripture that God has a certain foreknowledge of the voluntary actions of men. Now, if volitions were contingent events, they could not be foreknown, because nothing can be known without evidence, and for a contingent event no evidence can be produced. A contingent event is not self-evident, and it cannot be evident from its connexion with any other event, for connexion destroys contingency. Nor is it an admissible supposition that God may have ways of knowing that we cannot conceive of. For it is a contradiction to suppose an event known as certain, and, at the same time, as uncertain. Another evasion is, that knowledge can have no influence on the thing known. Granted, but pre-science may prove that an event is certain, without being the cause of its certainty. Certainty of knowledge does not make an infallible connexion between things, but it pre-supposes such a connexion. Again, it is said that with God there is no distinction of *before* and *after*; time is with him an eternal *now*. Edwards admits that there is no succession in God's knowledge, but observes that knowledge, whether before or after, implies the certainty of the thing known. If an event is known by him as certain, then it will most assuredly happen.

7. *Is liberty essential to morality?* The essence of virtue is supposed to consist, not in the nature of the acts of the will, but in their cause. But it is more consistent with common opinion to

regard moral evil as a deformity in the nature of certain dispositions and volitions. Ingratitude is hateful, not on account of the badness of its cause, but on account of its inherent deformity. It is true that our bodily movements are not in themselves either virtuous or vicious, but only the volitions and dispositions that produce them. This relation is erroneously supposed to exist between our volitions and some inner determining volitions. But mankind do not refer praise and blame to any occult causes of the will; they blame a man who does as he pleases, and who pleases to do wrong. When they ascribe an action to a man, they mean merely that the action is voluntary, not that it is self-determined. Their only conception of freedom is freedom from compulsion or restraint. They praise a man for his amiability, the gift of nature, as much as if it were the result of severe discipline. The will of God is necessarily good, but it is nevertheless praiseworthy. Although necessity is, therefore, perfectly compatible with praise and blame, it is nevertheless easy to understand how the opposite opinion should be generally entertained. Constraint is the proper and original meaning of necessity. Now, constraint is totally inconsistent with punishment and reward. Hence arises a strong association between blamelessness and necessity. When the word necessity is taken up by philosophers as the equivalent for certainty of connexion, the associated idea of blamelessness is carried insensibly and unwarily into the new meaning. But Edwards did not draw the obvious inference, that the word 'necessity' should be discarded from the controversy.

8. *Practical Consequences.* (1) Does the doctrine of necessity render efforts towards an end nugatory? This could only be said, if the doctrine affirmed, either that the event might follow without the means, or that the event might not follow, although the means was used. Does the doctrine of necessity effect any such rupture between means and ends? On the contrary, the certainty of the connexion between means and ends is the doctrine itself. (2) Does necessity lead to atheism and licentiousness? Edwards retorts on Liberty the charge of Atheism: How can the existence of God be proved without the principle that every change must have a cause? And how can it be maintained that every change has a cause, when the entire realm of volition is emancipated from causation? As to the charge of licentiousness, Edwards points to the exemplary conduct of the Calvinists, in contrast to the looseness that often coexists with Arminian doctrines.

PRICE, contending with Priestley, followed the view brought forward by Dr. Clarke. He defined liberty as a power of self-motion, and took up the following positions. (1) All animals possess spontaneity, and therefore liberty. (2) Liberty does not admit of degrees; between acting and not acting there is no middle course. (3) This liberty is possible. There must be somewhere a power of beginning motion, and we are conscious of such a power in ourselves. (4) In our volitions, we are not acted upon. (5) Liberty does not exclude the operation of motives. The power

of self-determination can never be excited without some view or design. But it is an intolerable absurdity to make our motives or ends the *physical* causes of action. Our ideas may be the occasion of our acting, but are certainly not mechanical efficient.

PRIESTLEY, in his controversy with Price, maintained the following positions:—

1. He denied that our consciousness is in favour of freedom. All we believe is that we have power to do what we will or please. To will without a motive, or contrary to the influence of all the motives presented to the mind, is what no man can be conscious of. The mind cannot choose without some inclination or preference for the thing chosen. To deny this, is to deny that every change must have a cause.

2. *Philosophical necessity* is consistent with accountability. Punishment has an improving effect both on our own future conduct, and on the conduct of others; this is the meaning of justness of punishment. To say that one is praiseworthy means that he is actuated by good principles, and is therefore an object of love, and a fit person to be made happy.

3. *Permission of Evil.* As regards God, there is no distinction between permitting and appointing evil. In the case of man, the difference is great, for his power of interference and control is limited. In creating any man, God must foresee and accept all the consequences. Whatever reasons can be produced to show why God permits evil, will be available to justify his appointing it.

4. *Remorse and Pardon.* Priestley admits that it sounds harsh, but affirms it nevertheless to be true, that 'in all those crimes men reproach themselves with, God is the agent; and that they are no more agents than a sword.' Actions may be referred to the persons themselves as secondary causes, but they must also be traced to the first cause. Mankind at first necessarily refer their actions to themselves, a conviction that becomes deeply rooted, before they begin to regard themselves as instruments in the hands of a superior agent. Self-applause and self-reproach have their origin in the narrower view, and cease when we refer our actions to the first great cause. The necessitarian believing that, strictly speaking, nothing goes wrong (*whatever is, is right*), cannot accuse himself of wrong doing. He has, therefore, nothing to do with repentance, confession, or pardon. This state of feeling, however, is a high and rare attainment; when the necessitarian mechanically refers his actions to himself, he will no doubt feel as others.

This admission by Priestley that remorse is inconsistent with necessity, has been turned to great account by Reid; but although the statement is very unguarded, it contains a portion of the truth. We may look upon a person's conduct in two aspects—in its effects, or in its causes. In its effects, it may be very hostile to human happiness, or the reverse. From this point of view, resentment and approbation are the spontaneous response of feeling; punishment and reward are clearly appropriate. On the other hand, we may confine our attention to the causes of the

man's conduct—his circumstances, education, and opinions. In several ways, this tends to discourage angry feeling, and to arouse sympathy and pity. In the first place, we are looking away from the effects of the conduct, and the considerations that justify and require punishment; in the next place, we may reflect that, in like circumstances, we might not have done better ourselves; then, the conduct may have resulted from a weak moral nature, in which case we are always more ready to pity than to punish; and, lastly, since we are at the scientific point of view, there is strongly suggested the conception of resistless sequence—a notion strictly applicable to many material phenomena, but incorrect as to human actions.

5. Priestley considered that materialism, to which he subscribed, involved the doctrine of necessity.

REID has devoted a large part of his work on *The Active Powers*, to the discussion of the Liberty of Moral Agents.

I.—*The Nature of Liberty.* He defines liberty to be a power over the determinations of one's Will. Necessity is when the will follows something involuntary in the state of mind, or something external. Moral liberty does not apply to all voluntary actions; many such are done by instinct or habit, without reflection, and so without will. It is a power not enjoyed in infancy, but only in riper years. It extends as far as we are accountable; in short, freedom is the *sine qua non* of praise or blame. In order still farther to clear up the conception of liberty, Reid devotes two chapters to explain the notion of cause. Everything that changes must either change itself, or be changed by some other being. In the one case, it has active power, in the other case it is acted upon or passive. His definition of cause is,—that which has an effect. We are efficient causes in our deliberate actions. We cannot will deliberately without believing that the thing willed is in our power [we may, if we merely expect the effect to follow]. We have a conviction of power to produce motion in our own bodies. To be an efficient cause is to be a free agent; a necessary agent is a contradiction in terms. In thus identifying freedom with power, Reid follows Clarke and Price, exposing himself to the refutation of Jonathan Edwards, not to mention the criticism of Sir W. Hamilton.

II.—*Arguments in Support of Free-will.* 1. We have by our constitution, a natural conviction or belief, that we act freely. The existence of such a belief is admitted by some fatalists themselves [Hamilton mentions Hommel, and also Lord Kames, who, however, withdrew the incautious admission]. The very notion of active power must arise from our constitution. We see events, but we see no potency nor chain linking one to the other, and therefore the notion of cause is not derived from external objects. Yet it is an unshaken conviction of the mind that every event has a cause that had power to produce it. (1) We are conscious of exercising power to produce some effect, and this implies a belief that we have power to produce the desired effect. [It, in truth, only

implies a belief that the effect will certainly happen, if we wish it.] (2) Can any one blame himself for yielding to necessity? Remorse implies a conviction that we could have done better. Reid further explains what he means by the actions that are in our power. We have no conception of power that is not directed by the will. But there are many things that depend on our will that are not in our power. Madmen, idiots, infants, people in a violent rage, have not the power of self-government. Likewise, the violence of a motive, or an inveterate habit, diminishes liberty.

2. Liberty is involved in accountability. To be accountable, a man must understand the law by which he is bound, and his obligations to obey it; and he must have power to do what he is accountable for. So far as man's power over himself extends, so far is he accountable. Hence violent passion limits responsibility. It is said that to constitute an action criminal, it need only be voluntary. Reid says, more is necessary, namely, moral liberty. For (1) the actions of brutes are voluntary, but not criminal. (2) So are the actions of young children. (3) Madmen have understanding and will, but no moral liberty, and hence are not criminal. (4) An irresistible motive palliates or takes away guilt.

3. Man's power over his volitions is proved by the fact that he can prosecute a series of means towards an end. A plan of conduct requires understanding to contrive and power to execute it. Now, if each volition in the series was produced not by the man himself, but by some cause acting necessarily upon him, there is no evidence that he contrived the plan. The cause that directed the determinations, must have understood the plan, and intended the execution of it. Motives could not have done it, for they have not understanding to conceive a plan.

III.—*Refutation of the Argument for Necessity.* 1. The influence of motives. (1) Reid allows that motives influence to action, but they do not act. Upon this, Sir W. Hamilton remarks that if motives influence to action, they co-operate in producing a certain effect upon the agent. They are thus, on Reid's own view, causes, and efficient causes. It is of no consequence in the argument, whether motives be said to determine a man to act, or to influence (that is to determine) him to determine himself to act. (2) Reid goes on to say that it is the glory of rational beings to act according to the best motives. God can do everything; it is his praise that he does only what is best. But according to Hamilton, this is just one of the insoluble contradictions in the question. If we attribute to the Deity the power of moral evil, we detract from his essential goodness; and if, on the other hand, we deny him this power, we detract from his omnipotence. (3) Is there a motive in every action? Reid thinks not. Many trifling actions are done without any conscious motive. Stewart disagrees with Reid in this remark; and Hamilton observes:—'Can we conceive any act of which there was not a sufficient cause, or concurrence of causes, why the man performed it and no other? If not, call this cause, or these concauses, the

motive, and there is no longer a dispute.' (4) It cannot be proved that when there is a motive on one side only, that motive must determine the action. Is there no such thing as wilfulness, caprice, or obstinacy? But 'Are not those all tendencies, and fatal tendencies, to act or not to act?' (5) Does the strongest motive prevail? If the test of the strongest motive is that it prevails, then the proposition is identical. The determination is made by the man, and not by the motive. 'But was the man determined by no motive to that determination? Was his specific volition to this or to that without a cause? On the supposition that the sum of influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to volition A, is equal to 12, and the sum of influences to counter volition B, equal to 8, can we conceive that the determination of volition A should not be necessary? We can only conceive the volition B to be determined by supposing that the man *creates* (calls from non-existence into existence) a certain supplement of influences. But this creation as actual, or in itself, is inconceivable, and even to conceive the possibility of this inconceivable act, we must suppose some cause by which the man is determined to exert it. We thus, in *thought*, never escape determination and necessity.' (6) It is very weak reasoning to infer from our power of predicting men's actions that they are necessarily determined by motives. Liberty is a power that men use according to their character. The wise use it wisely, the foolish, foolishly. (7) The doctrine of liberty does not render rewards and punishments of no effect. With wise men they will have their due effect, but not always with the foolish and vicious.

2. *The principle of sufficient Reason.* Reid makes a long criticism of this principle, as enounced by Leibnitz; but all reference to that may be omitted, since in so far as it applies to the present question, the principle is identical with the law of cause and effect. Reid's answer is that the man is the cause of action, but this evasion, as we have seen, has been refuted by Hamilton.

3. Every determination of the mind is foreseen by God, it is therefore necessary. This necessity may result in three ways: (1) a thing cannot be foreknown without being certain, or certain without being necessary. But there is no rule of reasoning from which it may be inferred that because an event necessarily shall be, therefore its production must be necessary. Its being certain does not determine whether it shall be freely or necessarily produced. (2) An event must be necessary because it is foreseen. Not so, for knowledge has no effect upon the thing known. God foresees his own future actions, but his foresight does not make them necessary. (3) No free action can be foreseen. This would prevent God foreseeing his own actions. Reid admits that there is no knowledge of future contingent actions in man. The prescience of God must therefore differ, not only in degree but in kind from our knowledge. Although we have no such knowledge, God may have. There is also a great analogy between the prescience of future contingents and the memory of past contin-

gents. Hamilton refutes this assertion. A past contingent is a contradiction, in becoming past it forthwith becomes necessary—it cannot but be. ‘Now, so far is it from being true, as Reid soon after says, that every “argument to prove the impossibility of prescience (as the knowledge of future contingents) proves, with equal force, the impossibility of memory” (as the knowledge of past contingents), that the possibility of a memory of events as contingent was, I believe, never imagined by any philosopher—nor, in reality, is it by Reid himself. And, in fact, one of the most insoluble objections to the possibility of a free agency, arises (on the admission that all future events are foreseen by God) from the analogy of prescience to memory, it being impossible for the human mind to reconcile the supposition that an event may or may not occur, and the supposition that one of these alternatives has been foreseen as certain.’

SIR W. HAMILTON occupies a peculiar position in regard to the present question. He demolishes all the chief popular arguments in favour of liberty, and rests the defence on his own Law of the Conditioned. At the same time, he attributes an exaggerated importance to Free-will, as being not only the foundation of morality, but the only doctrine from which we can legitimately infer the existence of God. The phenomena that require a deity for their explanation are exclusively mental: the phenomena of matter, taken by themselves, would ground even an argument to his negation. Fate or necessity might account for the material world; it is only because man is a free intelligence that a creator must be supposed endowed with free intelligence.

Hamilton admits, what is shown by Edwards, that the conception of an undetermined will is inconceivable. He thus disposes of the argument that the *person* is the cause of his volitions. ‘But is the person an *original undetermined* cause of the determination of his will? If he be not, then is he not a *free agent*, and the scheme of Necessity is admitted. If he be, in the first place, it is impossible to *conceive* the possibility of this; and, in the second, if the fact, though inconceivable, be allowed, it is impossible to see how a *cause, undetermined by any motive*, can be a *rational, moral, and accountable cause*. There is no conceivable medium between *Fatalism* and *Casualism*: and the contradictory schemes of Liberty and Necessity themselves are inconceivable. For, as we cannot compass in thought an *undetermined cause*,—an *absolute commencement*—the fundamental hypothesis of the one; so we can as little think an *infinite series of determined causes*—of *relative commencements*,—the fundamental hypothesis of the other. The champions of the opposite doctrines are thus at once irresistible in assault, and impotent in defence. The doctrine of Moral Liberty cannot be made conceivable, for we can only conceive the determined and the relative. As already stated, all that can be done is to show, (1) That, for the *fact* of Liberty, we have, immediately or mediately, the evidence of consciousness; and (2), that there are, among the phenomena of mind, many facts which

we *must* admit as actual, but of whose possibility we are wholly unable to form any notion.' Again, 'A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation. Nay, were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only casualism; and the free acts of an indifferent, are, morally and rationally, as worthless as the preordered passion of a determined, will.'

From his own point of view, Hamilton is free to expose the inconsistency of those who accept the law of causality, and yet make the will an exception. If causality and freedom are equally positive dictates of consciousness, there can be no ground for subordinating one of these dictates to the other. But by regarding causality as an impotence of thought, Hamilton thinks he can bring forward consciousness in favour of liberty. This fact of freedom is given either as an undoubted datum of consciousness, or as involved in an uncompromising law of duty.

In the last clause there is a reference to KANT's doctrine of Freedom. This will be stated in its proper connexion with his Ethical doctrine. [ETHICAL SYSTEMS.]

J. S. MILL, in his Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, has given a chapter to the Freedom of the Will. His polemic is chiefly against the theory of Sir W. Hamilton, whose attempt to create a prejudice in favour of his own peculiar views, by representing them as affording the only solid argument in support of the existence of God, Mr. Mill characterizes as 'not only repugnant to all the rules of philosophizing, but a grave offence against the morality of philosophic enquiry.' Both Hamilton and Mill are agreed upon the question at issue—namely, whether our volitions are emancipated from causation altogether. Both reject the evasion that 'I' am the cause.

1. *The evidence of experience.** Mr. Mill begins by conceding to Hamilton the inconceivability of an absolute commencement and an infinite regress. This double inconceivability applies, not only to volitions, but to all other events. Why then do we in regard to all events, except volitions, accept the alternative of regress? Because the causation-hypothesis is established by experience. But there is the same evidence in the case of our volitions. The antecedents are desires, aversions, habits, dispositions, and outward circumstances. The connexion between those antecedents and volitions is proved by every one's experience of themselves, by our observation of others, by our predicting their actions, and by the results of statistics. Where prediction is uncertain, it is because of the imperfection of our knowledge; we can predict more accurately the conduct of men,

* The evidence of experience is admitted by Mr. Mansel to be in favour of necessity:—'Were it not for the direct testimony of my own consciousness to my own freedom, I could regard human actions only as necessary links in the endless chain of phenomenal cause and effect.' *Mansel's Metaphysics*, p. 168.

than the changes of the weather. Hence a volition follows its moral causes, as a physical event follows its physical causes. Whether it *must* do so, Mr. Mill professes himself to be ignorant, and therefore condemns the use of the word necessity, but he knows that it always *does*.

2: *The testimony of Consciousness.* The evidence that decided Sir W. Hamilton was *Consciousness*. We are either directly conscious of freedom, or indirectly through moral obligation. Mr. Mill examines first, whether we are conscious of free will, whether before decision, whether we are conscious of being able to decide either way. Properly speaking, this is a fact we cannot possibly be conscious of, as we are conscious only of what *is*, not of what *will* be. We know we can do a thing only by doing it. The belief in freedom must, therefore, be an interpretation of past experience. This internal feeling of freedom implies that we could have decided the other way; but, the truth is, not unless we preferred that way. When we imagine ourselves acting differently from what we did, we think of a change in the antecedents, as by knowing something that we did not know. Mr. Mill therefore altogether disputes the assertion that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aversion.

3. *Accountability.* Mr. Mill then examines whether moral responsibility involves freedom from causation. Responsibility means either that we expect to be punished for certain acts, or that we should deserve punishment for those acts. The first alternative may be thrown out of account. The question then is, whether free-will is involved in the justness of punishment. In this discussion, Mr. Mill assumes no particular theory of morals; it is enough that a difference between right and wrong be admitted, and a natural preference for the right. Whoever does wrong becomes a natural object of active dislike, and perhaps of punishment. The liability of the wrong-doer to be thus called to account has probably much to do with the feeling of being accountable. Oriental despots and persons of a superior caste show not the least feeling of accountability to their inferiors. Moreover, if there were a race of men, as mischievous as lions and tigers, we should treat them precisely as we treat wild beasts, although they acted necessarily; so that the most stringent form of fatalism is not inconsistent with putting a high value on goodness, nor with the existence of approbation and penalties. The real question, however, is—Would the punishment be just? Is it just to punish a man for what he cannot help? Certainly it is, if punishment is the only means by which he can be enabled to help it. Punishment is inflicted as a means towards an end, but if there is no efficacy in the means to procure the end, that is to say, if our volitions are not determined by motives, then punishment is without justification. If an end is justifiable, the sole and necessary means to that end must be justifiable. Now, the Necessitarian Theory proceeds upon two ends,—the benefit of the offender himself, and the protection of others. To punish a child

for its benefit is no more unjust than to administer medicine. In the defence of just rights, punishment must also be just. The feeling of accountability is then nothing more than the knowledge that punishment will be just. Nor is this a *petitio principii*. Mr. Mill considers himself entitled to assume the reality of moral distinctions, such reality not depending on any theory of the will. If this account should not be considered sufficient, how can we justify the punishment of crimes committed in obedience to a perverted conscience? Ravaiillac and Balthasar Gérard regarded themselves as heroic martyrs. No person capable of being operated upon by the fear of punishment, will ever feel punishment for wrong-doing to be unjust.

4. *Necessity is not Fatalism.* The doctrine of Necessity is clearly distinguishable from Fatalism. Pure fatalism holds that our actions do not depend on our desires. A superior power overrides our wishes, and bends us according to its will. Modified fatalism proceeds upon the determination of our will by motives, but holds that our character is made for us and not by us, so that we are not responsible for our actions, and should in vain attempt to alter them. The true doctrine of causation holds that in so far as our character is amenable to moral discipline, we can improve it, if we desire. According to Mr. Mansel, such a theory of moral causation is really fatalism. Yet Kant held that the capability of predicting our actions does not destroy freedom: it is only in the formation of our character that we are free; and he almost admits that our actions necessarily follow from our character. But, in truth, the volitions tending to improve our character are as capable of being predicted as any voluntary actions. And necessity means only this possibility of being foreseen, so that we are no more free in the formation of our character, than in our subsequent volitions.

5. *The influence of Motives.* Mr. Mansel, following Reid, has denied that the strongest motive prevails, since there is no test of the strength of a motive but its ultimate prevalence. But (1) the strongest motive means the motive strongest in relation to pleasure and pain. (2) Even if the test referred to was the will, the proposition would still not be unmeaning. We say of two weights in a pair of scales, that the heavier will lift the other up; although we mean by the heavier only the weight that will lift the other up. This proposition implies that in most cases there is a heavier, and that this is always the same one, not one or the other, as it may happen. So also if there be motives uniformly followed by certain volitions, the free-will theory is not saved.

ETHICS.

PART I.

THE THEORY OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF ETHICAL QUESTIONS.

For ^{1st} As a preface to the account of the Ethical Systems, and ^{2nd} a principle of arrangement, for the better comparing of them, we shall review in order the questions that arise in the discussion.

ultimately 1. First of all is the question as to the ETHICAL STANDARD. What, in the last resort, is the test, criterion, umpire, appeal, or Standard, in determining Right and Wrong? In the concrete language of Paley, Why am I obliged to keep my word? The answer to this is the Theory of Right and Wrong, the essential part of every Ethical System.

We may quote the leading answers, as both explaining and summarizing the chief question of Ethics, and more especially of Modern Ethics.

1. It is alleged that the (arbitrary) Will of the Deity, as expressed in the Bible, is the ultimate standard. On this view anything thus commanded is right, whatever be its consequences, or however it may clash with our sentiments and reasonings.

2. It was maintained by Hobbes, that the Sovereign, acting under his responsibility to God, is the sole arbiter of Right and Wrong. As regards Obligatory Morality, this

The Law of the Sovereign is the rule of right and wrong

seems at first sight an identical proposition; morality is another name for law and sovereignty. In the view of Hobbes, however, the sovereign should be a single person, of absolute authority, humanly irresponsible, and irremovable; a type of sovereignty repudiated by civilized nations.

3. It has been held, in various phraseology, that a certain fitness, suitability, or propriety in actions, as determined by our Understanding or Reason, is the ultimate test. When a man keeps his word, there is a certain congruity or consistency between the action and the occasion, between the making of a promise and its fulfilment; and wherever such congruity is discernible, the action is right. This is the view of Cudworth, Clarke, and Price. It may be called the Intellectual or Rational theory.

A special and more abstract form of the same theory is presented in the dictum of Kant—'act in such a way that your conduct might be a law to all beings.'

4. It is contended, that the human mind possesses an intuition or instinct, whereby we feel or discern at once the right from the wrong; a view termed the doctrine of the Moral Sense, or Moral Sentiment. Besides being supported by numerous theorizers in Ethics, this is the prevailing and popular doctrine; it underlies most of the language of moral suasion. The difficulties attending the stricter interpretation of it have led to various modes of qualifying and explaining it, as will afterwards appear. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are more especially identified with the enunciation of this doctrine in its modern aspect.

5. It was put forth by Mandeville that Self-interest is the only test of moral rightness. Self-preservation is the first law of being; and even when we are labouring for the good of others, we are still having regard to our own interest.

6. The theory called Utility, and Utilitarianism, supposes that the well-being or happiness of mankind is the sole end, and ultimate standard of morality. The agent takes account both of his own happiness and of the happiness of others, subordinating, on proper occasions, the first to the second. This theory is definite in its opposition to all the others, but admits of considerable latitude of view within itself. Stoicism and Epicureanism are both included in its compass.

The two last-named theories—Self-Interest, and Utility or the Common Well-Being, have exclusive regard to the consequences of actions; the others assign to consequences a subordinate position. The terms External and Dependent

are also used to express the reference to Happiness as the end: Internal and Independent are the contrasting epithets.

II. Ethical Theory embraces certain questions of pure PSYCHOLOGY.

1. The Psychological nature of Conscience, ^{the} Moral Sense, or by whatever name we designate the faculty of distinguishing right and wrong, together with the motive power to follow the one and eschew the other. That such a faculty exists is admitted. The question is, what is its place and origin in the mind?

On the one side, Conscience is held to be a unique and ^{indefinable} ~~ultimate~~ ^{ultimate} power of the mind, like the feeling of Resistance, the sense of Taste, or the consciousness of Agreement. On the other side, Conscience is viewed as a growth or derivation from other recognized properties of the mind. The Theory of the Standard (4) called the doctrine of the Moral Sense, proceeds upon the first view; on that theory, the Standard and the Faculty make properly but one question. All other theories are more or less compatible with the composite or derivative nature of Conscience; the supporters of Utility, in particular, adopt this alternative.

2. A second Psychological question, regarded by many (notably by Kant) as vitally implicated in Moral Obligation, is the Freedom of the Will. The history of opinion on this subject has been in great part already given.

3. Thirdly, It has been debated, on Psychological grounds, whether our Benevolent actions (which all admit) are ultimately modes of self-regard, or whether there be, in the human mind, a source of purely Disinterested conduct. The first view, or the reference of benevolence to Self, admits of degrees and varieties of statement.

(1) It may be held that in performing good actions, we expect and obtain an immediate reward fully equivalent to the sacrifice made. Occasionally we are rewarded in kind; but the reward most usually forthcoming (according to Mandeville), is praise or flattery, to which the human mind is acutely sensitive.

(2) Our constitution may be such that we are pained by the sight of an object in distress, and give assistance, to relieve ourselves of the pain. This was the view of Hobbes; and it is also admitted by Mandeville as a secondary motive.

(3) We may be so formed as to derive enjoyment from the performance of acts of kindness, in the same immediate way that we are gratified by warmth, flowers, or music; we

should thus be moved to benevolence by an intrinsic pleasure, and not by extraneous consequences.

Bentham speaks of the pleasures and the pains of Benevolence, meaning that we derive pleasure from causing pleasure to others, and pain from the sight of pain in others.

(4) It may be affirmed that, although we have not by nature any purely disinterested impulses, these are generated in us by associations and habits, in a manner similar to the conversion of means into final ends, as in the case of money. This is the view propounded by James Mill, and by Mackintosh.

Allowance being made for a certain amount of fact in these various modes of connecting Benevolence with self, it is still maintained in the present work, as by Butler, Hume, Adam Smith, and others, that human beings are (although very unequally) endowed with a prompting to relieve the pains and add to the pleasures of others, irrespective of all self-regarding considerations; and that such prompting is not a product of associations with self.

In the ancient world, purely disinterested conduct was abundantly manifested in practice, although not made prominent in Ethical Theory. The enumeration of the Cardinal Virtues does not expressly contain Benevolence; but under Courage, Self-sacrifice was implied. Patriotic Self-devotion, Love, and Friendship were virtues highly esteemed. In Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, there is a recognition of general Benevolence.

The two heads now sketched—rd The Standard and the ^{2d} Psychology of our Moral nature—almost entirely exhaust modern Ethics. Smith, Stewart, and Mackintosh agree in laying down as the points in dispute these two:—First, What does virtue consist in? Secondly, What is the power or faculty of the mind that discovers and enforces it?

These two positions, however, are inadequate as regards Ancient Ethics. For remedying the deficiency, and for bringing to light matters necessary to the completeness of an Ethical survey, we add the following heads:—^{fourth}

III. The Theory of what constitutes the Supreme END of Life, the *Bonum* or the *Summum Bonum*. The question as to the highest End has divided the Ethical Schools, both ancient and modern. It was the point at issue between the Stoics and the Epicureans. That Happiness is not the highest end has been averred, in modern times, by Butler and others: the opposite position is held by the supporters of Utility. What may be called the severe and ascetic systems (theoretically)

refuse to sanction any pursuit of happiness or pleasure, except through virtue, or duty to others. The view practically proceeded upon, now and in most ages, is that virtue discharges a man's obligations to his fellows, which being accomplished, he is then at liberty to seek what pleases himself. (For the application of the laws of mind to the theory of HAPPINESS, see Appendix C.)

IV.—The CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES is characteristic of different systems and different authors. The oldest scheme is the Four Cardinal Virtues—Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice. The modern Christian moralists usually adopt the division—Duties to God, to Others, to Self.

Moreover, there are differences in the substance of Morality itself, or the things actually imposed. The code under Christianity has varied both from Judaism and from Paganism.

V.—The relationship of Ethics to POLITICS is close, while the points of difference of the two are also of great importance. In Plato the two subjects were inseparable; and in Aristotle, they were blended to excess. Hobbes also joined Ethics and Politics in one system. (See Chap. ii., § 3.)

VI. The relation of Ethics to THEOLOGY is variously represented in modern systems. The Fathers and the Schoolmen accepted the authority of the Bible chiefly on tradition, and did not venture to sit in judgment on the substance of the revelation. They, therefore, rested their Ethics exclusively on the Bible; or, at most, ventured upon giving some mere supplement of its precepts.

Others, in more modern times, have considered that the moral character of a revelation enters into the evidence in its favour; whence, morality must be considered as independent, and exclusively human, in its origin. It would be reasoning in a circle to derive the moral law from the Bible, and then to prove the Bible from the moral law.

Religion superadds its own sanction to the moral duties, so far as adopted by it; laying especial stress upon select precepts. It likewise calls into being a distinct code of duties, the religious duties strictly so called; which have no force except with believers. The 'duties to God,' in the modern classification, are religious, as distinguished from moral duties.

CHAPTER II.

^{1st} THE ETHICAL STANDARD.

1. ETHICS, or Morality, is ^{is a scientific inquiry into them} a department of Practice; and, as with other practical departments, is defined by its End.

Ethics is not mere knowledge or speculation, like the sciences of Astronomy, Physiology, or Psychology; it is knowledge applied to practice, or useful ends, like Navigation, Medicine, or Politics. Every practical subject has some end to be served, the statement of which is its definition in the first instance. Navigation is the applying of different kinds of knowledge, and of a variety of devices, to the end of sailing the seas.

2. The Ethical End is a certain portion of the welfare of human beings living together in society, realized through rules of conduct duly enforced.

The obvious intention of morality is the good of mankind. The precepts—do not steal, do not kill, fulfil agreements, speak truth—whatever other reasons may be assigned for them, have a direct tendency to prevent great evils that might otherwise arise in the intercourse of human beings.

Farther, the good aimed at by Ethics is attained by rules of acting, on the part of one human being to another; and, inasmuch as these rules often run counter to the tendencies of the individual mind, it is requisite to provide adequate inducements to comply with them.

The Ethical End is what is otherwise called the STANDARD, test, or criterion, of Right and Wrong. The leading controversy of Morals is centered in this point.

3. The Rules of Ethics, termed also Law, Laws, the Moral Law, are of two kinds:—

The first are rules imposed under a Penalty for neglect, or violation. The penalty is termed *Punishment*; the imposing party is named Government, or Authority; and the rules so imposed and enforced, are called Laws proper, Morality proper, Obligatory Morality, Duty. 25-10-88.

4. The second are rules whose only external support is *Rewards*; constituting Optional Morality, Merit, Virtue, or Nobleness.

Moral duties are a set of rules, precepts, or prescriptions, for the direction of human conduct, in a certain sphere or province. These rules are enforced by two kinds of motives, requiring to be kept distinct.

I.—One class of rules ~~are~~^{is} made compulsory by the infliction of pain, in the case of violation or neglect. The pain so inflicted is termed a Penalty, or Punishment; it is one of the most familiar experiences of all human beings living in society.

The Institution that issues Rules of this class, and inflicts punishment when they are not complied with, is termed Government, or Authority; all its rules are authoritative, or obligatory; they are Laws strictly so called, Laws proper. Punishment, Government, Authority, Superiority, Obligation, Law, Duty,—define each other; they are all different modes of regarding the same fact.

Morality is thus in every respect analogous to Civil Government, or the Law of the Land. Nay, farther, it squares, to a very great extent, with Political Authority. The points where the two coincide, and those where they do not coincide, may be briefly stated:—*obvious*

(1) All the most (essential) parts of Morality are adopted and carried out by the Law of the Land. The rules for protecting person and property, for fulfilling contracts, for performing reciprocal duties, are rules or laws of the State; and are enforced by the State, through its own machinery. The penalties inflicted by public authority constitute what is called the Political Sanction; they are the most severe, and the most strictly and dispassionately administered, of all penalties.

(2) There are certain Moral duties enforced, not by public and official authority, but by the members of the community, in their private capacity. These are sometimes called the Laws of Honour, because they are punished by withdrawing from the violator the honour or esteem of his fellow-citizens. Courage, Prudence as regards self, Chastity, Orthodoxy of opinion, a certain conformity in Tastes and Usages,—are all prescribed by the mass of each community, to a greater or less extent, and are insisted on under penalty of social disgrace and excommunication. This is the Social or the Popular Sanction. The department so marked out, being distinct

from the Political sphere, is called, by Austin, Positive Morality, or Morality proper.

Public opinion also chimes in with the Law, and adds its own sanction to the legal penalties for offences: unless the law happens to be in conflict with the popular sentiment. Criminals, condemned by the law, are additionally punished by social disgrace.

(3) The Law of the Land contains many enactments, besides the Moral Code and the machinery for executing it. The Province of Government passes beyond the properly protective function, and includes many institutions of public convenience, which are not identified with right and wrong. The defence from external enemies; the erection of works of public utility; the promotion of social improvements,—are all within the domain of the public authority.*

II.—The second class of Rules are supported, not by penalties, but by Rewards. Society, instead of punishing men for not being charitable or benevolent, praises and otherwise rewards them, when they are so. Hence, although Morality inculcates benevolence, this is not a Law proper, it is not obligatory, authoritative, or binding; it is purely voluntary, and is termed merit, virtuous and noble conduct.

In this department, the members of the community, in their unofficial capacity, are the chief agents and administrators. The Law of the Land occupies itself with the enforcement of its own obligatory rules, having at its command a perfect machinery of punishment. Private individuals ad-

* Duties strictly so called, the department of obligatory morality, enforced by punishment, may be exemplified in the following classified summary:—

Under the Legal Sanction, are included; (A) Forbearance from (1) Intentional injury—crimes, (2) Injury not intended by Damages or Compensation. (B) The rendering of services; (c) Fulfilling contracts or agreements; (d) Reciprocating anterior services rendered, though not requested, as in filial duty; (e) Cases of extreme or superior need, as parental duty, relief of destitution.

Under the Popular Sanction are created duties on such points as the following:—(1) The Etiquette of small societies or coteries. (2) Religious orthodoxy; Sabbath observance. (3) Unchastity; violations of the etiquette of the sexes, Immodesty, and whatever endangers chastity, especially in women. (4) Duties of parents to children, and of children to parents, beyond the requirements of the law. (5) Suicide: when only attempted, the individual is punished, when carried out, the relatives. (6) Drunkenness, and neglect of the means of self-support. (7) Gross Inhumanity. In all these cases the sanction, or punishment, is social; and is either mere disapprobation or dislike, not issuing in overt acts, or exclusion from fellowship and the good offices consequent thereon.

minister praise, honour, esteem, approbation, and reward. In a few instances, the Government dispenses rewards, as in the bestowal of office, rank, titles, and pensions, but this function is exceptional and limited.

The conduct rewarded by Society is chiefly resolvable into Beneficence. Whoever is moved to incur sacrifices, or to go through labours, for the good of others, is the object, not merely of gratitude from the persons benefited, but of approbation from society at large.

Any remarkable strictness or fidelity in the discharge of duties properly so called, receives general esteem. Even in matters merely ceremonial, if importance be attached to them, sedulous and exact compliance, being the distinction of the few, will earn the approbation of the many.*

5. The Ethical End, or Morality, as it has been, is founded partly on Well-being, or Utility: and partly on Sentiment. *agreeable or pleasant to our feelings*

The portions of Morality, having in view the prevention of human misery and the promotion of human happiness, are known and obvious. They are not the whole of Morality as it has been. *in general use*

* Optional Morality, the Morality of Reward, is exemplified as follows:—

(A) A liberal performance of duties properly so called. (a) The support of aged parents; this, though to a certain extent a legal duty, is still more a virtue, being stimulated by the approbation of one's fellows. The performance of the family duties generally is the subject of commendation. (b) The payment of debts that cannot be legally recovered, as in the case of bankrupts after receiving their discharge.

These examples typify cases (1) where no definite law is laid down, or where the law is content with a minimum; and (2) where the law is restrained by its rules of evidence or procedure. Society, in such cases, steps in and supplies a motive in the shape of reward.

(B) Pure Virtue, or Beneficence; all actions for the benefit of others without stipulation, and without reward; relief of distress, promotion of the good of individuals or of society at large. The highest honours of society are called into exercise by the highest services.

Bentham's principle of the claims of superior need cannot be fully carried out, (although he conceives it might, in some cases), by either the legal or the popular sanction. Thus, the act of the good Samaritan, the rescue of a ship's crew from drowning, could not be exacted; the law cannot require heroism. It is of importance to remark, that although Duty and Nobleness, Punishment and Reward, are in their extremes unmitigably contrasted, yet there may be a margin of doubt or ambiguity (like the passing of day into night). Thus, expressed approbation, generally speaking, belongs to Reward; yet, if it has become a thing of course, the withholding of it operates as a Punishment or a Penalty.

Sentiment, caprice, arbitrary liking or disliking, are names for states of feeling that do not necessarily arise from their objects, but may be joined or disjoined by education, custom, or the power of the will. The revulsion of mind, on the part of the Jews, against eating the pig, and on our own part, as regards horse flesh, is not a primitive or natural sensibility, like the pain of hunger, or of cold, or of a musical discord; it is purely artificial; custom has made it, and could unmake it. The feeling of fatigue from overwork is natural; the repugnance of caste to manual labour is factitious. The dignity attached to the military profession, and the indignity of the office of public executioner, are capricious, arbitrary, and sentimental. Our prospective regard to the comforts of our declining years points to a real interest; our feelings as to the disposal of the body after death are purely factitious and sentimental. Such feelings are of the things *in our own power*; and the grand mistake of the Stoics was their viewing all good and evil whatever in the same light.

It is an essential part of human liberty, to permit each person to form and to indulge these sentiments or caprices; although a good education should control them with a view to our happiness on the whole. But, when any individual liking or fancy of this description is imposed as a law upon the entire community, it is a perversion and abuse of power, a confounding of the Ethical end by foreign admixtures. Thus, to enjoin authoritatively one mode of sepulture, punishing all deviations from that, could have nothing to do with the preservation of the order of society. In such a matter, the interference of the state in modern times, has regard to the detection of crime in the matter of life and death, and to the evils arising from the putrescence of the dead. *Hobbes*

morally 6] The Ethical End, although properly confined to Utility, is subject to still farther limitations, according to the view taken of the Province of Moral Government, or Authority.

Although nothing should be made morally obligatory but what is generally useful, the converse does not hold; many kinds of conduct are generally useful, but not morally obligatory. A certain amount of bodily exercise in the open air every day would be generally useful; but neither the law of the land nor public opinion compels it. Good roads are works of great utility; it is not every one's duty to make them.

and The machinery of coercion is not brought to bear upon

every conceivable utility. It is principally reserved, when not abused, for a select class of utilities.

Some utilities are indispensable to the very existence of men in society. The primary moral duties must be observed to some degree, if men are to live together as men, and not to roam at large as beasts. The interests of *Security* are the first and most pressing concern of human society. Whatever relates to this has a surpassing importance. *Security* is contrasted with *Improvement*; what relates to *Security* is declared to be *Right*; what relates to *Improvement* is said to be *Expedient*; both are forms of *Utility*, but the one is pressing and indispensable, the other is optional. The same difference is expressed by the *Existence and Prosperous* *Well-being*; *Existentials and Circumstantials*. That the highway robber should be punished is a part of *Being*; that the highways should be in good repair, is a part of *Well-being*. That *Justice* should be done is *Existence*; that farmers and traders should give in to government the statistics of their occupation, is a means to *Prosperous Existence*.*

It is proper to advert to one specific influence in moral enactments, serving to disguise the Ethical end, and to widen the distinction between morality as it has been, and morality as it ought to be. The enforcing of legal and moral enactments demands a *power of coercion*, to be lodged in the hands of certain persons; the possession of which is a temptation to exceed the strict exigencies of public safety, or the common welfare. Probably many of the whims, fancies, ceremonies, likings and antipathies, that have found their way into the moral codes of nations, have arisen from the arbitrary disposition of certain individuals happening to be in authority at particular junctures. Even the general community, acting in a spontaneous manner, imposes needless restraints upon itself; delighting more in the exercise of power, than in the freedom of individual action.

* The conditions that regulate the authoritative enforcement of actions, are exhaustively given in works on Jurisprudence, but they do not all concern Ethical Theory. The expedience of imposing a rule depends on the importance of the object compared with the cost of the machinery. A certain line of conduct may be highly beneficial, but may not be a fit case for coercion. For example, the law can enforce only a *minimum* of service: now, if the case be such that a minimum is needed, as in helping a ship in distress, or in supporting aged parents, it is much better to leave the case to voluntary impulses, seconded by approbation or reward. Again, an offence punished by law must be, in its nature, definable; which makes a difficulty in such cases as insult, and defamation, and many species of fraud. Further, the offence must be easy of detection, so that the vast majority of offenders may not escape. This limits the action of the law in unchastity.

7. Morality, in its essential parts, is 'Eternal and Im-
mutable'; in other parts, it varies with Custom.

(1) The rules for protecting one man from another, for the observance of contracts, are essen-
tial, and may be styled 'Eternal and Im-
mutable.' The ends to be served require these rules; no caprice of custom could change them without sacrificing those ends. They are to society what food is to individual life, or sexual intercourse and mother's care to the continuance of the race. The primary moralities could not be exchanged for rules enacting murder, pillage, injustice, unverity, repudiation of engagements; because under these rules, human society would fall to pieces.

(2) The manner of carrying into effect these primary regulations of society, varies according to Custom. In some communities the machinery is rude and imperfect; while others have greatly improved it. The Greeks took the lead in advancing judicial machinery, the Romans followed.

In the regulations not essential to Being, but important to Well-being, there has prevailed the widest discrepancy of usage. The single department relating to the Sexes is a sufficient testimony on this head. No one form of the family is indispensable to the existence of society; yet some forms are more favourable to general happiness than others. But which form is on the whole the best, has greatly divided opinion; and legislation has varied accordingly. The more advanced nations have adopted compulsory monogamy, thereby giving the prestige of their authority in favour of that system. But it cannot be affirmed that the joining of one man to one woman is a portion of 'Eternal and Immutable Morality.'

Morality is an Institution of society, but not an arbitrary institution.

8. Before adducing the proofs in support of the posi-
tion above assumed, namely, that Utility or Human Happiness, with certain limitations, is the proper criterion of Morality, it is necessary to enquire, what sort of evidence the Ethical Standard is susceptible of.

Hitherto, the doctrine of Utility has been assumed, in order to be fully stated. We must next review the evidence in its favour, and the objections urged against it. It is desirable, however, to ask what kind of proof should be expected on such a question.

In the Speculative or Theoretical sciences, we prove a doctrine by referring it to some other doctrine or doctrines, until we come at last to some assumption that must be rested in as ultimate or final. We can prove the propositions of Euclid, the law of gravitation, the law of atomic proportions, the law of association; we cannot prove our present sensations, nor can we demonstrate that what has been, will be. The ultimate data must be accepted as self-evident; they have no higher authority than that mankind generally are disposed to accept them.

In the Practical Sciences, the question is not as to a principle of the order of nature, but as to an end of human action. There may be *derived* Ends, which are susceptible of demonstrative proof; but there must also be *ultimate* Ends, for which no proof can be offered; they must be received as self-evident, and their sole authority is the person receiving them. In most of the practical sciences, the ends are derived; the end of Medicine is Health, which is an end subsidiary to the final end of human happiness. So it is with Navigation, with Politics, with Education, and others. In all of them, we recognize the bearing upon human welfare, or happiness, as a common, comprehensive, and crowning end. On the theory of Utility, Morals is also governed by this highest end.

Now, there can be no proof offered for the position that Happiness is the proper end of all human pursuit, the criterion of all right conduct. It is an ultimate or final assumption, to be tested by reference to the individual judgment of mankind. If the assumption, that misery, and not happiness, is the proper end of life, found supporters, no one could reply, for want of a basis of argument—an assumption still more fundamental agreed upon by both sides. It would probably be the case, that the supporters of misery, as an end, would be at some point inconsistent with themselves; which would lay them open to refutation. But to any one consistently maintaining the position, there is no possible reply, because there is no medium of proof.

If then, it appears, on making the appeal to mankind, that happiness is admitted to be the highest end of all action, the theory of Utility is proved.

9. The judgment of Mankind is very generally in favour of Happiness, as the supreme end of human conduct, Morality included.

This decision, however, is not given without qualifica-

tions and reservations; nor is there perfect unanimity regarding it.

The theory of Motives to the Will is the answer to the question as to the ends of human action. According to the primary law of the Will, each one of us, for ourselves, seeks pleasure and avoids pain, present or prospective. The principle is interfered with by the operation of Fixed Ideas, under the influence of the feelings; whence we have the class of Impassioned, Exaggerated, Irrational Motives or Ends. Of these influences, one deserves to be signalized as a source of virtuous conduct, and as approved of by mankind generally; that is, Sympathy with others.

Under the Fixed Idea, may be ranked the acquired sense of Dignity, which induces us often to forfeit pleasure and incur pain. We should not choose the life of Plato's beatified oyster, or (to use Aristotle's example) be content with perpetual childhood, with however great a share of childish happiness.

19. The Ethical end that men are tending to, and may ultimately adopt without reservation, is human Welfare, Happiness, or Being and Well-being combined, that is, UTILITY.

The evidence consists of such facts as these:—

(1) By far the greater part of the morality of every age and country has reference to the welfare of society. Even in the most superstitious, sentimental, and capricious despotisms, a very large share of the enactments, political and moral, consist in protecting one man from another, and in securing justice between man and man. These objects may be badly carried out, they may be accompanied with much oppression of the governed by the governing body, but they are always aimed at, and occasionally secured. Of the Ten Commandments, four pertain to Religious Worship; six are Utilitarian, that is, have no end except to ward off evils, and to further the good of mankind.

(2) The general welfare is at all times considered a strong and adequate justification of moral rules, and is constantly adduced as a motive for obedience. The commonplaces in support of law (and morality) represent that if murder and theft were to go unpunished, neither life nor property would be safe; men would be in eternal warfare; industry would perish; society must soon come to an end.

There is a strong disposition to support the more purely

sentimental requirements, and even the excesses of mere tyranny, by utilitarian reasons.

The cumbersome ablutions of oriental nations are defended on the ground of cleanliness. The divine sanctity of kings is held to be an aid to social obedience. Slavery is alleged to have been at one time necessary to break in mankind to industry. Indissoluble marriage arose from a sentiment rather than from utility; but the arguments, commonly urged in its favour, are utilitarian.

(3) In new cases, and in cases where no sentiment or passion is called into play, Utility alone is appealed to. In any fresh enactment, at the present day, the good of the community is the only justification that would be listened to. If it were proposed to forbid absolutely the eating of pork in Christian countries, some great public evils would have to be assigned as the motive. Were the fatalities attending the eating of pork, on account of *trichiniae*, to become numerous, and unpreventible, there would then be a reason, such as a modern civilized community would consider sufficient, for making the rearing of swine a crime and an immorality. But no mere sentimental or capricious dislike to the pig, on the part of any number of persons, could now procure an enactment for disusing that animal.

(4) There is a gradual tendency to withdraw from the moral code, observances originating purely in sentiment, and having little or no connexion with human welfare.

We have abandoned the divine sacredness of kings. We no longer consider ourselves morally bound to denounce and extirpate heretics and witches; still less to observe fasts and sacred days. Even in regard to the Christian Sabbath, the opinion is growing in favour of withdrawing both the legal and popular sanction formerly so stringent; while the arguments for Sabbath observance are more and more charged with considerations of secular utility.

Should these considerations be held as adequate to support the proposition advanced, they are decisive in favour of Utility as the Moral Standard that *ought to be*. Any other standard that may be set up in competition with Utility, must ultimately ground itself on the very same appeal to the opinions and the practice of mankind.

11. The chief objections urged against Utility, as the moral Standard, have been in great part anticipated. Still, it is proper to advert to them in detail.

I.—It is maintained that Happiness is not, either in fact or in right, the sole aim of human pursuit; that men actually, deliberately, and by conscientious preference, seek other ends. For example, it is affirmed that Virtue is an end in itself, without regard to happiness.

On this argument it may be observed:—

(1) It has been abundantly shown in this work, that one part of the foregoing affirmation is strictly true. Men are not urged to action exclusively by their pleasures and their pains. They are urged by other motives, of the impassioned kind; among which, is to be signalized sympathy with the pains and pleasures of others. If this had been the only instance of action at variance with the regular course of the will, we should be able to maintain that the motive to act is still happiness, but not always the agent's own happiness. We have seen, however, that individuals, not unfrequently, act in opposition both to their own, and to other people's happiness; as when mastered by a panic, and when worked up into a frenzy of anger or antipathy.

The sound and tenable position seems to be this:—Human beings, in their best and soberest moods, looking before and after, weighing all the consequences of actions, are generally disposed to regard Happiness, to some beings or others, as the proper end of all endeavours. The mother is not exclusively bent on her own happiness; she is upon her child's. Howard abandoned the common pleasures of life for himself, to diminish the misery of fellow creatures.

(2) It is true that human beings are apt to regard Virtue as an end-in-itself, and not merely as a means to happiness as the final end. But the fact is fully accounted for on the general law of Association by Contiguity; there being many other examples of the same kind, as the love of money. Justice, Veracity, and other virtues, are requisite, to some extent, for the existence of society, and, to a still greater extent, for prosperous existence. Under such circumstances, it would certainly happen that the means would participate in the importance of the end, and would even be regarded as an end in itself.

(3) The great leading duties may be shown to derive their estimation from their bearing upon human welfare. Take first, Veracity or Truth. Of all the moral duties, this has most the appearance of being an absolute and independent requirement. Yet mankind have always approved of de-

ception practised upon an enemy in war, a madman, or a highway robber. Also, secrecy or concealment, even although misinterpreted, is allowed, when it does not cause pernicious results; and is even enjoined and required in the intercourse of society, in order to prevent serious evils. But an absolute standard of truth is incompatible, even with secrecy or disguise; in departing from the course of perfect openness, or absolute publicity of thought and action, in every possible circumstance, we renounce ideal truth in favour of a compromised or qualified veracity—a pursuit of truth in subordination to the general well-being of society.

Still less is there any form of Justice that does not have respect to utility. If Justice is defined as giving to every one their own, the motive clearly is to prevent misery to individuals. If there were a species of injustice that made no one unhappier, we may be quite sure that tribunals would not be set up for enforcing and punishing it. The idea of equality in Justice is seemingly an absolute conception, but, in point of fact, equality is a matter of institution. The children of the same parent are, in certain circumstances, regarded as unequal by the law; and justice consists in respecting this inequality.

The virtue of Self-denial, is one that receives the commendation of society, and stands high in the morality of reward. Still, it is a means to an end. The operation of the associating principle tends to raise it above this point to the rank of a final end. And there is an ascetic scheme of life that proceeds upon this supposition; but the generality of mankind, in practice, if not always in theory, disavow it.

(4) It is often affirmed by those that regard virtue, and not happiness, as the end, that the two coincide in the long run. Now, not to dwell upon the very serious doubts as to the matter of fact, a universal coincidence without causal connexion is so rare as to be in the last degree improbable. A fiction of this sort was contrived by Leibnitz, under the title of 'pre-established harmony;' but, among the facts of the universe, there are known to investigation only one or two cases.

§12. II.—It is objected to Utility as the Standard, that the bearings of conduct on general happiness are too numerous to be calculated; and that even where the calculation is possible, people have seldom time to make it.

(1) It is answered, that the primary moral duties refer to conduct where the consequences are evident and sure. The disregard of Justice and Truth would to an absolute certainty

The second objection. The first objection is answered.

bring about a state of confusion and ruin; their observance, in any high degree, contributes to raise the standard of well-being.

In other cases, the calculation is not easy, from the number of opposing considerations. For example, there are two sides to the question, Is dissent morally wrong? in other words, Ought all opinions to be tolerated? But if we venture to decide such a question, without the balancing or calculating process, we must follow blindfold the dictates of one or other of the two opposing sentiments,—Love of Power and Love of Liberty.

It is not necessary that we should go through the process of calculation every time we have occasion to perform a moral act. The calculations have already been performed for all the leading duties, and we have only to apply the maxims to the cases as they arise.

13. III.—The principle of Utility, it is said, contains no motives to seek the Happiness of others; it is essentially a form of Self-Love.

The averment is that Utility is a sufficient motive to pursue our own happiness, and the happiness of others as a means to our own; but it does not afford any purely disinterested impulses; it is a Selfish theory after all.

Now, as Utility is, by profession, a benevolent and not a selfish theory, either such profession is insincere, or there must be an obstruction in carrying it out. That the supporters of the theory are insincere, no one has a right to affirm. The only question then is, what are the difficulties opposed by this theory, and not present in other theories (the Moral Sense, for example) to benevolent impulses on the part of individuals?

Let us view the objection first as regards the Morality of Obligation, or the duties that bind society together. Of these duties, only a small number aim at positive beneficence; they are either Protective of one man against another, or they enforce Reciprocity, which is another name for Justice. The chief exception is the requiring of a minimum of charity towards the needy.

This department of duty is maintained by the force of a certain mixture of prudential and of beneficent considerations, on the part of the majority, and by prudence (as fear of punishment) on the part of the minority. But there does not appear to be anything in our professedly Benevolent Theory of Morals to interfere with the small portion of disinterested impulse that

is bound up with prudential regards, in the total of motives concerned in the morality of social order called the primary or obligatory morality.

Let us, in the next place, view the objection as regards Optional Morality, where positive beneficence has full play. The principal motive in this department is Reward, in the shape either of benefits or of approbation. Now, there is nothing to hinder the supporters of the standard of Utility from joining in the rewards or commendations bestowed on works of charity and beneficence.

Again, there is, in the constitution of the mind, a motive superior to reward, namely, Sympathy proper, or the purely Disinterested impulse to alleviate the pains and advance the pleasures of others. This part of the mind is wholly *unselfish*; it needs no other prompting than the fact that some one is in pain, or may be made happier by something within the power of the agent.

The objectors need to be reminded that ¹Obligatory Morality, which works by punishment, creates a purely selfish motive; that ²Optional Morality, in so far as stimulated by Reward, is also selfish; and that ³the only source of purely disinterested impulses is in the unprompted Sympathy of the individual mind. If such sympathies exist, and if nothing is done to uproot or paralyze them, they will urge men to do good to others, irrespective of all theories. Good done from any other source or motive is necessarily self-seeking. It is a common remark, with reference to the sanctions of a future life, that they create purely self-regarding motives. Any proposal to increase disinterested action by moral obligation contains a self-contradiction; it is suicidal. The rich may be made to give half their wealth to the poor; but in as far as they are *made* to do it, they are not benevolent. Law distrusts generosity and supersedes it. If a man is expected to regard the happiness of others as an end in itself, and not as means to his own happiness, he must be left to his own impulses: 'the quality of mercy is not *strained*.' The advocates of Utility may observe non-interference as well as others. 30.11.22.

CHAPTER III.

THE MORAL FACULTY.

1. THE chief question in the Psychology of Ethics is whether the Moral Faculty, or Conscience, be a simple or a complex fact of the mind. *incapable of analysis*

Practically, it would seem of little importance in what way the moral faculty originated, except with a view to teach us how it may be best strengthened when it happens to be weak. Still, a very great importance has been attached to the view, that it is simple and innate; the supposition being that a higher authority thereby belongs to it. If it arises from mere education, it depends on the teacher for the time being; if it exists prior to all education, it seems to be the voice of universal nature or of God.

2. In favour of the simple and intuitive character of Moral Sentiment, it is argued:—

First, That our judgments of right and wrong are immediate and instantaneous. (*As they are now.*)

On almost all occasions, we are ready at once to pronounce an action right or wrong. We do not need to deliberate or enquire, or to canvass reasons and considerations for and against, in order to declare a murder, a theft, or a lie to be wrong. We are fully armed with the power of deciding all such questions; we do not hesitate, like a person that has to consult a variety of different faculties or interests. Just as we pronounce at once whether the day is light or dark, hot or cold; whether a weight is light or heavy;—we are able to say whether an action is morally right or the opposite.

3. Secondly, It is a faculty or power belonging to all mankind.

This was expressed by Cicero, in a famous passage, often quoted with approbation, by the supporters of innate moral distinctions. “There is one true and original law conformable to reason and to nature, diffused over all, invariable, eternal, which calls to duty and deters from injustice, &c.”

4. Thirdly, Moral Sentiment is said to be radically different in its nature from any other fact or phenomenon of the mind.

The peculiar state of discriminating right and wrong, involving approbation and disapprobation, is considered to be entirely unlike any other mental element; and, if so, we are precluded from resolving or analyzing it into simpler modes of feeling, willing, or thinking.

We have many feelings that urge us to act and abstain from acting; but the prompting of conscience has something peculiar to itself, which has been expressed by the terms rightness, authority, supremacy. Other motives,—hunger, curiosity, benevolence, and so on,—have might, this has right.

So, the Intellect has many occasions for putting forth its aptitudes of discriminating, identifying, remembering; but the operation of discerning right and wrong is supposed to be a unique employment of those functions.

5. In reply to these arguments, and in support of the view that the Moral Faculty is complex and derived, the following considerations are urged:—

First, The Immediateness of a judgment, is no proof of its being innate; long practice or familiarity has the same effect.

In proportion as we are habituated to any subject, or any class of operations, our decisions are rapid and independent of deliberation. An expert geometer sees at a glance whether a demonstration is correct. In extempore speech, a person has to perform every moment a series of judgments as to the suitability of words to meaning, to grammar, to taste, to effect upon an audience. An old soldier knows in an instant, without thought or deliberation, whether a position is sufficiently guarded. There is no greater rapidity in the judgments of right and wrong, than in these acquired professional judgments.

Moreover, the decisions of conscience are quick only in the simpler cases. It happens not unfrequently that difficult and protracted deliberations are necessary to a moral judgment.

6. Secondly, The alleged similarity of men's moral judgments in all countries and times holds only to a limited degree.

The very great differences among different nations, as to what constitutes right and wrong, are too numerous, striking,

and serious, not to have been often brought forward in Ethical controversy. Robbery and murder are legalized in whole nations. Macaulay's picture of the Highland Chief of former days is not singular in the experience of mankind.

'His own vassals, indeed, were few in number, but he came of the best blood of the Highlands. He kept up a close connexion with his more powerful kinsmen; nor did they like him the less because he was a robber; for he never robbed them; and that robbery, merely as robbery, was a wicked and disgraceful act, had never entered into the mind of any Celtic chief.'

Various answers have been given by the advocates of innate morality to these serious discrepancies.

(1) It is maintained that savage or uncultivated nations are not a fair criterion of mankind generally: that as men become more civilized, they approximate to unity of moral sentiment; and what civilized men agree in, is alone to be taken as the judgment of the race.

Now, this argument would have great weight, in any discussion as to what is good, useful, expedient, or what is in accordance with the cultivated reason or intelligence of mankind; because civilization consists in the exercise of men's intellectual faculties to improve their condition. But in a controversy as to what is given us by nature,—what we possess independently of intelligent search and experience,—the appeal to civilization does not apply. What civilized men agree upon among themselves, as opposed to savages, is likely to be the reverse of a natural instinct; in other words, something suggested by reason and experience.

In the next place, counting only civilized races, that is, including the chief European, American, and Asiatic peoples of the present day, and the Greeks and Romans of the ancient world, we still find disparities on what are deemed by us fundamental points of moral right and wrong. Polygamy is regarded as right in Turkey, India, and China, and as wrong in England. Marriages that we pronounce incestuous were legitimate in ancient times. The views entertained by Plato and Aristotle as to the intercourse of the sexes are now looked upon with abhorrence.

(2) It has been replied that, although men differ greatly in what they consider right and wrong, they all agree in possessing *some notion* of right and wrong. No people are entirely devoid of moral judgments.

But this is to surrender the only position of any real importance. The simple and underived character of the moral

faculty is maintained because of the superior authority attached to what is natural, as opposed to what is merely conventional. But if nothing be natural but the mere fact of right and wrong, while all the details, which alone have any value, are settled by convention and custom, we are as much at sea on one system as on the other. *in comparison*

(3) It is fully admitted, being, indeed, impossible to deny, that education must concur with natural impulses in making up the moral sentiment. No human being, abandoned entirely to native promptings, is ever found to manifest a sense of right and wrong. As a general rule, the strength of the conscience depends on the care bestowed on its cultivation. Although we have had to recognize primitive distinctions among men as to the readiness to take on moral training, still, the better the training, the stronger will be the conscientious determinations.

But this admission has the effect of reducing the part performed by nature to a small and uncertain amount. Even if there were native preferences, they might be completely overborne and reversed by an assiduous education. The difference made by inculcation is so great, that it practically amounts to everything. A voice so feeble as to be overpowered by foreign elements would do no credit to nature.

7. Thirdly, Moral right and wrong is not so much a simple, indivisible property, as an extensive Code of regulations, which cannot even be understood without a certain maturity of the intelligence.

It is not possible to sum up the whole field of moral right and wrong, so as to bring it within the scope of a single limited perception, like the perception of resistance, or of colour. In regard to some of the alleged intuitions at the foundation of our knowledge, as for example time and space, there is a comparative simplicity and unity, rendering their innate origin less disputable. No such simplicity can be assigned in the region of duty. *(Generalization)*

After the subject of morals has been studied in the detail, it has, indeed, been found practicable to comprise the whole, by a kind of generalization, in one comprehensive recognition of regard to our fellows. But, in the first place, this is far from a primitive or an intuitive suggestion of the mind. It came at a late stage of human history, and is even regarded as a part of Revelation. In the second place, this high generality must be accompanied with detailed applications to particular cases

and circumstances. Life is full of conflicting demands, and there must be special rules to adjust these various demands. We have to be told that country is greater than family; that temporary interests are to succumb to more enduring, and so on.

Supposing the Love of our Neighbour to unfold in detail, as it expresses in sum, the whole of morality, this is only another name for our Sympathetic, Benevolent, or Disinterested regards, into which therefore Conscience would be resolved, as it was by Hume.

✓ But Morals is properly considered as a wide-ranging science, having a variety of heads full of difficulty, and demanding minute consideration. The subject of Justice, has nothing simple but the abstract statement—giving each one their due; before that can be applied, we must ascertain what is each person's due, which introduces complex questions of relative merit, far transcending the sphere of intuition.

✓ If any part of Morals had the simplicity of an instinct, it would be regard to Truth. The difference between truth and falsehood might almost be regarded as a primitive susceptibility, like the difference between light and dark, between resistance and non-resistance. That each person should say what is, instead of what is not, may well seem a primitive and natural impulse. In circumstances of perfect indifference, this would be the obvious and usual course of conduct; being, like the straight line, the shortest distance between two points. Let a motive arise, however, in favour of the lie, and there is nothing to insure the truth. Reference must be made to other parts of the mind, from which counter-motives may be furnished; and the intuition in favour of Truth, not being able to support itself, has to repose on the general foundation of all virtue, the instituted recognition of the claims of others.

✓ 8. Fourthly, Intuition is incapable of settling the debated questions of Practical Morality.

If we recall some of the great questions of practical life that have divided the opinions of mankind, we shall find that mere Intuition is helpless to decide them.

✓ The toleration of heretical opinions has been a greatly contested point. Our feelings are arrayed on both sides; and there is no prompting of nature to arbitrate between the opposing impulses. If the advance of civilization has tended to liberty, it has been owing partly to greater enlightenment, and partly to the successful struggles of dissent in the war with established opinion.

The questions relating to marriage are wholly undecidable by intuition. The natural impulses are for unlimited co-habitation. The degree of restraint to be put upon this tendency is not indicated by any sentiment that can be discovered in the mind. The case is very peculiar. In theft and murder, the immediate consequences are injury to some one; in sexual indulgence, the immediate result is agreeable to all concerned. The evils are traceable only in remote consequences, which intuition can know nothing of. It is not to be wondered, therefore, that nations, even highly civilized, have differed widely in their marriage institutions; agreeing only in the propriety of adopting and enforcing *some* regulations. So essentially has this matter been bound up with the moral code of every society, that a proposed criterion of morality unable to grapple with it, would be discarded as worthless. Yet there is no intuitive sentiment that can be of any avail in the question of marriage with a deceased wife's sister.

9. *Fifthly*, It is practicable to analyze or resolve the Moral Faculty; and, in so doing, to explain, both its peculiar property, and the similarity of moral judgments so far as existing among men.

We begin by estimating the operation of (1) Prudence, (2) Sympathy, and (3) the Emotions generally.

The inducements to perform a moral act, as, for example, the fulfilling of a bargain,—are plainly seen to be of various kinds.

(1) Prudence, or Self-interest, has obviously much to do with the moral conduct. Postponing for the present the consideration of Punishment, which is one mode of appeal to the prudential regards, we can trace the workings of self-interest on many occasions wherein men act right. To fulfil a bargain is, in the great majority of cases, for the advantage of the agent; if he fails to perform his part, others may do the same to him.

Our self-interest may look still farther. We may readily discover that if we set an example of injustice, it may be taken up and repeated to such a degree that we can count upon nothing; social security comes to an end, and individual existence, even if possible, would cease to be desirable.

A yet higher view of self-interest informs us, that by performing all our obligations to our fellows, we not only attain reciprocal performance, but generate mutual affections and sympathies, which greatly augment the happiness of life.

(2) Sympathy, or Fellow-feeling, the source of our disinterested actions, must next be taken into the account. It is a consequence of our sympathetic endowment that we revolt from inflicting pain on another, and even forego a certain satisfaction to self rather than be the occasion of suffering to a fellow creature. Moved thus, we perform many obligations on the ground of the misery (not our own) accruing from their neglect.

A considerable portion of human virtue springs directly from this source. If purely disinterested tendencies were withdrawn from the breast, the whole existence of humanity would be changed. Society might not be impossible; there are races where mutual sympathy barely exists: but the fulfilment of obligations, if always dependent on a sense of self-interest, would fail where that was not apparent. On the other hand, if we were on all occasions touched with the unhappiness to others immediately and remotely springing from our conduct—if sympathy were perfect and unfailing—we could hardly ever omit doing what was right.

(3) Our several Emotions or Passions may co-operate with Prudence and with Sympathy in a way to make both the one and the other more efficacious.

Prudence, in the shape of aversion to pain, is rendered more acute when the pain is accompanied with Fear. The perturbation of fear rises up as a deterring motive when dangers loom in the distance. One powerful check to the commission of injury is the retaliation of the sufferer, which is a danger of the vague and illimitable kind, calculated to create alarm.

Anger, or Resentment, also enters, in various ways, into our moral impulses. In one shape it has just been noticed. In concurrence with Self-interest and Sympathy, it heightens the feeling of reprobation against wrong-doers.

The Tender Emotion, and the Affections, uphold us in the performance of our duties to others, being an additional safeguard against injury to the objects of the feelings. It has already been shown how these emotions, while tending to coalesce with Sympathy proper, are yet distinguished from it.

The *Æsthetic* Emotions have important bearings upon Ethical Sentiment. As a whole, they are favorable to human virtue, being non-exclusive pleasures. They, however, give a bias to the formation of moral rules, and pervert the proper test of right and wrong in a manner to be afterwards explained.

10. Although Prudence and Sympathy, and the various Emotions named, are powerful inducements to what is right in action, and although, without these, right would not prevail among mankind, yet they do not stamp the peculiar attribute of Rightness. For this, we must refer to the institution of Government, or Authority.*

Although the force of these various motives on the side of right is all-powerful and essential, so much so, that without them morality would be impossible, they do not, of themselves, impart the character of a moral act. We do not always feel that, because we have neglected our interest or violated our sympathies, we have on that account done wrong. The criterion of rightness in particular cases is something different.

The reasons are apparent. For although prudence, as regards self, and sympathy or fellow-feeling, as regards others, would comprehend all the interests of mankind—everything that morality can desire to accomplish—nevertheless, the acting out of these impulses by each individual at random would not suffice for the exigencies of human life. They must be regulated, directed, reconciled by society at large; each person must be made to work upon the same plan as every other person. This leads to the institution of Government and Authority, with the correlatives of Law, Obligation, and Punishment. Our natural impulses for good are now directed into an artificial channel, and it is no longer optional whether they shall fall into that channel. The nature of the case requires all to conform alike to the general arrangements, and whoever is not sufficiently urged by the natural motives, is brought under the spur of a new kind of prudential motive—Punishment.

Government, Authority, Law, Obligation, Punishment, are all implicated in the same great Institution of Society, to which Morality owes its chief foundation, and the Moral Sentiment its special attribute. Morality is not Prudence, nor Benevolence, in their primitive or spontaneous manifestations: it is the systematic codification of prudential and benevolent actions, rendered obligatory by what is termed penalties or Punishment; an entirely distinct motive, artificially framed by human society, but made so familiar to every member of society as to be a second nature. None are allowed to be prudential or sympathizing in their own way. Parents are compelled to nourish their own children; servants to obey their

own masters, to the neglect of other regards; all citizens have to abide by the awards of authority; bargains are to be fulfilled according to a prescribed form and letter; truth is to be spoken on certain definite occasions, and not on others. In a formed society, the very best impulses of nature fail to guide the citizen's actions. No doubt there ought to be a general coincidence between what Prudence and Sympathy would dictate, and what Law dictates; but the precise adjustment is a matter of institution. A moral act is not merely an act tending to reconcile the good of the agent with the good of the whole society; it is an act, prescribed by the social authority, and rendered obligatory upon every citizen. Its morality is constituted by its authoritative prescription, and not by its fulfilling the primary ends of the social institution. A bad law is still a law; an ill-judged moral precept is still a moral precept, felt as such by every loyal citizen.

11. It may be proved, by such evidence as the case admits of, that the peculiarity of the Moral Sentiment, or Conscience, is identified with our education under government, or Authority.

Conscience is described by such terms as moral approbation and disapprobation; and involves, when highly developed, a peculiar and unmistakeable revulsion of mind at what is wrong, and a strong resentment towards the wrong-doer, which become Remorse, in the case of self.

It is capable of being proved, that there is nothing natural or primitive in these feelings, except in so far as the case happens to concur with the dictates of Self-interest, or Sympathy, aided by the Emotions formerly specified. Any action that is hostile to our interest, excites a form of disapprobation, such as belongs to wounded self-interest; and any action that puts another to pain may so affect our natural sympathy as to be disapproved, and resented on that ground. These natural or inborn feelings are always liable to coincide with moral right and wrong, although they are not its criterion or measure in the mind of each individual. But in those cases where an unusually strong feeling of moral disapprobation is awakened, there is apt to be a concurrence of the primitive motives of self, and of fellow-feeling; and it is the ideal of good law, and good morality, to coincide with a certain well-proportioned adjustment of the Prudential and the Sympathetic regards of the individual.

The requisite allowance being made for the natural impulses, we must now adduce the facts, showing that the cha-

whole moral sentiment
 racteristic of the Moral Sense is an education under Law, or Authority, through the instrumentality of Punishment.

(1) It is a fact that human beings living in society are placed under discipline, accompanied by punishment. Certain actions are forbidden, and the doers of them are subjected to some painful infliction; which is increased in severity if they are persisted in. Now, what would be the natural consequence of such a system, under the known laws of feeling, will, and intellect? Would not an action that always brings down punishment be associated with the pain and the dread of punishment? Such an association is inevitably formed, and becomes at least a part, and a very important part, of the sense of duty; nay, it would of itself, after a certain amount of repetition, be adequate to restrain for ever the performance of the action, thus attaining the end of morality.

There may be various ways of evoking and forming the moral sentiment, but the one way most commonly trusted to, and never altogether dispensed with, is the associating of pain, that is, punishment, with the actions that are disallowed. Punishment is held out as the consequence of performing certain actions; every individual is made to taste of it; its infliction is one of the most familiar occurrences of every-day life. Consequently, whatever else may be present in the moral sentiment, this fact of the connexion of pain with forbidden actions must enter into it with an overpowering prominence. Any natural or primitive impulse in the direction of duty must be very marked and apparent, in order to divide with this communicated bias the direction of our conduct. It is for the supporters of innate distinctions to point out any concurring impetus (apart from the Prudential and Sympathetic regards) sufficiently important to cast these powerful associations into a secondary or subordinate position.

By a familiar effect of Contiguous Association, the dread of punishment clothes the forbidden act with a feeling of aversion, which in the end persists of its own accord, and without reference to the punishment. Actions that have long been connected in the mind with pains and penalties, come to be contemplated with a *disinterested* repugnance; they seem to give pain on their own account. This is a parallel, from the side of pain, of the acquired attachment to money. Now, when, by such transference, a self-subsisting sentiment of aversion has been created, the conscience seems to be detached from all external sanctions, and to possess an isolated footing

in the mind. It has passed through the stage of reference to authority, and has become a law to itself. But no conscience ever arrives at the independent standing, without first existing in the reflected and dependent stage.

✓ We must never omit from the composition of the Conscience the primary impulses of Self-Interest and Sympathy, which in minds strongly alive to one or other, always count for a powerful element in human conduct, although for reasons already stated, not the strictly moral element, so far as the individual is concerned. They are adopted, more or less, by the authority imposing the moral code; and when the two sources coincide, the stream is all the stronger.

✓ (2) Where moral training is omitted or greatly neglected, there is an absence of security for virtuous conduct.

In no civilized community is moral discipline entirely wanting. Although children may be neglected by their parents, they come at last under the discipline of the law and the public. They cannot be exempted from the associations of punishment with wrong. But when these associations have not been early and sedulously formed, in the family, in the school, and in the workshop, the moral sentiment is left in a feeble condition. There still remain the force of the law and of public opinion, the examples of public punishment, and the reprobation of guilt. Every member of the community must witness daily the degraded condition of the viciously disposed, and the prosperity following on respect for the law. No human being escapes from thus contracting moral impressions to a very large amount.

✓ (3) Whenever an action is associated with Disapprobation and Punishment, there grows up, in reference to it, a state of mind undistinguishable from Moral Sentiment.

There are many instances where individuals are enjoined to a course of conduct wholly indifferent with regard to universal morality, as in the regulations of societies formed for special purposes. Each member of the society has to conform to these regulations, under pain of forfeiting all the benefits of the society, and of perhaps incurring positive evils. The code of honour among gentlemen is an example of these artificial impositions. It is not to be supposed that there should be an innate sentiment to perform actions having nothing to do with moral right and wrong; yet the disapprobation and the remorse following on a breach of the code of honour, will often be greater than what follows a breach of the moral law. The constant habit of regarding with dread the consequences of

violating any of the rules, simulates a moral sentiment, on a subject unconnected with morality properly so called.

The arbitrary ceremonial customs of nations, with reference to such points as ablutions, clothing, eating and abstinence from meats,—when rendered obligatory by the force of penalties,—occupy exactly the same place in the mind as the principles of moral right and wrong. The same form of dread attaches to the consequences of neglect; the same remorse is felt by the individual offender. The exposuro of the naked person is as much abhorred as telling a lie. The Turkish woman exposing her face, is no less conscience-smitten than if she murdered her child. There is no act, however trivial, that cannot be raised to the position of a moral act, by the imperative of society.

Still more striking is the growth of a moral sentiment in connexion with such usages as the Hindoo suttee. It is known that the Hindoo widow, if prevented from burning herself with her husband's corpse, often feels all the pangs of remorse, and leads a life of misery and self-humiliation. The habitual inculcation of this duty by society, the penalty of disgrace attached to its omission, operate to implant a sentiment in every respect analogous to the strongest moral sentiment.

PART II.

THE ETHICAL SYSTEMS.

THE first important name in Ancient Ethical Philosophy is
SOKRATES. [469-399 B.C.]

For the views of Sokrates, as well as his method,* we have first the MEMORABILIA of XENOPHON, and next such of the Platonic Compositions, as are judged, by comparison with the Memorabilia, to keep closest to the real Sokrates. Of these, the chief are the APOLOGY OF SOKRATES, the KRITON and the PHÆDON.

The 'Memorabilia' was composed by Xenophon, expressly to vindicate Sokrates against the accusations and unfavourable opinions that led to his execution. The 'Apology' is Plato's account of his method, and also sets forth his moral attitude. The 'Kriton' describes a conversation between him and his friend Kriton, in prison, two days before his death, wherein, in reply to the entreaties of his friends generally that he should make his escape from prison, he declares his determination to abide by the laws of the Athenian State. Inasmuch as, in the Apology, he had seemed to set his private convictions above the public authority, he here presents another side of his character. The 'Phædon' contains the conversation on 'the Immortality of the Soul' just before his execution. The Ethical bearings of the Philosophical method, the Doctrines, and the Life of Sokrates, are these:—

The direction he gave to philosophical enquiry, was expressed in the saying that he brought 'Philosophy down from Heaven to Earth.' His subjects were Man and Society. He entered a protest against the enquiries of the early philosophers

* See, on the method of Sokrates, Appendix A.

as to the constitution of the ^{The whole creation} Kosmos, the nature of the Heavenly Bodies, the theory of Winds and Storms. He called these Divine things; and in a great degree useless, if understood. The Human relations of life, the varieties of conduct of men towards each other in all capacities, were alone within the compass of knowledge, and capable of yielding fruit. In short, his turn of mind was thoroughly practical, we might say utilitarian.

I.—He gave a foundation and a shape to Ethical Science, by insisting on its practical character, and by showing that, like the other arts of life, it had an End, and a Theory from which flows the precepts or means. The End, which would be the STANDARD, was not stated by him, and hardly even by Plato, otherwise than in general language; the Summum Bonum had not as yet become a matter of close debate. 'The art of dealing with human beings,' 'the art of behaving in modes of expressing the final end of conduct.*' Sokrates clearly indicated the difference between an unscientific and a scientific art; the one is an incommunicable knack or dexterity, the other is founded on theoretical principles.

II.—Notwithstanding his professing ignorance of what virtue is, Sokrates had a definite doctrine with reference to Ethics, which we may call his Psychology of the subject. This was the doctrine that resolves Virtue into Knowledge. Vice into Ignorance or Folly. 'To do right was the only way to impart happiness, or the least degree of unhappiness, compatible with any given situation: now, this was precisely what every one wished for and aimed at—only that many persons, from ignorance, took the wrong road; and no man was wise enough always to take the right. But as no man was willingly his own enemy, so no man ever did wrong willingly; it was because he was not fully or correctly informed of the consequences of his own actions; so that the proper remedy to apply, was enlarged teaching of consequences and improved judgment. To make him willing to be taught, the only condition required was to make him conscious of his own ignorance; the want of which consciousness was the real cause both of indocility and of vice' (Grote). This

* In setting forth the Ethical End, the language of Sokrates was not always consistent. He sometimes stated it, as if it included an independent reference to the happiness of others; at other times, he speaks as if the end was the agent's own happiness, to which the happiness of others was the greatest and most essential means. The first view, although not always adhered to, prevails in Xenophon; the second appears most in Plato.

doctrine grew out of his favourite analogy between social duty and a profession or trade. When the artizan goes wrong, it is usually from pure ignorance or incapacity; he is willing to do good work if he is able.

III.—The SUMMUM BONUM with Sokrates was Well-doing. He had no ideal of pursuit for man apart from virtue, or what he esteemed virtue—the noble and the praiseworthy. This was the elevated point of view maintained alike by him and by Plato; and common to them with the ideal of modern ages.

Well-doing consisted in doing well whatever a man undertook. 'The best man,' he said, 'and the most beloved by the gods, is he that, as a husbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry; as a surgeon, the duties of the medical art; in political life, his duty towards the commonwealth. The man that does nothing well is neither useful nor agreeable to the gods.' And as knowledge is essential to all undertakings, knowledge is the one thing needful. This exclusive regard to knowledge was his one-sidedness as a moral theorist; but he did not consistently exclude all reference to the voluntary control of appetite and passion.

IV.—He inculcated Practical Precepts of a self-denying kind, intended to curb the excesses of human desire and ambition. He urged the pleasures of self-improvement and of duty against indulgences, honours, and worldly advancement. In the 'Apology,' he states it as the second aim of his life (after imparting the shock of conscious ignorance) to reproach men for pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom and virtue. In 'Kriton,' he lays it down that we are never to act wrongly or unjustly, although others are unjust to us. And, in his own life, he furnished an illustrious example of his teaching. The same lofty strain was taken up by Plato, and repeated in most of the subsequent Ethical schools.

V.—His Ethical Theory extended itself to Government, where he applied his analogy of the special arts. The legitimate King was he that knew how to govern well.

VI.—The connexion in the mind of Sokrates between Ethics and Theology was very slender.

In the first place, his distinction of Divine and Human things, was an exclusion of the arbitrary will of the gods from human affairs, or from those things that constituted the ethical end.

But in the next place, he always preserved a pious and reverential tone of mind; and considered that, after patient study, men should still consult the oracles, by which the gods, in

ases of difficulty, graciously signified their intentions, and their beneficent care of the race. Then, the practice of well-doing was prompted by reference to the satisfaction of the gods. In so far as the gods administered the world in a right spirit, they would show favour to the virtuous. *Ch. 89.*

PLATO. [427-347 B.C.]

The Ethical Doctrines of Plato are scattered through his various Dialogues; and incorporated with his philosophical method, with his theory of Ideas, and with his theories of *acc.* man and of society.

From Sokrates, Plato derived Dialectics, or the method of Debate; he embodied all his views in imaginary conversations, or Dialogues, suggested by, and resembling the real conversations of Sokrates. And farther, in imitation of his master, he carried on his search after truth under the guise of ascertaining the exact meaning or definition of leading terms; as Virtue, Courage, Holiness, Temperance, Justice, Law, Beauty, Knowledge, Rhetoric, &c.

We shall first pass in review the chief Dialogues containing Ethical doctrines.

The APOLOGY, KRITON, and EUTHYPHRON (we follow Mr. Grote's order) may be passed by as belonging more to his master than to himself; moreover, everything contained in them will be found recurring in other dialogues.

con- The ALKIBIADES I. is a good specimen of the Sokratic *man-*ner. It brings out the loose discordant notions of *Just* and *Unjust* prevailing in the community; sets forth that the Just is also honourable, good, and expedient—the cause of happiness to the just man; urges the importance of Self-knowledge; and maintains that the conditions of happiness are not wealth and power, but Justice and Temperance.

ALKIBIADES II. brings out a Platonic position as to the *Good*. There are a number of things that are good, as health, money, family, but there is farther required the skill to apply these in proper measure to the supreme end of life. All knowledge is not valuable; there may be cases where ignorance is better. What we are principally interested in knowing is the Good, the Best, the Profitable. The man of much learning, without this, is like a vessel tossed on the sea without a pilot.*

* What Plato here calls the Knowledge of Good, or Reason,—the just discrimination and comparative appreciation, of Ends and Means—appears in the Politikos and the Euthydemos, under the title of the Royal or

^{ca 116} In *Hippias Minor*, appears an extreme statement of the doctrine, common to Sokrates and Plato, identifying virtue with knowledge, or giving exclusive attention to the intellectual element of conduct. It is urged that a commendable ^{fair} person, able to tell the truth if he chooses, is better than one unable to tell it, although wishing to do so; the knowledge is of greater worth than the good disposition.

In *Minos* (or the Definition of *Law*) he refuses to accept the decree of the state as a law, but postulates the decision of some Ideal wise man. This is a following out of the Sokratic analogy of the professions, to a purely ideal demand; the wise man is never producible. In many dialogues (*Kriton*, *Laches*, &c.) the decision of some Expert is sought, as a physician is consulted in disease; but the Moral expert is unknown to any actual community.

In *LACHES*, the question 'what is Virtue?' is put; it is argued under the special virtue of *Courage*. In a truly Sokratic dialogue, Sokrates is in search of a definition of *Courage*; as happens in the search dialogues, there is no definite result, but the drift of the discussion is to make courage a mode of intelligence, and to resolve it into the grand desideratum of the knowledge of good and evil—belonging to the One Wise Man.

CHARMIDES discusses *Temperance*. As usual with Plato in discussing the virtues, with a view to their Logical definition, he presupposes that this is something beneficial and good. Various definitions are given of *Temperance*; and all are rejected; but the dialogue falls into the same track as the *Laches*, in putting forward the supreme science of good and evil. It is a happy example of the Sokratic manner and pur-

Political Art, as employing or directing the results of all other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the *Protagoras*, under the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the *Philêbus*, as measure and proportion: in the *Phædrus* (in regard to rhetoric) as the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of persuasion, all the special processes, stratagems, decorations, &c., imparted by professional masters. In the *Republic*, it is personified in the few venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of the society, and whose directions all the rest (Guardians and Producers) are bound implicitly to follow: the virtue of the subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience. In the *Leges*, it is defined as the complete subjection in the mind, of pleasures and pains to right Reason, without which, no special aptitudes are worth having. In the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*, it stands as a Sokratic authority under the title of *Sophrosynê* or *Temperance*: and the *Profitable* is declared identical with the *Good*, as the directing and limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings.' (Grote's *Plato*, I, 362.)

pose, of exposing the conceit of knowledge, the fancy that people understand the meaning of the general terms habitually employed.

LYSIS on *Friendship*, or *Love*, might be expected to furnish some ethical openings, but it is rather a piece of dialectic, without result, farther than to impart the consciousness of ignorance. If it suggests anything positive, it is the Idea of Good, as the ultimate end of affection. The subject possesses, a special interest in ancient Ethics, as being one of the aspects of Benevolent sentiment in the Pagan world. In Aristotle we first find a definite handling of it.

MENON may be considered as pre-eminently ethical in its design. It is expressly devoted to the question—Is Virtue teachable? Sokrates as usual confesses that he does not know what virtue is. He will not accept a catalogue of the admitted virtues as a definition of virtue, and presses for some common or defining attribute. He advances on his own side his usual doctrine that virtue is Knowledge, or a mode of Knowledge, and that it is good and profitable; which is merely an iteration of the Science of good and evil. He distinguishes virtue from Right Opinion, a sort of quasi-knowledge, the knowledge of esteemed and useful citizens, which cannot be the highest knowledge, since these citizens fail to impart it even to their own sons.

In this dialogue, we have Plato's view of Immortality, which comprises both pre-existence and post-existence. The pre-existence is used to explain the derivation of general notions, or Ideas, which are antecedent to the perceptions of sense.

In *PROTAGORAS*, we find one of the most important of the ethical discussions of Plato. It proceeds from the same question—Is virtue teachable?—Sokrates as usual expressing his doubts on the point. Protagoras then delivers a splendid harangue, showing how virtue is taught—namely, by the practice of society in approving, condemning, rewarding, punishing the actions of individuals. From childhood upward, every human being in society is a witness to the moral procedure of society, and by degrees both knows, and conforms to, the maxims of virtue of the society. Protagoras himself as a professed teacher, or sophist, can improve but little upon this habitual inculcation. Sokrates, at the end of the harangue, puts in his usual questions tending to bring out the essence or definition of virtue, and soon drives Protagoras into a corner, bringing him to admit a view nowhere else developed in Plato.

that Pleasure is the only good, Pain the only evil, and that the science of Good and Evil consists in Measuring, and in choosing between conflicting pleasures and pains—preferring the greater pleasure to the less, the less pain to the greater. For example, courage is a wise estimate of things terrible and things not terrible. In consistency with the doctrine that Knowledge is virtue, it is maintained here as elsewhere, that a man knowing good and evil must act upon that knowledge. Plato often repeats his theory of Measurement, but never again specifically intimates that the things to be measured are pleasures and pains. And neither here nor elsewhere, does he suppose the virtuous man taking directly into his calculation the pleasures and pains of other persons.

GORGAS, one of the most renowned of the dialogues in point of composition, is also ethical, but at variance with the Protagoras, and more in accordance with Plato's predominating views. The professed subject is Rhetoric, which, as an art, Sokrates professes to hold in contempt. The dialogue begins with the position that men are prompted by the desire of good, but proceeds to the great Platonic paradox, that it is a greater evil to do wrong than to suffer wrong. The criminal labours under a mental distemper, and the best thing that can happen to him, is to be punished that so he may be cured. The unpunished wrong-doer is more miserable than if he were punished. Sokrates in this dialogue maintains, in opposition to the thesis of Protagoras, that pleasure is not the same as good, that there are bad pleasures and good pains; and a skilful adviser, one versed in the science of good and evil, must discriminate between them. He does not mean that those pleasures only are bad that bring an overplus of future pains, which would be in accordance with the previous dialogue. The sentiment of the dialogue is ascetic and self-denying.* Order or Discipline is inculcated, not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself.

* 'Indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the Gorgias, than the manner in which Sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured, exorbitant, maleficent desires, but also depreciates and degrades all the actualities of life—all the recreative and elegant arts, including music and poetry, tragic as well as dithyrambic—all provision for the most essential wants, all protection against particular sufferings and dangers, even all service rendered to another person in the way of relief or of rescue—all the effective maintenance of public organized force, such as ships, docks, walls, arms, &c. Immediate satisfaction or relief, and those who confer it, are treated with contempt, and presented as in hostility to the perfection of the mental structure. And it is in this point of view, that various Platonic

critically The POLITIKUS is on the Art of Government, and gives the Platonic *beau idéal* of the One competent person, governing absolutely, by virtue of his scientific knowledge, and aiming at the good and improvement of the governed. This is merely another illustration of the Sokratic ideal—a despotism, anointed by supreme good intentions, and by an ideal skill. The Republic is an enlargement of the lessons of the POLITIKUS without the dialectic discussion.

The postulate of the One Wise man is repeated in KRATYLOS, on the unpromising subject of Language or the invention of Names.

The PHILEBUS has a decidedly ethical character. It propounds for enquiry the *Good*, the *Suummum Bonum*. This is *denied* to be mere pleasure, and the denial is enforced by Sokrates challenging his opponent to choose the lot of an ecstatic oyster. As usual, good must be related to *Intelligence*; and the Dialogue gives a long disquisition upon the One and the Many, the Theory of Ideas, the Determinate and the Indeterminate. Good is a compound of Pleasure and Intelligence, the last predominating. Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring the Determinate (Knowledge) to regulate it. This is merely another expression for the doctrine of Measure, and for the common saying, that the Passions must be controlled by Reason. There is, also, in the dialogue, a good deal on the Psychology of Pleasure and Pain. Pleasure is the fundamental harmony of the system; Pain its disturbance. Bodily Pleasure pre-supposes pain [true only of some pleasures]. Mental pleasures may be without previous pain, and are therefore pure pleasures. A life of Intelligence is conceivable without either pain or pleasure; this is the choice of the Wise man, and is the nature of the gods. Desire is a mixed state, and comprehends body and mind. Much stress is laid on the moderate and tranquil pleasures; the intense pleasures, coveted by mankind, belong to a distempered rather than a healthy state; they are false and delusive. Pleasure is, by its nature, a change or transition, and cannot be a supreme end. The mixture of Pleasure and Intelligence is to be adjusted by the all-important principle of Measure or Proportion, which connects the Good with the Beautiful.

commentators extol in an especial manner the Gorgias: as recognizing an Idea of Good superhuman and supernatural, radically disparate from pleasures and pains of any human being, and incommensurable with them, an *Universal Idea*, which, though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon its particulars, is separated from them by an irreducible space, and is discernible only by the Platonic telescope. (Grote, *Gorgias*)

A decided asceticism is the ethical tendency of this dialogue. It is markedly opposed to the view of the Protagoras. Still greater is the opposition between it and the two *Erotic* dialogues, *Phædrus* and *Symposium*, where *Bonum* and *Pulchrum* are attained in the pursuit of an ecstatic and overwhelming personal affection.

The *REPUBLIC* starts with the question—what is JUSTICE? and, in answering it, provides the scheme of a model Republic. Book I. is a Sokratic colloquy, where one speaker, on being interrogated, defines Justice as 'rendering to every man his due,' and afterwards amends it to 'doing good to friends, evil to enemies.' Another gives 'the right of the strongest.' A third maintains that Injustice by itself is profitable to the doer; but, as it is an evil to society in general, men make laws against it and punish it; in consequence of which, Justice is the more profitable. Sokrates, in opposition, undertakes to prove that Justice is good in itself, ensuring the happiness of the doer by its intrinsic effect on his mind; and irrespective of exemption from the penalties of injustice. He reaches this result by assimilating an individual to a state. Justice is shown to be good in the entire city, and by analogy it is also good in the individual. He accordingly proceeds to construct his ideal commonwealth. In the course of this construction many ethical views crop out.

The state must prescribe the religious belief, and allow no compositions at variance with it. The gods must always be set forth as the causes of good; they must never be represented as the authors of evil, nor as practising deceit. Neither is it to be allowed to represent men as unjust, yet happy; or just, and yet miserable. The poetic representation of bad characters is also forbidden. The musical training is to be adapted for disposing the mind to the perception of Beauty, whence it becomes qualified to recognize the other virtues. Useful fictions are to be diffused, without regard to truth. This pious fraud is openly recommended by Plato.

The division of the human mind into (1) REASON or Intelligence; (2) ENERGY, Courage, Spirit, or the Military Virtue; and (3) Many-headed APPETITE, all in mutual counter-play—is transferred to the State, each of the three parts being represented by one of the political orders or divisions of the community. The happiness of the man and the happiness of the commonwealth are attained in the same way, namely, by realizing the four virtues—Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, Justice; with this condition, that Wisdom, or Reason, is sought

the division of mind was then unknown

only in the Ruling caste, the Elders; Courage, or Energy, only in the second caste, the Soldiers or Guardians; while Temperance and Justice (meaning almost the same thing) must inhere alike in all the three classes, and be the only thing expected in the third, the Working Multitude.

If it be now asked, what and where is Justice? the answer is—'every man to attend to his own business.' Injustice occurs when any one abandons his post, or meddles with what does not belong to him; and more especially when any one of a lower division aspires to the function of a higher. Such is Justice for the city, and such is it in the individual; the higher faculty—Reason, must control the two lower—Courage and Appetite. Justice is thus a sort of harmony or balance of the mental powers; it is to the mind what health is to the body. Health is the greatest good, sickness the greatest evil, of the body; so is Justice of the mind.

It is an essential of the Platonic Republic that, among the guardians at least, the sexual arrangements should be under public regulation, and the monopoly of one woman by one man forbidden: a regard to the breed of the higher caste of citizens requires the magistrate to see that the best couples are brought together, and to refuse to rear the inferior offspring of ill-assorted connexions. The number of births is also to be regulated.

In carrying on war, special maxims of clemency are to be observed towards Hellenic enemies. *all the Greeks.*

The education of the Guardians must be philosophical; it is for them to rise to the Idea of the good, to master the science of Good and Evil; they must be emancipated from the notion that Pleasure is the good. To indicate the route to this attainment Plato gives his theory of cognition generally—the theory of Ideas;—and indicates (darkly) how these sublime generalities are to be reached.

The Ideal Commonwealth supposed established, is doomed to degradation and decay; passing through Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, to Despotism, with a corresponding declension of happiness. The same varieties may be traced in the Individual; the 'despotized' mind is the name of Injustice and consequent misery.

The comparative value of Pleasures is discussed. The pleasures of philosophy, or wisdom (those of Reason), are alone true and pure; the pleasures corresponding to the two other parts of the mind are inferior; Love of Honour (from Courage or Energy), and Love of Money (Appetite). The

well-ordered mind—Justice—is above all things the source of happiness. Apart from all consequences of Justice, this is true; the addition of the natural results only enhances the strength of the position.

In *Timæus*, Plato repeats the doctrine that wickedness is to the mind what disease is to the body. The soul suffers from two distempers, madness and ignorance; the man under passionate heat is not wicked voluntarily. No man is bad willingly; but only from some evil habit of body, the effect of bad bringing-up [very much the view of Robert Owen].

* The long treatise called the *Laws*, being a modified scheme of a Republic, goes over the same ground with more detail. We give the chief ethical points. It is the purpose of the law-giver to bring about happiness, and to provide all good things divine and human. The divine things are the cardinal virtues—Wisdom, Justice, Temperance, Courage; the human are the leading personal advantages—Health, Beauty, Strength, Activity, Wealth. He requires the inculcation of self-command, and a training in endurance. The moral and religious feelings are to be guided in early youth, by the influence of Poetry and the other Fine Arts, in which, as before, a stringent censorship is to be exercised; the songs and dances are all to be publicly authorized. The ethical doctrine that the just man is happy and the unjust miserable, is to be preached; and every one prohibited from contradicting it. Of all the titles to command in society, Wisdom is the highest, although policy may require it to be conjoined with some of the others (Birth, Age, Strength, Accident, &c.). It is to be a part of the constitution to provide public exhortations, or sermons, for inculcating virtue; Plato having now passed into an opposite phase as to the value of Rhetoric, or continuous address. The family is to be allowed in its usual form, but with restraints on the age of marriage, on the choice of the parties, and on the increase of the number of the population. Sexual intercourse is to be as far as possible confined to persons legally married; those departing from this rule are, at all events, to observe secrecy. The slaves are not to be of the same race as the masters. As regards punishment, there is a great complication, owing to the author's theory that wickedness is not properly voluntary. Much of the harm done by persons to others is unintentional or involuntary, and is to be made good by reparation. For the loss of balance or self-control, making the essence of injustice, there must be a penal and educational discipline, suited to cure the moral distemper;

not for the sake of the past, which cannot be recalled, but of the future. Under cover of this theory, the punishments are abundantly severe; and the crimes include Heresy, for which there is a gradation of penalties terminating in death.

We may now summarize the Ethics of Plato, under the general scheme as follows:—

I.—The Ethical Standard, or criterion of moral Right and Wrong. This we have seen is, ultimately, the Science of Good and Evil, as determined by a Scientific or Wise man; the Idea of the Good, which only a philosopher can ascend to. Plato gave no credit to the maxims of the existing society; these were wholly unscientific.

It is obvious that this vague and indeterminate standard would settle nothing practically; no one can tell what it is. It is only of value as belonging to a very exalted and poetic conception of virtue, something that raises the imagination above common life into a sphere of transcendental existence.

II.—The Psychology of Ethics.

1. As to the Faculty of discerning Right. This is implied in the foregoing statement of the criterion. It is the Cognitive or Intellectual power. In the definite position taken up in Protagoras, it is the faculty of Measuring pleasures against one another and against pains. In other dialogues, measure is still the important aspect of the process, although the things to be measured are not given.

2. As regards the Will. The theory that vice, if not the result of ignorance, is a form of madness, an uncontrollable fury, a mental distemper, gives a peculiar rendering of the nature of man's Will. It is a kind of Necessity, not exactly corresponding, however, with the modern doctrine of that name.

3. Disinterested Sentiment is not directly and plainly recognized by Plato. His highest virtue is self-regarding; a concern for the Health of the Soul.

III.—On the Bonum, or Summum Bonum. Plato is ascetic and self-denying. 1. We have seen that in Philebus, Pleasure is not good, unless united with Knowledge or Intelligence; and the greater the Intelligence, the higher the pleasure. That the highest happiness of man is the pursuit of truth or Philosophy, was common to Plato and to Aristotle.

2. Happiness is attainable only through Justice or Virtue. Justice is declared to be happiness, first, in itself, and secondly, in its consequences. Such is the importance attached to this maxim as a safeguard of Society, that, whether true or not, it is to be maintained by state authority.

Prudence, approved of by all sects), or by promoting the welfare of others. 7 H. & D

The family
17. Dogma **THE CYNICS AND THE CYRENAICS.**

These opposing sects sprang from Sokrates, and passed, with little modification, the one into the Stoics, the other into the Epicureans. Both ANTISTHENES, the founder of the Cynics, and ARISTIPPUS, the founder of the Cyrenaics, were disciples of Sokrates.

Their doctrines chiefly referred to the *Summum Bonum*—the Art of Living, or of Happiness.

The Cynics were most closely allied to Sokrates; they, in fact, carried out to the full his chosen mode of life. His favourite maxim—that the gods had no wants, and that the most godlike man was he that approached to the same state—was the Cynic Ideal. To subsist upon the narrowest means; to acquire indifference to pain, by a discipline of endurance; to despise all the ordinary pursuits of wealth and pleasure,—were Sokratic peculiarities, and were the *beau idéal* of Cynicism. *herm*

The Cynic succession of philosophers were, (1) ANTISTHENES, one of the most constant friends and companions of Sokrates; (2) DIOGENES of Sinope, the pupil of Antisthenes, and the best known type of the sect. (His disciple Krates, a Theban, was the master of Zeno, the first Stoic.) (3) STILPON of Megara, (4) MENEDEMUS of Eretria, (5) MONIMUS of Syracuse, (6) KRATES.

The two first heads of the Ethical scheme, so meagrely filled up by the ancient systems generally, are almost a total blank as regards both Cynics and Cyrenaics.

I.—As regards a Standard of right and wrong, moral good or evil, they recognized nothing but obedience to the laws and customs of society.

II.—They had no Psychology of a moral faculty, of the will, or of benevolent sentiment. The Cyrenaic Aristippus had a Psychology of Pleasure and Pain.

The Cynics, instead of discussing Will, exercised it, in one of its most prominent forms, *12* self-control and endurance.

Disinterested conduct was no part of their scheme, although the ascetic discipline necessarily promotes abstinence from sins against property, and from all the vices of public ambition.

III.—The proper description of both systems comes under the *Summum Bonum*, or the Art of Living.

The Cynic Ideal was the minimum of wants, the habituation to pain, together with indifference to the common enjoy-

ments. The compensating reward was exemption from fear, anxiety, and disappointment; also, the pride of superiority to fellow-beings and of approximation to the gods. Looking at the great predominance of misery in human life, they believed the problem of living to consist in a mastery over all the forms of pain; until this was first secured, there was to be a total sacrifice of pleasure.

The Cynics were mostly, like Sokrates, men of robust health, and if they put their physical constitution to a severe test by poor living and exposure to wind and weather, they also saved it from the wear and tear of steady industry and toil. Exercise of body and of mind, with a view to strength and endurance, was enjoined; but it was the drill of the soldier rather than the drudgery of the artisan.

In the eyes of the public, the prominent feature of the Cynic was his contemptuous jeering, and sarcastic abuse of everybody around. The name (Cynic, dog-like) denotes this peculiarity. The anecdotes relating to Diogenes illustrate his coarse denunciation of men in general and their luxurious ways. He set at defiance all the conventions of courtesy and of decency; spoke his mind on everything without fear or remorse; and delighted in his antagonism to public opinion. He followed the public and obtrusive life of Sokrates, but instead of dialectic skill, his force lay in vituperation, sarcasm, and repartee. 'To Sokrates,' says Epiktetus, 'Zeus assigned the cross-examining function; to Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising function; to Zeno (the Stoic), the didactic and dogmatical.'

The Cynics had thus in full measure one of the rewards of asceticism, the pride of superiority and power. They did not profess an end apart from their own happiness; they believed and maintained that theirs was the only safe road to happiness. They agreed with the Cyrenaics as to the end; they differed as to the means.

The founders of the sect, being men of culture, set great store by education, from which, however, they excluded (as it would appear) both the Artistic and the Intellectual elements of the superior instruction of the time, namely, Music, and the Sciences of Geometry, Astronomy, &c. Plato's writings and teachings were held in low esteem. Physical training, self-denial and endurance, and literary or Rhetorical cultivation, comprise the items taught by Diogenes when he became a slave, and was made tutor to the sons of his master.

IV.—As to the Moral Code, the Cynics were dissenters from the received usages of society. They disapproved of

marriage laws, and maintained the liberty of individual tastes in the intercourse of the sexes. Being free-thinkers in religion they had no respect for any of the customs founded on religion.

V.—The collateral relations of Cynical Ethics to Politics and to Theology afford no scope for additional observations. The Cynic and Cyrenaic both stood aloof from the affairs of the state, and were alike disbelievers in the gods.

The Cynics appear to have been inclined to communism among themselves, which was doubtless easy with their views as to the wants of life. It is thought not unlikely that Sokrates himself held views of communism both as to property and to wives; being in this respect also the prompter of Plato (Grant's Ethics of Aristotle, Essay ii.).

The CYRENAIC system originated with ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene, another hearer and companion of Sokrates. The temperament of Aristippus was naturally inactive, easy, and luxurious; nevertheless he set great value on mental cultivation and accomplishments. His conversations with Sokrates form one of the most interesting chapters of Xenophon's Memorabilia, and are the key to the plan of life ultimately elaborated by him. Sokrates finding out his disposition, repeats all the arguments in favour of the severe and ascetic system. He urges the necessity of strength, courage, energy, self-denial, in order to attain the post of ruler over others; which, however, Aristippus fences by saying that he has no ambition to rule; he prefers the middle course of a free man, neither ruling nor ruled over. Next, Sokrates recalls the dangers and evil contingencies of subjection, of being oppressed, unjustly treated, sold into slavery, and the consequent wretchedness to one unhardened by an adequate discipline. It is in this argument that he recites the well-known apologue called the choice of Herakles; in which, Virtue on the one hand, and Pleasure with attendant vices on the other, with their respective consequences, are set before a youth in his opening career. The whole argument with Aristippus was purely prudential; but Aristippus was not convinced nor brought over to the Socratic ideal. He nevertheless adopted a no less prudential and self-denying plan of his own.

Aristippus did not write an account of his system; and the particulars of his life, which would show how he acted it, are but imperfectly preserved. He was the first theorist to avow and maintain that Pleasure, and the absence of Pain, are the proper, the direct, the immediate, the sole end of living: not of course mere present pleasures and present relief from pain, but

present and future taken in one great total. He would surrender present pleasure, and incur present pain, with a view to greater future good; but he did not believe in the necessity of that extreme surrender and renunciation enjoined by the Cynics. He gratified all his appetites and cravings within the limits of safety. He could sail close upon the island of Calypso without surrendering himself to the sorceress. Instead of deadening the sexual appetite he gave it scope, and yet resisted the dangerous consequences of associating with ~~Heiæra~~. In his enjoyments he was free from jealousies; thinking it no derogation to his pleasure that others had the same pleasure. Having thus a fair share of natural indulgences, he dispensed with the Cynic pride of superiority and the luxury of contemning other men. Strength of will was required for this course no less than for the Cynic life.

Aristippus put forward strongly the impossibility of realizing all the Happiness that might seem within one's reach; such were the attendant and deterring evils, that many pleasures had to be foregone by the wise man. Sometimes even the foolish person attained more pleasure than the wise; such is the lottery of life; but, as a general rule, the fact would be otherwise. The wisest could not escape the natural evils, pain and death; but envy, passionate love, and superstition, being the consequences of vain and mistaken opinion, might be conquered by a knowledge of the real nature of Good and Evil.

As a proper appendage to such a system, Aristippus sketched a Psychology of Pleasure and Pain, which was important as a beginning, and is believed to have brought the subject into prominence. The soul comes under three conditions, 1. a gentle, smooth, equable motion, corresponding to Pleasure; 2. a rough, violent motion, which is Pain; and 3. a calm, quiescent state, indifference or Unconsciousness. More remarkable is the farther assertion that Pleasure is only *present* or *realized* consciousness; the memory of pleasures past, and the idea of pleasures to come, are not to be counted; the painful accompaniments of desire, hope, and fear, are sufficient to neutralize any enjoyment that may arise from ideal bliss. Consequently, the happiness of a life means the sum total of these moments of realized or present pleasure. He recognized pleasures of the mind, as well as of the body; sympathy with the good fortunes of friends or country gives a thrill of genuine and lively joy. Still, the pleasures and the pains of the body, and of one's own self, are more intense; witness the bodily inflictions used in punishing offenders.

The Cyrenaics denied that there is anything just, or honourable, or base, by nature; all depended on the laws and customs. These laws and customs the wise man obeys, to avoid punishment and discredit from the society where he lives; doubtless, also, from higher motives, if the political constitution, and his fellow citizens generally, can inspire him with respect.

Neither the Cynics nor the Cyrenaics made any profession of generous or disinterested impulses.

ARISTOTLE. [384-322 B.C.]

Three treatises on Ethics have come down associated with the name of Aristotle; one large work, the Nicomachean Ethics, referred to by general consent as the chief and important source of Aristotle's views; and two smaller works, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia, attributed by later critics to his disciples. Even of the large work, which consists of ten books, three books (V. VI. VII.), recurring in the Eudemian Ethics, are considered by Sir A. Grant, though not by other critics, to have been composed by Eudemus, the supposed author of this second treatise, and a leading disciple of Aristotle.

Like many other Aristotelian treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics is deficient in method and consistency on any view of its composition. But the profound and sagacious remarks scattered throughout render it permanently interesting, as the work of a great mind. There may be extracted from it certain leading doctrines, whose point of departure was Platonic, although greatly modified and improved by the genius and personality of Aristotle.

Our purpose will be best served by a copious abstract of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Book First discusses the Chief Good, or the Highest End of all human endeavours. Every exercise of the human powers aims at some good; all the arts of life have their several ends—medicine, ship-building, generalship. But the ends of these special arts are all subordinate to some higher end; which end is the chief good, and the subject of the highest art of all, the Political; for as Politics aims at the welfare of the state, or aggregate of individuals, it is identical with and comprehends the welfare of the individual (Chaps. I. II.).

As regards the *method* of the science, the highest exactness is not attainable; the political art studies what is just, honourable, and good; and these are matters about which the

utmost discrepancy of opinion prevails. From such premises, the conclusions which we draw can only be probabilities. The man of experience and cultivation will expect nothing more. Youths, who are inexperienced in the concerns of life, and given to follow their impulses, can hardly appreciate our reasoning, and will derive no benefit from it: but reasonable men will find the knowledge highly profitable (III.).

Resuming the main question—What is the highest practical good—the aim of the all-comprehending political science?—we find an agreement among men as to the name *happiness* (*ἡδονή*); but great differences as to the nature of the thing. The many regard it as made up of the tangible elements—pleasures, wealth, or honour; while individuals vary in their estimate according to each man's state for the time being; the sick placing it in health, the poor in wealth, the consciously ignorant in knowledge. On the other hand, certain philosophers [in allusion to Plato] set up an absolute good,—an Idea of the Good, apart from all the particulars, yet imparting to each its property of being good (IV.).

Referring to men's lives (as a clue to their notions of the good), we find three prominent varieties; ¹the life of pleasure or sensuality, ²the political life, aspiring to honour, ³and the contemplative life. The first is the life of the brutes, although countenanced by men high in power. The second is too precarious, as depending on others, and is besides only a means to an end—namely, our consciousness of our own merits; for the ambitious man seeks to be honoured for his virtue and by good judges—thus showing that he too regards virtue as the superior good. Yet neither will virtue satisfy all the conditions. The virtuous man may slumber or pass his life in inactivity, or may experience the maximum of calamity; and such a man cannot be regarded as happy. The money-lender is still less entitled, for he is an unnatural character; and money is obviously good as a means. So that there remains only the life of contemplation; respecting which more presently (V.).

To a review of the Platonic doctrine, Aristotle devotes a whole chapter. He urges against it various objections, very much of a piece with those brought against the theory of Ideas generally. If there be but one good, there should be but one science; the alleged Idea is merely a repetition of the phenomena; the recognized goods (*i.e.*, varieties of good) cannot be brought under one Idea; moreover, even granting the reality of such an Idea, it is useless for all practical purposes. What our science seeks is Good, human and attainable (VI.).

The Supreme End is what is not only chosen as an End, but is never chosen except as an End: not chosen both for itself and with a view to something ulterior. It must thus be—(1) An *end-in-itself*, pursued for its own sake; (2) it must farther be *self-sufficing*, leaving no outstanding want,—man's sociability being taken into account and gratified. Happiness is such an end; but we must state more clearly wherein happiness consists.

This will appear, if we examine what is the work appropriate and peculiar to man. Every artist, the sculptor, carpenter, currier (so too the eye and the hand), has his own peculiar work: and good, to him, consists in his performing that work well. Man also has his appropriate and peculiar work: not merely living—for that he has in common with vegetables; nor the life of sensible perception—for that he has in common with other animals, horses, oxen, &c. There remains the life of man as a rational being: that is, as a being possessing reason along with other mental elements, which last are controllable or modifiable by reason. This last life is the peculiar work or province of man. For our purpose, we must consider man, not merely as possessing, but as actually exercising and putting in action, these mental capacities. Moreover, when we talk generally of the work or province of an artist, we always tacitly imply a complete and excellent artist in his own craft: and so likewise when we speak of the work of a man, we mean that work as performed by a complete and competent man. Since the work of man, therefore, consists in the active exercise of the mental capacities, conformably to reason, the supreme good of man will consist in performing this work with excellence or virtue. Herein he will obtain happiness, if we assume continuance throughout a full period of life: one day or a short time is not sufficient for happiness (VII.).

Aristotle thus lays down the outline of man's supreme Good or Happiness: which he declares to be the beginning or principle (*ἀρχή*) of his deductions, and to be obtained in the best way that the subject admits. He next proceeds to compare this outline with the various received opinions on the subject of happiness, showing that it embraces much of what has been considered essential by former philosophers: such as being 'a good of the mind,' and not a mere external good: being equivalent to 'living well and doing well,' another definition; consisting in virtue (the Cynics); in practical wisdom

—*φρόνησις* (Sokrates) ⁵; in philosophy; or in all these coupled with pleasure (Plato, in the *Philebus*). Agreeing with those who insisted on virtue, Aristotle considers his own theory an improvement, by requiring virtue in act, and not simply in possession. Moreover, he contends that to the virtuous man, virtuous performance is in itself pleasurable; so that no extraneous source of pleasure is needed. Such (he says) is the judgment of the truly excellent man; which must be taken as conclusive respecting the happiness, as well as the honourable pre-eminence of the best mental exercises. Nevertheless, he admits (so far complying with the Cyrenaics) that some extraneous conditions cannot be dispensed with; the virtuous man can hardly exhibit his virtue in act, without some aid from friends and property; nor can he be happy if his person is disgusting to behold or his parentage vile (VIII.).

This last admission opens the door to those that place good fortune in the same line with happiness, and raises the question, how happiness is attained. By teaching? By habitual exercise? By divine grace? By Fortune? If there be any gift vouchsafed by divine grace to man, it ought to be this; but whether such be the case or not, it is at any rate the most divine and best of all acquisitions. To ascribe such an acquisition as this to Fortune would be absurd. Nature, which always aims at the best, provides that it shall be attained, through a certain course of teaching and training, by all who are not physically or mentally disqualified. It thus falls within the scope of political science, whose object is to impart the best character and active habits to the citizens. It is with good reason that we never call a horse happy, for he can never reach such an attainment; nor indeed can a child be so called while yet a child, for the same reason; though in his case we may hope for the future, presuming on a full term of life, as was before postulated (IX.). But this long term allows room for extreme calamities and change in a man's lot. Are we then to say, with Solon, that no one can be called happy so long as he lives? or that the same man may often pass backwards and forwards from happiness to misery? No; this only shows the mistake of resting happiness upon so unsound a basis as external fortune. The only true basis of it is the active manifestation of mental excellence, which no ill fortune can efface from a man's mind (X.). Such a man will bear calamity, if it comes, with dignity, and can never be made thoroughly miserable. If he be moderately supplied as to external circumstances, he is to be styled happy; that is,

happy as a man—as far as man can reasonably expect. Even after his decease he will be affected, yet only feebly affected, by the good or ill fortune of his surviving children. Aristotle evidently assigns little or no value to presumed posthumous happiness (XI.).

In his love of subtle distinctions, he asks, 'Is happiness a thing admirable in itself, or a thing praiseworthy?' It is admirable in itself; for what is praiseworthy has a relative character, and is praised as conducive to some ulterior end; while the chief good must be an End in itself, for the sake of which everything else is done (XII.). [This is a defective recognition of Relativity.]

Having assumed as one of the items of his definition, that man's happiness must be in his special or characteristic work, performed with perfect excellence, Aristotle now proceeds to settle wherein that excellence consists. This leads to a classification of the parts of the soul. The first distribution is, into Rational and Irrational; whether these two are separable in fact, or only logically separable (like concave and convex), is immaterial to the present enquiry. Of the irrational, the lowest portion is the Vegetative (*φυτικόν*), which seems most active in sleep; a state where bad men and good are on a par, and which is incapable of any human excellence. The next portion is the Appetitive (*ἐπιθυμητικόν*), which is not thus incapable. It partakes of reason, yet it includes something conflicting with reason. These conflicting tendencies are usually modifiable by reason, and may become in the temperate man completely obedient to reason. There remains Reason—the highest and sovereign portion of the soul. Human excellence (*ἀρετή*) or virtue, is either of the Appetitive part,—moral (*ἠθικὴ*) virtue; or of the Reason—intellectual (*ἐπιστημονικὴ*) virtue. Liberality and temperance are Moral virtues; philosophy, intelligence, and wisdom, Intellectual (XIII.).

Such is an outline of the First Book, having for its subject the Chief Good, the Supreme End of man.

Book Second embraces the consideration of points relative to the Moral Virtues; it also commences Aristotle's celebrated definition and classification of the virtues or excellencies.

Whereas the chief excellence is chiefly generated and improved by habit, excellence is a result of habit (*ἔθος*); whence its name (Ethical). Hence we may see that moral excellence is no inherent part of our nature: if it were, it could not be reversed by habit—any more than a stone can acquire from any number of repetitions the habit of moving

upward, or fix the habit of moving downward. These moral excellencies are neither a part of our nature, nor yet contrary to our nature: we are by nature fitted to take them on, but they are brought to consummation through habit. It is not with them as with our senses, where nature first gives us the power to see and hear, and where we afterwards exercise that power. Moral virtues are acquired only by practice. We learn to build or to play the harp, by building or playing the harp: so too we become just or courageous, by a course of just or courageous acts. This is attested by all lawgivers in their respective cities; all of them shape the characters of their respective citizens, by enforcing habitual practice. Some do it well; others ill; according to the practice, so will be the resulting character; as he that is practised in building badly, will be a bad builder in the end; and he that begins on a bad habit of playing the harp, becomes confirmed into a bad player. Hence the importance of making the young perform good actions habitually and from the beginning. The permanent ethical acquirements are generated by uniform and persistent practice (I). [This is the earliest statement of the philosophy of *habit*.]

Also Everything thus turns upon practice: and Aristotle reminds us that his purpose here is, not simply to teach what virtue is, but to produce virtuous agents. How are we to know what the practice should be? It must be conformable to right reason: every one admits this, and we shall explain it further in a future book. But let us proclaim at once, that in regard to moral action, as in regard to health, no exact rules can be laid down. Amidst perpetual variability, each agent must in the last resort be guided by the circumstances of the case. Still, however, something may be done to help him. Here Aristotle proceeds to introduce the famous doctrine of the MEAN. We may err, as regards health, both by too much and by too little of exercise, food, or drink. The same holds good in regard to temperance, courage, and the other excellences (II).

His next remark is another of his characteristic doctrines, that the test of a formed habit of virtue, is to feel no pain; he that feels pain in brave acts is a coward. Whence he proceeds to illustrate the position, that moral virtue (*ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*) has to do with pleasures and pains. A virtuous education consists in making us feel pleasure and pain at proper objects, and on proper occasions. Punishment is a discipline of pain. Some philosophers (the Cynics) have been led by this consideration

to make virtue consist in apathy, or insensibility; but Aristotle would regulate, and not extirpate our sensibilities (III.)

But does it not seem a paradox to say (according to the doctrine of habit in I.), that a man becomes just, by performing just actions; since, if he performs just actions, he is already just? The answer is given by a distinction drawn in a comparison with the training in the common arts of life. That a man is a good writer or musician, we see by his writing or his music; we take no account of the state of his mind in other respects: if he knows how to do this, it is enough. But in respect to moral excellence, such knowledge is not enough: a man may do just or temperate acts, but he is not necessarily a just or temperate man, unless he does them with right intention and on their own account. This state of the internal mind, which is requisite to constitute the just and temperate man, follows upon the habitual practice of just and temperate acts, and follows upon nothing else. But most men are content to talk without any such practice. They fancy erroneously that *knowing*, without doing, will make a good man. [We have here the reaction against the Socratic doctrine of virtue, and also the statement of the necessity of a proper motive, in order to virtue.]

cel *h* Aristotle now sets himself to find a definition of virtue, *per genus et differentiam*. There are three qualities in the Soul—*Passions* ($\piάθη$), as Desire, Anger, Fear, &c., followed by pleasure or pain; *Capacities or Faculties* ($δυνάμεις$), as our capability of being angry, afraid, affected by pity, &c.; *Fixed tendencies, acquirements, or states* ($ἕξεις$). To which of the three does virtue or excellence belong? It cannot be a Passion; for passions are not in themselves good or evil, and are not accompanied with deliberate choice ($προαίρεσις$), will, or intention. Nor is it a Faculty: for we are not praised or blamed because we can have such or such emotions; and moreover our faculties are innate, which virtue is not. Accordingly, virtue, or excellence, must be an acquirement ($ἕξις$)—a State (V.). This is the *genus*.

Now, as to the *differentia*, which brings us to a more specific statement of the doctrine of the Mean. The specific excellence of virtue is to be got at from quantity in the abstract, from which we derive the conceptions of more, less, and equal; or excess, defect, and mean; the equal being the mean between excess and defect. But in the case of moral actions, the arithmetical mean may not hold (for example, six between two and ten); it must be a mean relative to the individual;

Milo, must have more food than a novice in the training school. In the arts, we call a work perfect, when anything either added or taken away would spoil it. Now, virtue, which, like Nature, is better and more exact than any art, has for its subject-matter, passions and actions; all which are wrong either in defect or in excess. Virtue aims at the mean between them, or the maximum of Good: which implies a correct estimation of all the circumstances of the act,—when we ought to do it—under what conditions—towards whom—for what purpose—in what manner, &c. This is the praiseworthy mean, which virtue aspires to. We may err in many ways (for evil, as the Pythagoreans said, is of the nature of the Infinite, good of the Finite), but we can do right only in one way; so much easier is the path of error.

Combining then this *differentia* with the *genus*, as above established, the complete definition is given thus—‘Virtue is an acquirement or fixed state, tending by deliberate purpose (genus), towards a mean relative to us (difference).’ To which is added the following all-important qualification, ‘determined by reason (λόγος), and as the judicious man (ὁ φρόνιμος) would determine.’ [Such is the doctrine of the Mean, which combines the practical matter-of-fact quality of moderation, recognized by all sages, with a high and abstract conception, starting from the Pythagorean remark quoted by Aristotle, ‘the Infinite, or Indefinite, is evil, the Finite or the Definite is good,’ and re-appearing in Plato as ‘conformity to measure’ (μετρίότης), by which he (Plato) proposes to discriminate between good and evil. The concluding qualification of virtue—‘a rational determination, according to the ideal judicious man’—is an attempt to assign a standard or authority for what is the proper ‘Mean;’ an authority purely ideal or imaginary; the actual authority being always, rightly or wrongly, the society of the time.]

Aristotle admits that his doctrine of Virtue being a mean, cannot have an application quite universal; because there are some acts that in their very name connote badness, which are wrong therefore, not from excess or defect, but in themselves (VI.). He next proceeds to resolve his general doctrine into particulars; enumerating the different virtues stated, each as a mean, between two extremes—Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Magnanimity, Magnificence, Meekness, Amiability or Friendliness, Truthfulness, Justice (VII.). They are described in detail in the two following books. In chap. VIII., he qualifies his doctrine of Mean and Extremes,

by the remark that one Extreme may be much farther removed from the Mean than the other. Cowardice and Rashness are the extremes of Courage, but Cowardice is farthest removed from the Mean.

The concluding chapter (IX.) of the Book reflects on the great difficulty of hitting the mean in all things, and of correctly estimating all the requisite circumstances, in each particular case. He gives as practical rules:—To avoid at all events the worst extreme; to keep farthest from our natural bent; to guard against the snare of pleasure. Slight mistakes on either side are little blamed, but grave and conspicuous ones incur severe censure. Yet how far the censure ought to go, is difficult to lay down beforehand in general terms. There is the same difficulty in regard to all particular cases, and all the facts of sense: which must be left, after all, to the judgment of Sensible Perception (*αἰσθησις*.)

Book Third takes up the consideration of the Virtues in detail, but prefaces them with a dissertation, occupying five chapters, on the Voluntary and Involuntary. Since praise and blame are bestowed only on voluntary actions,—the involuntary being pardoned, and even pitied,—it is requisite to define Voluntary and Involuntary. What is done under physical compulsion, or through ignorance, is clearly involuntary. What is done under the fear of greater evils is partly voluntary, and partly involuntary. Such actions are voluntary in the sense of being a man's own actions; involuntary in that they are not chosen on their own account; being praised or blamed according to the circumstances. There are cases where it is difficult to say which of two conflicting pressures ought to preponderate, and compulsion is an excuse often misapplied: but compulsion, in its strict sense, is not strength of motive at all; it is taking the action entirely out of our own hands. As regards Ignorance, a difference is made. Ignorance of a general rule is matter for censure; ignorance of particular circumstances may be excused. [This became the famous maxim of law,—*'Ignorantia facti, excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat.'*] If the agent, when better informed, repents of his act committed in ignorance, he affords good proof that the act done was really involuntary. Acts done from anger or desire (which are in the agent's self, are not to be held as involuntary. (1) If they were, the actions of brutes and children would be involuntary. (2) Some of these acts are morally good and approved. (3) Obligation often attaches

to these feelings. (4) What is done from desire is pleasant; the involuntary is painful. (5) Errors of passion are to be eschewed, no less than those of reason (I.).

The next point is the nature of Purpose, Determination, or Deliberate Preference (*προαίρεσις*), which is in the closest kindred with moral excellence, and is even more essential, in the ethical estimate, than acts themselves. This is a part of the Voluntary; but not co-extensive therewith. For it excludes sudden and unpremeditated acts; and is not shared by irrational beings. It is distinct from desire, from anger, from wish, and from opinion; with all which it is sometimes confounded. Desire is often opposed to it; the incontinent man acts upon his desires, but without any purpose, or even against his purpose; the continent man acts upon his purpose, but against his desires. Purpose is still more distinct from anger, and is even distinct (though in a less degree) from wish (*βούλησις*), which is choice of the End, while Purpose is of the Means; moreover, we sometimes wish for impossibilities, known as such, but we never purpose them. Nor is purpose identical with opinion (*δόξα*), which relates to truth and falsehood, not to virtue and vice. It is among our voluntary proceedings, and includes intelligence; but is it identical with pre-deliberated action and its results? (II.)

To answer this query, Aristotle analyzes the process of Deliberation, as to its scope, and its mode of operation. We exclude from deliberation things Eternal, like the Kosmos, or the incommensurability of the side and the diagonal of a square; also things mutable, that are regulated by necessity, by nature, or by chance; things out of our power; also final ends of action, for we deliberate only about the *means* to ends. The deliberative process is compared to the investigation of a geometrical problem. We assume the end, and enquire by what means it can be produced; then again, what will produce the means, until we at last reach something that we ourselves can command. If, after such deliberation, we see our way to execution, we form a Purpose, or Deliberate Preference (*προαίρεσις*). Purpose is then definable as a deliberative appetency of things in our power (III.).

Next is started the important question as to the choice of the final *End*. Deliberation and Purpose respect means; our Wish respects the End—but what is the End that we wish? Two opinions are noticed; according to one (Plato) we are moved to the good; according to the other, to the apparent good. Both opinions are unsatisfactory; the one would make

out an incorrect choice to be no choice at all; the other would take away all constancy from ends.

Aristotle settles the point by distinguishing, in this case as in others, between what bears a given character simply and absolutely, and what bears the same character relatively to this or that individual. The object of Wish, simply, truly, and absolutely, is the Good; while the object of Wish, to any given individual, is what appears Good to him. But by the Absolute here, Aristotle explains that he means what appears good to the *virtuous and intelligent* man; who is declared, here as elsewhere, to be the infallible standard; while most men, misled by pleasure, choose what is not truly good. In like manner, Aristotle affirms, that those substances are truly and absolutely wholesome, which are wholesome to the healthy and well-constituted man; other substances may be wholesome to the sick or degenerate. Aristotle's Absolute is thus a Relative with its correlate chosen or imagined by himself.

He then proceeds to maintain that virtue and vice are voluntary, and in our own power. The arguments are these. (1) If it be in our power to act right, the contrary is equally in our own power; hence vice is as much voluntary as virtue. (2) Man must be admitted to be the origin of his own actions. (3) Legislators and others punish men for wickedness, and confer honour on good actions; even culpable ignorance and negligence are punished. (4) Our character itself, or our fixed acquirements, are in our power, being produced by our successive acts; men become intemperate, by acts of drunkenness. (5) Not only the defects of the mind, but the infirmities of the body also, are blamed, when arising through our own neglect and want of training. (6) Even if it should be said that all men aim at the apparent good, but cannot control their mode of conceiving (*phantasia*) the end; still each person, being by his acts the cause of his own fixed acquirements, must be to a certain extent the cause of his own conceptions. On this head, too, Aristotle repeats the clenching argument, that the supposed imbecility of conceiving would apply alike to virtue and to vice; so that if virtuous action be regarded as voluntary, vicious action must be so regarded likewise. It must be remembered that a man's fixed acquirements or habits are not in his own power, in the same sense and degree in which his separate acts are in his own power. Each act, from first to last, is alike in his power; but in regard to the habit, it is

only the initiation thereof that is thoroughly in his power; the habit, like a distemper, is taken on by imperceptible steps in advance (V.).

[In the foregoing account of the Ethical questions connected with the Will, Aristotle is happily unembroiled with the modern controversy. The *mal-apropos* of 'Freedom' had not been applied to voluntary action. Accordingly, he treats the whole question from the inductive side, distinguishing the cases where people are praised or blamed for their conduct, from those where praise and blame are inapplicable as being powerless. It would have been well if the method had never been departed from; a sound Psychology would have improved the induction, but would never have introduced any question except as to the relative strength of the different feelings operating as motives to voluntary conduct.

In one part of his argument, however, where he maintains that vice must be voluntary, because its opposite, virtue, is voluntary, he is already touching on the magical island of the bad enchantress; allowing a question of fact to be swayed by the notion of factitious dignity. Virtue is assumed to be voluntary, not on the evidence of fact, but because there would be an *indignity* cast on it, to suppose otherwise. Now, this consideration, which Aristotle gives way to on various occasions, is the motive underlying the objectionable metaphor.]

After the preceding digression on the Voluntary and Involuntary, Aristotle takes up the consideration of the Virtues in order, beginning with COURAGE, which was one of the received cardinal virtues, and a subject of frequent discussion. (Plato, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*, &c.) § 11. 23.

[Courage (*ἀνδρεία*), the mean between timidity and foolhardiness, has to do with evils: All evils are objects of fear; but there are some evils that even the brave man does right to fear—as disgrace. Poverty or disease he ought not to fear. Yet, he will not acquire the reputation of courage from not fearing these, nor will he acquire it if he be exempt from fear when about to be scourged. Again, if a man be afraid of envy from others, or of insults to his children or wife, he will not for that reason be regarded as a coward. It is by being superior to the fear of great evils, that a man is extolled as courageous; and the greatest of evils is death, since it is a final close, as well of good as of evil. Hence the dangers of war are the greatest occasion of courage. But the cause must be honourable (VI.).

Thus the key to true courage is the quality or merit of the action. That man is brave, who both fears, and affronts

without fear, what he ought and when he ought: who suffers and acts according to the value of the cause, and according to a right judgment of it. The opposites or extremes of courage include (1) Deficiency of fear; (2) Excess of fear, cowardice; (3) Deficiency of daring, another formula for cowardice; (4) Excess of daring, Rashness. Between these, Courage is the mean (VII.).

Aristotle enumerates five analogous forms of quasi-courage, approaching more or less to genuine courage. (1) The first, most like to the true, is political courage, which is moved to encounter danger by the Punishments and the Honours of society. The desire of honour rises to virtue, and is a noble spring of action. (2) A second kind is the effect of Experience, which dispels seeming terrors, and gives skill to meet real danger. (3) Anger, Spirit, Energy (*θυμός*) is a species of courage, founded on physical power and excitement, but not under the guidance of high emotions. (4) The Sanguine temperament, by overrating the chances of success, gives courage. (5) Lastly, Ignorance of the danger may have the same effect as courage (VIII.).

Courage is mainly connected with pain and loss. Men are called brave for the endurance of pain, even although it bring pleasure in the end, as to the boxer who endures bruises from the hope of honour. Death is painful, and most so to the man that by his virtue has made life valuable. Such a man is to be considered more courageous, as a soldier, than a mercenary with little to lose (IX.).

[The account of Courage thus given is remarkably exhaustive; although the constituent parts might have been more carefully disentangled. A clear line should be drawn between two aspects of courage. The one is the resistance to Fear properly so called; that is, to the perturbation that exaggerates coming evil: a courageous man, in this sense, is one that possesses the true measure of impending danger, and acts according to that, and not according to an excessive measure. The other aspect of Courage, is what gives it all its nobleness as a virtue, namely, *Self-sacrifice*, or the deliberate encountering of evil, for some honourable or virtuous cause. When a man knowingly risks his life in battle for his country, he may be called courageous, but he is still better described as a heroic and devoted man.

Inasmuch as the leading form of heroic devotion, in the ancient world, was exposure of life in war, Self-sacrifice was presented under the guise of Courage, and had no independent

standing as a cardinal virtue. From this circumstance, paganism is made to appear in a somewhat disadvantageous light, as regards self-denying duties.]

2. Next in order among the excellences or virtues of the irrational department of mind is TEMPERANCE, or Moderation, (*σωφροσύνη*), a mean or middle state in the enjoyment of pleasure. Pleasures are mental and bodily. With the mental, as love of learning or of honour, temperance is not concerned. Nor with the bodily pleasures of muscular exercise, of hearing and of smell, but only with the animal pleasures of touch and taste: in fact, sensuality resides in touch; the pleasure of eating being a mode of contact (X.).

In the desires natural and common to men, as eating and the nuptial couch, men are given to err, and error is usually on the side of excess. But it is in the case of special tastes or preferences, that people are most frequently intemperate. Temperance does not apply to enduring pains, except those of abstinence from pleasures. The extreme of insensibility to pleasure is rarely found, and has no name. The temperate man has the feelings of pleasure and pain, but moderates his desires according to right reason (XI.). He desires what he ought, when he ought, and as he ought: correctly estimating each separate case (XII.). The question is raised, which is most voluntary, Cowardice or Intemperance? (1) Intemperance is more voluntary than Cowardice, for the one consists in choosing pleasure, while in the other there is a sort of compulsory avoidance of pain. (2) Temperance is easier to acquire as a habit than Courage. (3) In Intemperance, the particular acts are voluntary, although not the habit; in Cowardice, the first acts are involuntary, while by habit, it tends to become voluntary (XII.).

[Temperance is the virtue most suited to the formula of the Mean, although the settling of what is the mean depends after all upon a man's own judgment. Aristotle does not recognize asceticism as a thing existing. His Temperance is moderation in the sensual pleasures of eating and love.]

Book Fourth proceeds with the examination of the Virtues or Ethical Excellences.

3. LIBERALITY (*ἐλευθεριότης*), in the matter of property, is the mean of Prodigality and Illiberality. The right uses of money are spending and giving. Liberality consists in giving willingly, from an honourable motive, to proper persons, in proper quantities, and at proper times; each individual case being measured by correct reason. If such measure be not

taken, or if the gift be not made willingly, it is not liberality. The liberal man is often so free as to leave little to himself. This virtue is one more frequent in the inheritors than in the makers of fortunes. Liberality beyond one's means is prodigality. The liberal man will receive only from proper sources and in proper quantities. Of the extremes, prodigality is more curable than illiberality. The faults of prodigality are, that it must derive supplies from improper sources; that it gives to the wrong objects, and is usually accompanied with intemperance. Illiberality is incurable: it is confirmed by age, and is more congenial to men generally than prodigality. Some of the illiberal fall short in giving—those called stingy, close-fisted, and so on; but do not desire what belongs to other people. Others are excessive in receiving from all sources; such are they that ply disreputable trades (I.).

4 MAGNIFICENCE (*μεγαλοπρεπεία*) is a grander kind of Liberality; its characteristic is greatness of expenditure, with suitableness to the person, the circumstances, and the purpose. The magnificent man takes correct measure of each; he is in his way a man of science (*ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ὅμοιος*—II.). The motive must be honourable, the outlay unstinted, and the effect artistically splendid. The service of the gods, hospitality to foreigners, public works, and gifts, are proper occasions. Magnificence especially becomes the well-born and the illustrious. The house of the magnificent man will be of suitable splendour; everything that he does will show taste and propriety. The extremes, or corresponding defects of character, are, on the one side, vulgar, tasteless profusion, and on the other, meanness or pettiness, which for some paltry saving will spoil the effect of a great outlay (II.).

5 MAGNANIMITY, or HIGH-MINDEDNESS (*μεγαλοψυχία*), loftiness of spirit, is the culmination of the virtues. It is concerned with greatness. The high-minded man is one that, being worthy, rates himself at his real worth, and neither more (which is vanity) nor less (which is littleness of mind). Now, worth has reference to external goods, of which the greatest is honour. The high-minded man must be in the highest degree honourable, for which he must be a good man: honour being the prize of virtue. He will accept honour only from the good, and will despise dishonour, knowing it to be undeserved. In all good or bad fortune, he will behave with moderation: in not highly valuing even the highest thing of all, honour itself, he may seem to others supercilious. Wealth and fortune contribute to high-mindedness; but most of all, superior goodness;

for the character cannot exist without perfect virtue. The high-minded man neither shuns nor courts danger; nor is he indisposed to risk even his life. He gives favours, but does not accept them; he is proud to the great, but affable to the lowly. He attempts only great and important matters; is open in friendship and in hatred; truthful in conduct, with an ironical reserve. He talks little, either of himself or of others; neither desiring his own praise, nor caring to utter blame. He wonders at nothing, bears no malice; is no gossip. His movements are slow, his voice deep, his diction stately (III.).

There is a nameless virtue, a mean between the two extremes of too much and too little ambition, or desire of honour; the reference being to smaller matters and to ordinary men. The fact that both extremes are made terms of reproach, shows that there is a just mean; while each extreme alternately claims to be the virtue, as against the other, since there is no term to express the mean (IV.).

6 MILDNESS (*πραότης*) is a mean state with reference to Anger, although inclining to the defective side. The exact mean, which has no current name, is that state wherein the agent is free from perturbation (*ἀτάραχος*), is not impelled by passion, but guided by reason; is angry when he ought, as he ought, with whom, and as long as, he ought: taking right measure of all the circumstances. Not to be angry on the proper provocation, is folly, insensibility, slavish submission. Of those given to excess in anger, some are quick, impetuous, and soon appeased; others are sulky, repressing and perpetuating their resentment. It is not easy to define the exact mean; each case must be left to individual perception (V.).

7 The next virtue is Good-breeding in society, a balance between surliness on the one hand, and weak assent or interested flattery on the other. It is a nameless virtue, resembling friendship without the special affection. Aristotle shows what he considers the bearing of the finished gentleman, studying to give pleasure, and yet expressing disapprobation when it would be wrong to do otherwise (VI.).

Closely allied to the foregoing is the observance of a due mean, in the matter of Boastfulness. The boastful lay claim to what they do not possess; false modesty (*εἰρωνεία*) is denying or underrating one's own merits. The balance of the two is the straightforward and truthful character; asserting just what belongs to him, neither more nor less. This is a kind of truthfulness,—distinguished from 'truth' in its more

serious aspect, as discriminating between justice and injustice—and has a worth of its own; for he that is truthful in little things will be so in more important affairs (VII.).

In the playful intercourse of society, there is room for the virtue of Wit, a balance or mean between buffoonish excess, and the clownish dulness that can neither make nor enjoy a joke. Here the man of refinement must be a law to himself (VIII.).

MODESTY (*αἰδώς*) is briefly described, without being put through the comparison with its extremes. It is more a feeling than a state, or settled habit. It is the fear of ill-report; and has the physical expression of fear under danger—the blushing and the pallor. It befits youth as the age of passion and of errors. In the old it is no virtue, as they should do nothing to be ashamed of (IX.).

Book Fifth (the first of the so-called Eudemian books), treats of Justice, the Social virtue by pre-eminence. Justice as a virtue is defined, the state of mind, or moral disposition, to do what is just. The question then is—what is the just and the unjust in action? The words seem to have more senses than one. The just may be (1) the Lawful, what is established by law; which includes, therefore, all obedience, and all moral virtue (for every kind of conduct came under public regulation, in the legislation of Plato and Aristotle). Or (2) the just may be restricted to the fair and equitable as regards property. In both senses, however, justice concerns our behaviour to some one else: and it thus stands apart from the other virtues, as (essentially and in its first character) seeking another's good—not the good of the agent himself (I.).

The first kind of justice, which includes all virtue, called Universal Justice, being set aside, the enquiry is reduced to the Particular Justice, or Justice proper and distinctive. Of this there are two kinds, Distributive and Corrective (II.). Distributive Justice is a kind of equality or proportion in the distribution of property, honours, &c., in the State, according to the merits of each citizen; the standard of worth or merit being settled by the constitution, whether democratic, oligarchic, or aristocratic (III.). Corrective, or Reparative Justice takes no account of persons; but, looking at cases where unjust loss or gain has occurred, aims to restore the balance, by striking an arithmetical mean (IV.). The Pythagorean idea, that Justice is Retaliation, is inadequate; proportion and other circumstances must be included. Proportionate Retaliation, or Reciprocity of services,—as in the case

of Commercial Exchange, measured through the instrument of money, with its definite value,—is set forth as the great bond of society. Just dealing is the mean between doing injustice and suffering injustice (V.). Justice is definitely connected with Law, and exists only between citizens of the State, and not between father and children, master and slave, between whom there is no law proper, but only a sort of relation analogous to law (VI.). Civil Justice is partly Natural, partly conventional. The natural is what has the same force everywhere, whether accepted or not; the conventional varies with institutions, acquiring all its force from adoption by law, and being in itself a matter of indifference prior to such adoption. Some persons regard all Justice as thus conventional. They say—‘What exists by nature is unchangeable, and has everywhere the same power; for example, fire burns alike in Persia and here; but we see regulations of justice often varied—differing here and there.’ This, however, is not exactly the fact, though to a certain extent it is the fact. Among the gods indeed, it perhaps is not the fact at all: but among men, it is true that there exists something by nature changeable, though everything is not so. Nevertheless, there are some things existing by nature, other things not by nature. And we can plainly see, among those matters that admit of opposite arrangement, which of them belong to nature and which to law and convention; and the same distinction will fit in other cases also. Thus the right hand is by nature more powerful than the left; yet it is possible that all men may become ambidextrous. Those regulations of justice that are not by nature, but by human appointment, are not the same everywhere; nor is the political constitution everywhere the same; yet there is one political constitution only that is by nature the best everywhere (VII.).

To constitute Justice and Injustice in acts, the acts must be voluntary; there being degrees of culpability in injustice according to the intention, the premeditation, the greater or less knowledge of circumstances. The act that a person does may perhaps be unjust; but he is not, on that account, always to be regarded as an unjust man (VIII.).

Here a question arises, Can one be injured voluntarily? It seems not, for what a man consents to is not injury. Nor can a person injure himself. Injury is a relationship between two parties (IX.). Equity does not contradict, or set aside, Justice, but is a higher and finer kind of justice, coming in where the law is too rough and general.

Book Sixth treats of Intellectual Excellences, or Virtues of the Intellect. It thus follows out the large definition of virtue given at the outset, and repeated in detail as concerns each of the ethical or moral virtues successively.

According to the views most received at present, Morality is an affair of conscience and sentiment; little or nothing is said about estimating the full circumstances and consequences of each act, except that there is no time to calculate correctly, and that the attempt to do so is generally a pretence for evading the peremptory order of virtuous sentiment, which, if faithfully obeyed, ensures virtuous action in each particular case. If these views be adopted, an investigation of our intellectual excellences would find no place in a treatise on Ethics. But the theory of Aristotle is altogether different. Though he recognizes Emotion and Intellect as inseparably implicated in the mind of Ethical agents, yet the sovereign authority that he proclaims is not Conscience or Sentiment, but Reason. The subordination of Sentiment to Reason is with him essential. It is true that Reason must be supplied with First Principles, whence to take its start; and these First Principles are here declared to be, fixed emotional states or dispositions, engendered in the mind of the agent by a succession of similar acts. But even these dispositions themselves, though not belonging to the department of Reason, are not exempt from the challenge and scrutiny of Reason; while the proper application of them in act to the complicated realities of life, is the work of Reason altogether. Such an ethical theory calls upon Aristotle to indicate, more or less fully, those intellectual excellences, whereby alone we are enabled to overcome the inherent difficulties of right ethical conduct; and he indicates them in the present Book, comparing them with those other intellectual excellences which guide our theoretical investigations, where conduct is not directly concerned.

In specifying the ethical excellences, or excellences of disposition, we explained that each of them aimed to realize a mean—and that this mean was to be determined by Right Reason. To find the mean, is thus an operation of the Intellect; and we have now to explain what the right performance of it is,—or to enter upon the Excellences of the Intellect. The soul having been divided into Irrational and Rational, the Rational must further be divided into two parts,—the Scientific (dealing with necessary matter), the Calculative, or Deliberative (dealing with contingent matter). We must

touch upon the excellence or best condition of both of them (I.). There are three principal functions of the soul—Sensation, Reason, and Appetite or Desire. Now, Sensation (which beasts have as well as men) is not a principle of moral action. The Reason regards truth and falsehood only; it does not move to action, it is not an end in itself. Appetite or Desire, which aims at an end, introduces us to moral action. Truth and Falsehood, as regards Reason, correspond to Good and Evil as regards Appetite: Affirmation and Negation, with the first, are the analogues of Pursuit and Avoidance, with the second. In purpose, which is the principle of moral action, there is included deliberation or calculation. Reason and Appetite are thus combined: Good Purpose comprises both true affirmation and right pursuit: you may call it either an Intelligent Appetite, or, an Appetitive Intelligence. Such is man, as a principle of action (*ἡ τριάντη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος*).

Science has to do with the necessary and the eternal; it is teachable, but teachable always from *præcognita*, or principles, obtained by induction; from which principles, conclusions are demonstrated by syllogism (III.). Art, or Production, is to be carefully distinguished from the action or agency that belongs to man as an ethical agent, and that does not terminate in any separate assignable product. But both the one and the other deal with contingent matters only. Art deals for the most part with the same matters as are subject to the intervention of Fortune or Chance (IV.).

Prudence or Indicousness (*φρόνησις*, the quality of *ὁ φρόνιμος*), the Practical Reason, comes next. We are told what are the matters wherewith it is, and wherewith it is not, conversant. It does not deal with matters wherein there exist art, or with rules of art. It does not deal with necessary matters, nor with matters not modifiable by human agency. The prudent or judicious man is one who (like Pericles) can accurately estimate and foresee matters (apart from Science and Art) such as are good or evil for himself and other human beings. On these matters, feelings of pleasure or pain are apt to bias the mind, by insinuating wrong aims; which they do not do in regard to the properties of a triangle and other scientific conclusions. To guard against such bias, the judicious man must be armed with the ethical excellence described above as Temperance or Moderation. Indicousness is not an Art, admitting of better and worse; there are not good judicious men, and bad judicious

men, as there are good and bad artists. Judiciousness is itself an excellence (i.e. the term connotes excellence)—an excellence of the rational soul, and of that branch of the rational soul which is calculating, deliberative, not scientific (V.). Reason or Intellect (*νοῦς*) is the faculty for apprehending the first principles of demonstrative science. It is among the infallible faculties of the mind, together with Judiciousness, Science, and Philosophy. Each of these terms connotes truth and accuracy (VI.). Wisdom in the arts is the privilege of the superlative artists, such as Phidias in sculpture. But there are some men wise, not in any special art, but absolutely; and this wisdom (*σοφία*) is Philosophy. It embraces both principles of science (which Aristotle considers to come under the review of the First Philosophy) and deductions therefrom; it is *νοῦς* and *ἐπιστήμη* in one. It is more venerable and dignified than Prudence or Judiciousness; because its objects, the Kosmos and the celestial bodies, are far more glorious than man, with whose interests alone Prudence is concerned; and also because the celestial objects are eternal and unvarying; while man and his affairs are transitory and ever fluctuating. Hence the great honour paid to Thales, Anaxagoras, and others, who speculated on theories thus magnificent and superhuman, though useless in respect to human good.

We have already said that Prudence or Judiciousness is good counsel on human interests, with a view to action. But we must also add that it comprises a knowledge not of universals more, but also of particulars; and experienced men, much conversant with particulars, are often better qualified for action than inexperienced men of science (VII.). Prudence is the same in its intellectual basis as the political science or art—not looked at in a different aspect. Both of them are practical and consultative, respecting matters of human good and evil; but prudence, in the stricter sense of the word, concerns more especially the individual self; still, the welfare of the individual is perhaps inseparable from household and state concerns. Prudence farther implies a large experience; whence boys, who can become good mathematicians, cannot have practical judgment or prudence. In consultation, we are liable to error both in regard to universals, and in regard to particulars; it is the business of prudence, as well as of the political science, to guard against both. That prudence is not identical with Science, is plain enough; for Science is the intermediate process between the first principles and the last conclusions:

whereas prudence consists chiefly in seizing these last, which are the applications of reasoning, and represent the particular acts to be done. Prudence is the counterpart of Reason (*Noûs*) or Intellect, but at the opposite extremity of the mental process. For Intellect (*Noûs*) apprehends the extreme Universals,—the first principles,—themselves not deducible, but from which deduction starts; while Prudence fastens on the extreme particulars, which are not known by Science, but by sensible Perception. We mean here by sensible Perception, not what is peculiar to any of the five senses, but what is common to them all—whereby we perceive that the triangle before us is a geometrical ultimum, and that it is the final subject of application for all the properties previously demonstrated to belong to triangles generally. The mind will stop here in the downward march towards practical application, as it stopped at first principles in the upward march. Prudence becomes, however, confounded with sensible perception, when we reach this stage. [The statement here given involves Aristotle's distinction of the proper and the common Sensibles; a shadowing out of the muscular element in sensation] (VIII.).

Good counsel (*εὐβουλία*) is distinguished from various other qualities. It is, in substance, choosing right means to a good end; the end being determined by the great faculty—Prudence or Judiciousness (IX.). Sagacity (*σύνεσις*) is a just intellectual measure in regard to the business of life, individual and social; critical ability in appreciating and interpreting the phenomena of experience. It is distinguished from Prudence in this respect—that Prudence carries inferences into Practice (X.). Considerateness (*γνώμη*) is another intellectual virtue, with a practical bearing. It is that virtue whereby we discern the proper occasions for indulgent construction, softening the rigour of logical consistency. It is the source of equitable decisions.

The different intellectual excellences just named—Considerateness, Sagacity, Prudence (*φρόνησις*), and Intellect (*Noûs*), seem all to bear on the same result, and are for the most part predicable of the same individuals. All of them are concerned with the ultimate applications of principle to practice, and with the actual moments for decision and action. Indeed, Intellect (*Noûs*) deals with the extremes at both ends of the scale: with the highest and lowest terms. In theoretical science, it apprehends and sanctions the major propositions, the first and highest *principia* of demonstrations: in

practical dealings, it estimates the minor propositions of the syllogism, the possibilities of the situation, and the ultimate action required. All these are the *principia* from whence arises the determining motive: for the universal is always derived from particulars; these we must know through sensible perception, which is in this case the same thing as intellect (*Noûs*). Intellect is in fact both the beginning and the end: it cognizes both the first grounds of demonstration and the last applications of the results of demonstration. A man cannot acquire science by nature, or without teaching: but he may acquire Intellect and Sagacity by nature, simply through long life and abundant experience. The affirmations and opinions of old men deserve attention, hardly less than demonstrations: they have acquired an eye from experience, and can thus see the practical principles (though they may not be able to lay out their reasons logically) (XI.).

But an objector may ask—Of what use are Philosophy and Prudence? He may take such grounds as these. (1) Philosophy has no practical aim at all; nor does it consider the means of happiness. (2) Prudence, though bearing on practice, is merely knowledge, and does not ensure right action. (3) Even granting the knowledge to be of value as direction, it might be obtained, like medical knowledge, from a professional adviser. (4) If philosophy is better than prudence, why does prudence control philosophy? We have to answer these doubts. The first is answered by asserting the independent value of philosophy and prudence, as perfections of our nature, and as sources of happiness in themselves. The second and third doubts are set at rest, by affirming prudence to have no existence apart from virtue. Without a virtuous aim, there is no such thing as Prudence: there is nothing but cleverness degenerating into cunning; while virtue without virtuous prudence is nothing better than a mere instinct, liable to be misguided in every way (XII.).

There is one more difficulty to be cleared up respecting virtue. All our dispositions, and therefore all our ethical excellences, come to us in a certain sense by nature; that is, we have from the moment of birth a certain aptitude for becoming temperate, courageous, just, &c. But these natural aptitudes or possessions (*φυσικαὶ εἴσεις*) are something altogether distinct from the ethical excellences proper, though capable of being matured into them, if intellect and prudence be superadded. Sokrates was mistaken in resolving all the virtues into prudence; but he was right in saying that none

of them can exist without prudence. The virtues ought to be defined as, not merely ethical dispositions *according* to right reason, but ethical dispositions *along with* right reason or prudence (i.e., prudence is an ever present co-efficient). It is thus abundantly evident that none but a prudent man can be good, and none but a good man can be prudent. The virtues are separable from each other, so far as the natural aptitudes are concerned: a man may have greater facility for acquiring one than another. But so far as regards the finished acquirements of excellence, in virtue of which a man is called *good*—no such separation is possible. All of them alike need the companionship of Prudence (XIII.).

Book Seventh has two Parts. Part first discusses the grades of moral strength and moral weakness. Part second is a short dissertation on Pleasure, superseded by the superior handling of the subject in the Tenth Book.

With reference to moral power, in self-restraint, six grades are specified. (1) God-like virtue, or reason impelling as well as directing. (2) The highest human virtue, expressed by Temperance (*σωφροσύνη*)—appetite and passion perfectly harmonized with reason. (3) Continence (*ἐγκράτεια*) or the mastery of reason, after a struggle. (4) Incontinence, the mastery of appetite or passion, but not without a struggle. (5) Vice, reason perverted so as to harmonize entirely with appetite or passion. (6) Bestiality, naked appetite or passion, without reason. Certain prevalent opinions are enumerated, which are to form the subject of the discussions following—(1) Continence and endurance are morally good. (2) The Continent man sticks to his opinion. (3) The Incontinent *either* knowingly. (4) Temperance and Continence are the same. (5) Wise and clever men may be Incontinent. (6) Incontinence applies to other things than Pleasure, as anger, honour, and gain (I.).

See also The third point (the Incontinent sin knowingly) is first mooted. Sokrates held the contrary; he made vice and ignorance convertible. Others think that the knowledge possessed by the incontinent is mere opinion, or a vague and weak conviction. It is objected to No. 4, that continence implies evil desires to be controlled; while temperance means the character fully harmonized. As to No. 2, Continence must often be bad, if it consists in sticking to an opinion (II.).

The third point, the only question of real interest or difficulty, is resumed at greater length. The distinction between

knowledge and opinion (the higher and the lower kinds of knowledge) does not settle the question, for opinion may be as *strong* as knowledge. The real point is, what is meant by *having knowledge*? A man's knowledge may be in abeyance, as it is when he is asleep or intoxicated. Thus, we may have in the mind two knowledges (like two separate syllogisms), one leading to continence, the other to incontinence; the first is not drawn out, like the syllogism wanting a minor; hence it may be said to be not present to the mind; so that, in a certain sense, Sokrates was right in denying that actual and present knowledge could be overborne. Vice is a form of oblivion (III.).

The next question is, what is the object-matter of incontinence; whether there is any man incontinent simply and absolutely (without any specification of wherein), or whether all incontinent men are so in regard to this or that particular matter? (No. 6). The answer is, that it applies directly to the bodily appetites and pleasures, which are necessary up to a certain point (the sphere of Temperance), and then he that commits unreasonable excess above this point is called Incontinent simply. But if he commits excess in regard to pleasures, which, though not necessary, are natural and, up to a certain point, reasonable—such as victory, wealth, honour—we designate him as incontinent, yet with a specification of the particular matter (IV.).

The modes of Bestiality, as cannibalism and unnatural passion, are ascribed to morbid depravity of nature or of habits, analogous to disease or madness (V.).

Incontinence in anger is not so bad as Incontinence in lust, because anger (1) has more semblance of reason, (2) is more a matter of constitution, (3) has less of deliberate purpose—while lust is crafty, (4) arises under pain, and not from wantonness (VI.).

Persons below the average in resisting *pleasures* are incontinent; those below the average in resisting *pains* are soft or effeminate. The mass of men incline to both weaknesses. He that deliberately pursues excessive pleasures, or other pleasures in an excessive way, is said to be abandoned. The intemperate are worse than the incontinent. Sport, in its excess, is effeminacy, as being relaxation from toil. There are two kinds of incontinence: the one proceeding from precipitancy, where a man acts without deliberating at all; the other from feebleness,—where he deliberates, but where the result of deliberation is too weak to countervail his appetite (VII.). Intemperance or

profligacy is more vicious, and less curable than Incontinence. The profligate man is one who has in him no principle (*ἀρχή*) of good or of right reason, and who does wrong without afterwards repenting of it; the incontinent man has the good principle in him, but it is overcome when he does wrong, and he afterwards repents (VIII). Here, again, Aristotle denies that sticking to one's opinions is, *per se*, continence. The opinion may be wrong; in that case, if a man sticks to it, prompted by mere self-assertion and love of victory, it is a species of incontinence. One of the virtues of the continent man is to be open to persuasion, and to desert one's resolutions for a noble end (IX). Incontinence is like sleep or drunkenness as opposed to wakeful knowledge. The incontinent man is like a state having good laws, but not acting on them. The incontinence of passion is more curable than that of weakness; what proceeds from habit more than what is natural (X). // 12 // 88

The Eighth and Ninth Books contain the treatise on Friendship.

The subject deserves a place in an Ethical treatise, because of its connexion with virtue and with happiness. Several questions have been debated concerning Friendship,—Is it based on likeness or unlikeness? Can bad men be friends? Is there but one species of Friendship, or more than one? (I.) Some progress towards a solution of these questions may be made by considering what are the objects of liking; these are the good, the pleasant, the useful. By the good is not meant the absolute good of Plato, but the apparent good. Inanimate things must be excluded, as wanting reciprocation (II.). The varieties of friendship follow these three modes of the likeable. The friendships for the useful and the pleasant, are not disinterested, but self-seeking; they are therefore accidental and transitory; they do not involve intimate and frequent association. Friendship for the good, and between the virtuous, is alone perfect; it is formed slowly, and has the requisites of permanence. It occurs rarely (III.). As regards the useful and the pleasant, the bad may be friends. It may happen that two persons are mutually pleasant to each other, as lover and beloved; while this lasts, there is friendship. It is only as respects the good, that there exists a permanent liking for the person. Such friendship is of an absolute nature; the others are accidental (IV.). Friendship is in full exercise only during actual intercourse; it may exist potentially at a distance; but in long absence, there is danger

of its being dissolved. Friendship is a settled state or habit, while fondness is a mere passion, which does not imply our wishing to do good to the object of it, as friendship does (V.). The perfect kind of friendship, from its intensity, cannot be exercised towards more than a small number. In regard to the useful and the pleasant, on the other hand, there may be friendship with many; as the friendship towards tradesmen and between the young. The happy desire pleasant friends. Men in power have two classes of friends; one for the useful, the other for the pleasant. Both qualities are found in the good man; but he will not be the friend of a superior, unless he be surpassed (by that superior) in virtue also. In all the kinds of friendship now specified there is equality (VI.). There are friendships where one party is superior, as father and son, older and younger, husband and wife, governor and governed. In such cases there should be a proportionably greater love on the part of the inferior. When the love on each side is proportioned to the merit of the party beloved, then we have a certain species of equality, which is an ingredient in friendship. But equality in matters of friendship, is not quite the same as equality in matters of justice. In matters of justice, equality proportioned to merit stands first—equality between man and man (no account being taken of comparative merit) stands only second. In friendship, the case is the reverse; the perfection of friendship is equal love between the friends towards each other; to have greater love on one side, by reason of and proportioned to superior merit, is friendship only of the second grade. This will be evident if we reflect that extreme inequality renders friendship impossible—as between private men and kings or gods. Hence the friend can scarcely wish for his friend the maximum of good, to become a god; such extreme elevation would terminate the friendship. Nor will he wish his friend to possess all the good; for every one wishes most for good to self (VII.). The essence of friendship is to love rather than to be loved, as seen in mothers; but the generality of persons desire rather to be loved, which is akin to being honoured (although honour is partly sought as a sign of future favours). By means of love, as already said, unequal friendships may be equalized. Friendship with the good, is based on equality and similarity, neither party ever desiring base services. Friendships for the useful are based on the contrariety of fulness and defect, as poor and rich, ignorant and knowing (VIII.). Friendship is an incident of political society; men associating together for common

ends, become friends. Political justice becomes more binding when men are related by friendship. The state itself is a community for the sake of advantage; the expedient to all is the just. In the large society of the state, there are many inferior societies for business, and for pleasure: friendship starts up in all (IX.). There are three forms of Civil Government, with a characteristic declension or perversion of each:—Monarchy passing into Despotism; Aristocracy into Oligarchy; Timocracy (based on wealth) into Democracy; parent and child typifies the first; husband and wife the second; brothers the third (X.). The monarchial or paternal type has superiority on one side, and demands honour as well as love on the other. In aristocracy, the relation is one of merit, and the greater love is given to the better. In timocracy, and among brothers, there is equality; and hence the most frequent friendships. There is no friendship towards a slave, as a slave, for, as such he is a mere animate tool (XI.). In the relations of the family, friendship varies with the different situations. Parents love their children as a part of themselves, and from the first; children grow to love their parents. Brothers are affected by their community of origin, as well as by common education and habits of intimacy. Husband and wife come together by a natural bond, and as mutual helps; their friendship contains the useful and the pleasant, and, with virtue, the good. Their offspring strengthens the bond (XII.). The friendships that give rise to complaints are confined to the Useful. Such friendships involve a legal element of strict and measured reciprocity [mere trade], and a moral or unwritten understanding, which is properly friendship. Each party is apt to give less and expect more than he gets; and the rule must be for each to reciprocate liberally and fully, in such manner and kind as they are able (XIII.). In unequal friendships, between a superior and inferior, the inferior has the greater share of material assistance, the superior should receive the greater honour (XIV.).

Book Ninth proceeds without any real break. It may not be always easy to fix the return to be made for services received. Protagoras, the sophist, left it to his pupils to settle the amount of fee that he should receive. When there is no agreement, we must render what is in our power, for example, to the gods and to our parents (I.). Cases may arise of conflicting obligation; as, shall we prefer a friend to a deserving man? shall a person robbed reciprocate to robbers? and others. [We have here the germs of Casuistry.] (II.) As to the termina-

tion of Friendship; in the case of the useful and the pleasant, the connexion ceases with the motives. In the case of the good, it may happen that one party counterfeits the good, but is really acting the useful or the pleasant; or one party may turn out wicked, and the only question is, how far hopes of his improvement shall be entertained. Again, one may continue the same, while the other makes large advances in mental training; how far shall present disparity operate against old associations?

(III.). There is a sort of illustrative parallelism between the feelings and acts of friendship, and the feelings and acts of self-love, or of a good man to himself. The virtuous man wishes what is good for himself, especially for his highest part—the intellect or thinking part; he desires to pass his life in the company of his own thoughts; he sympathizes with his own sorrows. On the other hand, the bad choose the pleasant, although it be hurtful; they fly from themselves; their own thoughts are unpleasant companions; they are full of repentance (IV.). Good-will is different from friendship; it is a feeling towards some distinguished or like-antagonist. It has not the test of longing in absence. It may be the prelude to friendship (V.).

Unanimity, or agreement of opinion, is a part of friendship. Not as regards mere speculation, as about the heavenly bodies; but in practical matters, where interests are at stake, such as the politics of the day. This unanimity cannot occur in the bad, from their selfish and grasping disposition (VI.).

The position is next examined—that the love felt by benefactors is stronger than the love felt by those benefitted. It is not a sufficient explanation to say, the benefactor is a creditor, who wishes the prosperity of his debtor. Benefactors are like workmen, who love their own work, and the exercise of their own powers. They also have the feeling of nobleness on their side; while the recipient has the less lovable idea of profit. Finally, activity is more akin to love than recipiency (VII.). Another question raised for discussion is—‘Ought a man to love himself most, or another?’ On the one hand, selfishness is usually condemned as the feature of bad men; on the other hand, the feelings towards self are made the standard of the feelings towards friends. The solution is given thus. There is a lower self (predominant with most men) that gratifies the appetites, seeking wealth, power, &c. With the select few, there is a higher self that seeks the honourable, the noble, intellectual excellence, at any cost of pleasure, wealth, honour,

&c. These noble-minded men procure for themselves the greater good by sacrificing the less: and their self-sacrifice is thus a mode of self. It is the duty of the good man to love himself: for his noble life is profitable, both to himself, and to others; but the bad man ought not to love himself. [Self-sacrifice, formerly brought under Courage, is here depicted from another point of view] (VIII.).

By way of bringing out the advantages of friendship, it is next asked, Does the happy man need friends? To this, it is answered, (1) That happiness, being the sum of all human good, must suppose the possession of the greatest of external goods, which is friendship. (2) The happy man will require friends as recipients of his overflow of kindness. (3) He cannot be expected either to be solitary, or to live with strangers. (4) The highest play of existence is to see the acts of another in harmony with self. (5) Sympathy supports and prolongs the glow of one's own emotions. (6) A friend confirms us in the practice of virtue. (7) The sense of existence in ourselves is enlarged by the consciousness of another's existence (IX.). The number of friends is again considered, and the same barriers stated—the impossibility of sharing among many the highest kind of affection, or of keeping up close and harmonious intimacy. The most renowned friendships are between pairs (X.). As to whether friends are most needed in adversity or in prosperity—in the one, friendship is more necessary, in the other more glorious (XI.). The essential support and manifestation of friendship is Intercourse. Whatever people's tastes are, they desire the society of others in exercising them (XII.).

Book Tenth discusses Pleasure, and lays down as the highest and perfect pleasure, the exercise of the Intellect in Philosophy.

Pleasure is deserving of consideration, from its close intimacy with the constitution of our race; on which account, in our training of youth, we steer them by pleasure and pain; and it is of the first importance that they should feel pleasure in what they ought, and displeasure in what they ought, as the groundwork (or *principium*) of good ethical dispositions. Such a topic can never be left unnoticed, especially when we look at the great difference of opinion thereupon. Some affirm pleasure to be the chief good [*Eudoxus*]. Others call it altogether vile and worthless [party of *Speusippus*]. Of these last, some perhaps really think so; but the rest are actuated by the necessity of checking men's too great proneness to it,

and disparage it on that account. This policy Aristotle strongly censures, and contends for the superior efficacy of truth (I).

The arguments urged by Eudoxus as proving pleasure to be the chief good, are, (1) That all beings seek pleasure; (2) and avoid its opposite, pain; (3) that they seek pleasure as an end-in-itself, and not as a means to any farther end; (4) that pleasure, added to any other good, such as justice or temperance, increases the amount of good; which could not be the case, unless pleasure were itself good. Yet this last argument (Aristotle urges) proves pleasure to be a good, but not to be the Good; indeed, Plato urged the same argument, to show that pleasure could *not* be The Good: since The Good (the Chief Good) must be something that does not admit of being enhanced or made more good. The objection of Speusippus,—that irrational creatures are not to be admitted as witnesses,—Aristotle disallows, seeing that rational and irrational agree on the point; and the thing that seems to all, must be true. Another objection, That the opposite of pain is not pleasure, but a neutral state—is set aside as contradicted by the fact of human desire and aversion, the two opposite states of feeling (II.).

The arguments of the Platonists, to prove that pleasure is not good, are next examined. (1) Pleasure, they say, is not a quality; but neither (replies Aristotle) are the exercises or actual manifestations of virtue or happiness. (2) Pleasure is not definite, but unlimited, or admitting of degrees, while The Good is a something definite, and does not admit of degrees. But if these reasoners speak about the pure pleasures, they might take objection on similar grounds against virtue and justice also; for these too admit of degrees, and one man is more virtuous than another. And if they speak of the mixed pleasures (alloyed with pain), their reasoning will not apply to the unmixed. Good health is acknowledged to be a good, and to be a definite something; yet there are nevertheless some men more healthy, some less. (3) The Good is perfect or complete; but objectors urge that no motion or generation is complete, and pleasure is in one of these two categories. This last assertion Aristotle denies. Pleasure is *not* a motion; for the attribute of velocity, greater or less, which is essential to all motion, does not attach to pleasure. A man may be quick in becoming pleased, or in becoming angry; but in the act of being pleased or angry, he can neither be quick nor slow. Nor is it true that pleasure is a genera-

tion. In all generation, there is something assignable out of which generation takes place (not any one thing out of any other), and into which it reverts by destruction. If pleasure be a generation, pain must be the destruction of what is generated; but this is not correct, for pain does not re-establish the state antecedent to the pleasure. Accordingly, it is not true that pleasure is a generation. Some talk of pain as a want of something required by nature, and of pleasure as a filling up of that want. But these are corporeal, not mental facts, and are applicable only to eating and drinking; not applicable to many other pleasures, such as those of sight, hearing, or learning. (4) There are some disgraceful pleasures. Aristotle replies that these are not absolutely and properly pleasures, but only to the depraved man; just as things are not yellow, which appear so to men in a jaundice. Pleasures differ from each other in species: there are good pleasures, i.e., those arising from good sources; and bad pleasures; i.e., from bad sources. The pleasure *per se* is always desirable; but not when it comes from objectionable acts. The pleasures of each man will vary according to his character; none but a musical man can enjoy the pleasures of music. No one would consent to remain a child for life, even though he were to have his fill of childish pleasure.

Aristotle sums up the result thus. Pleasure is not The Good. Not every mode of pleasure is to be chosen. Some pleasures, distinguished from the rest specifically or according to their sources, are to be chosen *per se* (III.).

He then attempts to define pleasure. It is something perfect and complete in itself, at each successive moment of time; hence it is not motion, which is at every moment incomplete. Pleasure is like the act of vision, or a point, or a monad, always complete in itself. It accompanies every variety of sensible perception, intelligence, and theorizing contemplation. In each of these faculties, the act is more perfect, according as the subjective element is most perfect, and the object most grand and dignified. When the act is most perfect, the pleasure accompanying it is also the most perfect; and this pleasure puts the finishing consummation to the act. The pleasure is not a pre-existing acquirement now brought into exercise, but an accessory end implicated with the act, like the fresh look which belongs to the organism just matured. It is a sure adjunct, so long as subject and object are in good condition. But continuity of pleasure, as well as of the other exercises, is impossible. Life is itself an exercise much diversified, and

each man follows the diversity that is suitable to his own inclination—music, study, &c. Each has its accessory and consummating mode of pleasure; and to say that all men desire pleasure, is the same as saying that all men desire life. It is no real question to ask—Do we choose life for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life? The truth is, that the two are implicated and inseparable (IV.).

As our acts or exercises differ from each other specifically, so, also the pleasures that are accessory to them differ specifically. Exercises intellectual differ from exercises perceptive, and under each head there are varieties differing from each other. The pleasures accessory and consummating to each, are diversified accordingly. Each pleasure contributes to invigorate and intensify the particular exercise that it is attached to; the geometer who studies his science with pleasure becomes more acute and successful in prosecuting it. On the other hand, the pleasures attached to one exercise impede the mind in regard to other exercises; thus men fond of the flute cannot listen to a speaker with attention, if any one is playing the flute near them. What we delight in doing, we are more likely to do well; what we feel pain in doing, we are not likely to do well. And thus each variety of exercise is alike impeded by the pains attached to itself, and by the pleasures attached to other varieties.

Among these exercises or acts, some are morally good, others morally bad; the desires of the good are also praiseworthy, the desires of the bad are blameable; but if so, much more are the pleasures attached to the good exercises, good pleasures—and the pleasures attached to the bad exercises, bad pleasures. For the pleasures attached to an exercise are more intimately identified with that exercise than the desire of it can be. The pleasure of the exercise, and the exercise itself, are indeed so closely identified one with the other, that to many they appear the same. Sight, hearing, and smell, differ in purity from touch and taste; and the pleasures attached to each differ in like manner. The pleasures of intellect differ from those of sense, as these two exercises differ from one another. Every animal has its own peculiar pleasures, as it has also its own peculiar manifestation and exercises. Among the human race, the same things give pleasure to one individual and pain to another. The things that appear sweet to the strong and healthy man, do not appear sweet to one suffering from fever, or weakly. Now, amidst this discrepancy, what appears to the virtuous and intelligent man, really

is. His pleasures are the true and real pleasures. Excellence, and the good man *quatenus* good, are to be taken as the standard. If what he abhors appears pleasurable to some persons, we must not be surprised, since there are many depravations of individuals, in one way or another; but these things are not pleasures really, they are only pleasures to these depraved mortals (V.).

So far the theory of Pleasure. Aristotle now goes back to his starting point—the nature of the Good, and Happiness. He re-states his positions: That Happiness is an exercise or actuality (*ἐνέργεια*), and not an acquirement or state (*ἔξις*); That it belongs to such exercises as are worthy of choice for their own sake, and not to such as are worthy of choice for the sake of something else; That it is perfect and self-sufficing, seeking nothing beyond itself, and leaving no wants unsupplied. Hence he had concluded that it consisted in acting according to virtue; for the honourable and good are chosen for their own sake. But amusements are also sought for their own sake; Are these also to be called happiness? No. It is true that they are much pursued by those whom the vulgar envy—men of wealth and despots—who patronize and reward the practitioners of amusement. But this proves nothing, for we cannot adopt the choice of these despots, who have little virtue or intellect, and have never known the taste of refined and liberal pleasure. Children and mature men, bad men and virtuous, have each their different pleasures; the virtuous and intelligent man finds a life of excellence and the pleasures attached thereunto most worthy of his choice, and such a man (Aristotle has declared more than once) is our standard. It would indeed be childish to treat amusements as the main end of life; they are the relaxation of the virtuous man, who derives from them fresh vigour for the prosecution of the serious business of life, which he cannot prosecute continuously. The serious exercises of life are better than the comic, because they proceed from the better part of man. The slave may enjoy bodily pleasures to the full, but a slave is not called happy (VI.).

We have thus shown that Happiness consists in exercise or actual living according to excellence; naturally, therefore, according to the highest excellence, or the excellence of the best part of man. This best part is the Intellect (*Nous*), our most divine and commanding element; in its exercise, which is theoretical or speculative, having respect to matters honourable, divine, and most worthy of study. Such philosophical

exercise, besides being the highest function of our nature, is at the same time more susceptible than any mode of active effort, of being prosecuted for a long continuance. It affords the purest and most lasting pleasure; it approaches most nearly to being self-sufficing, since it postulates little more than the necessaries of life, and is even independent of society, though better *with* society. Perfect happiness would thus be the exercise of the theorizing intellect, continued through a full period of life. But this is more than we can expect. Still, we ought to make every effort to live according to this best element of our nature; for, though small in bulk, it stands exalted above the rest in power and dignity, and, being the sovereign element in man, is really The Man himself (VII.).

Next, yet only second, come the other branches of excellence: the active social life of a good citizen. Exercises according to this branch of virtue are the natural business of man, for it is bound up with our whole nature, including body as well as mind, our appetites, and our passions, whereas the happiness of intellect is separate. Active social virtue postulates conditions of society and external aids in considerable measure; but the life of intellect requires only the minimum of these, and is even impeded by much of them.

That perfect happiness is to be found in the philosophical life only, will appear farther when we recollect that the gods are blest and happy in the highest degree, and that this is the only mode of life suitable to them. With the gods there can be no scope for active social virtues; for in what way can they be just, courageous, or temperate? Neither virtuous practice nor constructive art can be predicated of the gods; what then remains, since we all assume them to live, and therefore to be in act or exercise of some kind; for no one believes them to live in a state of sleep, like Endymion. There remains nothing except philosophical contemplation. This, then, must be the life of the gods, the most blest of all; and that mode of human life which approaches nearest to it will be the happiest. No other animal can take part in this, and therefore none can be happy. In so far as the gods pay attention to human affairs, they are likely to take pleasure in the philosopher, who is most allied to themselves. A moderate supply of good health, food, and social position, must undoubtedly be ensured to the philosopher; for, without these, human nature will not suffice for the business of contemplation. But he will demand nothing more than a moderate supply, and when thus equipped, he will approach nearer to

happiness than any one else. Aristotle declares this confidently; citing Solon, Anaxagoras, and other sages, as having said much the same before him (VIII.).

In the concluding chapter, Aristotle gives the transition from Ethics to Politics. Treatises on virtue may inspire a few liberal minds; but, for the mass of men, laws, institutions, and education are necessary. The young ought to be trained, not merely by paternal guidance directing in the earliest years their love and hatred, but also by a scheme of public education, prescribed and enforced by authority throughout the city. Right conduct will thus be rendered easier by habit; but still, throughout life, the mature citizen must continue under the discipline of law, which has force adequate to correction, and, being impersonal, does not excite aversion and hatred. Hence the need for a system of good public training. Nowhere is this now established and enforced; hardly anywhere, except in Sparta, is it even attempted. Amid such public neglect, it becomes the duty of an individual to contribute what he can to the improvement of those that he is concerned in, and for that purpose to acquire the capacities qualifying him for becoming a lawgiver. Private admonition will compensate to a certain extent for the neglect of public interference, and in particular cases may be even more discriminating. But how are such capacities to be acquired? Not from the Sophists, whose method is too empirical; nor from practical politicians, for they seem to have no power of imparting their skill. Perhaps it would be useful to make a collection of existing laws and constitutions. Aristotle concludes with sketching the plan of his own work on Politics.

The Aristotelian doctrines are generally summed up in such points as these:—The theory of Good; Pleasure; the theory of Virtue; the doctrine of the Will, distinguishing voluntary from involuntary; Virtue a Habit; the doctrine of the MEAN; the distinction between the Moral Virtues and the Intellectual Virtues; Justice, distributive and commutative; Friendship; the Contemplative Life.

The following are the indications of his views, according to the six leading subjects of Ethics.

I. and II.—It is characteristic of Aristotle (as is fully stated in Appendix B.) to make the judgment of the wisest and most cultivated minds, the standard of appeal in moral questions. He lays down certain general principles, such as the doctrine of the Mean, but in the application of these

(which is everything), he trusts to the most experienced and skilled advisers that the community can furnish.

III.—On the theory of Happiness, or the *Summum Bonum*, it is needless to repeat the abstract of the tenth book.

IV.—In laying down the Moral Code, he was encumbered with the too wide view of Virtue; but made an advance in distinguishing virtue proper from excellence in general.

V.—He made Society tutelary to the individual in an excessive degree. He had no clear conception of the province of authority or law; and did not separate the morality of obligation from the morality of reward and nobleness.

VI.—His exclusion of Theology from morality was total.

THE STOICS.

The Stoics were one of the four sects of philosophy, recognized and conspicuous at Athens during the three centuries preceding the Christian era, and during the century or more following. Among these four sects, the most marked antithesis of ethical dogma was between the Stoics and the Epicureans. The Stoical system dates from about 300 B.C.; it was derived from the system of the Cynics.

The founder of the system was ZENO, from Citium in Cyprus (he lived from 340—260 B.C.), who derived his first impulse from Krates the Cynic. He opened his school in a building or porch, called the *Stoa Poecile* ('Painted Portico') at Athens, whence the origin of the name of the sect. Zeno had for his disciple CLEANTHES, from Assos in the Troad (300—220 B.C.), whose *Hymn to Jupiter* is the only fragment or any length that has come down to us from the early Stoics, and is a remarkable production, setting forth the unity of God, his omnipotence, and his moral government. CHRYSIPPUS, from Soli in Cilicia (290—207 B.C.), followed Cleanthes, and, in his voluminous writings, both defended and modified the Stoical creed. These three represent the *first* period of the system. The *second* period (200—50 B.C.) embraces its general promulgation, and its introduction to the Romans. Chrysippus was succeeded by ZENO of Sidon, and DIOGENES of Babylon; then followed ANTIPATER of Tarsus, who taught PANÆTIUS of Rhodes (d. 112 B.C.), who, again, taught POSIDONIUS of Apamea, in Syria. (Two philosophers are mentioned from the native province of St. Paul, besides Chrysippus—ATHENODORUS, from Cana in Cilicia; and ARCHEDEMUS, from Tarsus, the apostle's birthplace. It is remarked by Sir A. Grant, that almost all the first Stoics were of Asiatic birth

and the system itself is undeniably more akin to the oriental mind than to the Greek.) Posidonius was acquainted with Marius and Pompey, and gave lessons to Cicero, but the moral treatise of Cicero, *De Officiis*, is derived from a work of Panætius. The third period of Stoicism is Roman. In this period, we have Cato the Younger, who invited to his house the philosopher Athenodorus; and, under the Empire, the three Stoic philosophers, whose writings have come down to us—SENECA (6 B.C.—65 A.D.), EPICTETUS (60—140 A.D.), who began life as a slave, and the Emperor MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS (121—180 A.D.). Stoicism prevailed widely in the Roman world, although not to the exclusion of Epicurean views.

The leading Stoical doctrines are given in certain phrases or expressions, as 'Life according to Nature' (although this phrase belongs also to the Epicureans), the ideal 'Wise Man,' 'Apathy,' or equanimity of mind (also an Epicurean ideal), the power of the 'Will,' the worship of 'Duty,' the constant 'Advance' in virtue, &c. But perspicuity will be best gained by considering the *Moral* system under four heads—the Theology; the Psychology or theory of mind; the theory of the Good or human happiness; and the scheme of Virtue or Duty.

I.—The THEOLOGICAL doctrines of the Stoics comprehended their system of the Universe, and of man's position in it. They held that the Universe is governed by one good and wise God, together with inferior or subordinate deities. God exercises a moral government; under it the good are happy, while misfortunes happen to the wicked. According to Epictetus, God is the father of men; Antoninus exults in the beautiful arrangement of all things. The earlier Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, entertained high reverence for the divination, prophecy, and omens that were generally current in the ancient world. They considered that these were the methods whereby the gods were graciously pleased to make known beforehand revelations of their foreordained purposes. (Herein lay one among the marked points of contrast between Stoics and Epicureans.) They held this foreordination even to the length of fatalism, and made the same replies, as have been given in modern times, to the difficulty of reconciling it with the existence of evil, and with the apparent condition of the better and the worse individuals among mankind. They offered explanations such as the following: (1) God is the author of all things except wickedness; (2) the very nature of good supposes its contrast evil, and the two are inseparable, like light and dark, (which may be called the argument from Relativity); (3) in the

enormous extent of the Universe, some things must be neglected; (4) when evil happens to the good, it is not as a punishment, but as connected with a different dispensation; (5) parts of the world may be presided over by evil demons; (6) what we call evil may not be evil.

Like most other ancient schools, the Stoics held God to be corporeal like man:—Body is the only substance; nothing incorporeal could act on what is corporeal; the First Cause of all, God or Zeus, is the primeval fire, emanating from which is the soul of man in the form of a warm ether.

It is for human beings to recognize the Universe as governed by universal Law, and not only to raise their minds to the comprehension of it, but to enter into the views of the administering Zeus or Fate, who must regard all interests equally; we are to be, as it were, in harmony with him, to merge self in universal Order, to think only of that and its welfare. As two is greater than one, the interests of the whole world are infinitely greater than the interests of any single being, and no one should be satisfied with a regard to anything less than the whole. By this elevation of view, we are necessarily raised far above the consideration of the petty events befalling ourselves. The grand effort of human reason is thus to rise to the abstraction or totality of entire Nature; 'no ethical subject,' says Chrysippus, 'could be rightly approached except from the pre-consideration of entire Nature, and the ordering of the whole.'

As to Immortality, the Stoics precluded themselves, by holding the theory of the *absorption* of the individual soul at death into the divine essence; but, on the other hand, their doctrine of advance and aspiration is what has in all times been the main natural argument for the immortality of the soul. For the most part, they kept themselves undecided as to this doctrine, giving it as an alternative, reasoning as to our conduct on either supposition, and submitting to the pleasure of God in this as in all other things.

In arguing for the existence of Divine power and government, they employed what has been called the argument from Design, which is as old as Sokrates. Man is conscious that he is in himself an intellectual or spiritual power, from which, by analogy, he is led to believe that a greater power pervades the universe, as intellect pervades the human system. 21 // 32.

II.—In the *PSYCHOLOGY* of the Stoics, two questions are of interest,¹ their theory of Pleasure and Pain, and² their views upon the Freedom of the Will.

1. *The theory of Pleasure and Pain.* The Stoics agreed with the Peripatetics (anterior to Epicurus, not specially against him) that the first principle of nature is (not pleasure or relief from pain, but) *self-preservation* or *self-love*; in other words, the natural appetite or tendency of all creatures is, to preserve their existing condition with its inherent capacities, and to keep clear of destruction or disablement. This appetite (they said) manifests itself in little children before any pleasure or pain is felt, and is moreover a fundamental postulate, pre-supposed in all desires of particular pleasures, as well as in all aversions to particular pains. We begin by loving our own vitality; and we come, by association, to love what promotes or strengthens our vitality; we hate destruction or disablement, and come (by secondary association) to hate whatever produces that effect.*

The doctrine here laid down associated, and brought under one view, what was common to man, not merely with the animal, but also with the vegetable world; a plant was declared to have an impulse or tendency to maintain itself, even without feeling pain or pleasure. Aristotle (in the tenth Book of the *Ethics*) says, that he will not determine whether we love life for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life; for he affirms the two to be essentially yoked together and inseparable; pleasure is the consummation of our vital manifestations. The Peripatetics, after him, put pleasure down to a lower level, as derivative and accidental; the Stoics went farther in the same direction—possibly from antithesis against the growing school of Epicurus.

The primary officium (in a larger sense than our word Duty) of man is (they said) to keep himself in the state of nature; the second or derivative *officium* is to keep to such things as are *according to nature*, and to avert those that are *contrary to nature*; our gradually increasing experience enabled us to discriminate the two. The youth learns, as he grows up, to value bodily accomplishments, mental cognitions and judgments, good conduct towards those around him,—as powerful aids towards keeping up the state of nature. When his experience is so far enlarged as to make him aware of the order and harmony of nature and human society, and to impress upon him the comprehension of this great *idéal*, his emotions as well as his reason become absorbed by it. He

* There is some analogy between the above doctrine and the great law of Self-conservation, as expounded in this volume (p. 75).

recognizes this as the only true ^{Good} Bonum or ^{honorable} Honestum, to which all other desirable things are referable,—as the only thing desirable for itself and in its own nature. He drops or dismisses all those prima naturæ that he had begun by desiring. ⁷² He no longer considers any of them as worthy of being desired ^{of} in itself, or for its own sake.

While therefore (according to Peripatetics as well as Stoics) the love of self and of preserving one's own vitality ^{Source} and activity, is the primary element, intuitive and connate, to which all rational preference (officium) was at first referred, —they thought it not the less true, that in process of time, by experience, association, and reflection, there grows up in the mind a grand acquired sentiment or notion, a new and later light, which extinguishes and puts out of sight the early beginning. It was important to distinguish the feeble and obscure elements from the powerful and brilliant aftergrowth; which indeed was fully realized only in chosen minds, and in them, hardly before old age. This idea, when once formed in the mind, was The Good—the only thing worthy of desire for its own sake. The Stoics called it the only Good, being sufficient in itself for happiness; other things being not good, nor necessary to happiness, but simply preferable ~~when they could be had~~: the Peripatetics

first and greatest good, but said also that it was not sufficient in itself; there were two other inferior varieties of good, of which something must be had as complementary (what the Stoics called præposita or sumenda). Thus the Stoics said, ^{Thy} ~~about~~ the origin of the Idea of Bonum or Honestum, much ^{take} the same as what Aristotle says about ethical virtue. It is not implanted in us by nature; but we have at birth certain initial tendencies and capacities, which, if aided by association and training, enable us (and that not in all cases) to acquire it.

2. The Freedom of the Will. A distinction was taken by Epictetus and other Stoics between things in our power and things not in our power. The things in our power are our opinions and notions about objects, and all our affections, desires, and aversions; the things not in our power are our bodies, wealth, honour, rank, authority, &c., and their opposites. The practical application is this: wealth and high rank may not be in our power, but we have the power to form an idea of these—namely, that they are unimportant, whence the want of them will not grieve us. A still more pointed application is to death, whose force is entirely in the idea.

With this distinction between things in our power and

2 things not in our power, we may connect the arguments between the Stoics and their opponents as to what is now called the Freedom of the Will. But we must first begin by distinguishing the two questions. 4 By things in our power, the Stoics meant, things that we could do or acquire, if we willed: 2 by things not in our power, they meant, things that we could not do or acquire if we willed. In both cases, the volition was assumed as a fact: the question, what determined it—or whether it was non-determined, i.e. self-determining—was not raised in the above-mentioned antithesis. But it was raised in other discussions between the Stoic theorist Chrysippus, and various opponents. These opponents denied that volition was determined by motives, and cited the cases of equal conflicting motives (what is known as the ass of Buridan) as proving that the soul includes in itself, and exerts, a special supervenient power of deciding action in one way or the other: a power not determined by any causal antecedent, but self-originating, and belonging to the class of agency that Aristotle recognizes under the denomination of automatic; spontaneous (or essentially irregular and unpredictable). Chrysippus replied by denying not only the reality of this supervenient force said to be inherent in the soul, but also the reality of all that Aristotle called automatic or spontaneous agency generally. Chrysippus said that every movement was determined by antecedent motives; that in cases of equal conflict, the exact equality did not long continue, because some new but slight motive slipped in unperceived and turned the scale on one side or the other. (See Plutarch *De Stoicorum Repugnantibus*, c. 23, p. 1045.) Here, we see, the question now known as the Freedom of the Will is discussed: and Chrysippus declares against it, affirming that volition is always determined by motives.

But we also see that, while declaring this opinion, Chrysippus does not employ the terms Necessity or Freedom of the Will: neither did his opponents, so far as we can see: they had a different and less misleading phrase. By Freedom, Chrysippus and the Stoics meant the freedom of doing what a man willed, if he willed it. A man is free, as to the thing that is in his power, when he wills it: he is not free, as to what is not in his power, under the same supposition. The Stoics laid great stress on this distinction. They pointed out how much it is really in a man's power to transform or discipline his own mind: in the way of

controlling or suppressing some emotions, 'generating or encouraging others, forming new intellectual associations,' &c., how much a man could do in these ways, if he willed it, and ^{had} if he went through the lessons, habits of conduct, meditations, suitable to produce such an effect. The Stoics strove to create in a man's mind the volitions appropriate for such mental discipline, by depicting the beneficial consequences resulting from it, and the misfortune and shame inevitable, if the mind were not so disciplined. Their purpose was to strengthen the governing reason of his mind, and to enthrone it as a fixed habit and character, which would control by counter suggestions the impulse arising at each special moment — particularly all disturbing terrors or allurements. This, in their view, is a *free mind*; not one wherein volition is independent of all motive, but one wherein the susceptibility to different motives is tempered by an ascendant reason, so as to give predominance to the better motive against the worse. One of the strongest motives that they endeavoured to enforce, was the prudence and dignity of bringing our volitions into harmony with the schemes of Providence: which (they said) were always arranged with a view to the happiness of the kosmos on the whole. The bad man, whose volitions conflict with these schemes, is always balked of his expectations, and brought at last against his will to see things carried by an overruling force, with aggravated pain and humiliation to himself: while the good man, who resigns himself to them from the first, always escapes with less pain, and often without any at all. *Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.* ^{They} ~~but they draw the unwilling~~ ^{only}

We have thus seen that in regard to the doctrine called in modern times the Freedom of the Will (i.e., that volitions are self-originating and unpredictable), the Stoic theorists not only denied it, but framed all their Ethics upon the assumption of the contrary. This same assumption of the contrary, indeed, was made also by Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus: in short, by all the ethical teachers of antiquity. All of them believed that volitions depended on causes: that under the ordinary conditions of men's minds, the causes that volitions generally depended upon are often misleading and sometimes ruinous: but that by proper stimulation from without and meditation within, the rational causes of volition might be made to overrule the impulsive. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, not less than the Stoics, wished to create new fixed habits and a new type of character. They differed, indeed, on the

question what the proper type of character was: but each of them aimed at the same general end—a new type of character, regulating the grades of susceptibility to different motives. And the purpose of all and each of these moralists precludes the theory of free-will—i.e., the theory that our volitions are self-originating and unpredictable.

III.—We must consider next the Stoical theory of Happiness, or rather of the *Good*, which with them was proclaimed to be the sole, indispensable, and self-sufficing condition of Happiness. They declared that Pleasure was no part of Good, and Pain no part of Evil; therefore, that even relief from pain was not necessary to Good or Happiness. This, however, if followed out consistently, would dispense with all morality and all human endeavour. Accordingly, the Stoics were obliged to let in some pleasures as an object of pursuit, and some pains as an object of avoidance, though not under the title of Good and Evil, but with the inferior name of *Sumenda* and *Evitanda*.^{*} Substantially, therefore, they held that pains are an evil, but, by a proper discipline, may be triumphed over. They disallowed the direct and ostensible pursuit of pleasure as an end (the point of view of Epicurus), but allured their followers partly by promising them the victory over pain, and partly by certain enjoyments of an elevated cast that grew out of their plan of life.

Pain of every kind, whether from the ^{1st} casualties of existence, or from the severity of the Stoical ^{accidents} virtues, was to be met by a discipline of endurance, a hardening process, which, if persisted in, would succeed in reducing the mind to a state of *Apathy* or indifference. A great many reflections were suggested in aid of this education. The influence of exercise and repetition in adapting the system to any new function, was illustrated by the Olympian combatants, and by the Lacedæmonian youth, who endured scourging without complaint. Great stress was laid on the instability of pleasure, and the constant liability to accidents; whence we should always be anticipating and adapting ourselves to the worst that could happen, so as never to be in a state where anything could ruffle the mind. It was pointed out how much might still be

* Aristotle and the Peripatetics held that there were *tria genera bonorum*: (1) Those of the mind (*mens sana*), (2) those of the body, and (3) external advantages. The Stoics altered this theory by saying that only the first of the three was *bonum*; the others were merely *proposita* or *sumenda*. The opponents of the Stoics contended that this was an alteration in words rather than in substance.

made of the worst eirenstances—poverty, banishment, public odium, sickness, old age—and every consideration was advanced that could ‘arm the obdurate breast with stubborn patience, as with triple steel.’ It has often been remarked that such a discipline of endurance was peculiarly suited to the unsettled condition of the world at the time, when any man, in addition to the ordinary evils of life, might in a moment be sent into exile, or sold into slavery.

Next to the discipline of endurance, we must rank the complacent sentiment of *Pride*, which the Stoic might justly feel in his conquest of himself, and in his lofty independence and superiority to the casualties of life.* The pride of the Cynic, the Stoic’s predecessor, was prominent and offensive, showing itself in seurrility and contempt towards everybody else; the Stoical pride was a refinement upon this, but was still a grateful sentiment of superiority, which helped to make up for the surrender of indulgence. It was usual to bestow the most extravagant laudation on the ‘Wise Man,’ and every Stoic could take this home to the extent that he considered himself as approaching that great ideal. *the character of it.*

The last and most elevated form of Stoical happiness was the satisfaction of contemplating the Universe and God. Epictetus says, that we can accommodate ourselves cheerfully to the providence that rules the world, if we possess two things—the power of seeing all that happens in the proper relation to its own purpose—and a grateful disposition. The work of Antoninus is full of studies of Nature in the devout spirit of ‘passing from Nature up to Nature’s God;’ he is never weary of expressing his thorough contentment with the course of natural events, and his sense of the beauties and fitness of everything. Old age has its grace, and death is the becoming termination. This high strain of exulting contemplation reconciled him to that complete submission to whatever might befall, which was the essential feature of the ‘Life according to Nature,’ as he conceived it.

IV.—The Stoical theory of Virtue is implicated in the ideas of the Good, now described.

The fountain of all virtue is manifestly the life according to nature; as being the life of subordination of self to more general interests—to family, country, mankind, the whole

* This also might truly be said of the Epicureans; though with them it is not so much *pride*, as a quiet self-satisfaction in escaping pains and disappointments that they saw others enduring. See the beginning of Lucretius’ second book, and the last epistle of Epicurus to Idomeneus.

universe. If a man is prepared to consider himself absolutely nothing in comparison with the universal interest, and to regard it as the sole end of life, he has embraced an ideal of virtue of the loftiest order. Accordingly, the Stoics were the first to preach what is called 'Cosmopolitanism;' for although, in their reference to the good of the whole, they confounded together sentient life and inanimate objects—rocks, plants, &c., solicitude for which was misspent labour—yet they were thus enabled to reach the conception of the universal kinship of mankind, and could not but include in their regards the brute creation. They said: 'There is no difference between the Greeks and Barbarians; the world is our city.' Seneca urges kindness to slaves, for 'are they not men like ourselves, breathing the same air, living and dying like ourselves?'

The Epicureans declined, as much as possible, interference in public affairs, but the Stoic philosophers urged men to the duties of active citizenship. Chrysippus even said that the life of philosophical contemplation (such as Aristotle preferred, and accounted godlike) was to be placed on the same level with the life of pleasure; though Plutarch observes that neither Chrysippus nor Zeno ever meddled personally with any public duty; both of them passed their lives in lecturing and writing. The truth is that both of them were foreigners residing at Athens; and at a time when Athens was dependent on foreign princes. Accordingly, neither Zeno nor Chrysippus had any sphere of political action open to them; they were, in this respect, like Epictetus afterwards—but in a position quite different from Seneca, the preceptor of Nero, who might hope to influence the great imperial power of Rome, and from Marcus Antoninus, who held that imperial power in his own hands.

Marcus Antoninus—not only a powerful Emperor, but also the most gentle and amiable man of his day—talks of active beneficence both as a duty and a satisfaction. But in the creed of the Stoics generally, active Beneficence did not occupy a prominent place. They adopted the four Cardinal Virtues—¹Wisdom, or the Knowledge of Good and Evil; ²Justice; ³Fortitude; ⁴Temperance—as part of their plan of the virtuous life, the life according to Nature. Justice, as the social virtue, was placed above all the rest. But the Stoics were not strenuous in requiring more than Justice, for the benefit of others beside the agent. They even reckoned compassion for the sufferings of others as a weakness, analogous to envy for the good fortune of others.

The Stoic recognized the gods (or Universal Nature, equivalent expressions in his creed) as managing the affairs of the world, with a view to producing as much happiness as was attainable on the whole. Towards this end the gods did not want any positive assistance from him; but it was his duty and his strongest interest, to resign himself to their plans, and to abstain from all conduct tending to frustrate them. Such refractory tendencies were perpetually suggested to him by the unreasonable appetites, emotions, fears, antipathies, &c., of daily life; all claiming satisfaction at the expense of future mischief to himself and others. To countervail these misleading forces, by means of a fixed rational character built up through meditation and philosophical teaching, was the grand purpose of the Stoic ethical creed. The emotional or appetitive self was to be starved or curbed, and retained only as an appendage to the rational self; an idea proclaimed before in general terms by Plato, but carried out into a system by the Stoics, and to a great extent even by the Epicureans.

The Stoic was taught to reflect how much that *appears* to be desirable, terror-striking, provocative, &c., is not really so, but is made to appear so by false and curable associations. And while he thus discouraged those self-regarding emotions that placed him in hostility with others, he learnt to respect the self of another man as well as his own. Epictetus advises to deal mildly with a man that hurts us either by word or deed; and advises it upon the following very remarkable ground. 'Recollect that in what he says or does, he follows his own sense of propriety, not yours. He must do what appears to him right, not what appears to you; if he judges wrongly, it is he that is hurt, for he is the person deceived. Always repeat to yourself, in such a case: The man has acted on his own opinion.'

The reason here given by Epictetus is an instance, memorable in ethical theory, of respect for individual dissenting conviction, even in an extreme case; and it must be taken in conjunction with his other doctrine, that damage thus done to us unjustly is really little or no damage, except so far as we ourselves give pungency to it by our irrational susceptibilities and associations. We see that the Stoic submerges, as much as he can, the pre-eminence of his own individual self, and contemplates himself from the point of view of another, only as one among many. But he does not erect the happiness of others into a direct object of his own positive pursuit, beyond

the *reciprocities* of family, citizenship, and common *humanity*. The Stoic theorists agreed with Epicurus in inculcating the reciprocities of justice between all fellow-citizens; and they even went farther than he did; by extending the sphere of such duties beyond the limits of city, so as to comprehend all mankind. But as to the reciprocities of individual friendship, Epicurus went beyond the Stoics, by the amount of self-sacrifice and devotion that he enjoined for the benefit of a friend.

There is also in the Stoical system a recognition of duties to God, and of morality as based on piety. Not only are we all brethren, but also ^{the} 'children of one Father.'

The extraordinary strain put upon human nature by the full Stoic *ideal* of submerging self in the larger interests of being, led to various *compromises*. The rigid following out of the ideal issued in one of the *paradoxes*, namely,—That all the actions of the wise man are equally perfect, and that, short of the standard of perfection, all faults and vices are equal; that, for example, the man that killed a cock, without good reason, was as guilty as he that killed his father. This has a meaning only when we draw a line between spirituality and morality, and treat the last as worthless in comparison of the first. The later Stoics, however, in their exhortations to special branches of duty, gave a positive value to practical virtue, irrespective of the *ideal*.

The idea of Duty was of Stoical origin, fostered and developed by the Roman spirit and legislation. The early Stoics had two different words,—one for the 'suitable' (*καθῆκον*), or incomplete propriety, admitting of degrees, and below the point of rectitude, and another for the 'right' (*κατόρθωμα*), or complete rectitude of action, which none could achieve except the wise man. It is a significant circumstance that the 'suitable' is the lineal ancestor of our word 'duty' (through the Latin *officium*).

It was a great point with the Stoic to be conscious of 'advance' or improvement.* By self-examination, he kept

* This was a later development of Stoicism: the earlier theorists laid it down that there were no graduating marks below the level of wisdom; all shortcomings were on a par. *Good* was a point, *Evil* was a point; there were gradations in the *præposita* or *sumenda* (none of which were *good*), and in the *rejecta* or *rejicienda* (none of which were *evil*), but there was no *more or less good*. The idea of advance by steps towards virtue or wisdom, was probably familiar to Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus; the Stoic theories, on the other hand, tended to throw it out of sight, though they insisted strenuously on the necessity of mental training and meditation.

himself constantly acquainted with his moral state, and it was both his duty and his satisfaction to be approaching to the ideal of the perfect man.

It is very illustrative of the unguarded points and contradictions of Stoicism, that contentment and apathy were not to permit grief even for the loss of friends. Seneca, on one occasion, admits that he was betrayed by human weakness on this point. On strict Stoical principles, we ought to treat the afflictions and the death of others with the same frigid indifference as our own; for why should a man feel for a second person *more* than he ought to feel for himself, as a mere unit in the infinitude of the Universe? This is the contradiction inseparable from any system that begins by abjuring pleasure, and relief or protection from pain, as the ends of life. Even granting that we regard pleasure and relief from pain as of no importance in our own case, yet if we apply the same measure to others we are bereft of all motives to benevolence; and virtue, instead of being set on a loftier pinnacle, is left without any foundation. 2.2 //

EPICURUS. [341—270 B.C.].

Epicurus was born 341 B.C. in the island of Samos. At the age of eighteen, he repaired to Athens, where he is supposed to have enjoyed the teaching of Xenocrates or Theophrastus. In 306 B.C., he opened a school in a garden in Athens, whence his followers have sometimes been called the 'philosophers of the garden.' His life was simple, chaste, and temperate. Of the 300 works he is said to have written, nothing has come down to us except three letters, giving a summary of his views for the use of his friends, and a number of detached sayings, preserved by Diogenes Laertius and others. Moreover, some fragments of his work on Nature have been found at Herculaneum. The additional sources of our knowledge of Epicurus are the works of his opponents, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of his follower Lucretius. Our information from Epicurean writers respecting the doctrines of their sect is much less copious than what we possess from Stoic writers in regard to Stoic opinions. We have no Epicurean writer on Philosophy except Lucretius; whereas respecting the Stoical creed under the Roman Empire, the important writings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Antoninus, afford most valuable evidence.

To Epicurus succeeded, in the leadership of his school,

Hermarchus, Polystratus, Dionysius, Basilides, and others, ten in number, down to the age of Augustus. Among Roman Epicureans, Lucretius (95—51 B.C.) is the most important, his poem (*De Rerum Natura*), being the completest account of the system that exists. Other distinguished followers were Horace, Atticus, and Lucian. In modern times, Pierre Gassendi (1592—1655) revived the doctrines of Epicurus, and in 1647 published his '*Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri*,' and a *Life of Epicurus*. The reputation of Gassendi, in his life time, rested chiefly upon his physical theories; but his influence was much felt as a Christian upholder of Epicureanism. Gassendi was at one time in orders as a Roman Catholic, and professor of theology and philosophy. He established an Epicurean school in France, among the disciples of which were, Molière, Saint Evremont, Count de Grammont, the Duke of Rochefoucault, Fontenelle, and Voltaire.

The standard of Virtue and Vice is referred by Epicurus to pleasure and pain. Pain is the only evil, Pleasure is the only good. Virtue is no end in itself, to be sought: Vice is no end in itself, to be avoided. The motive for cultivating Virtue and banishing Vice arises from the consequences of each, as the means of multiplying pleasures and averting or lessening pains. But to the attainment of this purpose, the complete supremacy of Reason is indispensable; in order that we may take a right comparative measure of the varieties of pleasure and pain, and pursue the course that promises the least amount of suffering.*

In all ethical theories that make happiness the supreme object of pursuit, the position of virtue depends entirely upon the theory of what constitutes happiness. Now, Epicurus (herein differing from the Stoics, as well as Aristotle), did not recognize Happiness as anything but freedom from pain:

* This theory (taken in its most general sense, and apart from differences in the estimation of particular pleasures and pains), had been proclaimed long before the time of Epicurus. It is one of the various theories of Plato: for in his dialogue called *Protagoras* (though in other dialogues he reasons differently) we find it explicitly set forth and elaborately vindicated by his principal spokesman, Sokrates, against the Sophist Protagoras. It was also held by Aristippus (companion of Sokrates along with Plato) and by his followers after him, called the Cyrenaics. Lastly, it was maintained by Eudoxus, one of the most estimable philosophers contemporary with Aristotle. Epicurus was thus in no way the originator of the theory: but he had his own way of conceiving it—his own body of doctrine physical, cosmological, and theological, with which it was implicated—and his own comparative valuation of pleasures and pains.

and enjoyment of pleasure. It is essential, however, to understand, how Epicurus conceived pleasure and pain, and what is the Epicurean scale of pleasures and pains, graduated as objects of reasonable desire or aversion? It is a great error to suppose that, in making pleasure the standard of virtue, Epicurus had in view that elaborate and studied gratification of the sensual appetites that we associate with the word *Epicurean*. Epicurus declares—‘When we say that pleasure is the end of life, we do not mean the pleasures of the debauchee or the sensualist, as some from ignorance or from malignity represent, but freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from anxiety. For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the society of women, nor rare viands, and other luxuries of the table, that constitute a pleasant life, but sober contemplation, such as searches out the grounds of choice and avoidance, and banishes those chimeras that harass the mind.’

Freedom from pain is thus made the primary element of happiness; a one-sided view, repeated in the doctrine of Locke, that it is not the idea of future good, but the present greatest uneasiness that most strongly affects the will. A neutral state of feeling is necessarily imperilled by a greedy pursuit of pleasures; hence the *dictum*, to be content with little is a great good; because little is most easily obtained. The regulation of the desires is therefore of high moment. According to Epicurus, desires fall into three grades. Some are *natural* and *necessary*, such as desire of drink, food, or life, and are easily gratified. But when the uneasiness of a want is removed, the bodily pleasures admit of no farther increase; anything additional only *varies* the pleasure. Hence the luxuries which go beyond the relief of our wants are thoroughly superfluous; and the desires arising from them (forming the *second* grade) though *natural*, are *not necessary*. A *third* class of desires is neither natural nor necessary, but begotten of vain opinion; such as the thirst for civic honours, or for power over others; those desires are the most difficult to gratify, and even if gratified, entail upon us trouble, anxiety, and peril. [This account of the desires, following up the advice—If you wish to be rich, study not to increase your goods, but to diminish your desires—is to a certain extent wise and even indispensable; yet not adapted to all temperaments. To those that enjoy pleasure very highly, and are not sensitive in an equal degree to pain, such a negative conception of happiness would be imperfect.] Epicurus did not,

however, deprecate positive pleasure. If it could be reached without pain, and did not result in pain, it was a pure good; and, even if it could not be had without pain, the question was still open, whether it might not be well worth the price. But in estimating the worth of pleasure, the absence of any accompanying pain should weigh heavily in the balance. At this point, the Epicurean theory connects itself most intimately with the conditions of virtue; for virtue is more concerned with averting mischief and suffering, than with multiplying positive enjoyments.

Bodily feeling, in the Epicurean psychology, is prior in order of time to the mental element; the former was primordial, while the latter was derivative from it by repeated processes of memory and association. But though such was the order of sequence and generation, yet when we compare the two as constituents of happiness to the formed man, the mental element much outweighed the bodily, both as pain and as pleasure. Bodily pain or pleasure exists only in the present; when not felt, it is nothing. But mental feelings involve memory and hope—embrace the past as well as the future—endure for a long time, and may be recalled or put out of sight, to a great degree, at our discretion.

This last point is one of the most remarkable features of the Epicurean mental discipline. Epicurus deprecated the general habit of mankind in always hankering after some new satisfaction to come; always discontented with the present, and oblivious of past comforts as if they had never been. These past comforts ought to be treasured up by memory and reflection, so that they might become as it were matter for rumination, and might serve, in trying moments, even to counterbalance extreme physical suffering. The health of Epicurus himself was very bad during the closing years of his life. There remains a fragment of his last letter, to an intimate friend and companion, Idomenus—'I write this to you on the last day of my life, which, in spite of the severest internal bodily pains, is still a happy day, because I set against them in the balance all the mental pleasure felt in the recollection of my past conversations with you. Take care of the children left by Metrodorus, in a manner worthy of your demeanour from boyhood towards me and towards philosophy.' Bodily pain might thus be alleviated, when it occurred; it might be greatly lessened in occurrence, by prudent and moderate habits; lastly, even at the worst, if violent, it never lasted long; if not violent, it might be patiently borne, and

was at any rate terminated, or terminable at pleasure, by death.

In the view of Epicurus, the chief miseries of life arose, not from bodily pains, but partly from delusions of hope, and exaggerated aspirations for wealth, honours, power, &c., in all which the objects appeared most seductive from a distance, inciting man to lawless violence and treachery, while in the reality they were always disappointments, and generally something worse; partly, and still more, from the delusions of fear. Of this last sort, were the two greatest torments of human existence—Fear of Death, and of eternal suffering after death, as announced by prophets and poets, and Fear of the Gods. Epicurus, who did not believe in the continued existence of the soul separate from the body, declared that there could never be any rational ground for fearing death, since it was simply a permanent extinction of consciousness.* Death was nothing to us (he said); when death comes, we are no more, either to suffer or to enjoy. Yet it was the groundless fear of this nothing that poisoned all the tranquillity of life, and held men imprisoned even when existence was a torment. Whoever had surmounted that fear was armed at once against cruel tyranny and against all the gravest misfortunes. Next, the fear of the gods was not less delusive, and hardly less tormenting, than the fear of death. It was a capital error (Epicurus declared) to suppose that the gods employed themselves as agents in working or superintending the march of the Cosmos; or in conferring favour on some men, and administering chastisement to others. The vulgar religious tales, which represented them in this character, were untrue and insulting as regards the gods themselves, and pregnant with perversion and misery as regards the hopes and fears of mankind. Epicurus believed sincerely in the gods; revered them as beings at once perfectly happy, immortal, and unchangeable; and took delight in the public religious festivals and ceremonies. But it was inconsistent with these attributes, and repulsive to his feelings of reverence, to conceive them as agents. The idea of agency is derived from human experience; we, as agents, act with a view to supply some want, to fulfil some obligation, to acquire some pleasure, to

* The soul, according to Epicurus, was a subtle but energetic compound (of air, vapour, heat, and another nameless ingredient), with its best parts concentrated in the chest, yet pervading and sustaining the whole body; still, however, depending for its support on the body, and incapable of separate or disembodied continuance.

accomplish some object desired but not yet attained—in short, to fill up one or other of the many gaps in our imperfect happiness; the gods already *have* all that agents strive to get, and more than agents ever do get; their condition is one not of agency, but of tranquil, self-sustaining, friction. Accordingly, Epicurus thought (as Aristotle* had thought before him) that the perfect, eternal, and imperturbable well-being and felicity of the gods excluded the supposition of their being agents. He looked upon them as types of that unmolested safety and unalloyed satisfaction which was what he understood by pleasure or happiness—as objects of reverential envy, whose sympathy he was likely to obtain by assimilating his own temper and condition to theirs, as far as human circumstances allowed.

These theological views were placed by Epicurus in the foreground of his ethical philosophy, as the only means of dispelling those fears of the gods that the current fables instilled into every one, and that did so much to destroy human comfort and security. He proclaimed that beings in immortal felicity neither suffered vexation in themselves nor caused vexation to others—neither showed anger nor favour to particular persons. The doctrine that they were the working managers in the affairs of the Cosmos, celestial and terrestrial, human and extra-human, he not only repudiated as incompatible with their attributes, but declared to be impious, considering the disorder, sufferings, and violence, everywhere visible. He disallowed all prophecy, divination, and oracular inspiration, by which the public around him believed that the gods were perpetually communicating special revelations to individuals, and for which Sokrates had felt so peculiarly thankful.†

It is remarkable that Stoics and Epicureans, in spite of their marked opposition in dogma or theory, agreed so far in practical results, that both declared these two modes of uneasiness (fear of the gods and fear of death) to be the great torments of human existence, and both strove to remove or counterbalance them.

So far, the teaching of Epicurus appears confined to the separate happiness of each individual, as dependent upon his own prudence, sobriety, and correct views of Nature. But

* Aristot. De Coelo. II. a. 12, p. 292, 22, 6, 5. In the Ethics, Aristotle assigns theorizing contemplation to the gods, as the only process worthy of their exalted dignity and supreme felicity.

† Xenophon Memor. I. 1—10; IV. 3—12

this is not the whole of the Epicurean Ethics. The system also considered each man as in companionship with others; The precepts were shaped accordingly, first as to Justice, next as to Friendship. In both these, the foundation whereon Epicurus built was Reciprocity: not pure sacrifice to others, but partnership with others, beneficial to all. He kept the ideas of self and of others inseparably knit together in one complex association: he did not expel or degrade either, in order to give exclusive ascendancy to the other. The dictate of Natural Justice was that no man should hurt another: each was bound to abstain from doing harm to others; each, on this condition, was entitled to count on security and relief from the fear that others would do harm to him. Such double aspect, or reciprocity, was essential to social companionship: those that could not, or would not, accept this covenant, were unfit for society. If a man does not behave justly towards others, he cannot expect that they will behave justly towards him; to live a life of injustice, and expect that others will not find it out, is idle. The unjust man cannot enjoy a moment of security. Epicurus laid it down explicitly, that just and righteous dealing was the indispensable condition to every one's comfort, and was the best means of attaining it.

The reciprocity of Justice was valid towards all the world; the reciprocity of Friendship went much farther; it involved indefinite and active beneficence, but could reach only to a select few. Epicurus insisted emphatically on the value of friendship, as a means of happiness to both the persons so united. He declared that a good friend was another self, and that friends ought to be prepared, in case of need, to die for each other. Yet he declined to recommend an established community of goods among the members of his fraternity, as prevailed in the Pythagorean brotherhood: for such an institution (he said) implied mistrust. He recommended efforts to please and to serve, and a forwardness to give, for the purpose of gaining and benefiting a friend, and he even declared that there was more pleasure in conferring favours than in receiving them; but he was no less strenuous in inculcating an intelligent gratitude on the receiver. No one except a wise man (he said) knew how to return a favour properly.*

* These exhortations to active friendship were not unfruitful. We know, even by the admission of witnesses adverse to the Epicurean doctrines, that the harmony among the members of the sect, with common veneration for the founder, was more marked and more enduring than

Virtue and happiness, in the theory of Epicurus, were thus inseparable. A man could not be happy until he had surmounted the fear of death and the fear of gods instilled by the current fables, which disturbed all tranquillity of mind; until he had banished those factitious desires that pushed him into contention for wealth, power, or celebrity; nor unless he behaved with justice to all, and with active devoted friendship towards a few. Such a mental condition, which he thought it was in every man's power to acquire by appropriate teaching and companionship, constituted virtue; and was the sure as well as the only precursor of genuine happiness. A mind thus undisturbed and purified was sufficient to itself. The mere satisfaction of the wants of life, and the conversation of friends, became then felt pleasures; if more could be had without preponderant mischief, so much the better; but Nature, disburthened of her corruptions and prejudices, required no more to be happy. This at least was as much as the conditions of humanity admitted: a tranquil, undisturbed, innocuous, non-competitive fruition, which approached most nearly to the perfect happiness of the Gods.*

The Epicurean theory of virtue is the type of all those that make an enlightened self-interest the basis of right and wrong. The four cardinal virtues were explained from the Epicurean point of view. *Prudence* was the supreme rule of conduct. It was a calculation and balancing of pleasures and pains. Its object was a judicious selection of pleasures to be sought. It teaches men to forego idle wishes, and to despise idle fears. *Temperance* is the management of sensual pleasures. It seeks to avoid excess, so as on the whole to extract

that exhibited by any of the other philosophical sects. Epicurus himself was a man of amiable personal qualities: his testament, still remaining, shows an affectionate regard, both for his surviving friends, and for the permanent attachment of each to the others, as well as of all to the school. Diogenes Laertius tells us—nearly 200 years after Christ, and 450 years after the death of Epicurus—that the Epicurean sect still continued its numbers and dignity, having outlasted its contemporaries and rivals. The harmony among the Epicureans may be explained, not merely from the temper of the master, but partly from the doctrines and plan of life that he recommended. Ambition and love of power were discouraged: rivalry among the members for success, either political or rhetorical, was at any rate a rare exception: all were taught to confine themselves to that privacy of life and love of philosophical communion which alike required and nourished the mutual sympathies of the brotherhood.

* Consistently with this view of happiness, Epicurus advised, in regard to politics, quiet submission to established authority, without active meddling beyond what necessity required.

as much pleasure as our bodily organs are capable of affording. *Fortitude* is a virtue, because it overcomes fear and pain. It consists in facing danger or enduring pain, to avoid greater possible evils. *Justice* is of artificial origin. It consists in a tacit agreement among mankind to abstain from injuring one another. The security that every man has in his person and property, is the great consideration urging to abstinence from injuring others. But is it not possible to commit injustice with safety? The answer was, 'Injustice is not an evil in itself, but becomes so from the fear that haunts the injurer of not being able to escape the appointed avengers of such acts.'

The Physics of Epicurus were borrowed in the main from the atomic theory of Democritus, but were modified by him in a manner subservient and contributory to his ethical scheme. To that scheme it was essential that those celestial, atmospheric, or terrestrial phenomena that the public around him ascribed to the agency and purposes of the gods, should be understood as being produced by physical causes. An eclipse, an earthquake, a storm, a shipwreck, unusual rain or drought, a good or a bad harvest—and not merely these, but many other occurrences far smaller and more unimportant, as we may see by the eighteenth chapter of the Characters of Theophrastus—were then regarded as visitations of the gods, requiring to be interpreted by recognized prophets, and to be appeased by ceremonial expiations. When once a man became convinced that all these phenomena proceeded from physical agencies, a host of terrors and anxieties would disappear from the mind; and this Epicurus asserted to be the beneficent effect and real recommendation of physical philosophy. He took little or no thought for scientific curiosity as a motive *per se*, which both Democritus and Aristotle put so much in the foreground.

Epicurus adopted the atomistic scheme of Democritus, but with some important variations. He conceived that the atoms all moved with equal velocity in the downward direction of gravity. But it occurred to him that upon this hypothesis there could never occur any collisions or combinations of the atoms—nothing but continued and unchangeable parallel lines. Accordingly, he modified it by saying that the line of descent was not exactly rectilinear, but that each atom deflected a little from the straight line, and each in its own direction and degree; so that it became possible to assume collisions, resiliences, adhesions, combinations, among them, as it had been possible under the variety of original movements ascribed to them by Democritus. The opponents of Epicurus derided this auxiliary hypothesis;

they affirmed that he invented the individual deflection of each atom, without assigning any cause, and only because he was perplexed by the mystery of man's *free-will*. But Epicurus was not more open to attack on this ground than other physical philosophers. Most of them (except perhaps the most consistent of the Stoic fatalists) believed that some among the phenomena of the universe occurred in regular and predictable sequence, while others were essentially irregular and unpredictable; each philosopher devised his hypothesis, and recognized some fundamental principle, to explain the first class of phenomena as well as the second. Plato admitted an invincible Erratic necessity; Aristotle introduced Chance and Spontaneity; Democritus multiplied indefinitely the varieties of atomic movements. The hypothetical deflexion alleged by Epicurus was his way, not more unwarranted than the others, of providing a fundamental principle for the unpredictable phenomena of the universe. Among these are the mental (including the volitional) manifestations of men and animals; but there are many others besides; and there is no ground for believing that the mystery of free-will was peculiarly present to his mind. The movements of a man or animal are not exclusively subject to gravitation and other general laws; they are partly governed by mental impulses and by forces of the organism, intrinsic and peculiar to himself, unseen and unfelt by others. For these, in common with many other untraceable phenomena in the material world, Epicurus provides a principle in the supplementary hypothesis of deflexion. He rejected the fatalism contained in the theories of some of the Stoics, and admitted a limited range of empire to chance, or irregularity. But he maintained that the will, far from being among the phenomena essentially irregular, is under the influence of motives; for no man can insist more strenuously than he does (see the Letter to Menœceus) on the complete power of philosophy,—if the student could be made to feel its necessity and desire the attainment of it, so as to meditate and engrain within himself sound views about the gods, death, and human life generally,—to mould our volitions and character in a manner conformable to the exigencies of virtue and happiness.

When we read the explanations given by Epicurus and Lucretius of what the Epicurean theory really was, and compare them with the numerous attacks made upon it by opponents, we cannot but remark that the title or formula of the theory was ill chosen, and was really a misnomer. What

Epicurus meant by Pleasure was, not what most people meant by it, but something very different—a tranquil and comfortable state of mind and body; much the same as what Democritus had expressed before him by the phrase *εὐθυμία*. This last phrase would have expressed what Epicurus aimed at, neither more nor less. It would at least have preserved his theory from much misplaced sarcasm and aggressive rhetoric.

THE NEO-PLATONISTS. *or Alexandrian*

PLOTINUS (A.D. 205–70), PORPHYRY, &c.

Constructed with reference to the broken-down state of ancient society, and seeking its highest aim in a regeneration of humanity, the philosophical system of Neo-Platonism was throughout ethical or ethico-religious in spirit; yet its ethics admits of no great development according to the usual topics. A pervading ethical character is not incompatible with the absence of a regular ethical scheme; and there was this peculiarity in the system, that its end, though professedly moral, was to be attained by means of an intellectual regimen. In setting up its ideal of human effort, it was least of all careful about prescribing a definite course of external conduct.

The more strictly ethical views of PLOTINUS, the chief representative of the school, are found mainly in the first of the six *Enneads* into which Porphyry collected his master's essays. But as they presuppose the cosmological and psychological doctrines, their place in the works, as now arranged, is to be regarded as arbitrary. The soul having fallen from its original condition, and, in consequence and as a penalty, having become united with a material body, the one true aim recognized for human action is, to rise above the debasing connection with matter, and again to lead the old spiritual life. For those that have sunk so far as to be content with the world of sense, wisdom consists in pursuing pleasure as good, and shunning pain as evil: but the others can partake of a better life, in different degrees. The first step in reformation is to practise virtue in the affairs of life, which means to subject Sense and the lower desires to Reason. This is done in the fourfold form of the common cardinal virtues, called *political* by Plotinus, to mark the sphere of action where they can be exerted, and is the virtue of a class of men capable of a certain elevation, though ignorant of all the rest that lies above them. A second step is made through the

means of the *καθάρσεις* or purifying virtues; where it is sought to root out, instead of merely moderating, the sensual affections. If the soul is thus altogether freed from the dominion of sense, it becomes at once able to follow its natural bent towards good, and enters into a permanent state of calm. This is virtue in its true meaning—becoming like to the Deity, all that went before being merely a preparation. The pure and perfect life of the soul may still be described as a field whereon the four virtues are exercised, but they now assume a far higher meaning than as political virtues, having relation solely to the contemplative life of the Nous. *mixed*

of Happiness is unknown to Plotinus as distinct from perfection, and perfection in the sense of having subdued all material cravings (except as regards the bare necessities of life), and entered upon the undisturbed life of contemplation. If this recalls, at least in name, the Aristotelian ideal, there are points added that appear to be echoes of Stoicism. Rapt in the contemplation of eternal verities, the purified soul is indifferent to external circumstances: pain and suffering are unheeded, and the just man can feel happy even in the bull of Phalaris. But in one important respect the Neo-Platonic teaching is at variance with Stoical doctrine. Though its first and last precept is to rid the soul from the bondage of matter, it warns against the attempt to sever body and soul by suicide. By no forcible separation, which would be followed by a new junction, but only by prolonged internal effort is the soul so set free from the world of sense, as to be able to have a vision of its ancient home while still in the body, and to return to it at death. Small, therefore, as is the consideration bestowed by Neo-Platonism on the affairs of practical life, it has no disposition to shirk the burden of them.

One other peculiar aim, the highest of all, is proposed to the soul in the Alexandrian philosophy. It is peculiar, because to be understood only in connexion with the metaphysics and cosmology of the system. In the theory of Emanation, ¹²the primordial One or Good emits the Nous wherein the Ideas are immanent; the Nous, in turn, sends forth ³⁰the Soul, and the Soul, Matter or nature; the gradation applying to man as well as to the Universe. Now, to each of these principles, there is ^{four}a corresponding subjective state in the inner life of man. ¹³The life of sense answers to nature or the material body; the virtue that is founded upon free-will and reason, to the soul; ¹⁴the contemplative life, as the result of complete purification

from sense, to the Nons or Sphere of Ideas; finally, to the One or Good, snpreme in the scale of existenee, corresponds the state of Love, or, in its highest form, *Ecstasy*. This peculiar elevation is something far above the highest intelleetual contemplation, and is not reached by thought. It is not even a mere intuition of, but a real union or contaet with, the Good. To attain it, there mnst be a complete withdrawal into self from the external world, and then the subject must wait quietly till perchance the state comes on. It is one of ineffable *indeed* bliss, bnt, from the nature of man, transitory and rare.

5. book 1600 SCHOLASTIC ETHICS. *Phil. cal teaching*

ABAEIARD (1079-1142) has a special treatise on the subject of Ethics, entitled *Scito te ipsum*. As the name implies, it lays chief stress upon the Snbjective element in morality, and, in this aspect, is considered to supply the idea that underlies a very largo portion of modern ethieal speculation. By nature a notoriously independent thinker, Abaelard elaimed for philosophy the right of diseussing ethieal questions and fixing a natural moral law, though he allowed^{2a} a correetive in the Christian scheme. Having this position with referenee to the church, he was also mnch less under the yoke of philosophical authority than his suecessors, from living at a time when Aristotle was not yet supreme. Yet, with Aristotle, he assigns the attainment of the highest good as the aim of all human effort, Ethics showing the way; and, with the sehoolmen generally, pronounes the highest good to be God. If the highest good in itself is God, the highest human good is love to God. This is attained by way of virtne, which is a good Will consolidated into a habit. On the influence of habit on aetion his view is Aristotelian. His own specialty lies in his judging aetions solely with referenee to the intention (*intentio*) of the agent, and this intention with referenee to conseienee (*conscientia*). All aetions, he says, are in themselves indifferent, and not to be called good or evil exept from the intention of the doer. *Peccatum* is properly only the aetion that is done *Sin* with evil intent; and where this is present, where the mental consent (*consensus*) is clearly established, there is *peccatum*, though the aetion remains nnexeuted. When the *consensus* is absent, as in original sin, there is only *vitium*; hence, a life without *peccata* is not impossible to men in the exercise of their freedom, however difficult it may be.

The snpremaey assigned by him to the snbjective element of conseienee appears in such phrases as, there is no sin exept

against conscience; also in the opinion he pronounces, that, though in the case of a mistaken moral conviction, an action is not to be called good, yet it is not so bad as an action objectively right but done against conscience. Thus, without allowing that conscientious persecutors of Christians act rightly, he is not afraid, in the application of his principle, to say that they would act still more wrongly if through not listening to their conscience, they spared their victims. But this means only that by following conscience we avoid sinning; for virtue in the full sense, it is necessary that the conscience should have judged rightly. By what standard, however, this is to be ascertained, he nowhere clearly says. *Contemptus Dei*, given by him as the real and only thing that constitutes an action bad, is merely another subjective description.

ST. BERNARD of Clairvaux (1091-1153), the strenuous opponent of Abaelard, and the great upholder of mysticism against rationalism in the early scholastic period when the two were not yet reconciled, gave utterance, in the course of his mystical effusions, to some special views of love and disinterestedness.

There are two degrees of Christian virtue, Humility and Charity or Love. When men look into themselves, and behold the meanness that is found there, the fitting state of mind is, first, humility; but soon the sense of their very weakness begets in them charity and compassion towards others, while the sense also of a certain human dignity raises within them feelings of love towards the author of their being. The treatise *De Amore Dei* sets forth the nature of this love, which is the highest exercise of human powers. Its fundamental characteristic is its disinterestedness. It has its reward, but from meriting, not from seeking. It is purely voluntary, and, as a free sentiment, necessarily unbought; it has God for its single object, and would not be love to God, if he were loved for the sake of something else.

He distinguishes various degrees of love. There is, first, a natural love of self for the sake of self. Next, a motion of love towards God amid earthly misfortunes, which also is not disinterested. The third degree is different, being love to God for his own sake, and to our neighbour for God's sake. But the highest grade of all is not reached, until men come to love even themselves only by relation to God; at this point, with the disappearance of all special and interested affection, the mystic goal is attained.

JOHN of SALISBURY (d. 1180) is the last name to be cited in the early scholastic period. He professed to be a practical philosopher, to be more concerned about the uses of knowledge than about knowledge itself, and to subordinate everything to some purpose; by way of protest against the theoretic hair-splitting and verbal subtleties of his predecessors. Even more than in *Ethics*, he found in *Politics* his proper sphere. He was the stannest upholder of the Papal Supremacy, which, after long struggles, was about to be established at its greatest height, before presiding at the opening of the most brilliant period of scholasticism.

In the *Politicus* especially, but also in his other works, the foundations and provisions of his moral system are found. He has no distinction to draw in *Ethics* between theology and philosophy, but uses Scripture and observation alike, though Scripture always in the final appeal. Of philosophizing, the one final aim, as also of existence, is Happiness; the question of questions, how it is to be attained. Happiness is not pleasure, nor possession, nor honour, but consists in following the path of virtue. Virtue is to be understood from the constitution of human nature. In man, there is a lower and a higher faculty of Desire; or, otherwise expressed, there are the various affections that have their roots in sense and centre in self-love or the desire of self-preservation, and there is also a natural love of justice implanted from the beginning. In proportion as the *appetitus justus*, which consists in will, gains upon the *appetitus commodi*, men become more worthy of a larger happiness. Self-love rules in man, so long as he is in the natural state of sin; if, amid great conflict and by divine help, the higher affection gains the upper hand, the state of true virtue, which is identical with the theoretic state of belief, and also of pure love to God and man, is reached.

By the middle of the thirteenth century, the schoolmen had before them the whole works of Aristotle, obtained from Arabian and other sources. Whereas, previous to this time, they had comprehended nearly all the subjects of Philosophy under the one name of Dialectics or Logic, always reserving, however, *Ethics* to Theology, they were now made aware of the ancient division of the sciences, and of what had been accomplished in each. The effect, both in respect of form and of subject-matter, was soon apparent in such compilations or more independent works as they were able to produce after their commentaries on the Aristotelian text. But in

Ethics, the nature of the subject demanded of men in their position a less entire submission to the doctrines of the pagan philosopher; and here accordingly they clung to the traditional theological treatment. If they were commenting on the Ethics of Aristotle, the Bible was at hand to supply his omissions; if they were setting up a complete moral system, they took little more than the ground-work from him, the rest being Christian ideas and precepts, or fragments borrowed from Platonism and other Greek systems, nearly allied in spirit to their own faith. *st*

This is especially true, as will be seen, of Thomas Aquinas. His predecessors can be disposed of in a few words. ALEXANDER of HALES (d. 1245) was almost purely theological. BONAVENTURA (1221-74) in his double character of rigid Franciscan and mystic, was led far beyond the Aristotelian Ethics. The mean between excess and defect is a very good rule for the affairs of life, but the true Christian is bound besides to works of supererogation: first of all, to take on the condition of poverty; while the state of mystic contemplation remains as a still higher goal for the few. ALBERT THE GREAT (1193-1280), the most learned and complete commentator of Aristotle that had yet appeared, divided the whole subject of Ethics into *Monastica*, *Economica*, and *Politica*. In this division, which is plainly suggested by the Aristotelian division of Politics in the large sense, the term *Monastica* not inaptly expresses the reference that Ethics has to the conduct of men as individuals. Albert, however, in commenting on the Nicomachean Ethics, adds exceedingly little to the results of his author beyond the incorporation of a few Scriptural ideas. To the cardinal virtues he appends the *virtutes adjunctæ*, Faith, Hope, and Charity, and again in his compendious work, *Summa Theologiæ*, distinguishes them as *infusæ*, the cardinal being considered as *acquisitæ*.

Besides his commentaries on the Aristotelian works (the Ethics included) and many other writings, THOMAS AQUINAS (1226-74) left two large works, the *Summa philosophica* and the famous *Summa Theologiæ*. Notwithstanding the prominence assigned to theological questions, the first is a regular philosophical work; the second, though containing the exposition of philosophical opinions, is a theological textbook. Now, as it is in the Summary for theological purposes that the whole practical philosophy of Aquinas is contained, it is to be inferred that he regarded the subject of Ethics as not on the same level with other departments of philo-

sophy. Moreover, even when he is not appealing to Scripture, he is seen to display what is for him a most unusual tendency to desert Aristotle, at the really critical moments, for Plato or Plotinus, or any other authority of a more theological cast.

In the (unfinished) *Summa Theologiæ*, the Ethical views and cognate questions occupy the two sections of the second part—the so-called *prima* and *secunda secundæ*. He begins, in the Aristotelian fashion, by seeking an ultimate end of human action, and finds it in the attainment of the highest good or happiness. But as no created thing can answer to the idea of the highest good, it must be placed in God. God, however, as the highest good, can only be the object, in the search after human happiness, for happiness in itself is a state of the mind or act of the soul. The question then arises, what sort of act? Does it fall under the Will or under the Intelligence? The answer is, Not under the will, because happiness is neither desire nor pleasure, but *consecutio*, that is, a possessing. Desire precedes *consecutio*, and pleasure follows upon it; but the act of getting possession, in which lies happiness, is distinct from both. This is illustrated by the case of the miser having his happiness in the mere possession of money; and the position is essentially the same as Butler's, in regard to our appetites and desires, that they blindly seek their objects with no regard to pleasure. Thomas concludes that the *consecutio*, or happiness, is an act of the intelligence; what pleasure there is being a mere accidental accompaniment.

Distinguishing between two phases of the intellect—the theoretic and the practical—in the one of which it is an end to itself, but in the other subordinated to an external aim, he places true happiness in acts of the self-sufficing theoretic intelligence. In this life, however, such a constant exercise of the intellect is not possible, and accordingly what happiness there is, must be found, in great measure, in the exercise of the practical intellect, directing and governing the lower desires and passions. This twofold conception of happiness is Aristotelian, even as expressed by Thomas under the distinction of perfect and imperfect happiness; but when he goes on to associate perfect happiness with the future life only, to found an argument for a future life from the desire of a happiness more perfect than can be found here, and to make the pure contemplation, in which consists highest bliss, a vision of the divine essence face to face, a direct cognition of Deity far surpassing demonstrative knowledge or

mortal faith—he is more theologian than philosopher, or if a philosopher, more Platonist than Aristotelian.

The condition of perfect happiness being a theoretic or intellectual state, the *visio*, and not the *delectatio*, is consistently given as its central fact; and when he proceeds to consider the other questions of Ethics, the same superiority is steadily ascribed to the intellectual function. It is because we know a thing to be good that we wish it, and knowing it, we cannot help wishing. Conscience, as the name implies, is allied to knowledge. Reason gives the law to will.

After a long disquisition about the passions and the whole appetitive side of human nature, over which Reason is called to rule, he is brought to the subject of virtue. He is Aristotelian enough to describe virtue as *habitus*—a disposition or quality (like health) whereby a subject is more or less well disposed with reference to itself or something else; and he takes account of the acquisition of good moral habits (*virtutes acquisitæ*) by practice. But with this he complies, or tends to substitute for it, the definition of Augustine that virtue is a good quality of mind, *quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur*, as a ground for *virtutes infusæ*, conferred as gifts upon man, or rather on certain men, by free grace from on high. He wavers greatly at this stage, and in this respect his attitude is characteristic for all the schoolmen.

So again in passing from the general question of Virtue to the virtues, he puts several of the systems under contribution, as if not prepared to leave the guidance of Aristotle, but feeling at the same time the necessity of bridging over the distance between his position and Christian requirements. Understanding Aristotle to make a co-ordinate division of virtues into Moral and Intellectual, he gives reasons for such a step. Though virtue, he says, is not so much the perfecting of the operation of our faculties, as their employment by the will for good ends, it may be used in the first sense, and thus the intellectual virtues will be the habits of intelligence that procure the truest knowledge. The well-known division of the cardinal virtues is his next theme; and it is established as complete and satisfactory by a twofold deduction. But a still higher and more congenial view is immediately afterwards adopted from Plotinus. This is the Neo-Platonic description of the four virtues as *politice*, *purgatorie*, and *purgati animi*, according to the scale of elevation reached by the soul in its efforts to mount above sense. They are called by Thomas also *exemplares*, when regarded at once

as the essence of the Deity, and as the models of human perfections.

This mystical division, not unsupported by philosophical authority, smooths the way for his account of the highest or *theological* virtues. These bear upon the vision of Deity, which was recognized above as the highest good of humanity, and form an order apart. They have God for their object, are altogether inspired by God (hence called *infuse*), and are taught by revelation. Given in connection with the natural faculties of intellect and will, they are exhibited in the attainment of the supernatural order of things. With intellect goes *Faith*, as it were the intellect applied to things not intelligible; with Will go Hope and Charity or Love: Hope being the Will exercised upon things not naturally desired, and Love the union of Will with what is not naturally brought near to us.

Aquinas then passes to politics, or at least the discussion of the political ideas of law, right, &c. 26.//.80.

Coming now to *modern* thinkers, we begin with

THOMAS HOBBS. [1588-1679.]

The circumstances of Hobbes's life, so powerful in determining the nature of his opinions, had an equally marked effect on the order and number of expositions that he gave to the psychological and political parts of his system. His ethical doctrines, in as far as they can be dissociated from his politics, may be studied in no less than three distinct forms; either in the first part of the *Leviathan* (1651); or in the *De Cive* (1647), taken along with the *De Homine* *man* (1658); or in the *Treatise of Human Nature* (1650, but written ten years earlier), coupled with the *De Corpore Politico* (also *State* 1650). But the same result, or with only unimportant variations, being obtained from all, we need not here go beyond the first-mentioned.

In the first part of the *Leviathan*, then, bearing the title *Of Man*, and designed to consider Man as at once the *matter* and *artificer* of the Commonwealth or State, Hobbes is led, after discussing Sense, Imagination, Train of Imaginations, Speech, Reason and Science, to take up, in chapter sixth, the Passions, or, as he calls them, the Interior beginnings of voluntary motions. Motions, he says, are either vital and animal, or voluntary. Vital motions; *e.g.*, circulation, nutrition, &c., need no help of imagination; on the other hand, voluntary motions, as going and speaking—since they depend on a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what—have in

the imagination their first beginning. But imagination is only the relics of sense, and sense, as Hobbes always declares, is motion in the human organs communicated by objects without; consequently, visible voluntary motions begin in invisible internal motions, whose nature is expressed by the word *Endeavour*. When the endeavour is towards something causing it, there is Appetite or Desire; endeavour 'fromward something' is Aversion. These very words, and the corresponding terms in Greek, imply an actual, not—as the schoolmen absurdly think—a metaphorical motion. Passing from the main question, he describes Love and Hate as Desire and Aversion when the object is present. Of appetites, some are born with us, others proceed from experience, being of particular things. Where we neither desire nor hate, we contemn [he means, disregard]. Appetites and aversions vary in the same person, and much more in different persons.

Then follows his definition of *good*,—the object of any man's appetite or desire, as evil is the object of his hate and aversion. Good and evil are always merely relative, either to the person of a man, or in a commonwealth to the representative person, or to an arbitrator if chosen to settle a dispute. Good in the promise is *pulchrum*, for which there is no exact English term; good in the effect, as the end desired, is *delightful*; good as the means, is *useful* or *profitable*. There is the same variety of evil.

His next topic is Pleasure. As sense is, in *reality*, motion, but, in '*appearance*,' light or sound or odour; so appetite, in reality a motion or endeavour effected in the heart by the action of objects through the organs of sense, is, in '*appearance*,' delight or trouble of mind. The emotion, whose *appearance* (i.e., subjective side) is pleasure or delight, seems to be a corroboration of vital motion; the contrary, in the case of molestation. Pleasure is, therefore, the sense of good; displeasure, the sense of evil. The one accompanies, in greater or less degree, all desire and love; the other, all aversion and hatred. Pleasures are either of *sense*; or of the *mind*, when arising from the expectation that proceeds from the foresight of the ends or consequence of things, irrespective of their pleasing the senses or not. For these mental pleasures, there is the general name *joy*. There is a corresponding division of displeasure into *pain* and *grief*.

All the other passions, he now proceeds to show, are these *simple passions*—appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, diversified in name for divers considerations.

Incidental remarks of ethical importance are these. *Covetousness*, the desire of riches, is a name signifying blame, because men contending for them are displeased with others attaining them; the desire itself, however, is to be blamed or allowed, according to the means whereby the riches are sought. *Curiosity* is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure. *Pity* is grief for the calamity of another, arising from the imagination of the like calamity befalling one's self; the best men have, therefore, least pity for calamity arising from great wickedness. *Contempt*, or little sense of the calamity of others, proceeds from security of one's own fortune; 'for that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.'

Having explained the various passions, he then gives his theory of the Will. He supposes a *liberty* in man of doing or omitting, according to appetite or aversion. But to this liberty an end is put in the state of *deliberation* wherein there is kept up a constant succession of alternating desires and aversions, hopes and fears, regarding one and the same thing. One of two results follows. Either the thing is judged impossible, or it is done; and this, according as aversion or appetite triumphs at the last. Now, the last aversion, followed by omission, or the last appetite, followed by action, is the act of *Willing*. Will is, therefore, the last appetite (taken to include aversion) in deliberating. So-called Will, that has been forborne, was *inclination* merely; but the last inclination with consequent action (or omission) is Will, or voluntary action.

After mentioning the forms of speech where the several passions and appetites are naturally expressed, and remarking that the truest signs of passion are in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends or aims otherwise known to belong to a man,—he returns to the question of good and evil. It is *apparent* good and evil, come at by the best possible foresight of all the consequences of action, that excite the appetites and aversions in deliberation. *Felicity* he defines continual success in obtaining the things from time to time desired; perpetual tranquillity of mind being impossible in this life, which is but motion, and cannot be without desire and fear any more than without sense. The happiness of the future life is at present unknown.

Men, he says at the close, *praise* the goodness, and *magnify*

the greatness, of a thing; the Greeks had also the word *μακαριότης*, to express an opinion of a man's felicity.

August In Chapter VII., Of the Ends of Discourse, he is led to remark on the meaning of *Conscience*, in connection with the word *Conscious*. Two or more men, he says, are conscious of a thing when they know it together (*con-scire*.) Hence arises the proper meaning of conscience; and the evil of speaking against one's conscience, in this sense, is to be allowed. Two other meanings are metaphorical: when it is put for a man's knowledge of his own secret facts and thoughts; and when men give their own new opinions, however absurd, the revered name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them. [*Hobbes is not concerned to foster the moral independence of individuals.*] *does not seek*

He begins Chapter VIII. by defining *Virtue* as something that is valued for eminence, and that consists in comparison, but proceeds to consider only the intellectual virtues—all that is summed up in the term of a *good wit*—and their opposites. Farther on, he refers difference of wits—discretion, prudence, craft, &c.—to difference in the passions, and this to difference in constitution of body and of education. The passions chiefly concerned are the desires of power, riches, knowledge, honour, but all may be reduced to the single desire of power.

In Chapter IX. is given his Scheme of Sciences. The relation in his mind between Ethics and Politics is here seen. Science or Philosophy is divided into 'Natural or' Civil, according as it is knowledge of consequences from the accidents of natural bodies or of politic bodies. Ethics is one of the ultimate divisions of Natural Philosophy, dealing with consequences from the *passions* of men; and because the passions are *qualities* of bodies, it falls more immediately under the head of Physics. Politics is the whole of the second main division, and deals with consequences from the institution of commonwealths (1) to the rights and duties of the Sovereign, and (2) to the duty and right of the Subject.

Ethics, accordingly, in Hobbes's eyes, is part of the science of man (as a natural body), and it is always treated as such. But subjecting, as he does, so much of the action of the individual to the action of the state, he necessarily includes in his Politics many questions that usually fall to Ethics. Hence arises the necessity of studying for his Ethics also part of the civil Philosophy; though it happens that, in the *Leviathan*, this requisite part is incorporated with the Section containing the Science of Man.

Chapter X. is on Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness. A man's *power* being his present means to obtain some future apparent good, he enumerates all the sources of original and acquired power. The *worth* of a man is what would be given for the use of his power; it is, therefore, never absolute, but dependent on the need and judgment of another. *Dignity* is the value set on a man by the state. *Honour* and *dishonour* are the manifestation of value. He goes through all the signs of honour and dishonour. *Honourable* is any possession, action, or quality that is the sign of power. Where there is the opinion of power, the justice or injustice of an action does not affect the honour. He clearly means a universally accepted opinion of power, and cites the characters of the pagan deities. So, too, before times of civil order, it was held no dishonour to be a pirate, and even still, dnels, though unlawful, are honourable, and will be till there be honour ordained for them that refuse. Farther on, he distinguishes *Worthiness*, (1) from worth, and (2) from merit, or the possession of a particular ability or desert, which, as will be seen, presupposes a right to a thing, founded on a promise.

Chapter XI. bears the title, Of the difference of Manners; by manners being meant, not decency of behaviour and points of the 'small morals,' but the qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. Felicity of life, as before, he pronounces to be a continual progress of desire, there being no *finis ultimus* nor *summum bonum*. The aim of all men is, therefore, not only to enjoy once and for an instant, but to assure for ever the way of future desire. Men differ in their way of doing so, from diversity of passion and their different degrees of knowledge. One thing he notes as common to all, a restless and perpetual desire of power after power, because the present power of living well depends on the acquisition of more. Competition inclines to contention and war. The desire of ease, on the other hand, and fear of death or wounds, dispose to civil obedience. So also does desire of knowledge, implying, as it does, desire of leisure. Desire of praise and desire of fame after death dispose to laudable actions; in such fame, there is a present delight from foresight of it, and of benefit redounding to posterity; for pleasure to the sense is also pleasure in the imagination. Unrequitable benefits from an equal engender secret hatred, but from a superior, love; the cheerful acceptance, called *gratitude*, requiting the giver with honour. Requirable benefits, even from equals or inferiors, dispose to love; for hence

arises emulation in benefiting—‘the most noble and profitable contention possible, wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.’ He passes under review other dispositions, such as fear of oppression, vain-glory, ambition, pusillanimity, frugality, &c., with reference to the course of conduct they prompt to. Then he comes to a favorite subject, the mistaken courses whereinto men fall that are ignorant of natural causes and the proper signification of words. The effect of ignorance of the causes of right, equity, law, and justice, is to make custom and example the rule of actions, as with children, or to induce the setting of custom against reason, and reason against custom, whereby the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen, and by the sword. Again, taking up ignorance of the laws of nature, he is led on to the subject of natural Religion, and devotes also the whole of Chapter XII. to Religion and kindred topics.

In Chapter XIII., he deals with the natural condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity and Misery. All men, he says, are by nature equal. Differences there are in the faculties of body and mind, but, when all is taken together, not great enough to establish a steady superiority of one over another. Besides even more than in strength, men are equal in *prudence*, which is but experience that comes to all. People indeed generally believe that others are not so wise as themselves, but ‘there is not ordinarily a greater sign of equal distribution of anything than that every person is contented with his share.’

Of this equality of ability, the consequence is that two men desiring the exclusive possession of the same thing, whether for their own conservation or for delectation, will become enemies and seek to destroy each other. In such a case, it will be natural for any man to seek to secure himself by anticipating others in the use of force or wiles; and, because some will not be content with merely securing themselves, others, who would be content, will be driven to take the offensive for mere self-conservation. Moreover, men will be displeased at being valued by others less highly than by themselves, and will use force to extort respect.

Thus, he finds three principal causes of quarrel in the nature of man—*competition*, *diffidence* (distrust), and *glory*, making men invade for gain, for safety, and for reputation. Men will accordingly, in the absence of any power to keep them in awe, be in a constant state of war; by which is meant,

not actual fighting, but the known disposition thereto, and no assurance to the contrary.

He proceeds to draw a very dismal picture of the results of this state of enmity of man against man—no industry, no agriculture, no arts, no society, and so forth, but only fear and danger of violent death, and life solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. To those that doubt the truth of such an 'inference made from the passions,' and desire the confirmation of experience, he cites the wearing of arms and locking of doors, &c., as actions that accuse mankind as much, as any words of his. Besides, it is not really to accuse man's nature; for the desires and passions are in themselves no sin, nor the actions proceeding from them, until a law is made against them. He seeks further evidence of an original condition of war, in the actual state of American savages, with no government at all, but only a concord of small families, depending on natural Inst; also in the known horrors of a civil war, when there is no common power to fear: and, finally, in the constant hostile attitude of different governments.

In the state of natural war, the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place, there being no law; and there is no law, because there is no common power. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice is no faculty of body and mind like sense and passion, but only a quality relating to men in society. Then adding a last touch to the description of the state of nature,—by saying of property, that 'only that is every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it,'—he opens up, at the close of the chapter, a new prospect by allowing a possibility to come out of so evil a condition. The possibility consists partly in the passions that incline to peace—viz., fear of death, desire of things necessary to commodious living, and hope by industry to obtain them; partly in reason, which suggests convenient articles of peace and agreement, otherwise called the Laws of Nature.

The first and second Natural Laws, and the subject of contracts, take up Chap. XIV. First comes a definition of *Jus Naturale* or Right of Nature—the liberty each man has of using his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature or life. Liberty properly means the absence of external impediments; now a man may externally be hindered from doing all he would, but not from using what power is left him, according to his best reason and judgment. A Law of Nature, *lex naturalis*, is defined, a general rule,

found out by reason, forbidding a man to do what directly or indirectly is destructive of his life, or to omit what he thinks may best preserve it. Right and Law, though generally confounded, are exactly opposed, Right being liberty, and Law obligation.

In the natural state of war, every man, being governed by his own reason, has a right to everything, even to another's body. But because thus no man's life is secure, he finds the First and fundamental law of nature, or general rule of reason, to be to *seek peace and follow it, if possible*: failing which, we may defend ourselves by all the means we can. Here the law being 'to endeavour peace,' from this follows the Second law, that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and self-defence he shall think it necessary, to *lay down this right to all things*; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. This is the same as the Gospel precept, Do to others, &c.

Laying down one's right to anything is divesting one's self of the liberty of hindering another in the exercise of his own original right to the same. The right is *renounced*, when a man cares not for whose benefit; *transferred*, when intended to benefit some certain person or persons. In either case the man is *obliged* or *bound* not to hinder those, in whose favour the right is abandoned, from the benefit of it; it is his *duty* not to make void his own voluntary act, and if he does, it is *injustice* or *injury*, because he acts now *sine Jure*. Such conduct Hobbes likens to an intellectual absurdity or self-contradiction. Voluntary signs to be employed in abandoning a right, are words and actions, separately or together; but in all bonds, the strength comes not from their own nature, but from the fear of evil resulting from their rupture.

He concludes that not all rights are alienable, for the reason that the abandonment, being a voluntary act, must have for its object some good to the person that abandons his right. A man, for instance, cannot lay down the right to defend his life; to use words or other signs for that purpose, would be to despoil himself of the end—security of life and person—for which those signs were intended.

Contract is the mutual transferring of right, and with this idea he connects a great deal. First, he distinguishes^a transference of right to a thing, and^b transference of the thing itself. A contract fulfilled by one party, but left on trust to be fulfilled by the other, is called the *Covenant* of this other,

(a distinction he afterwards drops), and leaves room for the keeping or violation of faith. To contract he opposes *gift*, *free-gift*, or *grace*, where there is no mutual transference of right, but one party transfers in the hope of gaining friendship or service from another, or the reputation of charity and magnanimity, or deliverance from the merited pain of compassion, or reward in heaven.

There follow remarks on signs of contract, as either express or by inference, and a distinction between free-gift as made by words of the present or past, and contract as made by words past, present, or future; wherefore, in contracts like buying and selling, a promise amounts to a covenant, and is obligatory.

The idea of *Merit* is thus explained. Of two contracting parties, the one that has first performed merits what he is to receive by the other's performance, or has it as *due*. Even the person that wins a prize, offered by free-gift to many, merits it. But, whereas, in contract, I merit by virtue of my own power and the other contractor's need, in the case of the gift, I merit only by the benignity of the giver, and to the extent that, when he has given it, it shall be mine rather than another's. This distinction he believes to coincide with the scholastic separation of *meritum condigni* and *meritum condigni*.

He adds many remarks in regard to covenants made on mutual trust. They are void in the state of nature, upon any reasonable suspicion; but when there is a common power to compel observance, and thus no more room for fear, they are valid. Even when fear makes them invalid it must have arisen after they were made, else it should have kept them from being made. Transference of a right implies transference, as far as may be, of the means to its enjoyment. With beasts there is no covenant, because no proper mutual understanding. With God also none, except through special revelation or with his lieutenant in his name. Anything vowed contrary to the law of nature is vowed in vain; if the thing vowed is commanded by the law of nature, the law, not the vow, binds. Covenants are of things possible and future. Men are freed from them by performance, or forgiveness, which is restitution of liberty. He pronounces covenants extorted by fear to be binding alike in the state of mere nature and in commonwealths, if once entered into. A former covenant makes void a later. Any covenant not to defend one's self from force by force is always void; as said above, there is no transference possible of right to

defend one's self from death, wounds, imprisonment, &c. So no man is obliged to accuse himself, or generally to give testimony where from the nature of the case it may be presumed to be corrupted. Accusation upon torture is not to be reputed as testimony. At the close he remarks upon oaths. He finds in human nature two imaginable helps to strengthen the force of words, otherwise too weak to insure the performance of covenants. One of these—*pride* in appearing not to need to break one's word, he supposes too rare to be presumed upon. The other, *fear*, has reference either to power of spirits invisible, or of men. In the state of nature, it is the first kind of fear—a man's religion—that keeps him to his promises. An oath is therefore swearing to perform by the God a man fears. But to the obligation itself it adds nothing.

Of the other Laws of Nature, treated in Chap. XV., the third, *that men perform their covenants made*, opens up the discussion of *Justice*. Till rights have been transferred and covenants made there is no justice or injustice; injustice is no other than the non-performance of covenants. Further, justice (and also property) begins only where a regular coercive power is constituted, because otherwise there is cause for fear, and fear, as has been seen, makes covenants invalid. Even the scholastic definition of justice recognizes as much; for there can be no constant will of giving to every man his own, when, as in the state of nature, there is no *own*. He argues at length against the idea that justice, *i.e.*, the keeping of covenants, is contrary to reason; repelling three different arguments. (1) He demonstrates that it cannot be reasonable to break or keep covenants according to *benefit supposed to be* gained in each case, because this would be a subversion of the principles whereon society is founded, and must end by depriving the individual of its benefits, whereby he would be left perfectly helpless. (2) He considers it frivolous to talk of securing the happiness of heaven by any kind of injustice, when there is but one possible way of attaining it, *viz.*, the keeping of covenants. (3) He warns men (he means his contemporaries) against resorting to the mode of injustice known as rebellion to gain sovereignty, from the hopelessness of gaining it and the uncertainty of keeping it. Hence he concludes that justice is a rule of reason, the keeping of covenants being the surest way to preserve our life, and therefore a law of nature. He rejects the notion that laws of nature are to be supposed conducive, not to the preservation of life on earth, but to the attainment of eternal felicity; whereto

such breach of covenant as rebellion may sometimes be supposed a means. For that, the knowledge of the future life is too uncertain. Finally, he consistently holds that faith is to be kept with heretics and with all that it has once been pledged to.

He goes on to distinguish between justice of men or manners, and justice of actions; whereby in the one case men are *just* or *righteous*, and in the other, *guiltless*. After making the common observation that single inconsistent acts do not destroy a character for justice or injustice, he has this: 'That which gives to human actions the relish of justice, is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life to fraud, or breach of promise.' Then he shows the difference between injustice, injury, and damage; asserts that nothing done to a man with his consent can be injury; and, rejecting the common mode of distinguishing between *commutative* and *distributive* justice, calls the first the justice of a contractor, and the other an improper name for just distribution, or the justice of an arbitrator, *i.e.*, the act of defining what is just—equivalent to equity, which is itself a law of nature.

The rest of the laws follow in swift succession. The 4th recommends *Gratitude*, which depends on antecedent *grace* for instead of covenant. Free-gift being voluntary, *i.e.*, done with intention of good to one's self, there will be an end to benevolence and mutual help, unless gratitude is given as compensation.

The 5th enjoins *Complaisance*; a disposition in men not to seek superfluities that to others are necessaries. Such men are *sociable*.

The 6th enjoins *Pardon* upon repentance, with a view (like the last) to peace.

The 7th enjoins that punishment is to be only for correction of the offender and direction of others; *i.e.*, for profit and example, not for 'glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end.' Against *Cruelty*.

The 8th is against *Contumely*, as provocative of dispeace.

The 9th is against *Pride*, and enjoins the acknowledgment of the equality of all men by nature. He is here very sarcastic against Aristotle, and asserts, in opposition to him, that all inequality of men arises from consent.

The 10th is, in like manner, against *Arrogance*, and in favour of *Modesty*. Men, in entering into peace, are to reserve no rights but such as they are willing shall be reserved by others.

The 11th enjoins *Equity*; the disposition, in a man trusted to judge, to distribute equally to each man what in reason belongs to him. Partiality 'deters men from the use of judges and arbitrators,' and is a cause of war.

The 12th enjoins the common, or the proportionable, use of things that cannot be distributed.

The 13th enjoins the resort to *lot*, when separate or common enjoyment is not possible; the 14th provides also for *natural lot*, meaning first possession or primogeniture.

The 15th demands safe conduct for mediators.

The 16th requires that parties at controversy shall submit their right to *arbitration*.

The 17th forbids a man to be his own judge; the 18th, any interested person to be judge.

The 19th requires a resort to witnesses in a matter of fact, as between two contending parties.

This list of the laws of nature is only slightly varied in the other works. He enumerates none but those that concern the doctrine of Civil Society, passing over things like Intemperance, that are also forbidden by the law of nature because destructive of particular men. All the laws are summed up in the one expression: Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself.

The laws of nature he regards as always binding in *foro interno*, to the extent of its being desired they should take place; but in *foro externo*, only when there is security. As binding in *foro interno*, they can be broken even by an act according with them, if the purpose of it was against them. They are immutable and eternal; 'injustice, ingratitude, &c., can never be made lawful,' for war cannot preserve life, nor peace destroy it. Their fulfilment is easy, as requiring only an unfeigned and constant endeavour.

Of these laws the science is true moral philosophy, i.e., the science of good and evil in the society of mankind. Good and evil vary much from man to man, and even in the same man; but while private appetite is the measure of good and evil in the condition of nature, all allow that peace is good, and that justice, gratitude, &c., as the way or means to peace, are also good, that is to say, *moral virtues*. The true moral philosophy, in regarding them as laws of nature, places their goodness in their being the means of peaceable, comfortable, and sociable living; not, as is commonly done, in a mediocrity of passions, 'as if not the cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude.'

His last remark is, that these dictates of reason are improperly called laws, because 'law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others.' But when considered not as mere conclusions or theorems concerning the means of conservation and defence, but as delivered in the word of God, that by right commands all, then they are properly called laws.

Chapter XVI., closing the whole first part of the *Leviathan*, is of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated. The definitions and distinctions contained in it add nothing of direct ethical importance to the foregoing, though needed for the discussion of 'Commonwealth,' to which he passes. The chief points under this second great head are taken into the summary.

The views of Hobbes can be only inadequately summarized.

I.—The Standard, to men living in society, is the Law of the State. This is Self-interest or individual Utility, masked as regard for Established Order; for, as he holds, under any kind of government there is more Security and Commodity of life than in the State of Nature. In the Natural Condition, Self-interest, of course, is the Standard; but not without responsibility to God, in case it is not sought, as far as other men will allow, by the practice of the dictates of Reason or Laws of Nature.

II.—His Psychology of Ethics is to be studied in the detail. Whether in the natural or in the social-state, the Moral Faculty, to correspond with the Standard, is the general power of Reason, comprehending the aims of the Individual or Society, and attending to the laws of Nature or the laws of the State, in the one case or in the other respectively.

On the question of the Will, his views have been given at length.

Disinterested Sentiment is, in origin, self-regarding; for, pitying others, we imagine the like calamity befalling ourselves. In one place, he seems to say, that the Sentiment of Power is also involved. It is the great defect of his system that he takes so little account of the Social affections, whether natural or acquired.

III.—His Theory of Happiness, or the *Summum Bonum*, would follow from his analysis of the Feelings and Will. But Felicity being a continual progress in desire, and consisting less in present enjoyment than in assuring the way of future desire, the chief element in it is the Sense of Power.

IV.—A Moral Code is minutely detailed under the name of

19 Laws of Nature, in force in the Natural State under Divine Sanction. It inculcates all the common virtues, and makes little or no departure from the usually received maxims.

V.—The relation of Ethics to Politics is the closest imaginable. Not even Society, as commonly understood, but only the established civil authority, is the source of rules of conduct. In the *civil* (which to Hobbes is the only meaning of the *social*) state, the laws of nature are superseded, by being supposed ~~taken up into~~ the laws of the Sovereign Power.

90 VI.—As regards Religion, he affirms the coincidence of his reasoned deduction of the laws of Nature with the precepts of Revelation. He makes a mild use of the sanctions of a Future Life to enforce the laws of Nature, and to give additional support to the commands of the sovereign that take the place of these in the social state.

Among the numberless replies, called forth by the bold speculations of Hobbes, were some works of independent ethical importance; in particular, the treatises of Cumberland, Cudworth, and Clarke. Cumberland stands by himself; Cudworth and Clarke, agreeing in some respects, are commonly called the *Rational* moralists, along with Wollaston and Price (who fall to be noticed later).

the laws of philosophy in his treatise
RICHARD CUMBERLAND. [1632-1718.]

Cumberland's Latin work, *De Legibus Naturæ disquisitio philosophica contra Hobbium instituta*, appeared in 1672. The book is important as a distinctly philosophical disquisition, but its extraordinarily discursive character renders impossible anything like analysis. His chief points will be presented in a fuller summary than usual.

11 L.—The STANDARD of Moral Good is given in the laws of Nature, which may all be summed up in one great Law—*Benevolence to all rational agents*, or the endeavour to the utmost of our power to promote the common good of all. His theory is hardly to be distinguished from the Greatest Happiness principle; unless it might be represented as putting forward still more prominently the search for Individual Happiness, with a fixed assumption that this is best secured through the promotion of the general good. No action, he declares, can be called 'morally good that does not in its own nature contribute somewhat to the happiness of men.' The speciality of his view is his professing not to make an induction as regards the character of actions from the observation of their effects, but to deduce the propriety of (benevolent) actions

from the consideration of the character and position of rational agents in nature. Rules of conduct, all directed to the promotion of the Happiness of rational agents, may thus be found in the form of propositions impressed upon the mind by the Nature of Things; and these are then interpreted to be laws of Nature (summed up in the one great Law), promulgated by God with the natural effects of actions as Sanctions of Reward and Punishment to enforce them.

II.—His Psychology of Ethics may be reduced to the following heads.

1. The Faculty is the Reason, ^{not Sentiment} apprehending the exact Nature of Things, and determining accordingly the modes of action that are best suited to promote the happiness of rational agents.

2. Of the Faculty, under the name of *Conscience*, he gives this description: 'The mind is conscious to itself of all its own actions, and both can, and often does, observe what counsels produced them; it naturally sits a judge upon its own actions, and thence procures to itself either tranquillity and joy, or anxiety and sorrow.' The principal design of his whole book is to show 'how this power of the mind, either by itself, or excited by external objects, forms certain universal practical propositions, which give us a more distinct idea of the happiness of mankind, and pronounces by what actions of ours, in all variety of circumstances, that happiness may most effectually be obtained.' [Conscience is thus only Reason, or the knowing faculty in general, as specially concerned about actions in their effect upon happiness; it rarely takes the place of the more general term.] very
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3. He expressly leaves aside the supposition that we have *innate ideas* of the laws of Nature whereby conduct is to be guided, or of the matters that they are conversant about. He has not, he says, been so happy as to learn the laws of Nature by so short a way, and thinks it ill-advised to build the doctrine of natural religion and morality upon a hypothesis that has been rejected by the generality of philosophers, as well heathen as Christian, and can never be proved against the Epicureans, with whom lies his chief controversy. Yet he declines to oppose the doctrine of innate ideas, because it looks with a friendly eye upon piety and morality; and perhaps it may be the case, that such ideas are *both* born with us and afterwards impressed upon us from without.

4. Will, he defines as 'the consent of the mind with the judgment of the understanding, concerning things agreeing

among themselves.' Although, therefore, he supposes that nothing but Good and Evil can determiné the will, and that the will is even necessarily determined to seek the one and flee the other, he escapes the conclusion that the will is moved only by private good, by accepting the implication of private with common good as the fixed judgment of the understanding or right reason.

Resolution. He argues against the resolution of all Benevolence into self-seeking, and thus claims for man a principle of disinterested action. But what he is far more concerned to prove is, that benevolence of all to all accords best with the whole frame of nature, stands forth with perfect evidence, upon a rational apprehension of the universe, as the great Law of Nature, and is the most effectual means of promoting the happiness of individuals, viz., through the happiness of all.

Conclusion. III.—Happiness is given as connected with the most full and constant exercise of all our powers, about the best and greatest objects and effects that are adequate and proportional to them; as consisting in the enlargement or perfection of the faculties of any one thing or several. Here, and in his protest against Hobbes's taking affection and desire, instead of Reason, as the measure of the goodness of things, may be seen in what way he passes from the conception of Individual, to the notion of Common Good, as the end of action. Reason affirms the common good to be more essentially connected with the perfection of man than any pursuit of private advantage. Still there is no disposition in him to sacrifice private to the common good: he declares that no man is called on to promote the common good beyond his ability, and attaches no meaning to the general good beyond the special good of all the particular rational agents in their respective places, from God (to whom he ventures to ascribe a Tranquillity, Joy, or Complacency) downwards. The happiness of men he considers as *Internal*, arising immediately from the vigorous exercise of the faculties about their proper and noblest objects; and *External*, the mediate advantages procurable from God and men by a course of benevolent action.

IV.—His Moral Code is arrived at by a somewhat elaborate deduction from the great Law of Nature enjoining Benevolence or Promotion of the Common Good of all rational beings.

This Common Good comprehends the Honour of God, and the Good or Happiness of Men, as Nations, Families, and Individuals.

The actions that promote this Common Good, are Acts

either of the understanding, or of the will and affections, or of the body as determined by the will. From this he finds that *Prudence* (including Constancy of Mind and Moderation) is enjoined in the Understanding, and, in the Will, *Universal Benevolence* (making, with Prudence, *Equity*), *Government of the Passions*, and the Special Laws of Nature—*Innocence, Self-denial, Gratitude, &c.*

This he gets from the consideration of what is contained in the general Law of Nature. But the obligation to the various moral virtues does not appear, until he has shown that the Law of Nature, for procuring the Common Happiness of all, suggests a natural law of *Universal Justice*, commanding to make and preserve a *division of Rights, i.e.,* giving to particular persons Property or Dominion over things, and persons necessary to their Happiness. There are thus ¹*Rights of God* (to Honour, Glory, &c.) and *Rights of Men* (to have those advantages continued to them whereby they may preserve and perfect themselves, and be useful to all others).

For the same reason that *Rights* of particular persons are fixed and preserved, viz., that the common good of all should be promoted by every one,—two *Obligations* are laid upon all.

(1) Of *GIVING*: We are to contribute to others such a share of the things committed to our trust, as may not destroy the part that is necessary to our own happiness. Hence are obligatory the virtues (a) in regard to Gifts, *Liberality, Generosity, Compassion, &c.*; (b) in regard to Common Conversation or Intercourse, *Gravity and Courtousness, Veracity, Faith, Urbanity, &c.*

(2) Of *RECEIVING*: We are to reserve to ourselves such use of our own, as may be most advantageous to, or at least consistent with, the good of others. Hence the obligation of the virtues pertaining to the various branches of a limited Self-Love, (a) with regard to our *essential parts*, viz., Mind and Body—*Temperance* in the natural desires concerned in the preservation of the individual and the species; (b) with regard to *goods of fortune*—*Modesty, Humility, and Magnanimity.*

V.—He connects Politics with Ethics, by finding, in the establishment of civil government, a more effectual means of promoting the common happiness according to the Law of Nature, than in any equal division of things. But the Law of Nature, he declares, being before the civil laws, and containing the ground of their obligation, can never be superseded

by these. Practically, however, the difference between him and Hobbes comes to very little; he recognizes no kind of earthly check upon the action of the civil power.

VI.—With reference to Religion, he professes to abstain entirely from theological questions, and does abstain from mixing up the doctrines of Revelation. But he attaches a distinctly divine authority to his moral rules, and supplements earthly by supernatural sanctions.

RALPH CUDWORTH. [1617-88.]

Cudworth's *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, did not appear until 1731, more than forty years after his death. Having in a former work ('Intellectual system of the Universe') contended against the 'Atheistical Fate' of Epicurus and others, he here attacks the 'Theologick Fate' (the arbitrarily omnipotent Deity) of Hobbes, charging him with reviving exploded opinions of Protagoras and the ancient Greeks, that take away the essential and eternal discrimination of moral good and evil, of just and unjust.

After piling up, out of the store of his classical and scholastic erudition, a great mass of testimony regarding all who had ever founded distinctions of Right and Wrong upon mere arbitrary disposition, whether of God or the State of men in general, he shadows forth his own view. Moral Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honest and Dishonest (if they be not mere names without any signification, or names for nothing else but *Willed* or *Commanded*, but have a reality in respect of the persons obliged to do and to avoid them), cannot possibly be arbitrary things, made by Will without nature; because it is universally true that Things are what they are not by Will, but by nature. As it is the nature of a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles, so it is the nature of 'good things' to have the nature of goodness, and things just the nature of justice; and Omnipotence is no more able to make a thing good without the fixed nature of goodness, than to make a triangular body without the properties of a triangle, or two things like or equal, without the natures of Likeness and Equality. The Will of God is the supreme *efficient* cause of all things, but not the *formal* cause of anything besides itself. Nor is this to be understood as at all derogating from God's perfection; to make natural justice and right independent of his will is merely to set his Wisdom, which is a rule or measure, above his Will, which is something indeterminate, but essentially regulable and measureable; and if it be the

case that above even his wisdom, and determining it in turn, stands his Infinite Goodness, the greatest perfection of his will must lie in its being thus twice determined.

By far the largest part of Cudworth's treatise consists of a general metaphysical argument to establish the independence of the mind's faculty of Knowledge, with reference to Sense and Experience. In Sense, according to the doctrine of the old 'Atomical philosophy' (of Democritus, Protagoras, &c.—but he thinks it must be referred back to Moses himself!), he sees nothing but *fancies* excited in us by local motions in the organs, taken on from 'the motion of particles' that constitute 'the whole world.' All the more, therefore, must there exist a superior power of Intellection and Knowledge of a different nature from sense, a power not terminating in mere seeming and appearance only, but in the reality of things, and reaching to the comprehension of what really and absolutely is; whose objects are the immutable and eternal essences and natures of things, and their unchangeable relations to one another. These *Rationes* or *Verities* of things are *intelligible* *things* only; are all comprehended in the eternal mind or intellect of *antel* the Deity, and from Him derived to our 'particular intellects.' They are neither arbitrary nor phantastical—neither alterable by Will nor changeable by Opinion.

Such eternal and immutable Verities, then, the moral distinctions of Good and Evil are, in the pauses of the general argument, declared to be. They, 'as they must have some certain natures which are the actions or souls of men,' are unalterable by Will or Opinion. 'Modifications of Mind and Intellect,' they are as much more real and substantial things than Hard, Soft, Hot, and Cold, modifications of mere senseless matter—and even so, on the principles of the atomical philosophy, dependent on the soul for their existence—as Mind itself stands prior in the order of nature to Matter. In the mind they are as 'anticipations of morality' springing up, not indeed 'from certain rules or propositions arbitrarily printed on the soul as on a book,' but from some more inward and vital Principle in intellectual beings, as such whereby these have within themselves a natural determination to do some things and to avoid others. *Propositions proved*

The only other ethical determinations made by Cudworth may thus be summarized:—Things called *naturally* Good and Due are such as the *intellectual nature* obliges to immediately, absolutely, and perpetually, and upon no condition of any voluntary action done or omitted intervening.

tively Good and Due are such as are in themselves indifferent, but the intellectual nature obliges to them accidentally or hypothetically, upon condition, in the case of a command, of some voluntary act of another person invested with lawful authority, or of one's self, in the case of a specific promise. In a positive command (as of the civil ruler), what *obliges* is only the intellectual nature of him that is commanded, in that he recognizes the lawful authority of him that commands, and so far determines and modifies his general duty of obedience as to do an action immaterial in itself for the sake of the formality of yielding obedience to lawfully constituted authority. So, in like manner, a specific promise, in itself immaterial and not enjoined by natural justice, is to be kept for the sake of the formality of keeping faith, which *is* enjoined.

Cndworth's work, in which these are nearly all the ethical allusions, gives no scope for a summary under the various topics.

I.—Specially excluding any such *External Standard* of moral Good as the arbitrary Will, either of God or the Sovereign, he views it as a simple ultimate natural quality of actions or dispositions, as included among the verities of things, by the side of which the phenomena of Sense are unreal.

II.—The general Intellectual Faculty cognizes the moral verities, which it contains within itself and brings rather than finds.

III.—He does not touch upon Happiness; probably he would lean to asceticism. He sets up no moral code.

IV.—Obligation to the Positive Civil Laws in matters indifferent follows from the intellectual recognition of the established relation between ruler and subject.

V.—Morality is not dependent upon the Deity in any other sense than the whole frame of things is. 28-11-82.

SAMUEL CLARKE. [1675-1729.]

CLARKE put together his two series of Boyle Lectures (preached 1704 and 1705) as 'A Discourse, concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation,' in answer to Hobbes, Spinoza, &c. The burden of the ethical discussion falls under the head of the Obligations of Natural Religion, in the second series.

He enunciates this all-comprehensive proposition: 'The but essentially and eternally different Relations that different

Things bear one to another, and the same consequent Fitness or Unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another, with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself to choose to act only what is agreeable to Justice, Equity, Goodness, and Truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe—ought likewise constantly to determine the Wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public, in their respective stations. That is, these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures so to act; they cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation on them so to do; even separate from the consideration of these Rules being the positive Will or Command of God, and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension of any particular private and personal Advantage or Disadvantage, Reward or Punishment, either present or future, annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive appointment, to the practising or neglecting of these rules.' In the explication of this, nearly his whole system is contained.

His first concern is to impress the fact that there are necessary and eternal differences of all things, and implied or consequent relations (proportions or disproportions) existing amongst them; and to bring under this general head the special case of differences of Persons (e.g., God and Man, Man and Fellow-man), for the sake of the implication that to different persons there belong peculiar *Fitnesses* and *Unfitnesses* of circumstances; or, which is the same thing, that there arises necessarily amongst them a suitability or unsuitableness of certain manners of Behaviour. The counter-proposition that he contends against is, that 'the relations among persons depend upon *positive constitution* of some kind, instead of being founded unchangeably in the nature and reason of things.

Next he shows how, in the rational or intellectual recognition of naturally existent relations amongst things (he always means persons chiefly), there is contained an obligation. When God, in his Omniscience and absolute freedom from error, is found determining his Will always according to this eternal reason of things, it is very unreasonable and blameworthy in the intelligent creatures whom he has made so far like himself, not to govern their actions by the same eternal rule of Reason, but to suffer themselves to depart from it through negligent *misunderstanding* or wilful passion. Herein

lies obligation: a man *ought* to act according to the Law of Reason, because he can as little refrain from *assenting* to the reasonableness and fitness of guiding his actions by it, as refuse his assent to a geometrical demonstration when he understands the terms. The original obligation of all is the eternal Reason of Things; the sanction of Rewards and Punishments (though 'truly the most effectual means of keeping creatures in their duty') is only a secondary and additional obligation. Proof of his position he finds in men's judgment of their own actions, better still in their judgments of others' actions, best of all in their judgment of injuries inflicted on themselves. Nor does any objection hold from the ignorance of savages in matters of morality: they are equally ignorant of the plainest mathematical truths; the need of instruction does not take away the necessary difference of moral Good and Evil, any more than it takes away the necessary proportions of numbers.

He, then, instead of deducing all our several duties as he might, contents himself with mentioning the three great branches of them. (a) Duties in respect of *God*, consisting of sentiments and acts (Veneration, Love, Worship, &c.) called forth by the consideration of his attributes, and having a character of Fitness far beyond any that is visible in applying equal geometrical figures to one another. (b) Duties in respect of our *Fellow-creatures*: (1) Justice and Equity, the doing as we would be done by. Iniquity is the very same in Action, as Falsity or Contradiction in Theory; what makes the one *absurd* makes the other *unreasonable*; 'it would be impossible for men not to be as much (!) ashamed of *doing Iniquity*, as they are of *believing Contradictions*;' (2) *Universal Love or Benevolence*, the promoting the welfare or happiness of all, which is obligatory on various grounds: the Good being the fit and reasonable, the greatest Good is the *most* fit and reasonable; by this God's action is determined, and so ought ours; no Duty affords a more ample pleasure; besides having a 'certain natural affection' for those most closely connected with us, we desire to multiply affinities, which means to found society, for the sake of the more comfortable life that mutual good offices bring. [This is a very confused deduction of an obligation.]; (c) Duties in respect to our *Selves*, viz., *self-preservation, temperance, contentment, &c.*; for not being authors of our being, we have no just power or authority to take it away directly, or, by abuse of our faculties, indirectly.

After expatiating in a rhetorical strain on the eternal, universal, and absolutely unchangeable character of the law

of Nature or Right Reason, he specifies the sense wherein the eternal moral obligations are independent of the will of God himself; it comes to this, that, although God makes all things and the relations between them, nothing is holy and good because he commands it, but he commands it because it is holy and good. Finally, he expounds the relation of Reward and Punishment to the law of Nature; the obligation of it is before and distinct from these; but, while full of admiration for the Stoical idea of the self-sufficiency of virtue, he is constrained to add that 'men never will generally, and indeed 'tis not very reasonably to be expected they should, part with all the comforts of life, and even life itself, without any expectation of a future recompense.' The 'manifold absurdities' of Hobbes being first exposed, he accordingly returns, in pursuance of the theological argument of his Lectures, to show that the eternal moral obligations, founded on the natural differences of things, are at the same time the express will and command of God to all rational creatures, and must necessarily and certainly be attended with Rewards and Punishments in a future state.

The summary of Clarke's views might stand thus:—

I.—The STANDARD is a certain Fitness of action between persons, implicated in their nature as much as any fixed proportions between numbers or other relation among things. Except in such an expression as this, moral good admits of no kind of external reference.

II.—There is very little Psychology involved. The Faculty is the Reason; its action a case of mere intellectual apprehension. The element of Feeling is nearly excluded. Disinterested sentiment is so minor a point as to call forth only the passing allusion to 'a certain natural affection.'

III.—Happiness is not considered except in a vague reference to good public and private as involved with Fit and Unfit action.

IV.—His account of Duties is remarkable only for the consistency of his attempt to find parallels for each amongst intellectual relations. The climax intended in the assimilation of Injustice to Contradictions is a very anti-climax; if people were only '*as much*' ashamed of doing injustice as of believing contradictions, the moral order of the world would be poorly provided for.

V.—The relation of Ethics to Politics is hardly touched. Society is born of the desire to multiply affinities through mutual interchange of good offices.

VI.—His Ethical disquisition is only part of a Theological argument; and this helps to explain his assertion of the Independence as well as of the Insufficiency of Morality. The final outcome of the discussion is that Morality needs the support of Revelation. But, to get from this an argument for the truth of Revelation, it is necessary that morality should have an independent foundation in the nature of things, apart from any direct divine appointment.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON (1659-1724), author of the 'Religion of Nature Delineated,' is usually put into the same class of moralists with Clarke. With him, a *bad* action (whether of commission or omission) contains the denial of a true proposition. Truth can be denied by actions as well as by words. Thus, the violation of a contract is the denial by an action that the contract has been concluded. Robbing a traveller is the denial that what you take from him is his. An action that denies one or more true propositions cannot be good, and is necessarily bad. A *good* action is one whose omission would be bad or whose contrary is bad, in the above sense. An *indifferent* action is one that can be omitted or done without contradicting any truth. Reason, the judge of what is true and false, is the only faculty concerned; but, at the same time, Wollaston makes large reference to the subject of Happiness, finding it to consist in an excess of pleasures as compared with pains. He holds that his doctrine is in conformity with all the facts. It affirms a progressive morality, that keeps pace with and depends upon the progress of Science. It can explain *errors* in morals as distinct from vice. An error is the affirmation by an action of a false proposition, thought to be true; the action is bad, but the agent is innocent.

JOHN LOCKE. [1632-1704.]

Locke did not apply himself to the consecutive evolution of an Ethical theory; whence his views, although on the whole sufficiently unmistakable, are not always reconcilable with one another.

In Book I. of the 'Essay on the Understanding' he devotes himself to the refutation of Innate Ideas, whether Speculative or Practical. Chap. III. is on the alleged Innate Practical Principles, or rules of Right and Wrong. The objections urged against these Principles have scarcely been added to, and have never been answered. We shall endeavour to indicate the heads of the reasoning.

1. The Innate Practical Principles are for the most part not self-evident; they are, in this respect, not on an equal footing with the Speculative Principles whose innate origin is also disputed. They require reasoning and explanation in order to be understood. Many men are ignorant of them, while others assent to them slowly, if they do assent to them; all which is at variance with their being innate.

2. There is no Practical Principle universally received among mankind. All that can be said of Justice is that *most men* agree to recognize it. It is vain to allege of confederacies of thieves, that they keep faith with one another; for this keeping of faith is merely for their own convenience. We cannot call that a sense of Justice which merely binds a man to a certain number of his fellow-criminals, in order the more effectually to plunder and kill honest men. Instead of Justice, it is the essential condition of success in Injustice.

If it be said in reply, that these men tacitly assent in their minds to what their practice contradicts, Locke answers, first, that men's actions must be held as the best interpreters of their thoughts; and if many men's practices, and some men's open professions, have been opposed to these principles, we cannot conclude them to be Innate. Secondly, It is difficult for us to assent to Innate Practical Principles, ending only in contemplation. Such principles either influence our conduct, or they are nothing. There is no mistake as to the Innate principles of the desire of happiness, and aversion to misery; these do not stop short in tacit assent, but urge every man's conduct every hour of his life. If there were anything corresponding to these in the sense of Right and Wrong, we should have no dispute about them.

3. There is no Moral rule, that may not have a reason demanded for it; which ought not to be the case with any innate principle. That we should do as we would be done by, is the foundation of all morality, and yet, if proposed to any one for the first time, might not such an one, without absurdity, ask a reason why? But this would imply that there is some deeper principle for it to repose upon, capable of being assigned as its motive; that it is not ultimate, and therefore not innate. That men should observe compacts is a great and undeniable rule, yet, in this, a Christian would give as reason the command of God; a Hobbist would say that the public requires it, and would punish for disobeying it; and an old heathen philosopher would have urged that it was opposed to human virtue and perfection.

Bound up with this consideration, is the circumstance that moral rules differ among men, according to their views of happiness. The existence of God, and our obedience to him, are manifest in many ways, and are the true ground of morality, seeing that only God can call to account every offender; yet, from the union of virtue and public happiness, all men have recommended the practice of what is for their own obvious advantage. There is quite enough in this self-interest to cause moral rules to be enforced by men that care neither for the supreme Lawgiver, nor for the Hell ordained by him to punish transgressors.

After all, these great principles of morality are more commended than practised. As to Conscience checking us in these breaches, making them fewer than they would otherwise be, men may arrive at such a conscience, or self-restraining sentiment, in other ways than by an innate endowment. Some men may come to assent to moral rules from a knowledge of their value as means to ends. Others may take up the same view as a part of their education. However the persuasion is come by, it will serve as a conscience; which conscience is nothing else than our own opinion of the rectitude or pravity of our actions.

How could men with serenity and confidence transgress rules stamped upon their inmost soul? Look at the practices of nations civilized and uncivilized; at the robberies, murders, rapes of an army sacking a town; at the legalized usages of nations, the destruction of infants and of aged parents for personal convenience; cannibalism; the most monstrous forms of unchastity; the fashionable murder named Duelling. Where are the innate principles of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity, Chastity?

If we read History, and cast our glance over the world, we shall scarcely find any rule of Morality (excepting such as are necessary to hold society together, and these too with great limitations) but what is somewhere or other set aside, and an opposite established, by whole societies of men. Men may break a law without disowning it; but it is inconceivable that a whole nation should publicly reject and renounce what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knows to be a law. Whatever practical principle is innate, must be known to every one to be just and good. The generally allowed breach of any rule anywhere must be held to prove that it is not innate. If there be any rule having a fair claim to be imprinted by nature, it is the rule that Parents should preserve

and cherish their children. If such a principle be innate, it must be found regulating practice everywhere: or, at the lowest, it must be known and assented to. But it is very far from having been uniformly practised, even among enlightened nations. And as to its being an innate truth, known to all men, that also is untrue. Indeed, the terms of it are not intelligible without other knowledge. The statement, 'it is the duty of parents to preserve their children,' cannot be understood without a Law; a Law requires a Law-maker, and Reward or Punishment. And as punishment does not always follow in this life, nothing less than a recognition of Divine Law will suffice; in other words, there must be intuitions of God, Law, Obligation, Punishment, and a Future Life: every one of which may be, and is, deemed to be innate.

It is incredible that men, if all these things were stamped on their minds, could deliberately offend against them; still more, that rulers should silently connive at such transgressions.

4. The supporters of innate principles are unable to point out distinctly what they are.* Yet, if these were imprinted

* Locke examines the Innate Principles put forth by Lord Herbert in his book *De Veritate*, 1st, There is a supreme governor of the world; 2nd, Worship is due to him; 3rd, Virtue, joined with Piety, is the best Worship; 4th, Men must repent of their sins; 5th, There will be a future life of rewards and punishments. Locke admits these to be such truths as a rational creature, after due explanation given them, can hardly avoid attending to; but he will not allow them to be innate. For,

First, There are other propositions with as good a claim as these to be of the number imprinted by nature on the mind.

Secondly, The marks assigned are not found in all the propositions. Many men, and even whole nations, disbelieve some of them.

Then, as to the third principle,—virtue, joined with piety, is the best worship of God; he cannot see how it can be innate, seeing that it contains a name, virtue, of the greatest possible uncertainty of meaning. For, if virtue be taken, as commonly it is, to denote the actions accounted laudable in particular countries, then the proposition will be untrue. Or, if it is taken to mean accordance with God's will, it will then be true, but unmeaning; that God will be pleased with what he commands is an identical assertion, of no use to any one.

So the fourth proposition,—men must repent of their sins,—is open to the same remark. It is not possible that God should engrave on men's minds principles couched on such uncertain words as Virtue and Sin. Nay more, as a general word is nothing in itself, but only report as to particular facts, the knowledge of rules is a knowledge of a sufficient number of actions to determine the rule. [Innate principles are not compatible with Nominalism.]

According to Lord Herbert, the standard of virtue is the common notions in which all men agree. They are such as the following,—to avoid evil, to be temperate, in doubtful cases to choose the safer course, not to do to others what you would not wish done to yourself, to be grateful to

on the mind, there could be no more doubt about them than about the number of our fingers. We well know that, if men of different sects were to write out their respective lists, they would set down exactly such as suited their several schools or churches.

There is, Locke remarks, a ready, but not very material, answer to his objections, namely, that the innate principles may, by Education and Custom, be darkened and worn out of men's minds. But this takes away at once the argument from universal consent, and leaves nothing but what each party thinks should pass for universal consent, namely, their own private persuasion: a method whereby a set of men presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason, put aside the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind. Thus, notwithstanding the innate light, we are as much in the dark as if it did not exist; a rule that will warp any way is not to be distinguished amidst its contraries. If these rules are so liable to vary, through adventitious notions, we should find them clearest in children and in persons wholly illiterate. He grants that there are many opinions, received by men of different countries, educations, and tempers, and held as unquestionable first principles; but then the absurdity of some, and the mutual contradiction of others, make it impossible that they should be all true. Yet it will often happen that these men will sooner part with their lives, than suffer the truth of their opinions to be questioned.

We can see from our experience how the belief in principles grows up. Doctrines, with no better original than the superstition of a nurse, or the authority of an old woman, may in course of time, and by the concurrence of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of first truths in Religion and in Morality. Persons matured under those influences, and, looking into their own minds, find nothing anterior to the opinions taught them before they kept a record of themselves; they, therefore, without scruple, conclude that those propositions whose origin they cannot trace are the impress of God and nature upon their minds. Such a result is unavoidable in the circumstances of the bulk of mankind, who require some foundation of principles to rest upon, and have no

benefactors, &c. *Conscience* is what teaches us to carry out those principles in practice. It excites joy over good actions, and produces abhorrence and repentance for bad. Upon it, our repentance of mind and eternal welfare depend. (For an account of Lord Herbert's common notions, see Appendix B., Lord Herbert of Cherbury.)

means of obtaining them but on trust from others. *Custom is a greater power than Nature*, and, while we are yet young, seldom fails to make us worship as divine what she has innred us to; nor is it to be wondered at, that, when we come to mature life, and are engrossed with quite different matters, we are indisposed to sit down and examine all our received tenets, to find ourselves in the wrong, to run counter to the opinions of our country or party, and to be branded with such epithets as whimsical, sceptical, Atheist. It is inevitable that we should take up at first borrowed principles; and unless we have all the faculties and the means of searching into their foundations, we naturally go on to the end as we have begun.

In the following chapter (IV.), he argues the general question of Innate Ideas in the case of the Idea of God.

In Book II., Chap. XXL, Locke discusses the freedom of the will, with some allusions to the nature of happiness and the causes of wrong conduct. Happiness is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, misery the utmost pain; pleasure and pain define Good and Evil. In practice, we are chiefly occupied in getting rid of troubles; absent good does not much move us. All uneasiness being removed, a moderate portion of good contents us; and some few degrees of pleasure in a succession of ordinary enjoyments are enough to make happiness. [Epicurus, and others among the ancients, said as much.]

Men have wrong desires, and do wrong acts, but it is from wrong judgments. They never mistake a present pleasure or pain; they always act correctly upon that. They are the victims of deceitful appearances; they make wrong judgments in comparing present with future pains, such is the weakness of the mind's constitution in this department. Our wrong judgments proceed partly from ignorance and partly from inadvertence, and our preference of vice to virtue is accounted for by these wrong judgments.

Chap. XXVIII. discusses Moral Relations. Good and Evil are nothing but Pleasure and Pain, and what causes them. Moral Good or Evil is the conformity or unconformity of our voluntary actions to some Law, entailing upon us good or evil by the will and power of the Law-giver, to which good and evil we apply the names Reward and Punishment.

There are three sorts of Moral Rules: 1st, The Divine Law, whether promulgated by the Light of Nature or by Revelation, and enforced by rewards and punishments in a future life. This law, when ascertained, is the touchstone of

moral rectitude. 2nd, The Civil Law, or the Law of the State, supported by the penalties of the civil judge. 3rd, The Law of Opinion or Reputation. Even after resigning, to public authority, the disposal of the public force, men still retain the power of privately approving or disapproving actions, according to their views of virtue and vice. The being commended or dispraised by our fellows may thus be called the sanction of Reputation, a power often surpassing in efficacy both the other sanctions.

Morality is the reference of all actions to one or other of these three Laws. Instead of applying innate notions of good and evil, the mind, having been taught the several rules enjoined by these authorities, compares any given action with these rules, and pronounces accordingly. A rule is an aggregate of simple Ideas; so is an action; and the conformity required is the ordering of the action so that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those required by the law. Thus, all Moral Notions may be reduced to the simple ideas gained by the two leading sources—Sensation and Reflection. Murder is an aggregate of simple ideas, traceable in the detail to these sources.

The summary of Locke's views is as follows:—

I.—With reference to the Standard of Morality, we have these two great positions—

First, That the production of pleasure and pain to sentient beings is the ultimate foundation of moral good and evil.

Secondly, That morality is a system of Law, enacted by one or other of three different authorities.

II.—In the Psychology of Ethics, Locke, by implication, holds—

First, That there is no innate moral sentiment; that our moral ideas are the generalities of moral actions. That our faculties of moral discernment are—(1) those that discern the pleasures and pains of mankind; and (2), those that comprehend and interpret the laws of God, the Nation, and Public Opinion. And (3) he counts that the largest share in the formation of our Moral Sentiments is due to Education and Custom.

[We have seen his views on Free-will, p. 413.]

As regards the nature of Disinterested Action, he pronounces no definite opinion. He makes few attempts to analyze the emotional and active part of our nature.

III.—His *Summum Bonum* is stated generally as the procuring of Pleasure and the avoiding of Pain.

IV.—He has no peculiar views on the Moral Code, or on the enforcements of Morality.

V.—The connexion of Ethics with Politics is, in him, the assimilating of Morality to Law.

VI.—With reference to Theology, he considers that, by the exercise of the Reason, we may discover the existence and attributes of God, and our duties to him; his ascertained will is the highest moral rule, the true touchstone of Moral Rectitude.

JOSEPH BUTLER. [1692-1752.]

BUTLER'S Ethical System may be found—First, in a short Dissertation on Virtue, appended to the Analogy; secondly, and chiefly, in his first three Sermons, entitled 'Human Nature;' thirdly, in other Sermons, as (V.) on Compassion, and (XI.) on Benevolence. Various illustrations of Ethical doctrine are interspersed through the Analogy, as in Part I, Chap. 2, entitled 'the government of God by rewards and punishments.'

The Dissertation on Virtue is intended to vindicate, in man, the existence of a moral nature, apart from both Prudence and Benevolence.

A moral government supposes a moral nature in man, or a power of distinguishing right from wrong. All men and all systems agree as to the fact of moral perceptions.

As characteristics of these moral perceptions, it is to be noted—First, they refer to voluntary actions. Secondly, they are accompanied with the feelings of good or of ill desert, which good or ill desert is irrespective of the good of society. Thirdly, the perception of ill desert has regard to the capacities of the agent. Fourthly, Prudence, or regard to ourselves, is a fair subject of moral approbation, and imprudence of the contrary. Our own self-interest seems to require strengthening by other men's manifested pleasure and displeasure. Still, this position is by no means indisputable, and the author is willing to give up the words 'virtue' and 'vice,' as applicable to prudence and folly; and to contend merely that our moral faculty is not indifferent to this class of actions. Fifthly, Virtue is not wholly resolvable into Benevolence (that is, the general good, or Utility*). This is shown by the fact that

* In this respect, Butler differs from both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. With Shaftesbury, the main function of the moral sense is to smile approval on benevolent affections, by which an additional pleasure is thrown into the scale against the selfish affections. The superiority of the

our approbation is not in proportion to the amount of happiness flowing from an action [he means *immediately* flowing, which does not decide the question]. We disapprove of falsehood, injustice, and unprovoked violence, even although more happiness would result from them than from the contrary. Moreover, we are not always judges of the whole consequences of acting. Undoubtedly, however, benevolence is our duty, if there be no moral principle to oppose it.

The title 'Human Nature,' given to Butler's chief Ethical exposition, indicates that he does not take an *a priori* view of the foundations of Ethics, like Cudworth and Clarke, but makes them repose on the constitution of the human mind.

In Sermon first, he lays out the different parts of our Emotional and Active nature, including Benevolence, Self-love, Conscience. The recognition of these three as distinct, and mutually irresolvable, is the Psychological basis of his Ethics.*

The existence of pure or disinterested Benevolence is proved by such facts, as Friendship, Compassion, Parental and Filial affections, Benevolent impulses to mankind generally. But although the object of benevolence is the public good, and of self-love private good, yet the two ultimately coincide. [This questionable assertion must trammel any proof that the author can give of our possessing purely disinterested impulses.]

In a long note, he impugns the theory of Hobbes that Benevolent affection and its pleasures are merely a form of the love of Power. He maintains, and with reason, that the love of power manifests its consequences quite as much in cruelty as in benevolence.

The second argument, to show that Benevolence is a fact of our constitution, involves the greatest peculiarity of Butler's

'natural affections' thus depends on a double pleasure, their intrinsically pleasurable character, and the superadded pleasure of reflection. The tendency of Shaftesbury is here to make benevolence and virtue identical, and at the same time to impair the disinterested character of benevolence.

* With this view, we may compare the psychology of Shaftesbury, set forth in his 'Characteristics of Men, Manners, and Times.' The soul has two kinds of affections—(1) *Self-affection*, leading to the 'good of the private,' such as love of life, revenge, pleasure or aptitude towards nourishment and the means of generation, emulation or love of praise, indolence; and (2) *Natural affections*, leading to the good of the public. The natural or spontaneous predominance of benevolence is *goodness*; the subjection of the selfish by effort and training is *virtue*. Virtue consists generally in the proper exercise of the several affections.

Psychology, although he was not the first to announce it. The scheme of the human feelings comprehends, in addition to Benevolence and Self-Love, a number of passions and affections tending to the same ends as these (some to the good of our fellows, others to our own good); while in following them we are not conscious of seeking those ends, but some different ends. Such are our various Appetites and Passions. Thus, hunger promotes our private well-being, but in obeying its dictates we are not thinking of that object, but of the procuring of food. Curiosity promotes both public and private good, but its direct and immediate object is *knowledge*.

[This refined distinction appears first in Aquinas; there is in it a palpable confusion of ideas. If we regard the final impulse of hunger, it is not toward the food, but towards the appeasing of a pain and the gaining of a pleasure, which are certainly identical with self, being the definition of self in the last resort. We associate the food with the gratification of these demands, and hence food becomes an end to us—one of the *associated* or *intermediate* ends. So the desire of knowledge is the desire of the pleasure, or of the relief from pain, accruing from knowledge; while, as in the case of food, knowledge is to a great degree only an instrument, and therefore an intermediate and associated end. So the desire of esteem is the desire of a pleasure, or else of the instrument of pleasure.

In short, Butler tries, without effect, to evade the general principles of the will—our being moved exclusively by pleasure and pain. Abundant reference has been already made to the circumstances that modify in appearance, or in reality, the operation of this principle. The distinction between self-love and the particular appetites, passions, and affections, is mainly the distinction between a great aggregate of the reason (the total interests of our being) and the separate items that make it up.]

The distinction is intended to prepare the way for the setting forth of Conscience,* which is called a 'principle of

* Butler's definition of conscience, and his whole treatment of it, have created a great puzzle of classification, as to whether he is to be placed along with the upholders of a 'moral sense.' Shaftesbury is more explicit: 'No sooner does the eye open upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the Beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are *actions* viewed, no sooner the human affections discerned (and they are, most of them, as soon discerned as felt), than straight an inward eye distinguishes the *fair* and *shapely*, the *amiable* and *admirable*, apart from the *deformed*, the *foul*, the *odious*, or the

reflection in men, whereby they distinguish between, approve and disapprove, their own actions.' This principle has for its result the good of society; still, in following it, we are not conscious of aiming at the good of society. A father has an affection for his children; this is one thing. He has also a principle of reflection, that urges him with added force and with more steady persistency than any affection; which principle must therefore be different from mere affection.

Butler's analysis of the human feelings is thus: I.—Benevolence and Self-love. II.—The particular Appetites, Passions, and Affections, operating in the same direction as Benevolence and Self-love, but without intending it. III.—Conscience, of which the same is to be said.

His reply to the objection,—against our being made for Benevolence,—founded on our mischievous propensities, is, that in the same way there are tendencies mischievous to ourselves, and yet no one denies us the possession of self-love. He remarks farther that these evil tendencies are the abuse of such as are right; ungovernable passion, reckless pursuit of our own good, and not pure malevolence, are the causes of injustice and the other vices.

In short, we are made for pursuing both our own good and the good of others; but present gratifications and passing inclinations interfere alike with both objects.

Sermons II., III., are meant to establish, from our moral nature, the Supremacy of Conscience.

Our moral duties may be deduced from the scheme of our nature, which shows the design of the Deity. There may be some difficulties attending the deduction, owing to the want of uniformity in the human constitution. Still, the broad feelings of the mind, and the purpose of them, can no more be mistaken than the existence and the purpose of the eyes. It can be made quite apparent that the single principle called conscience is intended to rule all the rest.

But, as Conscience is only one part of our nature, there

despicable. 'In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense, are the objects of the affections, but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, and gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this *reflected sense*, there arises another kind of affection towards these affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike.' What this 'moral sense' approves is benevolence, and when its approval has been acted upon, by subjecting the selfish affections, 'virtue' is attained.

being two other parts, namely, (1) Benevolence and Self-love, and (2) the particular Appetites and Passions, why are they not all equally natural, and all equally to be followed?

This leads to an inquiry into the meanings of the word Nature.

First, Nature may mean any prompting whatever; anger and affection are equally natural, as being equally part of us.

Secondly, it may mean our strongest passion, what most frequently prevails with us and shows our individual characters. In this sense, vice may be natural.

But, thirdly, we may reclaim against those two meanings, and that on the authority both of the Apostle Paul and of the ancient sages, and declare that the proper meaning of following nature is following Conscience, or that superior principle in every man which bears testimony to its own supremacy. It is by this faculty, natural to a man, that he is a moral agent, a law to himself.

Men may act according to their strongest principle, and yet violate their nature, as when a man, urged by present gratification, incurs certain ruin. The violation of nature, in this instance, may be expressed as *disproportion*.

There is thus a difference in *kind* between passions; self-love is superior to temporary appetite.

Passion or Appetite means a tendency towards certain objects with no regard to any other objects. Reflection or Conscience steps in to protect the interests that these would lead us to sacrifice. Surely, therefore, this would be enough to constitute superiority. Any other passion taking the lead is a case of usurpation.

We can hardly form a notion of Conscience without this idea of superiority. Had it might, as it has right, it would govern the world.

Were there no such supremacy, all actions would be on an equal footing. Impiety, profaneness, and blasphemy would be as suitable as reverence; parricide would justify itself by the right of the strongest.

Hence human nature is made up of a number of propensities in union with this ruling principle; and as, in civil government, the constitution is infringed by strength prevailing over authority, so the nature of man is violated when the lower faculties triumph over conscience. Man has a rule of right within, if he will honestly attend to it. Out of this arrangement, also, springs Obligation; the law of conscience is the law of our nature. It carries its

authority with it; it is the guide assigned by the Author of our nature.

He then replies to the question, 'Why should we be concerned about anything out of or beyond ourselves?' Supposing we do possess in our nature a regard to the well-being of others, why may we not set that aside as being in our way to our own good.

The answer is, We cannot obtain our own good without having regard to others, and undergoing the restraints prescribed by morality. There is seldom any inconsistency between our duty and our interest. Self-love, in the present world, coincides with virtue. If there are any exceptions, all will be set right in the final distribution of things. Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way.

Such is a brief outline of the celebrated 'Three Sermons on Human Nature.' The radical defect of the whole scheme lies in its Psychological basis. Because we have, as mature human beings, in civilized society, a principle of action called Conscience, which we recognize as distinct from Self-love and Benevolence, as well as from the Appetites and Passions, Butler would make us believe that this is, from the first, a distinct principle of our nature. The proper reply is to analyze Conscience; showing at the same time, from its very great discrepancies in different minds, that it is a growth, or product, corresponding to the education and the circumstances of each, although of course involving the common elements of the mind.

In his Sermons on Compassion (V., VI.), he treats this as one of the Affections in his second group of the Feelings (Appetites, Passions, and Affections); vindicates its existence against Hobbes, who treated it as an indirect mode of self-regard; and shows its importance in human life, as an adjunct to Rational Benevolence and Conscience.

In discussing Benevolence (Sermon XII.) Butler's object is to show that it is not ultimately at variance with Self-love. In the introductory observations, he adverts to the historical fact, that vice and folly take different turns in different ages, and that the peculiarity of his own age is 'to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to self-interest' than formerly. He accommodates his preaching of virtue to this characteristic of his time, and promises that *there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite passion.*

His mode of arguing is still the same as in the sermons on

Human Nature. Self-love does not comprehend our whole being; it is only one principle among many. It is characterized by a *subjective* end, the *feeling* of happiness; but we have other ends of the *objective* kind, the ends of our appetites, passions, and affections—food, injury to another, good to another, &c. The total happiness of our being includes all our ends. Self-love attends only to one interest, and if we are too engrossed with that, we may sacrifice other interests, and narrow the sphere of our happiness. A certain disengagement of mind is necessary to enjoyment, and the intensity of pursuit interferes with this. [This is a true remark, but misapplied; external pursuit may be so intense as nearly to do away with subjective consciousness, and therefore with pleasure; but this applies more to *objective* ends,—wealth, the interest of others—than to self-love, which is in its nature subjective.]

Now, what applies to the Appetites and Affections applies to Benevolence; it is a distinct motive or urgency, and should have its scope like every other propensity, in order to happiness.

Such is his reasoning, grounded on his peculiar Psychology. He then adduces the ordinary arguments to show, that seeking the good of others is a positive gratification in itself, and fraught with pleasure in its consequences.

In summary, Butler's views stand thus:—

I.—His Standard of Right and Wrong is the subjective Faculty, called by him Reflection, or Conscience. He assumes such an amount of uniformity in human beings, in regard to this Faculty, as to settle all questions that arise.

II.—His Psychological scheme is the threefold division of the mind already brought out; Conscience being one division, and a distinct and primitive element of our constitution.

He has no Psychology of the Will; nor does he anywhere inquire into the problem of Liberty and Necessity.

He maintains the existence of Disinterested Benevolence, by saying that Disinterested action, as opposed to direct self-regard, is a much wider fact of our mental system, than the regard to the welfare of others. We have seen that this is a mere stroke of ingenuity, and owes its plausible appearance to his making our associated ends the primary ends of our being.

III.—With regard to the *Summum Bonum*, or the theory of Happiness, he holds that men cannot be happy by the pursuit of mere self; but must give way to their benevolent impulses as well, all under the guidance of conscience. In short,

virtue is happiness, even in this world; and, if there be any exception to the rule, it will be rectified in another world. This is in fact the Platonic view. Men are not to pursue happiness; that would be to fall into the narrow rut of self-love, and would be a failure; they are to pursue virtue, including the good of others, and the greatest happiness will ensue to each.

It is a remarkable indication of the spirit of Butler's age, or of his estimate of it, that he would never venture to require of any one a single act of uncompensated self-sacrifice.

IV.—The substance of the Moral Code of Butler is in no respect peculiar to him. He gives no classification of our duties. His means and inducements to virtue have just been remarked upon.

V.—The relationship of Ethics to Politics and to Theology needs no remark.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON. [1694-1747.]

Hutcheson's views are to be found in his 'Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,' his 'Treatise on the Passions,' and his posthumous work, 'A System of Moral Philosophy.' The last-mentioned, as the completest exposition of his Ethics, Speculative and Practical, is followed here.

There are three books; the first treating of Human Nature and Happiness; the second, of Laws of Nature and Duties, previous to Civil Government and other adventitious states; the third, of Civil Polity.

In Book I., Chap. I., Hutcheson states that the aim of Moral Philosophy is to point out the course of action that will best promote the highest happiness and perfection of men, by the light of human nature and to the exclusion of revelation; thus to indicate the rules of conduct that make up the Law of Nature. Happiness, the end of this art, being the state of the mind arising from its several grateful perceptions or modifications, the natural course of the inquiry is to consider the various human powers, perceptions, and actions, and then to compare them so as to find what really constitutes happiness, and how it may be attained. The principles that first display themselves in childhood are the external senses, with some small powers of spontaneous motion, introducing to the mind perceptions of pleasure and pain, which becoming forthwith the object of desire and aversion, are our first notions of natural good and evil. Next to Ideas of Sensation, we acquire Concomitant ideas of Sensation from

two or more senses together—number, extension, &c. Ideas of consciousness or reflection, which is another natural power of perception, complete the list of the materials of knowledge; to which, when the powers of judging and reasoning are added, all the main acts of the understanding are given. There are still, however, some finer perceptions, that may be left over until the will is disposed of.

Under the head of Will, he notes first the facts of Desire and Aversion, being new motions of the soul, distinct from, though arising out of, sensations, perceptions, and judgments. To these it is common to add Joy and Sorrow, arising in connexion with desire, though they partake more of sensations than of volitions. Acts of the will are *selfish* or *benevolent*, according as one's own good, or (as often really in fact happens) the good of others is pursued. Two *calm* natural determinations of the will are to be conceded; the one an invariable constant impulse towards one's own highest perfection and happiness; the other towards the universal happiness of others, when the whole system of beings is regarded without prejudice, and in the absence of the notion that their happiness interferes with our own. There are also *turbulent* passions and appetites, whose end is their simple gratification; whereupon the violence and uneasiness cease. Some are selfish—hunger, lust, power, fame; some benevolent—pity, gratitude, parental affection, &c.; others may be of either kind—anger, envy, &c. In none of them is there any reference in the mind to the greatest happiness of self or others; and that they stand so often in real opposition to the calm motions, is sufficient proof of their distinct character, *e.g.*, the opposition of lust and calm regard for one's highest interest.

In Chapter II., he takes up some finer powers of perception, and some other natural determinations of the will. Bonded up with seeing and hearing are certain other powers of perception or senses—Beauty, Imitation, Harmony, Design, summed up by Addison under the name of Imagination, and all natural sources of pleasure. The two grateful perceptions of Novelty and Grandeur may be added to the list of natural determinations or senses of pleasure. To attempt to reduce the natural sense of Beauty to the discernment of real or apparent usefulness is hopeless. The next sense of the soul noted is the Sympathetic, in its two Phases of Pity or Compassion and Congratulation. This is fellow-feeling on apprehending the state of others, and proneness to relieve, without any thought of our own advantage, as seen

in children. Pity is stronger than congratulation, because, whether for ourselves or others, the desire to repel evil is stronger than to pursue good. Sympathy extends to all the affections and passions; it greatly subserves the grand determination of the soul towards universal happiness.

Other finer senses have actions of men for their objects, there being a general determination of the soul to exercise all its active powers,—a universal impulse to action, bodily and intellectual. In all such action there is real pleasure, but the grand source of human happiness is the power of perceiving the *moral* notions of actions and characters. This, the *Moral Sense*, falls to be fully discussed later. Distinct from our moral sense is the *Sense of Honour or Shame*, when we are praised or condemned by others. The *Sense of Decency or Dignity*, when the mind perceives excellence of bodily and mental powers in ourselves or others, is also natural, and distinct from the moral sense. Some would allow a natural Sense of the Ridiculous in objects or events. There follow some remarks on the tendency to associate perceptions. In addition also to the natural propensity towards action, there is a tendency in repeated action to become Habit, whereby our powers are greatly increased. Habit and Customs can raise, however, no new ideas beyond the sentiments naturally excited by the original actions.

Sexual desire, wisely postponed by nature beyond the earliest years, does not, in man, end in mere sensual pleasure, but involves a natural liking of beauty as an indication of temper and manners, whereupon grow up esteem and love. Mankind have a universal desire of *offspring*, and love for their young; also an affection, though weaker, for all blood-relations. They have, further, a natural impulse to *society* with their fellows, as an immediate principle, and are not driven to associate only by indigence. All the other principles already mentioned, having little or no exercise in solitude, would bring them together, even without family ties. Patriotism and love of country are acquired in the midst of social order.

Natural Religion inevitably springs up in the best minds at sight of the benevolent order of the world, and is soon diffused among all. The principles now enumerated will be found, though in varying proportions, among all men not plainly monstrous by accident, &c.

Chapter III. treats of the Ultimate Determinations of the Will and Benevolent Affections. The question now is to find

some order and subordination among the powers that have been cited, and to discover the ultimate ends of action, about which there is no reasoning. He notices various systems that make each self-love the one leading principle of action, and specially the system that, allowing the existence of particular disinterested affections, puts the self-satisfaction felt in yielding to the generous sentiments above all other kinds of enjoyments. But, he asks, is there not also a *calm determination* towards the good of others, without reference to private interest of any kind? In the case of particular desires, which all necessarily involve an uneasy sensation until they are gratified, it is no proof of their being selfish that their gratification gives the joy of success and stops uneasiness. On the other hand, to desire the welfare of others in the interest of ourselves is not benevolence nor virtue. What we have to seek are benevolent affections terminating ultimately in the good of others, and constituted by nature (either alone, or mayhap corroborated by some views of interest) 'the immediate cause of moral approbation.' Now, anything to be had from men could not raise within us such affections, or make us careful about anything beyond external deportment. Nor could rewards from God, or the wish for self-approbation, create such affections, although, on the supposition of their existence, these may well help to foster them. It is benevolent *dispositions* that we morally approve; but dispositions are not to be raised by will. Moreover, they are often found where there has been least thought of cultivating them: and, sometimes, in the form of parental affection, gratitude, &c., they are followed so little for the sake of honour and reward, that though their absence is condemned, they are themselves hardly accounted virtuous at all. He then rebuts the idea that generous affections are selfish, because by *sympathy* we make the pleasures and pains of others our own. Sympathy is a real fact, but has regard only to the distress or suffering beheld or imagined in others, whereas generous affection is varied toward different characters. Sympathy can never explain the immediate ardour of our good-will towards the morally excellent character, or the eagerness of a dying man for the prosperity of his children and friends. Having thus accepted the existence of purely disinterested affections, and divided them as before into each and turbulent, he puts the question, Whether is the selfish or benevolent principle to yield in case of opposition? And although it appears that, as a fact, the universal happiness is preferred to the individual in the order

of the world by the Deity, this is nothing, unless by some determination of the soul we are made to comply with the Divine intentions. If by the desire of reward, it is selfishness still; if by the desire, following upon the sight, of moral excellence, then there must necessarily exist as its object some determination of the will involving supreme moral excellence, otherwise there will be no way of deciding between particular affections. This leads on to the consideration of the Moral Faculty.

Bnt, in the beginning of Chapter IV., he first rejects one by one these various accounts of the reason of our approbation of moral conduct:—pleasure by sympathy; pleasure through the moral sense; notion of advantage to the agent, or to the approver, and this direct or imagined; tendency to procure honour; conformity to law, to truth, fitness, congruity, &c.; also education, association, &c. He then asserts a natural and immediate determination in man to approve certain affections and actions consequent on them; or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our other senses, or by reasoning. It is a sense not dependent on bodily organs, but a settled determination of the soul. It is a sense, in like manner as, with every one of our powers—voice, designing, motion, reasoning, there is bound up a taste, sense, or relish, discerning and recommending their proper exercise; but superior to all these, because the power of moral action is superior. It can be trained like any other sense—hearing, harmony, &c.—so as to be brought to approve finer objects, for instance the general happiness rather than mere motions of pity. That it is meant to control and regulate all the other powers is matter of immediate consciousness; we must ever prefer moral good to the good apprehended by the other perceptive powers. For while every other good is lessened by the sacrifices made to gain it, moral good is thereby increased and relished the more. The *objects* of moral approbation are primarily affections of the will, but, all experience shows, only such as tend to the happiness of others, and the moral perfection of the mind possessing them. There are, however, many degrees of approbation; and, when we put aside qualities that approve themselves merely to the sense of decency or dignity, and also the calm desire of private good, which is indifferent, being neither virtuous nor vicious, the gradation of qualities morally approved may be given thus: (1) Dignified abilities (pursuit of sciences, &c.), showing a taste above sensuality

and selfishness. (2) Qualities immediately connected with virtuous affections—candour, veracity, fortitude, sense of honour. (3) The kind affections themselves, and the more as they are fixed rather than passionate, and extensive rather than narrow; highest of all in the form of universal good-will to all. (4) The disposition to desire and love moral excellence, whether observed in ourselves or others—in short, true piety towards God. He goes on to give a similar scale of moral turpitude. Again, putting aside the indifferent qualities, and also those that merely make people despicable and prove them insensible, he cites—(1) the gratification of a narrow kind of affection when the public good might have been served. (2) Acts detrimental to the public, done under fear of personal ill, or great temptation. (3) Sudden angry passions (especially when grown into habits) causing injury. (4) Injury caused by selfish and sensual passions. (5) Deliberate injury springing from calm selfishness. (6) Impiety towards the Deity, as known to be good. The worst conceivable disposition, a fixed, unprovoked original malice, is hardly found among men. In the end of the chapter, he re-asserts the supremacy of the moral faculty, and of the principle of pure benevolence that it involves. The inconsistency of the principles of self-love and benevolence when it arises, is reduced in favour of the second by the intervention of the moral sense, which does not hold out future rewards and pleasures of self-approbation, but decides for the generous part by ‘an immediate undefinable perception.’ So at least, if human nature were properly cultivated, although it is true that in common life men are wont to follow their particular affections, generous and selfish, without thought of extensive benevolence or calm self-love; and it is found necessary to counterbalance the advantage that the selfish principles gain in early life, by propping up the moral faculty with considerations of the surest mode of attaining the highest private happiness, and with views of the moral administration of the world by the Deity.

But before passing to these subjects, he devotes Chapter V. to the confirmation of the doctrine of the Moral Sense, and first from the Sense of Honour. This, the grateful sensation when we are morally approved and praised, with the reverse when we are censured, he argues in his usual manner, involves no thought of private interest. However the facts may stand, it is always under the impression of actions being moral or immoral, that the sense of honour works. In

defence of the doctrine of a moral sense, against the argument from the varying morality of different nations, he says it would only prove the sense not uniform, as the palate is not uniform in all men. But the moral sense is really more uniform. For, in every nation, it is the benevolent actions and affections that are approved, and wherever there is an error of fact, it is the reason, not the moral sense, that is at fault. There are no cases of nations where moral approval is restricted to the pursuit of private interest. The chief causes of variety of moral approbation are three: (1) Different notions of happiness and the means of promoting it, whereby much that is peculiar in national customs, &c., is explained, without reflecting upon the moral sense. (2) The larger or more confined field on which men consider the tendencies of their actions—sect, party, country, &c. (3) Different opinions about the divine commands, which are allowed to over-ride the moral sense. The moral sense does not imply innate complex ideas of the several actions and their tendencies, which must be discovered by observation and reasoning; it is concerned only about inward affections and dispositions, of which the effects may be very various. In closing this part of his subject, he considers that all that is needed for the formation of morals, has been given, because from the moral faculty and benevolent affection all the special laws of nature can be deduced. But because the moral faculty and benevolence have difficulty in making way against the selfish principles so early rooted in man, it is needful to strengthen these foundations of morality by the consideration of the nature of the highest happiness.

With Chapter VI. accordingly he enters on the discussion of Happiness, forming the second half of his first book. The supreme happiness of any being is the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature desires or is capable of; but, in case of their being inconsistent, the constant gratification of the higher, intenser, and more durable pleasures is to be preferred.

In Chapter VII., he therefore directly compares the various kinds of enjoyment and misery, in order to know what of the first must be surrendered, and what of the second endured, in aiming at highest attainable happiness. Pleasures the same in kind are preferable, according as they are more intense and enduring; of a different kind, as they are more enduring and dignified, a fact decided at once by our immediate sense of dignity or worth. In the great diversity of tastes regarding pleasures, he supposes the ultimate decision

as to the value of pleasures to rest with the possessors of finer perceptive powers, but adds, that good men are the best judges, because possessed of fuller experience than the vicious, whose tastes, senses, and appetites have lost their natural vigour through one-sided indulgence. He then goes through the various pleasures, depreciating the pleasures of the palate on the positive side, and sexual pleasure as transitory and enslaving when pursued for itself; the sensual enjoyments are, notwithstanding, quite proper within due limits, and then, perhaps, are at their highest. The pleasures of the *imagination*, knowledge, &c., differ from the last in not being preceded by an uneasy sensation to be removed, and are clearly more dignified and endurable, being the proper exercise of the soul when it is not moved by the affections of social virtue, or the offices of rational piety. The *sympathetic* pleasures are very extensive, very intense, and may be of very long duration; they are superior to all the foregoing, if there is a hearty affection, and are at their height along with the feeling of universal good will. *Moral* Enjoyments, from the consciousness of good affections and actions, when by close reflexion we have attained just notions of virtue and merit, rank highest of all, as well in dignity as in duration. The pleasures of *honour*, when our conduct is approved, are also among the highest, and when, as commonly happens, they are conjoined with the last two classes, it is the height of human bliss. The pleasures of *mirth*, such as they are, fall in best with virtue, and so, too, the pleasures of *wealth* and *power*, in themselves unsatisfying. Anger, malice, revenge, &c., are not without their uses, and give momentary pleasure as removing an uneasiness from the subject of them; but they are not to be compared with the sympathetic feelings, because their effects cannot long be regarded with satisfaction. His general conclusion is, that as the highest personal satisfaction is had in the most benevolent dispositions, the same course of conduct is recommended alike by the two great determinations of our nature, towards our own good and the good of others. He then compares the several sorts of pain, which, he says, are not necessarily in the proportion of the corresponding pleasures. Allowing the great misery of bodily pain, he yet argues that, at the worst, it is not to be compared for a moment to the pain of the worst wrong-doing. The imagination, great as are its pleasures, cannot cause much pain. The sympathetic and moral pains of remorse and infamy are the worst of all.

In Chapter VIII. the various Tempers and Characters are compared in point of happiness or misery. Even the private affections, in due moderation, promote the general good; but that system is the best possible where, along with this, the generous affections also promote private good. No natural affection is absolutely evil; the evil of excess in narrow generous affection lies in the want of proportion; in calm extensive good-will there can be no excess. The social and moral enjoyments, and those of honour, being the highest, the affections and actions that procure them are the chief means of happiness; amid human mischances, however, they need support from a trust in Providence. The unkind affections and passions (anger, &c.) are uneasy even when innocent, and never were intended to become permanent dispositions. The narrow kind of affections are all that can be expected from the majority of men, and are very good, if only they are not the occasion of unjust partiality to some, or, worse, ill-grounded aversion to others. The rest of the chapter is taken up in painting the misery of the selfish passions when in excess—love of life, sensual pleasure, desire of power, glory, and ease. He has still one ‘object of affection to every rational mind’ that he must deal with before he is done with considering the question of highest happiness. This is the Deity, or the Mind that presides in the Universe.

Chapter IX., at great length, discusses the first part of the subject—the framing of primary ideas regarding the Divine Nature. He proves the existence of an original mind from design, &c., in the world; he then finds this mind to be benevolent, on occasion of which he has to deal with the great question of Evil, giving reasons for its existence, discovering its uses, narrowing its range as compared with good, and finally reducing it by the consideration and proof of immortality; he ends by setting forth the other attributes of God—providence, holiness, justice, &c.

In Chapter X., he considers the Affections, Duty, and Worship to be exercised towards God. The moral sense quite specially enjoins worship of the Deity, internal and external; internal by love and trust and gratitude, &c., external by prayer, praise, &c. [He seems to ascribe to prayer nothing beyond a subjective efficacy.] In the acknowledgment of God is highest happiness, and the highest exercise of the moral faculty.

In Chapter XI., he closes the whole book with remarks on the Supreme Happiness of our Nature, which he makes

to consist in the perfect exercise of the nobler virtues, especially love and resignation to God, and of all the inferior virtues consistent with the superior; also in external prosperity, so far as virtue allows. The moral sense, and the truest regard for our own interest, thus recommend the same course as the calm, generous determination; and this makes up the supreme cardinal virtue of Justice, which includes even our duties to God. Temperance in regard to sensual enjoyments, Fortitude as against evils, and Prudence, or Consideration, in regard to everything that solicits our desires, are the other virtues; all subservient to Justice. In no station of life are men shut out from the enjoyment of the supreme good.

Book II. is a deduction of the more special laws of nature and duties of life, so far as they follow from the course of life shown above to be recommended by God and nature as most lovely and most advantageous; all adventitious states or relations among men aside. The three first chapters are of a general nature.

In Chapter I., he reviews the circumstances that increase the moral good or evil of actions. Virtue being primarily an affair of the will or affections, there can be no imputation of virtue or vice in action, unless a man is free and able to act; the necessity and impossibility, as grounds of non-imputation, must, however, have been in no way brought about by the agent himself. In like manner, he considers what effects and consequents of his actions are imputable to the agent; remarking, by the way, that the want of a proper degree of good affections and of solicitude for the public good is morally evil. He then discusses the bearing of ignorance and error, vineible and invineible, and specially the case wherein an erroneous conscience extenuates. The difficulty of such cases, he says, is due to ambiguity, wherefore he distinguishes three meanings of Conscience that are found, (1) the moral faculty, (2) the judgment of the understanding about the springs and effects of actions, upon which the moral sense approves or condemns them, (3) our judgments concerning actions compared with the *law* (moral maxims, divine laws, &c.).

In Chapter II., he lays down general rules of judging about the morality of actions from the affections exciting to them or opposing them; and first as to the degree of virtue or vice when the ability varies; in other words, morality as dependent on the *strength* of the affections. Next, and at greater length, morality as dependent on the *kind* of the affections.

Here he attempts to fix, in the first place, the degree of benevolence, as opposed to private interest, that is necessary to render men virtuous, or even innocent, in accordance with his principle that there is implanted in us a very high standard of necessary goodness, requiring us to do a public benefit, when clear, however burdensome or hurtful the act may be to ourselves; in the second place, the proportion that should be kept between the narrower and the more extensive generous affections, where he does not forget to allow that, in general, a great part of human virtue must necessarily lie within the narrow range. Then he gives a number of special rules for appreciating conduct, advising, *for the very sake of the good to others that will result therefrom*, that men should foster their benevolence by the thought of the advantage accruing to themselves here and hereafter from their virtuous actions; and closes with the consideration of the cases wherein actions can be imputed to other than the agents.

In Chapter III., he enters into the general notion of Rights and Laws, and their divisions. From *right* use of such affection or actions as are approved by the moral faculty from their relation to the general good, or the good of particular persons consistently with the general good, he distinguishes the *right* of a man to do, possess, demand, &c., which exists when his doing, possessing, &c. tend to the good of society, or to his own, consistent with the rights of others and the general good, and when obstructing him would have the contrary tendency. He proceeds to argue, on utilitarian principles, that the rights that seem to attend every natural desire are perfectly valid when not against the public interest, but never valid when they are against it.

Chapter IV. contains a discussion upon the state of Nature, maintaining that it is not a state of anarchy or war, but full of rights and obligations. He points out that independent states in their relation to one another are subject to no common authority, and so are in a state of nature. Rights belong (1) to individuals, (2) to societies, (3) to mankind at large. They are also natural, or adventitious, and again perfect or imperfect.

Chapter V. Natural rights are antecedent to society, such as the right to life, to liberty, to private judgment, to marriage, &c. They are of two kinds—perfect and imperfect.

Chapter VI. Adventitious rights are divided into Real and Personal (a distinction chiefly of legal value.) He also examines into the nature and foundation of private property.

Chapter VII. treats of the Acquisition of property, Hutcheson, as is usual with moralists, taking the *occupatio* of the Roman Law as a basis of ownership. Property involves the right of (1) use, (2) exclusive use, (3) alienation.

Chapter VIII. Rights drawn from property are such as mortgages, servitudes, &c., being rights of what may be called partial or imperfect ownership.

Chapter IX. discusses the subject of contracts, with the general conditions required for a valid contract.

Chapter X. Of Veracity. Like most writers on morals, Hutcheson breaks in upon the strict rule of veracity by various necessary, but ill-defined, exceptions. Expressions of courtesy and etiquette are exempted, so also artifices in war, answers extorted by unjust violence, and some cases of peculiar necessity, as when a man tells a lie to save thousands of lives.

Chapter XI. Oaths and Vows.

Chapter XII. belongs rather to Political Economy. Its subject is the values of goods in commerce, and the nature of coin.

Chapter XIII. enumerates the various classes of contracts, following the Roman Law, taking up *Mandatum*, *Depositum*, Letting to Hire, Sale, &c.

Chapter XIV. adds the Roman *quasi-contracts*.

Chapter XV. Rights arising from injuries or wrongs (*torts*). He condemns duelling, but admits that, where it is established, a man may, in some cases, be justified in sending or accepting a challenge.

Chapter XVI. Rights belonging to society as against the individual. The perfect rights of society are such as the following:—(1) To prevent suicide; (2) To require the producing and rearing of off-spring, at least so far as to tax and discourage bachelors; (3) To compel men, though not without compensation, to divulge useful inventions; (4) To compel to some industry, &c.

Chapter XVII. takes up some cases where the ordinary rights of property or person are set aside by some overbearing necessity.

Chapter XVIII. The way of deciding controversies in a state of nature by arbitration.

Book III.—Civil Polity, embracing Domestic and Civil Rights.

Chapter I. *Marriage*. Hutcheson considers that Marriage should be a perpetual union upon equal terms, 'and not such a one wherein the one party stipulates to himself a right of

governing in all domestic affairs, and the other promises subjection.' He would allow divorce for adultery, desertion, or implacable enmity on either side. Upon defect of children, some sort of concubinage would be preferable to divorce, but leaving to the woman the option of divorce with compensation. He notices the misrepresentations regarding Plato's scheme of a community of wives; 'Never was there in any plan less provision made for sensual gratification.'

Chapter II. The Rights and Duties of Parents and Children.

Chapter III. The Rights and Duties of Masters and Servants.

Chapter IV. discusses the Motives to constitute Civil Government. If men were perfectly wise and upright, there would be no need for government. Man is naturally sociable and political (*ξῶον πολιτικόν*.)

Chapter V. shows that the natural method of constituting civil government is by consent or social compact.

Chapter VI. The Forms of Government, with their respective advantages and disadvantages.

Chapter VII. How far the Rights of Governors extend. Their lives are more sacred than the lives of private persons; but they may nevertheless be lawfully resisted, and, in certain cases, put to death.

Chapter VIII. The ways of acquiring supreme Power. That government has most divine right that is best adapted to the public good: a divine right of succession to civil offices is ridiculous.

Chapter IX. takes up the sphere of civil law. (1) To enforce the laws of nature; (2) To appoint the forms &c., of contracts and dispositions, with a view to prevent fraud; (3) To require men to follow the most prudent methods of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce; (4) To prescribe rules in matters morally indifferent, where uniformity is advantageous. Opinions should be tolerated; all except Atheism, and the denial of moral obligation.

Chapter X. The Laws of Peace and War, belonging now to the subject of International Law.

Chapter XI. (concluding the work) discusses some cases connected with the duration of the 'Politick Union.'

This bare indication of topics will suffice to give an idea of the working out of Hutcheson's system. For summary:—

I.—The Standard, according to Hutcheson, is identical with the Moral Faculty. It is the Sense of unique excellence in

certain affections and in the actions consequent upon them. The object of approval is, in the main, benevolence.

II.—His division of the feelings is into calm and turbulent, each of these being again divided into self-regarding and benevolent. He affirms the existence of pure Disinterestedness, a *calm* regard for the most extended well-being. There are also *turbulent* passions of a benevolent kind, whose end is their simple gratification. Hutcheson has thus a higher and lower grade of Benevolence; the higher would correspond to the disinterestedness that arises from the operation of *fixed ideas*, the lower to those affections that are generated in us by pleasing objects.

He has no discussion on the freedom of the will, contenting himself with mere voluntariness as an element in moral approbation or censure.

III.—The *Summum Bonum* is fully discussed. He places the pleasures of sympathy and moral goodness (also of piety) in the highest rank, the passive sensations in the lowest. Instead of making morality, like health, a neutral state (though an indispensable condition of happiness), he ascribes to it the highest positive gratification.

IV.—In proceeding upon Rights, instead of Duties, as a basis of classification, Hutcheson is following in the wake of the juriseonsults, rather than of the moralists. When he enters into the details of moral duties, he throws aside his 'moral sense,' and draws his rules, most of them from Roman Law, the rest chiefly from manifest convenience.

V. and VI.—Hutcheson's relation to Politics and Theology requires no comment.

BERNARD DE MANDEVILLE [1670-1733.]

MANDEVILLE was author of 'The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Public Benefits' (1714). This work is a satire upon artificial society, having for its chief aim to expose the hollowness of the so-called dignity of human nature. Dugald Stewart considered it a recommendation to any theory of the mind that it exalted our conceptions of human nature. Shaftesbury's views were entitled to this advantage; but, observes Mandeville, 'the ideas he had formed of the goodness and excellency of our nature, were as romantic and chimerical, as they are beautiful and amiable.' Mandeville examined not what human nature *ought to be*, but what it really is. In contrast, therefore, to the moralists that distinguish between a higher and a lower in our nature, attribut-

ing to the higher everything good and noble, while the lower ought to be persecuted and despised, Mandeville declares the fancied higher parts to be the region of vanity and imposture, while the renowned deeds of men, and the greatness of kingdoms, really arise from the passions usually reckoned base and sensual. As his views are scattered through numerous dissertations, it will be best to summarize them under a few heads.

1. *Virtue and Vice.* Morality is not natural to man; it is the invention of wise men, who have endeavoured to infuse the belief, that it is best for everybody to prefer the public interest to their own. As, however, they could bestow no *real* recompense for the thwarting of self-interest, they contrived an *imaginary* one—honour. Upon this they proceeded to divide men into two classes, the one abject and base, incapable of self-denial; the other noble, because they suppressed their passions, and acted for the public welfare. Man was thus won to virtue, not by force, but by flattery.

In regard to praiseworthiness, Shaftesbury, according to Mandeville, was the first to affirm that virtue could exist without self-denial. This was opposed to the prevailing opinion, and to the view taken up and criticised by Mandeville. His own belief was different. 'It is not in feeling the passions, or in being affected with the frailties of nature, that vice consists; but in indulging and obeying the call of them, contrary to the dictates of reason.'

2. *Self-love.* 'It is an admirable saying of a worthy divine, that though many discoveries have been made in the world of self-love, there is yet abundance of *terra incognita* left behind.' There is nothing so sincere upon earth as the love that creatures bear to themselves. 'Man centres everything in himself, and neither loves nor hates, but for his own sake.' Nay, more, we are naturally regardless of the effect of our conduct upon others; we have no innate love for our fellows. The highest virtue is not without reward; it has a satisfaction of its own, the pleasure of contemplating one's own worth. But is there no genuine self-denial? Mandeville answers by a distinction: mortifying one passion to gratify another is very common, but it is not self-denial; self-inflicted pain without any recompense—where is that to be found?

'Charity is that virtue by which part of that sincere love we have for ourselves is transferred pure and unmixed to others (not friends or relatives), whom we have no obligation to, nor hope or expect anything from.' The counterfeit of true charity is *pity* or *compassion*, which is a fellow-feeling for

the sufferings of others. Pity is as much a frailty of our nature as anger, pride, or fear. The weakest minds (*e.g.*, women and children) have generally the greatest share of it. It is excited through the eye or the ear; when the suffering does not strike our senses, the feeling is weak, and hardly more than an imitation of pity. Pity, since it seeks rather our own relief from a painful sight, than the good of others, must be curbed and controlled in order to produce any benefit to society.

Mandeville draws a nice distinction between self-love, and, what he calls, *self-liking*. 'To increase the care in creatures to preserve themselves, Nature has given them an instinct, by which every individual values itself above its real worth.' The more mettlesome and spirited animals (*e.g.*, horses) are endowed with this instinct. In us, it is accompanied with an apprehension that we do overvalue ourselves; hence our insensibility to the confirmatory good opinion of others. But if each were to display openly his own feeling of superiority, quarrels would inevitably arise. The grand discovery whereby the ill consequences of this passion are avoided is *politeness*. 'Good manners consists in flattering the pride of others, and concealing our own.' The first step is to conceal our good opinion of ourselves; the next is more impudent, namely, to pretend that we value others more highly than ourselves. But it takes a long time to come to that pitch; the Romans were almost masters of the world before they learned politeness.

3. *Pride, Vanity, Honour*. Pride is of great consequence in Mandeville's system. 'The moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride.' Man is naturally innocent, timid, and stupid; destitute of strong passions or appetites, he would remain in his primitive barbarism were it not for pride. Yet all moralists condemn pride, as a vain notion of our own superiority. It is a subtle passion, not easy to trace. It is often seen in the humility of the humble, and the shamelessness of the shameless. It simulates charity; 'pride and vanity have built more hospitals than all the virtues together.' It is the chief ingredient in the elasticity of women, and in the courage of men. Less cynical moralists than Mandeville have looked with suspicion on posthumous fame; 'so silly a creature is man, as that, intoxicated with the fumes of vanity, he can feast on the thought of the praises that shall be paid his memory in future ages, with so much ecstasy as to neglect his present life, nay court and court death, if he but imagines that it will add to the glory he had acquired before.' But the

most notable institution of pride is the love of honour. Honour is a 'chimera,' having no reality in nature, but a mere invention of moralists and politicians, to keep men close to their engagements, whatever they be. In some families it is hereditary, like the gout; but, luckily, the vulgar are destitute of it. In the time of chivalry, honour was a very troublesome affair; but in the beginning of the 17th century, it was melted over again, and brought to a new standard; 'they put in the same weight of courage, half the quantity of honesty, and a very little justice, but not a scrap of any other virtue.' The worst thing about it is duelling; but there are more suicides than duels, so that at any rate men do not hate others more than themselves. After a half-satirical apology for duelling, he concludes with one insurmountable objection; duelling is wholly repugnant to religion, adding with the muffled scepticism characteristic of the 18th century, 'how to reconcile them must be left to wiser heads than mine.'

4. *Private vices, public benefits.* Mandeville ventures to compare society to a bowl of punch. Avarice is the souring, and prodigality the sweetening of it. The water is the ignorance and folly of the insipid multitude, while honour and the noble qualities of man represent the brandy. To each of these ingredients we may object in turn, but experience teaches that, when judiciously mixed, they make an excellent liquor. It is not the good, but the evil qualities of men, that lead to worldly greatness. Without luxury we should have no trade. This doctrine is illustrated at great length, and has been better remembered than anything else in the book; but it may be dismissed with two remarks. (1) It embodies an error in political economy, namely, that it is spending and not saving that gives employment to the poor. If Mandeville's aim had been less critical, and had he been less delighted with his famous paradox, we may infer from the acuteness of his reasoning on the subject, that he would have anticipated the true doctrine of political economy, as he saw through the fallacy of the mercantile theory. (2) He employs the term, luxury, with great latitude, as including whatever is not a bare necessary of existence. According to the fashionable doctrine of his day, all luxury was called an evil and a vice; and in this sense, doubtless, vice is essential to the existence of a great nation.

5. *The origin of society.* Mandeville's remarks on this subject are the best he has written, and come nearest to the accredited views of the present day. He denies that we have

any natural affection for one another, or any natural aversion or hatred. Each seeks his own happiness, and conflict arises from the opposition of men's desires. To make a society out of the raw material of uncivilized men, is a work of great difficulty, requiring the concurrence of many favourable accidents, and a long period of time. For the qualities developed among civilized men no more belong to them in a savage state, than the properties of wine exist in the grape. Society begins with families. In the beginning, the old savage has a great wish to rule his children, but has no capacity for government. He is inconstant and violent in his desires, and incapable of any steady conduct. What at first keeps men together is not so much reverence for the father, as the common danger from wild beasts. The traditions of antiquity are full of the prowess of heroes in killing dragons and monsters. The second step to society is the danger men are in from one another. To protect themselves, several families would be compelled to accept the leadership of the strongest. The leaders, seeing the mischiefs of dissension, would employ all their art to extirpate that evil. Thus they would forbid killing one another, stealing one another's wives, &c. The third and last step is the invention of letters; this is essential to the growth of society, and to the corresponding expansion of law.*

I.—Mandeville's object being chiefly *negative* and *dialectical*, he has left little of positive ethical theory. Virtue he regards as *de facto* an arbitrary institution of society; what it ought to be, he hardly says, but the tendency of his writings is to make the good of the whole to be preferred to private interest.

II.—He denies the existence of a moral sense and of disinterestedness. The motive to observe moral rules is pride

* It is instructive to compare Mandeville's *a priori* guesses with the results of Mr. Maine's historical investigation into the condition of early societies. The evidence shows that society originated in the family system. Mandeville conjectured that solitary families would never attain to government; but Mr. Maine considers that there was a complete despotic government in single families. 'They have neither assemblies for consultation nor *themistes*, but every one exercises jurisdiction over his wives and children, and they pay no regard to one another.' The next stage is the rise of *gentes* and tribes, which took place probably when a family held together instead of separating on the death of the patriarch. The features of this state were chieftainship and *themistes*, that is, government not by laws, but by *ex post facto* decisions upon cases as they arose. This gradually developed into customary law, which was in its turn superseded, on the invention of writing, by written codes. Maine's Ancient Law, Chap. V.

and vanity fomented by politicians. He does not regard virtue as an independent end, even by association, but considers that pride in its naked form is the ever present incentive to good conduct.

V.—The connexion of virtue with society is already fully indicated.

In France, the name of **HELVETIUS** (author of *De l'esprit, De l'homme*, &c., 1715-71) is identified with a serious (in contrast to Mandeville), and perfectly consistent, attempt to reduce all morality to direct Self-interest. Though he adopted this ultimate interpretation of the facts, Helvetius was by no means the 'low and loose moralist' that he has been described to be; and, in particular, his own practice displayed a rare benevolence.

DAVID HUME. [1711-1776.]

The Ethical views of Hume are contained in '*An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*.'

In an Introductory Section (I.) he treats of the **GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS**.

After describing those that profess to deny the reality of the distinction of Right and Wrong, as disingenuous disputants, useless to reason with,—he states the great problem of Morals to be, whether the foundation is **REASON** or **SENTIMENT**; whether our knowledge of moral distinctions is attained by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling or finer internal sense.

Specious arguments may be urged on both sides. On the side of Reason, it may be contended, that the justice and injustice of actions are often a subject of argument and controversy like the sciences; whereas if they appealed at once to a sense, they would be as unsusceptible of truth or falsehood as the harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, or the brilliancy of wit.

In reply, the supporters of Sentiment may urge that the character of virtue is to be *amiable*, and of vice to be *odious*, which are not intellectual distinctions. The end of moral distinctions is to influence the feelings and determine the will, which no mere assent of the understanding can do. Extinguish our *feelings* towards virtue and vice, and morality would cease to have any influence on our lives.

The arguments on both sides have so much force in them, that we may reasonably suspect that Reason and Sentiment both concur in our moral determinations. The final sentence

upon actions, whereby we pronounce them praiseworthy or blameable, may depend on the feelings; while a process of the understanding may be requisite to make nice distinctions, examine complicated relations, and ascertain matters of fact.

It is not the author's intention, however, to pursue the subject in the form of adjudicating between these two principles, but to follow what he deems a simpler method—to analyze that complication of mental qualities, called **PERSONAL MERIT**: to ascertain the attributes or qualities that render a man an object of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt. This is a question of fact, and not of abstract science; and should be determined, as similar questions are, in the modern physics, by following the experimental method, and drawing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances.

Section II. is Of BENEVOLENCE.

His first remark on Benevolence is, that it is identified in all countries with the highest merits that human nature is capable of attaining to.

This prepares the way for the farther observation, that in setting forth the praises of a humane, beneficent man, the one circumstance that never fails to be insisted on is the happiness to society arising through his good offices. Like the sun, an inferior minister of providence, he cheers, invigorates, and sustains the surrounding world. May we not therefore conclude that the **UTILITY** resulting from social virtues, forms, at least, a *part* of their merit, and is one source of the approbation paid to them. He illustrates this by a number of interesting examples, and defers the enquiry—*how large* a part of the social virtues depend on utility, and for what reason we are so much affected by it.

Section III. is on **JUSTICE**. That Justice is useful to society, and thence derives *part* of its merit, would be superfluous to prove. That public utility is the *sole* origin of Justice, and that the beneficial consequences are the *sole* foundation of its merit, may seem more questionable, but can in the author's opinion be maintained.

He puts the supposition, that the human race were provided with such abundance of all external things, that without industry, care, or anxiety, every person found every want fully satisfied; and remarks, that while every other social virtue (the affections, &c.) might flourish, yet, as property would be absent, mine and thine unknown, Justice would be useless, an idle ceremonial, and could never come into the catalogue of the virtues. In point of fact, where any agent,

as air, water, or land, is so abundant as to supply everybody, questions of justice do not arise on that particular subject.

Suppose again that in our present necessitous condition, the mind of every man were so enlarged and so replete with generosity that each should feel as much for his fellows as for himself—the *beau idéal* of communism—in this case Justice would be in abeyance, and its ends answered by Benevolence. This state is actually realized in well-cultivated families; and communism has been attempted and maintained for a time in the ardour of new enthusiasms.

Reverse the above suppositions, and imagine a society in such want that the utmost care is unable to prevent the greater number from perishing, and all from the extremes of misery, as in a shipwreck or a siege; in such circumstances, justice is suspended in favour of self-preservation; the possibility of good order is at an end, and Justice, the means, is discarded as useless. Or, again, suppose a virtuous man to fall into a society of ruffians on the road to swift destruction; his sense of justice would be of no avail, and consequently he would arm himself with the first weapon he could seize, consulting self-preservation alone. The ordinary punishment of criminals is, as regards them, a suspension of justice for the benefit of society. A state of war is the remission of justice between the parties as of no use or application. A civilized nation at war with barbarians must discard even the small relics of justice retained in war with other civilized nations. Thus the rules of equity and justice depend on the condition that men are placed in, and are limited by their *UTILITY* in each separate state of things. The common state of society is a medium between the extreme suppositions now made: we have our self-partialities, but have learnt the value of equity; we have few enjoyments by nature, but a considerable number by industry. Hence we have the ideas of Property; to these Justice is essential, and it thus derives its moral obligation.

The poetic fictions of the Golden Age, and the philosophic fictions of a State of Nature, equally adopt the same fundamental assumption; in the one, justice was unnecessary, in the other, it was inadmissible. So, if there were a race of creatures so completely servile as never to contest any privilege with us, nor resent any infliction, which is very much our position with the lower animals, justice would have no place in our dealings with them. Or, suppose once more, that each person possessed within himself every faculty for

existence, and were isolated from every other; so solitary a being would be as incapable of justice as of speech. The sphere of this duty begins with society; and extends as society extends, and as it contributes to the well-being of the individual members of society.

The author next examines the *particular laus* embodying justice and determining property. He supposes a creature, having reason, but unskilled in human nature, to deliberate with himself how to distribute property. His most obvious thought would be to give the largest possessions to the most virtuous, so as to give the power of doing good where there was the most inclination. But so unpracticable is this design, that although sometimes conceived, it is never executed; the civil magistrate knows that it would be utterly destructive of human society; sublime as may be the ideal justice that it supposes, he sets it aside on the calculation of its bad consequences.

Seeing also that, with nature's liberality, were all her gifts equally distributed, every one would have so good a share that no one would have a title to complain; and seeing, farther, that this is the only type of perfect equality or ideal justice—there is no good ground for falling short of it but the knowledge that the attempt would be pernicious to society. The writers on the Law of Nature, whatever principles they begin with, must assign as the ultimate reason of law the necessities and convenience of mankind. Uninstructed nature could never make the distinction between *mine* and *yours*; it is a purely artificial product of society. Even when this distinction is established, and justice requires it to be adhered to, yet we do not scruple in extraordinary cases to violate justice in an individual case for the safety of the people at large.

When the interests of society require a rule of justice, but do not indicate any rule in particular, the resort is to some *analogy* with a rule already established on grounds of the general interest.

For determining what is a man's property, there may be many statutes, customs, precedents, analogies, some constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary, but all professedly terminating in the interests of human society. But for this, the laws of property would be undistinguishable from the wildest superstitions.

Such a reference, instead of weakening the obligations of justice, strengthens them. What stronger foundations can there be for any duty than that, without it, human nature

could not subsist; and that, according as it is observed, the degrees of human happiness go on increasing?

Either Justice is evidently founded on Utility, or our regard for it is a simple instinct like hunger, resentment, or self-preservation. But on this last supposition, property, the subject-matter, must be also discerned by an instinct; no such instinct, however, can be affirmed. Indeed, no single instinct would suffice for the number of considerations entering into a fact so complex. To define Inheritance and Contract, a hundred volumes of laws are not enough; how then can nature embrace such complications in the simplicity of an instinct. For it is not laws alone that we must have, but authorized interpreters. Have we original ideas of prætors, and chancellors, and juries?

Instincts are uniform in their operation; birds of a species build their nests alike. The laws of states are uniform to about the same extent as houses, which must have a roof and walls, windows and chimneys, because the end in view demands certain essentials; but beyond these, there is every conceivable diversity.

It is true that, by education and custom, we blame injustice without thinking of its ultimate consequences. So universal are the rules of justice, from the universality of its end, that we approve of it mechanically. Still, we have often to recur to the final end, and to ask, What must become of the world if such practices prevail? How could society subsist under such disorders?

Thus, then, Hume considers that, by an inductive determination, on the strict Newtonian basis, he has proved that the *SOLE* foundation of our regard to justice is the support and welfare of society: and since no moral excellence is more esteemed, we must have some strong disposition in favour of general usefulness. Such a disposition must be a part of the humane virtues, as it is the *SOLE* source of the moral approbation of fidelity, justice, veracity, and integrity.

Section IV. relates to *POLITICAL SOCIETY*, and is intended to show that Government, Allegiance, and the Laws of each State, are justified solely by Utility.

If men had *sagacity* to perceive, and *strength of mind* to follow on, distant and general interests, there had been no such thing as government. In other words, if government were totally useless, it would not be. The duty of Allegiance would be no duty, but for the advantage of it, in preserving peace and order among mankind.

[Hume is here supposing that men enter into society on equal terms; he makes no allowance for the exercise of the right of the stronger in making compulsory social unions. This, however, does not affect his reasoning as to the source of our approbation of social duty, which is not usually extended to tyranny.]

When political societies hold intercourse with one another, certain regulations are made, termed Laws of Nations, which have no other end than the advantage of those concerned.

The virtue of Chastity is subservient to the utility of rearing the young, which requires the combination of both parents; and that combination reposes on marital fidelity. Without such a utility, the virtue would never have been thought of. The reason why chastity is extended to cases where child-bearing does not enter, is that *general rules* are often carried beyond their original occasion, especially in matters of taste and sentiment.

The prohibition of marriage between near relations, and the turpitude of incest, have in view the preserving of purity of manners among persons much together.

The laws of good manners are a kind of lesser morality. for the better securing of our pleasures in society.

Even robbers and pirates must have their laws. Immoral gallantries, where authorized, are governed by a set of rules. Societies for play have laws for the conduct of the game. War has its laws as well as peace. The fights of boxers, wrestlers, and such like, are subject to rules. For all such cases, the common interest and utility begets a standard of right and wrong in those concerned.

Section V. proceeds to argue WHY UTILITY PLEASES. However powerful education may be in forming men's sentiments, there must, in such a matter as morality, be some deep natural distinction to work upon. Now, there are only two natural sentiments that Utility can appeal to: (1) Self-Interest, and (2) Generosity, or the interests of others.

The deduction of morals from Self-Love is obvious, and no doubt explains much. An appeal to experience, however, shows its defects. We praise virtuous actions in remote ages and countries, where our own interests are out of the question. Even when we have a private interest in some virtuous action, our praise avoids that part of it, and prefers to fasten on what we are not interested in. When we hear of the details of a generous action, we are moved by it, before we know when or where it took place. Nor will the force of imagination account

for the feeling in those cases; if we have an eye solely to our own *real* interest, it is not conceivable how we can be moved by a mere imaginary interest.

But another view may be taken. Some have maintained that the public interest is our own interest, and is therefore promoted by our self-love. The reply is that the two are often opposed to each other, and still we approve of the preference of the public interest. We are, therefore, driven to adopt a more public affection, and to admit that the interests of society, *on their own account*, are not indifferent to us.

Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity or benevolence? Or to conceive that the very aspect of happiness, joy, prosperity, gives pleasure; while pain, suffering, sorrow, communicate uneasiness? Here we have an unmistakeable, powerful, universal sentiment of human nature to build upon.

The author gives an expanded illustration of the workings of Benevolence or Sympathy, which well deserves to be read for its merits of execution. We must here content ourselves with stating that it is on this principle of disinterested action, belonging to our nature, that he founds the chief part of our sentiment of Moral Approbation.

Section VI. takes into the account QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES. We praise in individuals the qualities useful to themselves, and are pleased with the happiness flowing to individuals by their own conduct. This can be no selfish motive on our part. For example, DISCRETION, so necessary to the accomplishing of any useful enterprise, is commended; that measured union of enterprise and caution found in great commanders, is a subject of highest admiration; and why? For the usefulness, or the success that it brings. What need is there to display the praises of INDUSTRY, or of FRUGALITY, virtues useful to the possessor in the first instance? Then the qualities of HONESTY, FIDELITY, and TRUTH, are praised, in the first place, for their tendency to the good of society; and, being established on that foundation, they are also approved as advantageous to the individual's own self. A part of our blame of UNCHASTITY in a woman is attached to its imprudence with reference to the opinion regarding it. STRENGTH OF MIND being to resist present care, and to maintain the search of distant profit and enjoyment, is another quality of great value to the possessor. The distinction between the *Fool* and the *Wise* man illustrates the same position. In our approbation of all such qualities, it is evident that the hap-

piness and misery of others are not indifferent spectacles to us: the one, like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains, imparts joy and satisfaction; the other, like a lowering cloud or a barren landscape, throws a damp over the spirits.

He next considers the influence of bodily endowments and the goods of fortune as bearing upon the general question.

Even in animals, one great source of *beauty* is the suitability of their structure to their manner of life. In times when bodily strength in men was more essential to a warrior than now, it was held in so much more esteem. Impotence in both sexes, and barrenness in women, are generally condemned, for the loss of human pleasure attending them.

As regards fortune, how can we account for the regard paid to the rich and powerful, but from the reflexion to the mind of prosperity, happiness, ease, plenty, authority, and the gratification of every appetite. Rank and family, although they may be detached from wealth and power, had originally a reference to these.

In Section VII., Hume treats of QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OURSELVES. Under this head, he dilates on the influence of CHEERFULNESS, as a social quality: on GREATNESS OF MIND, or Dignity of Character; on COURAGE; on TRANQUILLITY, or equanimity of mind, in the midst of pain, sorrow, and adverse fortune; on BENEVOLENCE in the aspect of an agreeable spectacle; and lastly, on DELICACY of Taste, as a merit. As manifested to a beholder, all these qualities are engaging and admirable, on account of the immediate pleasure that they communicate to the person possessed of them. They are farther testimonies to the existence of social sympathy, and to the connexion of that with our sentiment of approbation towards actions or persons.

Section VIII. brings forward the QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OTHERS. These are GOOD MANNERS or POLITENESS; the WIT or INGENUITY that enlivens social intercourse; MODESTY, as opposed to impudence, arrogance, and vanity; CLEANLINESS, and GRACEFUL MANNER; all which are obviously valued for the pleasures they communicate to people generally. Section IX. is the CONCLUSION. Whatever may have been maintained in systems of philosophy, he contends that in common life the habitual motives of panegyric or censure are of the kind described by him. He will not enter into the question as to the relative shares of benevolence and self-love in the human constitution. Let the generous sentiments be

ever so weak, they still direct a preference of what is serviceable to what is pernicious; and on these preferences a moral distinction is founded. In the notion of morals, two things are implied; a sentiment common to all mankind, and a sentiment whose objects comprehend all mankind; and these two requisites belong to the sentiment of humanity or benevolence.

Another spring of our constitution, that brings a great addition of force to moral sentiment, is Love of Fame. The pursuit of a character, name, and reputation in the world, leads to a habit of surveying our own actions, begets a reverence for self as well as others, and is thus the guardian of every virtue. Humanity and Love of Reputation combine to form the highest type of morality yet conceived.

The nature of moral *approbation* being thus solved, there remains the nature of *obligation*; by which the author means to enquire, if a man having a view to his own welfare, will not find his best account in the practice of every moral virtue. He dwells upon the many advantages of social virtue, of benevolence and friendship, humanity and kindness, of truth and honesty; but confesses that the rule that 'honesty is the best policy' is liable to many exceptions. He makes us acquainted with his own theory of Happiness. How little is requisite to supply the *necessities* of nature? and what comparison is there between, on the one hand, the cheap pleasures of conversation, society, study, even health, and, on the other, the common beauties of nature, with self-approbation; and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expense?

Thus ends the main treatise; but the author adds, in an Appendix, four additional dissertations.

The first takes up the question started at the outset, but postponed, how far our moral approbation is a matter of *reason*, and how far of *sentiment*. His handling of this topic is luminous and decisive.

If the utility of actions be a foundation of our approval of them, *reason* must have a share, for no other faculty can trace the results of actions in their bearings upon human happiness. In Justice especially, there are often numerous and complicated considerations; such as to occupy the deliberations of politicians and the debates of lawyers.

On the other hand, reason is insufficient of itself to constitute the feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation. Reason shows the means to an end; but if we are otherwise indifferent to the end, the reasonings fall inoperative on the mind. Here then a *sentiment* must display itself, a delight

in the happiness of men, and a repugnance to what causes them misery. Reason teaches the consequences of actions; Humanity or Benevolence is roused to make a distinction in favour of such as are beneficial.

He adduces a number of illustrations to show that reason alone is insufficient to make a moral sentiment. He bids us examine Ingratitude, for instance; good offices bestowed on one side, ill-will on the other. Reason might say, whether a certain action, say the gift of money, or an act of patronage, was for the good of the party receiving it, and whether the circumstances of the gift indicated a good intention on the part of the giver; it might also say, whether the actions of the person obliged were intentionally or consciously hurtful or wanting in esteem to the person obliging. But when all this is made out by reason, there remains the sentiment of abhorrence, whose foundations must be in the emotional part of our nature, in our delight in manifested goodness, and our abhorrence of the opposite.

He refers to Beauty or Taste as a parallel case, where there may be an operation of the intellect to compute proportions, but where the elegance or beauty must arise in the region of feeling. Thus, while *reason* conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood, *sentiment* or emotion must give beauty and deformity, vice and virtue.

Appendix No. II. is a discussion of SELF-LOVE. The author adverts first to the position that benevolence is a mere pretence, a cheat, a gloss of self-love, and dismisses it with a burst of indignation. He next considers the less offensive view, that all benevolence and generosity are resolvable in the last resort into self-love. He does not attribute to the holders of this opinion any laxity in their own practice of virtue, as compared with other men. Epicurus and his followers were no strangers to probity; Athens and Horace were men of generous dispositions; Hobbes and Locke were irreproachable in their lives. These men all allowed that friendship exists without hypocrisy; but considered that, by a sort of mental chemistry, it might be made out self-love, twisted and moulded by a particular turn of the imagination. But, says Hume, as some men have not the turn of imagination, and others have, this alone is quite enough to make the widest difference of human characters, and to stamp one man as virtuous and humane, and another vicious and meanly interested. The analysis in no way sets aside the reality of moral distinctions. The question is, therefore, purely speculative.

As a speculation, it is open to these objections. (1) Being contrary to the unprejudiced notions of mankind, it demands some very powerful aid from philosophy. On the face of things, the selfish passions and the benevolent passions are widely distinguished, and no hypothesis has ever yet so far overcome the disparity as to show that the one could grow out of the other; we may discern in the attempts that love of *simplicity*, which has done so much harm to philosophy.

The Animals are susceptible of kindness; shall we then attribute to them, too, a refinement of self-interest? Again, what interest can a fond mother have in view who loses her health in attendance on a sick child, and languishes and dies of grief when relieved from the slavery of that attendance?

(2) But farther, the real simplicity lies on the side of independent and disinterested benevolence. There are bodily appetites that carry us to their objects before sensual enjoyment; hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end; the gratification follows, and becomes a secondary desire. [A very questionable analysis.] So there are mental passions, as fame, power, vengeance, that urge us to act, in the first instance; and when the end is attained, the pleasure follows. Now, as vengeance may be so pursued as to make us neglect ease, interest, and safety, why may we not allow to humanity and friendship the same privileges? [This is Butler, improved in the statement.]

Appendix III. gives some farther considerations with regard to JUSTICE. The point of the discussion is to show that Justice differs from Generosity or Beneficence in a regard to distant consequences, and to General Rules. The theme is handled in the author's usual happy style, but contains nothing special to him. He omits to state what is also a prime attribute of Justice, its being indispensable to the very existence of society, which cannot be said of generosity, apart from its contributing to justice.

Appendix IV. is on some VERBAL DISPUTES. He remarks that, neither in English nor in any other modern tongue, is the boundary fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects; that praise is given to natural endowments, as well as to voluntary exertions. The epithets *intellectual* and *moral* do not precisely divide the virtues; neither does the contrast of *head* and *heart*; many virtuous qualities partake of both ingredients. So the sentiment of *conscious worth*, or of its opposite, is affected by what is not in our power, as well as by what is; by the goodness or badness of our memory, as well

as by continence or dissoluteness of conduct. Without endowments of the understanding, the best intentions will not procure esteem.

The ancient moralists included in the virtues what are obviously natural endowments. Prudence, according to Cicero, involved sagacity or powers of judgment. In Aristotle, we find, among the virtues, Courage, Temperance, Magnanimity, Modesty, Prudence, and manly Openness, as well as Justice and Friendship. Epictetus puts people on their guard against humanity and compassion. In general, the difference of voluntary and involuntary was little regarded in ancient ethics. This is changed in modern times, by the alliance of Ethics with Theology. The divine has put all morality on the footing of the civil law, and guarded it by the same sanctions of reward and punishment; and consequently must make the distinction of voluntary and involuntary fundamental.

Hume also composed a dialogue, to illustrate, in his light and easy style, the great variety, amounting almost to opposition, of men's moral sentiments in different ages. This may seem adverse to his principle of Utility, as it is to the doctrine of an Intuitive Sense of Right and Wrong. He allows, however, for the different ways that people may view Utility, seeing that the consequences of acting are often difficult to estimate, and people may agree in an end without agreeing in the means. Still, he pays too little attention to the sentimental likings and dislikings that frequently overbear the sense of Utility; scarcely recognizing it, except in one passage, where he dwells on the superstitions that mingle with a regard to the consequences of actions in determining right.

We shall now repeat the leading points of Hume's system, in the usual order.

I.—The Standard of Right and Wrong is Utility, or a reference to the Happiness of mankind. This is the ground, as well as the motive, of moral approbation.

II.—As to the nature of the Moral Faculty, he contends that it is a compound of Reason, and Humane or Generous Sentiment.

He does not introduce the subject of Free-will into Morals.

He contends strongly for the existence of Disinterested Sentiment, or Benevolence; but scarcely recognizes it as leading to absolute and uncompensated self-sacrifice. He does not seem to see that as far as the approbation of benevolent actions is concerned, we are anything but disinterested parties. The good done by one man is done to some others;

and the recipients are moved by their self-love to encourage beneficence. The regard to our own benefactor makes all benefactors interesting.

III.—He says little directly bearing on the constituents of Human Happiness; but that little is all in favour of simplicity of life and cheap pleasures. He does not reflect that the pleasures singled out by him are far from cheap; 'agreeable conversation, society, study, health, and the beauties of nature,' although not demanding extraordinary wealth, cannot be secured without a larger share of worldly means than has ever fallen to the mass of men in any community.

IV.—As to the substance of the Moral Code, he makes no innovations. He talks somewhat more lightly of the evils of Unchastity than is customary; but regards the prevailing restraints as borne out by Utility.

The inducements to virtue are, in his view, our humane sentiments, on the one hand, and our self-love, or prudence, on the other; the two classes of motives conspiring to promote both our own good and the good of mankind.

V.—The connexion of Ethics with Politics is not specially brought out. The political virtues are moral virtues. He does not dwell upon the sanctions of morality, so as to distinguish the legal sanction from the popular sanction. He draws no line between Duty and Merit.

VI.—He recognizes no relationship between Ethics and Theology. The principle of Benevolence in the human mind is, he thinks, an adequate source of moral approbation and disapprobation; and he takes no note of what even sceptics (Gibbon, for example) often dwell upon, the aid of the Theological sanction in enforcing duties imperfectly felt by the natural and unprompted sentiments of the mind.

RICHARD PRICE. (1723-1791.)

Price's work is entitled, 'A Review of the principal questions in Morals; particularly those respecting the Origin of our Ideas of Virtue, its Nature, Relation to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-matter, and Sanctions.' In the third edition, he added an Appendix on 'the Being and Attributes of the Deity.'

The book is divided into ten chapters.

Chapter I. is on the origin of our Ideas of Right and Wrong. The actions of moral agents, he says, give rise in us to three different perceptions: 1st, Right and Wrong; 2nd,

Beauty and Deformity; 3rd, Good or Ill Desert. It is the first of these perceptions that he proposes mainly to consider.

He commences by quoting Hutcheson's doctrine of a Moral Sense, which he describes as an *implanted* and *arbitrary* principle, imparting a relish or disrelish for actions, like the sensibilities of the various senses. On this doctrine, he remarks, the Creator might have annexed the same sentiments to the opposite actions. Other schemes of morality, such as Self-love, Positive Laws and Compacts, the Will of the Deity, he dismisses as not meeting the true question.

The question, as conceived by him, is, 'What is the power within us that perceives the distinctions of Right and Wrong?' The answer is, The UNDERSTANDING.

To establish this position, he enters into an enquiry into the distinct provinces of Sense and of Understanding in the origin of our ideas. It is plain, he says, that what judges concerning the perceptions of the senses, and contradicts their decisions, cannot itself be sense, but must be some nobler faculty. Likewise, the power that views and compares the objects of all the senses cannot be sense. Sense is a mere capacity of being passively impressed; it presents particular forms to the mind, and is incapable of discovering general truths. It is the understanding that perceives order or proportion; variety and regularity; design, connexion, art, and power; aptitudes, dependence, correspondence, and adjustment of parts to a whole or to an end. He goes over our leading ideas in detail, to show that mere sense cannot furnish them. Thus, Solidity, or Impenetrability, needs an exertion of reason; we must compare instances to know that two atoms of matter cannot occupy the same space. *Vis Inertia* is a perception of the reason. So Substance, Duration, Space, Necessary Existence, Power, and Causation involve the understanding. Likewise, that all Abstract Ideas whatsoever require the understanding is superfluously proved. The author wonders, therefore, that his position in this matter should not have been sooner arrived at.

The tracing of Agreement and of Disagreement, which are functions of the Understanding, is really the source of simple ideas. Thus, Equality is a simple idea originating in this source; so are Proportion, Identity and Diversity, Existence, Cause and Effect, Power, Possibility and Impossibility; and (as he means ultimately to show) Right and Wrong.

Although the author's exposition is not very lucid, his main conclusion is a sound one. Sense, in its narrowest

acceptation, gives particular impressions and experiences of Colour, Sound, Touch, Taste, Odour, &c. The Intellectual functions of Discrimination and Agreement are necessary as a supplement to Sense, to recognize these impressions as differing and agreeing, as Equal or Unequal; Proportionate or Disproportionate; Harmonious or Discordant. And farther, every abstract or general notion,—colours in the abstract, sweetness, pungency, &c.—supposes these powers of the understanding in addition to the recipiency of the senses.

To apply this to Right and Wrong, the author begins by affirming [what goes a good way towards begging the question] that right and wrong are simple ideas, and therefore the result of an *immediate* power of perception in the human mind. Beneficence and Cruelty are indefinable, and therefore ultimate. There must be some actions that are in the last resort an end in themselves. This being assumed, the author contends that the power of immediately perceiving these ultimate ideas is the Understanding. Shaftesbury had contended that, because the perception of right and wrong was immediate, therefore it must reside in a special Sense. The conclusion, thinks Price, was, to say the least of it, hasty; for it does not follow that every immediate perception should reside in a special sensibility or sense. He puts it to each one's experience whether, in conceiving Gratitude or Beneficence to be right, one feels a sensation merely, or performs an act of understanding. 'Would not a Being purely intelligent, having happiness within his reach, approve of securing it for himself? Would he not think this right; and would it not be right? When we contemplate the happiness of a species, or of a world, and pronounce on the actions of reasonable beings which promote it, that they are *right*, is this judging erroneously? Or is it no determination of the judgment at all, but a species of mental taste [as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson supposed]? [As against a moral sense, this reasoning may be effective; but it obviously assumes an end of desire,—happiness for self, or for others—and yet does not allow to that end any share in making up the sense of right and wrong.] Every one, the author goes on to say, must desire happiness for himself; and our rational nature thenceforth must approve of the actions for promoting happiness; and disapprove of the contrary actions. Surely the understanding has some share in the revulsion that we feel when any one brings upon himself, or upon others, calamity and ruin. A being flattered with hopes of bliss and then plunged into torments would

complain *justly*; he would consider that violence had been done to a perception of the human *understanding*.

He next brings out a metaphysical difficulty in applying right and wrong to actions, on the supposition that they are mere effects of sensation. All sensations, as such, are modes of consciousness, or feelings, of a sentient being, and must be of a nature different from their causes. Colour is in the mind, not an attribute of the object; but right and wrong are qualities of actions, of objects, and therefore must be ideas, not sensations. Then, again, there can be nothing true or untrue in a sensation; all sensations are alike just; while the moral rectitude of an action is something absolute and unvarying. Lastly, all actions have a nature, or character; something truly belonging to them, and truly affirmable of them. If actions have no character, then they are all indifferent; but this no one can affirm; we all strongly believe the contrary. Actions are not indifferent. They are good or bad, better or worse. And if so, they are declared such by an act of *judgment*, a function of the understanding.

The author, considering his thesis established, deduces from it the corollary, that morality is *eternal and immutable*. As an object of the Understanding, it has an invariable essence. No will, not even Omnipotence, can make *things* other than they are. Right and wrong, as far as they express the real characters of actions, must immutably and necessarily belong to the actions. By action, is of course understood not a bare external effect, but an effect taken along with its principle or rule, the motives or reasons of the being that performs it. The matter of an action being the same, its morality reposes upon the end or motive of the agent. Nothing can be obligatory in us that was not so from eternity. The will of God could not make a thing right that was not right in its own nature.

The author closes his first chapter with a criticism of the doctrine of Protagoras—that man is the measure of all things—interpreting it as another phase of the view that he is combating.

Although this chapter is but a small part of the work, it completes the author's demonstration of his ethical theory.

Chapter II. is on 'our Ideas of the Beauty and Deformity of Actions.' By these are meant our pleasurable and painful sentiments, arising from the consideration of moral right and wrong, expressed by calling some actions amiable, and others odious, shocking, vile. Although, in this aspect of actions,

it would seem that the reference to a sense is the suitable explanation, he still contends for the intervention of the Understanding. The character of the Deity must appear more amiable the better it is *known* and *understood*. A reasonable being, without any special sensibilities, but knowing what order and happiness are, would receive pleasure from the contemplation of a universe where order prevailed, and pain from a prospect of the contrary. To *behold* virtue is to admire her; to *perceive* vice is to be moved to condemnation. There must always be a consideration of the circumstances of an action, and this involves intellectual discernment.

The author now qualifies his doctrine by the remark, that to some superior beings the intellectual discernment may explain the whole of the appearances, but inferior natures, such as the human, are aided by *instinctive determinations*. Our appetites and passions are too strong for reason by itself, especially in early years. Hence he is disposed to conclude that 'in contemplating the actions of moral agents, we have both a *perception of the understanding* and a *feeling of the heart*;' but that this feeling of the heart, while partly instinctive, is mainly a sense of congruity and incongruity in actions. The author therefore allows something to innate sense, but differs from Shaftesbury, who makes the whole a matter of intuitive determination.

Chapter III. relates to the origin of our Desires and Affections, by which he means more especially Self-love and Benevolence. His position here is that Self-love is the essence of a Sensible being, Benevolence the essential of an Intelligent being. By the very nature of our sensitive constitution, we cannot but choose happiness for self; and it is only an act of intellectual consistency to extend the same measure to others. The same qualification, however, is made as to the insufficiency of a mere intellectual impulse in this matter, without constitutional tendencies. These constitutional tendencies the author considers as made up of our Appetites and Passions, while our Affections are founded on our rational nature. Then follow a few observations in confirmation of Butler's views as to the disinterested nature of our affections.

Chapter IV. is on our Ideas of good and ill Desert. These are only a variety of our ideas of right and wrong, being the feelings excited towards the moral Agent. Our reason determines, with regard to a virtuous agent, that he ought to be the better for his virtue. The ground of such determination, however, is not solely that virtuous conduct promotes the

happiness of mankind, and vice detracts from it; this counts for much, but not for all. Virtue is in itself rewardable; vice is of essential demerit. Our understanding recognizes the absolute and eternal rectitude, the intrinsic fitness of the procedure in both aspects.

Chapter V. is entitled 'Of the Reference of Morality to the Divine Nature; the Rectitude of our Faculties; and the Grounds of Belief.' The author means to reply to the objection that his system, in setting up a criterion independent of God, is derogatory to the Divine nature. He urges that there must be attributes of the Deity, independent of his will; as his Existence, Immensity, Power, Wisdom; that Mind supposes Truth apart from itself; that without moral distinctions there could be no Moral Attributes in the Deity. Certain things are inherent in his Nature, and not dependent on his will. There is a limit to the universe itself; two infinities of space or of duration are not possible. The necessary goodness of the divine nature is a part of necessary truth. Thus, morality, although not asserted to depend on the will of the Deity, is still resolvable into his nature. In all this, Price avowedly follows Cudworth.

He then starts another difficulty. May not our faculties be mistaken, or be so constituted as to deceive us? To which he gives the reply, made familiar to us by Hamilton, that the doubt is suicidal; the faculty that doubts being itself under the same imputation. Nay, more, a being cannot be made such as to be imposed on by falsehood; what is false is nothing. As to the cases of actual mistake, these refer to matters attended with some difficulty; and it does not follow that we must be mistaken in cases that are clear.

He concludes with a statement of the ultimate grounds of our belief. These are, (1) Conscience or Feeling, as in regard to our own existence, our sensations, passions, &c.; (2) Intuition, comprising self-evident truths; and (3) Deduction, or Argumentation. He discusses under these the existence of a material world, and affirms that we have an Intuition that it is *possible*.

Chapter VI. considers Fitness and Moral Obligation, and other prevailing forms of expression regarding morality. Fitness and Unfitness denote Congruity or Incongruity, and are necessarily a perception of the Understanding.

The term Obligation is more perplexing. Still, it is but another name for *rightness*. What is Right is, by that very fact, obligatory. Obligation, therefore, cannot be the creature

of law, for law may command what is morally wrong. The will of God enforced by rewards and punishments cannot make right; it would only determine what is *prudent*. Rewards and punishments do not make obligation, but suppose it. Rectitude is a Law, the authoritative guide of a rational being. It is Supreme, universal, unalterable, and indispensable. Self-valid and self-originated, it stands on immovable foundations. Being the one authority in nature, it is, in short, the Divine authority. Even the obligations of religion are but branches of universal rectitude. The Sovereign Authority is not the mere result of his Almighty Power, but of this conjoined with his necessary perfections and infinite excellence.

He does not admit that obligation implies an obliger.

He takes notice of the objection that certain actions may be right, and yet we are not bound to perform them; such are acts of generosity and kindness. But his answer throws no farther light on his main doctrine.

In noticing the theories of other writers in the same vein, as Wollaston, he takes occasion to remark that, together with the perception of conformity or fitness, there is a simple immediate perception urging us to act according to that fitness, for which no farther reason can be assigned. When we compare innocence and eternal misery, we are struck with the idea of unsuitableness, and are inspired in consequence with intense repugnance.

Chapter VII. discusses the Heads or Divisions of Virtue; under which he enquires first what are virtuous actions; secondly, what is the true principle or motive of a virtuous agent; and thirdly, the estimate of the degrees of virtue.

He first quotes Butler to show that all virtue is not summed up in Benevolence; repeating that there is an intrinsic rectitude in keeping faith; and giving the usual arguments against *Utility*, grounded on the supposed crimes that might be committed on this plea. He is equally opposed to those that would deny disinterested benevolence, or would resolve beneficence into veracity. He urges against Hutcheson, that, these being independent and distinct virtues, a distinct sense would be necessary to each; in other words, we should, for the whole of virtue, need a plurality of moral senses.

His classification of Virtue comprehends (1) Duty to God, which he dilates upon at some length. (2) Duty to Ourselves, wherein he maintains that our sense of self-interest is not enough for us. (3) Beneficence, the Good of others. (4) Grati-

tude. (5) Veracity, which he inculcates with great earnestness, adverting especially to impartiality and honesty in our enquiries after truth. (6) Justice, which he treats in its application to the Rights of Property. He considers that the difficulties in practice arise partly from the conflict of the different heads, and partly from the different modes of applying the same principles; which he gives as an answer to the objection from the great differences of men's moral sentiments and practices. . He allows, besides, that custom, education, and example, may blind and deprave our intellectual and moral powers; but denies that the whole of our notions and sentiments could result from education. No amount of depravity is able utterly to destroy our moral discernment.

Chapter VIII. treats of Intention as an element in virtuous action. He makes a distinction between Virtue in the Abstract and Virtue in Practice, or with reference to all the circumstances of the agent. A man may do abstract wrong, through mistake, while as he acts with his best judgment and with upright intentions, he is practically right. He grounds on this a powerful appeal against every attempt at dominion over conscience. The requisites of Practical Morality are (1) Liberty, or Free-will, on which he takes the side of free-agency. (2) Intelligence, without which there can be no perception of good and evil, and no moral agency. (3) The Consciousness of Rectitude, or Righteous Intention. On this he dwells at some length. No action is properly the action of a moral agent unless designed by him. A virtuous motive is essential to virtue. On the question—Is Benevolence a virtuous motive? he replies: Not the Instinctive benevolence of the parent, but only Rational benevolence; which he allows to coincide with rectitude. Reason presiding over Self-love renders it a virtuous principle likewise. The presence of Reason in greater or less degree is the criterion of the greater or less virtue of any action.

Chapter IX. is on the different Degrees of Virtue and Vice. and the modes of estimating them; the Difficulties attending the Practice of Virtue; the use of Trials, and the essentials of a good or a bad Character. The considerations adduced are a number of perfectly well-known maxims on the practice of morality, and scarcely add anything to the elucidation of the author's Moral Theory. The concluding chapter, on Natural Religion, contains nothing original.

To sum up the views of Price:—

I.—As regards the Moral Standard, he asserts that a percep-

tion of the Reason or the Understanding,—a sense of fitness or congruity between actions and the agents, and all the circumstances attending them,—is what determines Right and Wrong.

He finds it impracticable to maintain his position without sundry qualifications, as we have seen. Virtue is naturally adapted to *please* every observing mind; vice the contrary. Right actions must be *grateful*, wrong ungrateful to us. To *behold* virtue is to *admire* her. In contemplating the actions of moral agents, we have *both* a perception of the understanding and a feeling of the heart. He thus re-admits an element of feeling, along with the intellect, in some undefined degree; contending only that *all morality* is not to be resolved into feeling or instinct. We have also noticed another singular admission, to the effect that only superior natures can discover virtue by the understanding. Reason alone, did we possess it in a high degree, would answer all the ends of the passions. Parental affection would be unnecessary, if parents were sufficiently alive to the reasons of supporting the young, and were virtuous enough to be always determined by them.

Utility, although not the *sole* ground of Justice, is yet admitted to be *one* important reason or ground of many of its maxims.

II.—The nature of the Moral Faculty, in Price's theory, is not a separate question from the standard, but the same question. His discussion takes the form of an enquiry into the Faculty:—'What is the power within us that perceives the distinctions of Right and Wrong?' The two questions are mixed up throughout, to the detriment of precision in the reasoning.

With his usual facility of making concessions to other principles, he says it is not easy to determine how far our natural sentiments may be altered by custom, education, and example: while it would be unreasonable to conclude that all is derived from these sources. That part of our moral constitution depending on instinct is liable to be corrupted by custom and education to almost any length; but the most depraved can never sink so low as to lose all moral discernment, all ideas of just and unjust; of which he offers the singular proof that men are never wanting in resentment when they are *themselves* the objects of ill-treatment.

As regards the Psychology of Disinterested Action, he provides nothing but a repetition of Bentler (Chapter III.) and a vague assertion of the absurdity of denying disinterested benevolence.

III.—On Human Happiness, he has only a few general remarks. Happiness is an object of essential and eternal value. Happiness is the *end*, and the *only* end, conceivable by us, of God's providence and government; but He pursues this end in subordination to rectitude. Virtue tends to happiness, but does not always secure it. A person that sacrifices his life rather than violate his conscience, or betray his country, gives up all possibility of any present reward, and loses the more in proportion as his virtue is more glorious.

Neither on the Moral Code, nor in the relations of Ethics to Politics and to Theology, are any further remarks on Price called for.

ADAM SMITH. [1723-90.]

The 'Theory of the Moral Sentiments' is a work of great extent and elaboration. It is divided into five Parts; each part being again divided into Sections, and these subdivided into Chapters.

PART I. is entitled, OF THE PROPRIETY OF ACTION. *Section I.* is, '*Of the Sense of Propriety.*' Propriety is his word for Rectitude or Right.

Chapter I., entitled, 'Of Sympathy,' is a felicitous illustration of the general nature and workings of Sympathy. He calls in the experience of all mankind to attest the existence of our sympathetic impulses. He shows through what medium sympathy operates; namely, by our placing ourselves in the situation of the other party, and imagining what we should feel in that case. He produces the most notable examples of the impressions made on us by our witnessing the actions, the pleasurable and the painful expression of others; effects extending even to fictitious representations. He then remarks that, although on some occasions, we take on simply and purely the feelings manifested in our presence,—the grief or joy of another man, yet this is far from the universal case: a display of angry passion may produce in us hostility and disgust; but this very result may be owing to our sympathy for the person likely to suffer from the anger. So our sympathy for grief or for joy is imperfect until we know the cause, and may be entirely suppressed. We take the whole situation into view, as well as the expression of the feeling. Hence we often feel for another person what that person does not feel for himself; we act out our own view of the situation, not his. We feel for the insane what they do not feel; we sympathize even with the dead.

Chapter II. is 'Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy.' It contains illustrations of the delight that we experience in the sympathy of others; we being thereby strengthened in our pleasures and relieved in our miseries. He observes that we demand this sympathy more urgently for our painful emotions than for such as are pleasurable; we are especially intolerant of the omission of our friends to join in our resentments. On the other hand, we feel pleasure in the act of sympathizing, and find in that a compensation for the pain that the sight of pain gives us. Still, this pleasure may be marred if the other party's own expression of grief or of joy is beyond what we think suitable to the situation.

Chapter III. considers 'the manner of our judging of the propriety of other men's affections by their consonance with our own.' The author illustrates the obvious remark, that we approve of the passions of another, if they are such as we ourselves should feel in the same situation. We require that a man's expression and conduct should be suitable to the occasion, according to our own standard of judging, namely, our own procedure in such cases.

Chapter IV. continues the subject, and draws a distinction between two cases; the case where the objects of a feeling do not concern either ourselves or the person himself, and the case where they do concern one or other. The first case is shown in matters of taste and science, where we derive pleasure from sympathy, but yet can tolerate difference. The other case is exemplified in our personal fortunes; in these, we cannot endure any one refusing us their sympathy. Still, it is to be noted that the sympathizer does not fully attain the level of the sufferer; hence the sufferer, aware of this, and desiring the satisfaction of a full accord with his friend, tones down his own vehemence till it can be fully met by the other; which very circumstance is eventually for his own good, and adds to, rather than detracts from, the tranquillizing influence of a friendly presence. We sober down our feelings still more before casual acquaintance and strangers; and hence the greater equality of temper in the man of the world than in the recluse.

Chapter V. makes an application of these remarks to explain the difference between the Amiable and the Respectable Virtues. The soft, the gentle, and the amiable qualities are manifested when, as sympathizers, we enter fully into the expressed sentiments of another; the great, the awful and respectable virtues of self-denial, are shown when the princi-

pal person concerned brings down his own ease to the level that the most ordinary sympathy can easily attain to. The one is the virtue of giving much, the other of expecting little.

Section II. is '*Of the Degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety.*' Under this head he reviews the leading passions, remarks how far, and why, we can sympathize with each.

Chapter I. is on the Passions having their origin in the body. We can sympathize with hunger to a certain limited extent, and in certain circumstances; but we can rarely tolerate any very prominent expression of it. The same limitations apply to the passion of the sexes. We partly sympathize with bodily pain, but not with the violent expression of it. These feelings are in marked contrast to the passions seated in the imagination: wherein our appetite for sympathy is complete; disappointed love or ambition, loss of friends or of dignity, are suitable to representation in art. On the same principle, we can sympathize with danger; as regards our power of conceiving, we are on a level with the sufferer. From our inability to enter into bodily pain, we the more admire the man that can bear it with firmness.

Chapter II. is on certain Passions depending on a peculiar turn of the Imagination. Under this he exemplifies chiefly the situation of two lovers, with whose passion, in its intensity, a third person cannot sympathize, although one may enter into the hopes of happiness, and into the dangers and calamities often flowing from it.

Chapter III. is on the Unsocial Passions. These necessarily divide our sympathy between him that feels them and him that is their object. Resentment is especially hard to sympathize with. We may ourselves resent wrong done to another, but the less so that the sufferer strongly resents it. Moreover, there is in the passion itself an element of the disagreeable and repulsive; its manifestation is naturally distasteful. It may be useful and even necessary, but so is a prison, which is not on that account a pleasant object. In order to make its gratification agreeable, there must be many well known conditions and qualifications attending it.

Chapter IV. gives the contrast of the Social Passions. It is with the humane, the benevolent sentiments, that our sympathy is unrestricted and complete. Even in their excess, they never inspire aversion.

Chapter V. is on the Selfish Passions. He supposes these, in regard to sympathy, to hold a middle place between the

social and the unsocial. We sympathize with small joys and with great sorrows; and not with great joys (which dispense with our aid, if they do not excite our envy) or with small troubles.

Section III. considers the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgments of mankind regarding propriety of action.

Chapter I. puts forward the proposition that our sympathy with sorrow, although more lively than our sympathy with joy, falls short of the intensity of feeling in the person concerned. It is agreeable to sympathize with joy, and we do so with the heart; the painfulness of entering into grief and misery holds us back. Hence, as he remarked before, the magnanimity and nobleness of the man that represses his woes, and does not exact our compassionate participation.

Chapter II. inquires into the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks. Proceeding upon the principle just enounced, that mankind sympathize with joy rather than with sorrow, the author composes an exceedingly eloquent homily on the worship paid to rank and greatness.

Chapter III., in continuation of the same theme, illustrates the corruption of our moral sentiments, arising from this worship of the great. 'We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous.' 'The external graces, the frivolous accomplishments of that impertinent and foolish thing called a man of fashion, are commonly more admired than the solid and masculine virtues of a warrior, a statesman, a philosopher, or a legislator.'

PART II. is OF MERIT AND DEMERIT; OR OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT. It consists of three Sections.

Section I. is, Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit.

Chapter I. maintains that whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment. The author distinguishes between gratitude and mere love or liking; and, obversely, between resentment and hatred. Love makes us pleased to see any one promoted; but gratitude urges us to be ourselves the instrument of their promotion.

Chapter II. determines the proper objects of Gratitude and Resentment, these being also the proper objects of Reward and Punishment respectively. 'These, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper, and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes

with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.' In short, a good moral decision is obtained by the unanimous vote of all impartial persons.

This view is in accordance with the course taken by the mind in the two contrasting situations. In sympathizing with the joy of a prosperous person, we approve of his complacent and grateful sentiment towards the author of his prosperity; we make his gratitude our own: in sympathizing with sorrow, we enter into, and approve of, the natural resentment towards the agent causing it.

Chapter III. remarks that where we do not approve of the conduct of the person conferring the benefit, we have little sympathy with the gratitude of the receiver; we do not care to enter into the gratitude of the favourites of profligate monarchs.

Chapter IV. supposes the case of our approving strongly the conduct and the motives of a benefactor, in which case we sympathize to a corresponding degree with the gratitude of the receiver.

Chapter V. sums up the analysis of the Sense of Merit and of Demerit thus:—The sense of Merit is a compound sentiment, made up of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent (constituting the propriety of the action), and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the recipient. The sense of Demerit includes a direct antipathy to the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer.

Section II. is Of Justice and Beneficence.

Chapter I. compares the two virtues. Actions of a beneficent tendency, from proper motives, seem alone to require a reward; actions of a hurtful tendency, from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment. It is the nature of Beneficence to be free; the mere absence of it does not expose to punishment. Of all the duties of beneficence, the one most allied to perfect obligation is gratitude; but although we talk of the debt of gratitude (we do not say the debt of charity), we do not punish ingratitude.

Resentment, the source of punishment, is given for defence against positive evil; we employ it not to extort benefits, but to repel injuries. Now, the injury is the violation of Justice. The sense of mankind goes along with the employment of violence to avenge the hurt done by injustice, to prevent the injury, and to restrain the offender. Beneficence, then, is the

subject of reward; and the want of it is not the subject of punishment. : There may be cases where a beneficent act is compelled by punishment, as in obliging a father to support his family, or in punishing a man for not interfering when another is in danger; but these cases are immaterial exceptions to the broad definition. He might have added, that in cases where justice is performed under unusual difficulties, and with unusual fidelity, our disposition would be not merely to exempt from punishment, but to reward.

Chapter II. considers the sense of Justice, Remorse, and the feeling of Merit.

Every man is recommended by nature to his own care, being fitter to take care of himself than of another person. We approve, therefore, of each one seeking their own good; but then it must not be to the hurt of any other being. The primary feeling of self-preservation would not of itself, however, be shocked at causing injury to our fellows. It is when we pass out of this point of view, and enter into the mental state of the spectator of our actions, that we feel the sense of injustice and the sting of Remorse. Though it may be true that every individual in his own breast prefers himself to mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts on this principle. A man is approved when he outstrips his fellows in a fair race; he is condemned when he jostles or trips up a competitor unfairly. The actor takes home to himself this feeling; a feeling known as Shame, Dread of Punishment, and Remorse.

So with the obverse. He that performs a generous action can realize the sentiments of the by-stander, and applaud himself by sympathy with the approbation of the supposed impartial judge. This is the sense of Merit.

Chapter III. gives reflections upon the utility of this constitution of our nature. Human beings are dependent upon one another for mutual assistance, and are exposed to mutual injuries. Society might exist without love or beneficence, but not without mutual abstinence from injury. Beneficence is the ornament that embellishes the building; Justice the main pillar that supports it. It is for the observance of Justice that we need that consciousness of ill-desert, and those terrors of mental punishment, growing out of our sympathy with the disapprobation of our fellows. Justice is necessary to the existence of society, and we often defend its dictates on that ground; but, without looking to such a remote and comprehensive end, we are plunged into remorse for its violation

by the shorter process of referring to the censure of a supposed spectator [in other words, to the sanction of public opinion].

Section III.—Of the influence of Fortune upon the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the Merit and the Demerit of actions.

Every voluntary action consists of three parts:—(1) the Intention or motive, (2) the Mechanism, as when we lift the hand, and give a blow, and (3) the Consequences. It is, in principle, admitted by all, that only the first, the Intention, can be the subject of blame. The Mechanism is in itself indifferent. So the Consequences cannot be properly imputed to the agent, unless intended by him. On this last point, however, mankind do not always adhere to their general maxim; when they come to particular cases, they are influenced, in their estimate of merit and demerit, by the actual consequences of the action.

Chapter I. considers the causes of this influence of Fortune. Gratitude requires, in the first instance, that some pleasure should have been conferred; Resentment pre-supposes pain. These passions require farther that the object of them should itself be susceptible of pleasure and pain; they should be human beings or animals. Thirdly, It is requisite that they should have produced the effects from a design to do so. Now, the absence of the pleasurable consequences intended by a beneficent agent leaves out one of the exciting causes of gratitude, although including another; the absence of the painful consequences of a maleficent act leaves out one of the exciting causes of resentment; hence less gratitude seems due in the one, and less resentment in the other.

Chapter II. treats of the extent of this influence of Fortune. The effects of it are, first, to diminish, in our eyes, the merit of laudable, and the demerit of blameable, actions, when they fail of their intended effects; and, secondly, to increase the feelings of merit and of demerit beyond what is due to the motives, when the actions chance to be followed by extraordinary pleasure or pain. Success enhances our estimate of all great enterprises; failure takes off the edge of our resentment of great crimes.

The author thinks (Chapter III.) that final causes can be assigned for this irregularity of Sentiments. In the first place, it would be highly dangerous to seek out and to resent mere bad intentions. In the next place, it is desirable that beneficent wishes should be put to the proof by results. And,

lastly, as regards the tendency to resent evil, although unintended, it is good to a certain extent that men should be taught intense circumspection on the point of infringing one another's happiness.

PART III. is entitled OF THE FOUNDATION OF OUR JUDGMENTS CONCERNING OUR OWN SENTIMENTS AND CONDUCT, AND OF THE SENSE OF DUTY.

Chapter I. is 'Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation.' Having previously assigned the origin of our judgments respecting others, the author now proceeds to trace out our judgments respecting ourselves. The explanation is still the same. We approve or disapprove of our own conduct; according as we feel that the impartial spectator would approve or disapprove of it.

To a solitary human being, moral judgments would never exist. A man would no more think of the merit and demerit of his sentiments than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. Such criticism is exercised first upon other beings; but the critic cannot help seeing that he in his turn is criticised, and he is thereby led to apply the common standard to his own actions; to divide himself as it were into two persons—the examiner or judge, and person examined into, or judged of. He knows what conduct of his will be approved of by others, and what condemned, according to the standard he himself employs upon others; his concurrence in this approbation or disapprobation is self-approbation or self-disapprobation. The happy consciousness of virtue is the consciousness of the favourable regards of other men.

Chapter II. is 'Of the love of Praise, and of Praise-worthiness; the dread of Blame, and of Blame-worthiness;' a long and important chapter. The author endeavours to trace, according to his principle of sympathy, the desire of Praise-worthiness, as well as of Praise. We approve certain conduct in others, and are thus disposed to approve the same conduct in ourselves: what we praise as judges of our fellow-men, we deem praise-worthy, and aspire to realize in our own conduct. Some men may differ from us, and may withhold that praise; we may be pained at the circumstance, but we adhere to our love of the praise-worthy, even when it does not bring the praise. When we obtain the praise we are pleased, and strengthened in our estimate; the approbation that we receive confirms our self-approbation, but does not give birth to it. In short, there are two principles at work within us. We are pleased with approbation, and pained by

reproach: we are farther pleased if the approbation coincides with what we approve when we are ourselves acting as judges of other men. The two dispositions vary in their strength in individuals, confirming each other when in concert, thwarting each other when opposed. The author has painted a number of striking situations arising out of their conflict. He enquires why we are more pained by unmerited reproach, than lifted up by unmerited approbation; and assigns as the reason that the painful state is more pungent than the corresponding pleasurable state. He shows how those men whose productions are of uncertain merit, as poets, are more the slaves of approbation, than the authors of unmistakeable discoveries in science. In the extreme cases of unmerited reproach, he points out the appeal to the all-seeing Judge of the world, and to a future state rightly conceived; protesting, however, against the view that would reserve the celestial regions for monks and friars, and condemn to the infernal, all the heroes, state-men, poets, and philosophers of former ages; all the inventors of the useful arts; the protectors, instructors, and benefactors of mankind; and all those to whom our natural sense of praise-worthiness forces us to ascribe the highest merit and most exalted virtue.

Chapter III. is 'On the influence and authority of Conscience;' another long chapter, occupied more with moral reflections of a practical kind than with the following out of the analysis of our moral sentiment. Conceding that the testimony of the supposed impartial spectator does not of itself always support a man, he yet asserts its influence to be great, and that by it alone we can see what relates to ourselves in the proper shape and dimensions. It is only in this way that we can prefer the interest of many to the interest of one; the interest of others to our own. To fortify us in this hard lesson two different schemes have been proposed; one to increase our feelings for others, the other to diminish our feelings for ourselves. The first is prescribed by the whining and melancholy moralists, who will never allow us to be happy, because at every moment many of our fellow-beings are in misery. The second is the doctrine of the Stoics, who annihilate self-interest in favour of the vast commonwealth of nature; on that the author bestows a lengthened comment and correction, founded on his theory of regulating the manifestations of joy or grief by the light of the impartial judge. He gives his own panacea for human misery, namely, the power of nature to accommodate men to their permanent situa-

ation, and to restore tranquillity, which is the one secret of happiness.

Chapter IV. handles Self-Deceit, and the Origin and Use of General Rules. The interference of our passions is the great obstacle to our holding towards ourselves the position of an impartial spectator. From this notorious fact the author deduces an argument against a special moral faculty, or moral sense; he says that if we had such a faculty, it would surely judge our own passions, which are the most clearly laid open to it, more correctly than the passions of others.

To correct our self-partiality and self-deceit is the use of general rules. Our repeated observations on the tendency of particular acts, teach us what is fit to be done generally; and our conviction of the propriety of the general rules is a powerful motive for applying them to our own case. It is a mistake to suppose, as some have done, that rules precede experience; on the contrary, they are formed by finding from experience that all actions of a certain kind, in certain circumstances, are approved of. When established, we appeal to them as standards of judgment in right and wrong, but they are not the original judgments of mankind, nor the ultimate foundations of moral sentiment.

Chapter V. continues the subject of the authority and influence of General Rules, maintaining that they are justly regarded as laws of the Deity. The grand advantage of general rules is to give steadiness to human conduct, and to enable us to resist our temporary varieties of temper and disposition. They are thus a grand security for human duties. That the important rules of morality should be accounted laws of the Deity is a natural sentiment. Men have always ascribed to their deities their own sentiments and passions; the deities held by them in special reverence, they have endowed with their highest ideal of excellence, the love of virtue and beneficence, and the abhorrence of vice and injustice. The researches of philosophical inquiry confirmed mankind in the supposition that the moral faculties carry the badge of authority, that they were intended as the governing principles of our nature, acting as the vicegerents of the Deity. This inference is confirmed by the view that the happiness of men, and of other rational creatures, is the original design of the Author of nature, the only purpose reconcilable with the perfections we ascribe to him.

Chapter VI. is on the cases where the Sense of Duty should be the sole motive of conduct; and on those where it

ought to join with other motives. Allowing the importance of religion among human motives, he does not concur with the view that would make religious considerations the sole landable motives of action. The sense of duty is not the only principle of our conduct; it is the ruling or governing one. It may be a question, however, on what occasions we are to proceed strictly by the sense of duty, and on what occasions give way to some other sentiment or affection. The author answers that in the actions prompted by benevolent affections, we are to follow out our sentiments as much as our sense of duty; and the contrary with the malevolent passions. As to the selfish passions, we are to follow duty in small matters, and self-interest in great. But the rules of duty predominate most in cases where they are determined with exactness, that is, in the virtue of Justice.

PART IV. OF THE EFFECT OF UTILITY UPON THE SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION.

Chapter I. is on the Beauty arising out of Utility. It is here that the author sets forth the dismal career of 'the poor man's son, whom heaven in the hour of her anger has cursed with ambition,' and enforces his favourite moral lesson of contentment and tranquillity.

Chapter II. is the connexion of Utility with Moral Approbation. There are many actions possessing the kind of beauty or charm arising from utility; and hence, it may be maintained (as was done by Hume) that our whole approbation of virtue may be explained on this principle. And it may be granted that there is a coincidence between our sentiments of approbation or disapprobation, and the useful or hurtful qualities of actions. Still, the author holds that this utility or hurtfulness is not the foremost or principal source of our approbation. In the first place, he thinks it incongruous that we should have no other reason for praising a man than for praising a chest of drawers. In the next place, he contends at length that the usefulness of a disposition of mind is seldom the first ground of our approbation. Take, for example, the qualities useful to ourselves—reason and self-command; we approve the first as just and accurate, before we are aware of its being useful; and as to self-command, we approve it quite as much for its propriety as for its utility; it is the coincidence of our opinion with the opinion of the spectator, and not an estimate of the comparative utility, that affects us. Regarding the qualities useful to others—humanity, generosity, public spirit and justice—he merely repeats his own theory that they

are approved by our entering into the view of the impartial spectator. The examples cited only show that these virtues are not approved from self-interest; as when the soldier throws away his life to gain something for his sovereign. He also puts the case of a solitary human being, who might see fitness in actions, but could not feel moral approbation.

PART V. THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM ON THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. The first chapter is a pleasing essay on the influence of custom and fashion on manners, dress, and in Fine Art generally. The second chapter makes the application to our moral sentiments. Although custom will never reconcile us to the conduct of a Nero or a Claudius, it will heighten or blunt the delicacy of our sentiments on right and wrong. The fashion of the times of Charles II. made dissoluteness repntable, and discountenanced regularity of conduct. There is a customary behaviour that we expect in the old and in the young, in the clergyman and in the military man. The situations of different ages and countries develop characteristic qualities—endurance in the savage, humanity and softness in the civilized community. But these are not the extreme instances of the principle. We find particular usages, where custom has rendered lawful and blameless actions, that shock the plainest principles of right and wrong; the most notorious and universal is infanticide.

PART VI. THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE.

Section I. is on *Prudence*, and is an elegant essay on the *beau idéal* of the prudential character. *Section II.* considers *character as affecting other people*. Chapter I. is a disquisition on the comparative priority of the objects of our regard. After self, which must ever have the first place, the members of our own family are recommended to our consideration. Remoter connexions of blood are more or less regarded according to the customs of the country; in pastoral countries clanship is manifested; in commercial countries distant relationship becomes indifferent. Official and business connexions, and the association of neighbourhood, determine friendships. Special estimation is a still preferable tie. Favours received determine and require favours in return. The distinction of ranks is so far founded in nature as to deserve our respect. Lastly, the miserable are recommended to our compassion. Next, as regards *societies* (Chap. II.), since our own country stands first in our regard, the author dilates on the virtues of a good citizen. Finally, although our effectual good offices may not extend beyond our country, our good-will may

embrace the whole universe. This universal benevolence, however, the author thinks must repose on the belief in a benevolent and all-wise governor of the world, as realized, for example, in the meditations of Marcus Antoninus.

Section III. Of Self-command. On this topic the author produces a splendid moral essay, in which he describes the various modes of our self-estimation, and draws a contrast between pride and vanity. In so far as concerns his Ethical theory, he has still the same criterion of the virtue, the degree and mode commended by the impartial spectator.

PART VII. OF SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. On this we need only to remark that it is an interesting and valuable contribution to the history and the criticism of the Ethical systems.*

The Ethical theory of Adam Smith may be thus summed up:—

I.—The Ethical Standard is the judgment of an impartial spectator or critic; and our own judgments are derived by reference to what this spectator would approve or disapprove.

Probably to no one has this ever appeared a sufficient account of Right and Wrong. It provides against one defect, the self-partiality of the agent; but gives no account whatever of the grounds of the critic's own judgment, and makes no provision against his fallibility. It may be very well on points where men's moral sentiments are tolerably unanimous, but it

* It is perhaps worth while to quote a sentence or two, giving the author's opinion on the theory of the Moral Sense. 'Against every account of the principle of approbation, which makes it depend upon a peculiar sentiment, distinct from every other, I would object, that it is strange that this sentiment, which Providence undoubtedly intended to be the governing principle of human nature, should hitherto have been so little taken notice of, as not to have got a name in any language. The word Moral Sense is of very late formation, and cannot yet be considered as making part of the English tongue. The word approbation has but within these few years been appropriated to denote peculiarly anything of this kind. In propriety of language we approve of whatever is entirely to our satisfaction—of the form of a building, of the contrivance of a machine, of the flavour of a dish of meat. The word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions. When love, hatred, joy, sorrow, gratitude, resentment, with so many other passions which are all supposed to be the subjects of this principle, have made themselves considerable enough to get titles to know them by, is it not surprising that the sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so little heeded; that, a few philosophers excepted, nobody has yet thought it worth while to bestow a name upon it?'

is valueless in all questions where there are fundamental differences of view.

II.—In the Psychology of Ethics, Smith would consider the moral Faculty as identical with the power of Sympathy, which he treats as the foundation of Benevolence. A man is a moral being in proportion as he can enter into, and realize, the feelings, sentiments, and opinions of others.

Now, as morality would never have existed but for the necessity of protecting one human being against another, the power of the mind that adopts other people's interests and views must always be of vital moment as a spring of moral conduct; and Adam Smith has done great service in developing the workings of the sympathetic impulse.

He does not discuss Free-will. On the question of Disinterested Conduct, he gives no clear opinion. While denying that our sympathetic impulses are a refinement of self-love, he would seem to admit that they bring their own pleasure with them; so that, after all, they do not detract from our happiness. In other places, he recognizes self-sacrifice, but gives no analysis of the motives that lead to it; and seems to think, with many other moralists, that it requires a compensation in the next world.

III.—His theory of the constituents of Happiness is simple, primitive, and crude, but is given with earnest conviction. Ambition he laughs to scorn. 'What, he asks, can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, out of debt, and has a clear conscience?' Again, 'the chief part of happiness consists in the consciousness of being beloved, hence, sudden changes of fortune seldom contribute to happiness.' But what he dwells upon most persistently, as the prime condition of happiness, is Contentment, and Tranquillity.

IV.—On the Moral Code, he has nothing peculiar. As to the means and inducements to morality, he does not avail himself of the fertility of his own principle of Sympathy. Appeals to sympathy, and the cultivation of the power of entering into the feelings of others, could easily be shown to play a high part in efficacious moral suasion.

V.—He affords little or no grounds for remarking on the connexion of Morality with Politics. Our duties as citizens are a part of Morality, and that is all.

VI.—He gives his views on the alliance of Ethics with Religion. He does not admit that we should refer to the Religious sanction on all occasions. He assumes a benevolent and all-wise Governor of the world, who will ultimately

redress all inequalities, and remedy all outstanding injustice. What this Being approves, however, is to be inferred solely from the principles of benevolence. Our regard for him is to be shown, not by frivolous observances, sacrifices, ceremonies, and vain supplications, but by just and beneficent actions. The author studiously ignores a revelation, and constructs for himself a Natural Religion, grounded on a benevolent and just administration of the universe.

In Smith's Essay, the purely scientific enquiry is overlaid by practical and hortatory dissertations, and by eloquent delineations of character and of beau-ideals of virtuous conduct. His style being thus pitched to the popular key, he never pushes home a metaphysical analysis; so that even his favourite theme, Sympathy, is not philosophically sifted to the bottom.

DAVID HARTLEY. [1705-1757]

The 'Observations on Man' (1749) is the first systematic effort to explain the phenomena of mind by the Law of Association. It contains also a philosophical hypothesis, that mental states are produced by the *vibration* of infinitesimal particles of the nerves. This analogy, borrowed from the undulations of the hypothetical substance æther, has been censured as crude, and has been entirely superseded. But, although an imperfect analogy, it nevertheless kept constantly before the mind of Hartley the double aspect of all mental phenomena, thus preventing erroneous explanations, and often suggesting correct ones. In this respect, Aristotle and Hobbes are the only persons that can be named as equally fortunate.

The ethical remarks contained in the 'Observations,' relate only to the second head of summary, the Psychology of Ethics. We shall take, first, the account of disinterestedness, and, next, of the moral sense.

1. *Disinterestedness.* Under the name *Sympathy*, Hartley includes four kinds of feelings:—(1) Rejoicing at the happiness of others—Sociality, Good-will, Generosity, Gratitude; (2) Grieving for the misery of others—Compassion, Mercy; (3) Rejoicing at the misery of others—Anger, Jealousy, Cruelty, Malice; and (4) Grieving for the happiness of others—Emulation, Envy. All these feelings may be shown to originate in association. We select as examples of Hartley's method, Benevolence and Compassion. Benevolence is the pleasing affection that prompts us to act for the benefit of others. It is not a primitive feeling; but grows out of such

circumstances as the following. Almost all the pleasures, and few, in comparison, of the pains, of children, are caused by others; who are thus, in the course of time, regarded with pleasure, independently of their usefulness to us. Many of our pleasures are enjoyed along with, and are enhanced by, the presence of others. This tends to make us more sociable. Moreover, we are taught and required to put on the appearance of good-will, and to do kindly actions, and this may beget in us the proper feelings. Finally, we must take into account the praise and rewards of benevolence, together with the reciprocity of benefits that we may justly expect. All those elements may be so mixed and blended as to produce a feeling that shall teach us to do good to others without any expectation of reward, even that most refined recompense—the pleasure arising from a beneficent act. Thus Hartley conceives that he both proves the existence of disinterested feeling, and explains the manner of its development.

His account of *Compassion* is similar. In the young, the signs and appearances of distress excite a painful feeling, by recalling their own experience of misery. In the old, the connexion between a feeling and its adjuncts has been weakened by experience. Also, when children are brought up together, they are often annoyed by the same things, and this tends powerfully to create a fellow-feeling. Again, when their parents are ill, they are taught to cultivate pity, and are also subjected to unusual restraints. All those things conspire to make children desire to remove the sufferings of others. Various circumstances increase the feeling of pity, as when the sufferers are beloved by us, or are morally good. It is confirmatory of this view, that the most compassionate are those whose nerves are easily irritable, or whose experience of affliction has been considerable.

2.—*The Moral Sense.* Hartley denies the existence of any moral instinct, or any moral judgments, proceeding upon the eternal relations of things. If there be such, let instances of them be produced prior to the influence of associations. Still, our moral approbation or disapprobation is disinterested, and has a factitious independence. (1) Children are taught what is right and wrong, and thus the associations connected with the idea of praise and blame are transferred to the virtues inculcated and the vices condemned. (2) Many vices and virtues, such as sensuality, intemperance, malice, and the opposites, produce *immediate* consequences of evil and good

respectively. (3) The benefits, immediate or (at least) obvious, flowing from the virtues of others, kindle love towards them, and thereafter to the virtues they exhibit. (4) Another consideration is the *loveliness of virtue*, arising from the suitableness of the virtues to each other, and to the beauty, order, and perfection of the world. (5) The hopes and fears connected with a future life, strengthen the feelings connected with virtue. (6) Meditation upon God and prayer have a like effect. 'All the pleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition (pride and vanity), self-interest, sympathy, and theopathy (affection towards God), as far as they are consistent with one another, with the frame of our natures, and with the course of the world, beget in us a moral sense, and lead us to the love and approbation of virtue, and to the fear, hatred, and abhorrence of vice. This moral sense, therefore, carries its own authority with it, inasmuch as it is the sum total of all the rest, and the ultimate result from them; and employs the whole force and authority of the whole nature of man against any particular part of it that rebels against the determinations and commands of the conscience or moral judgment.'

Hartley's analysis of the moral sense is a great advance upon Hobbes and Mandeville, who make self-love the immediate constituent, instead of a remote cause, of conscience. Our moral consciousness may thus be treated as peculiar and distinguishable from other mental states, while at the same time it is denied to be unique and irresolvable.

THOMAS REID * [1710-95.]

Reid's Ethical views are given in his *Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind*.

* ADAM FERGUSON (1724-1816), is not of sufficient importance in purely Ethical theory to demand a full abstract. The following remark on his views is made by Professor Veitch:—'Ferguson, while holding with Reid that the notion of Rightness is not resolvable into utility, or to be derived from sympathy or a moral sense, goes a step beyond both Reid and Stewart in the inquiry which he raises regarding the definite nature and ground of Rightness itself.' The following is his definition of Moral Good:—'Moral good is the specific excellence and felicity of human nature, and moral depravity its specific defect and wretchedness.' The 'excellence' of human nature consists in four things, drawn out after the analogy of the cardinal virtues: (1) *Shrewdness* (Wisdom); (2) *Benignity*, the principal excellence of a creature destined to perform a part in social life (Justice); (3) *Application of mind* (Temperance); (4) *Power*, or energy to overcome obstacles (Fortitude). Regarding the nature to

ESSAY III., entitled THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION, contains (Part III.) a disquisition on the *Rational Principles of Action*, as opposed to what Reid calls respectively *Mechanical Principles* (Instinct, Habit), and *Animal Principles* (Appetites, Desires, Affections).

The Rational Principles of Action are Prudence, or regard to our own good on the whole, and Duty, which, however, he does not define by the antithetical circumstance—the ‘good of others.’ The notion of Duty, he says, is too simple for logical definition, and can only be explained by synonymes—*what we ought to do*; what is fair and honest; what is approvable; the professed rule of men’s conduct; what all men praise; the laudable in itself, though no man praise it.

Duty, he says, cannot be resolved into Interest. The language of mankind makes the two distinct. Disregard of our interest is folly; of honour, baseness. Honour is more than mere reputation, for it keeps us right when we are not seen. This principle of Honour (so-called by men of rank) is, in vulgar phrase, honesty, probity, virtue, conscience; in philosophical language, the moral sense, the moral faculty, rectitude.

The principle is universal in men grown up to years of understanding. Such a testimony as Hume’s may be held decisive on the reality of moral distinctions. The ancient world recognized it in the leading terms, *honestum* and *utile*, &c.

The abstract notion of Duty is a relation between the action and the agent. It must be voluntary, and within the power of the agent. The opinion (or intention) of the agent gives the act its moral quality.

As to the Sense of Duty, Reid pronounces at once, without hesitation, and with very little examination, in favour of an original power or faculty, in other words, a Moral Sense. Intellectual judgments are judgments of the external senses; moral judgments result from an internal moral sense. The external senses give us our intellectual first principles; the moral sense our moral first principles. He is at pains to exemplify the deductive process in morals. It is a question of moral reasoning, Ought a man to have only one wife?

virtue, either virtue is its own reward, or divine rewards and punishments constitute a sanction; but, in any case, the motive is our own happiness. All the virtues enumerated are themselves useful or pleasant, but, over and above, they give rise to an additional pleasure, when they are made the subject of reflection.

The reasons are, the greater good of the family, and of society in general; but no reason can be given why we should prefer greater good; it is an intuition of the moral sense.

He sums up the chapter thus:—‘That, by an original power of the mind, which we call *conscience*, or the *moral faculty*, we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation, and our other moral conceptions; and that, by the same faculty, we perceive some things in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty; and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates, as upon the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural faculties.’ Hamilton remarks that this theory virtually founds morality on intelligence.

Moral Approbation is the affection and esteem accompanying our judgment of a right moral act. This is in all cases pleasurable, but most so, when the act is our own. So, conversely, for Moral Disapprobation.

Regarding Conscience, Reid remarks, first, that like all other powers it comes to maturity by insensible degrees, and may be a subject of culture or education. He takes no note of the difficulty of determining what is primitive and what is acquired. Secondly, Conscience is peculiar to man; it is wanting in the brutes. Thirdly, it is evidently intended to be the director of our conduct; and fourthly, it is an Active power and an Intellectual power combined.

ESSAY IV. is OF THE LIBERTY OF MORAL AGENTS, which we pass by, having noticed it elsewhere. ESSAY V. is OF MORALS.

Chapter I. professes to enumerate the axiomatic first principles of Morals. Some of these relate (A) to virtue in general: as (1) There are actions deserving of praise, and others deserving blame; (2) the involuntary is not an object of praise or blame; (3) the unavoidable is not an object of praise or blame; (4) omission may be culpable; (5) we ought to inform ourselves as to duty; (6) we should fortify ourselves against temptation. Other principles relate (B) to particular virtues: (1) We should prefer a greater good to a less; (2) we should comply with the intention of nature, apparent in our constitution; (3) no man is born for himself alone; (4) we should judge according to the rule, ‘Do to others,’ &c.; (5) if we believe in God, we should venerate and submit to him. A third class of principles (C) settle the preference

among opposing virtues. Thus, unmerited generosity should yield to gratitude, and both to justice.

Chapter II. remarks upon the growth and peculiar advantages of Systems of Morals. Chapter III. is on Systems of Natural Jurisprudence. The four subsequent chapters of the Essay he states to have been composed in answer to the Ethical doctrines of Hume.

Chapter IV. enquires whether a moral action must proceed from a moral purpose in the agent. He decides in the affirmative, replying to certain objections, and more especially to the allegation of Hume, that justice is not a natural, but an artificial virtue. This last question is pursued at great length in Chapter V., and the author takes occasion to review the theory of Utility or Benevolence, set up by Hume as the basis of morals. He gives Hume the credit of having made an important step in advance of the Epicurean, or Selfish, system, by including the good of others, as well as our own good, in moral acts. Still, he demands why, if Utility and Virtue are identical, the same name should not express both. It is true, that virtue is both agreeable and useful in the highest degree; but that circumstance does not prevent it from having a quality of its own, not arising from its being useful and agreeable, but arising from its being virtue. The common good of society, though a pleasing object to all men, hardly ever enters into the thoughts of the great majority; and, if a regard to it were the sole motive of justice, only a select number would ever be possessed of the virtue. The notion of justice carries inseparably along with it a notion of moral obligation; and no act can be called an act of justice unless prompted by the motive of justice.

Then, again, good music and good cookery have the merit of utility, in procuring what is agreeable both to ourselves and to society, but they have never been denominated moral virtues; so that, if Hume's system be true, they have been very unfairly treated.

Reid illustrates his positions against Hume to a length unnecessary to follow. The objections are exclusively and effectively aimed at the two unguarded points of the Utility system as propounded by Hume; namely, first, the not recognizing moral rules as established and enforced among men by the dictation of authority, which does not leave to individuals the power of reference to ultimate ends; and, secondly, the not distinguishing between obligatory, and non-obligatory, useful acts.

Reid continues the controversy, with reference to Justice, in Chapter VI., on the Nature and Obligation of a Contract; and in Chapter VII. maintains, in opposition to Hume, that Moral approbation implies a Judgment of the intellect, and is not a mere feeling, as Hume seems to think. He allows the propriety of the phrase 'Moral Sentiment,' because 'Sentiment' in English means judgment accompanied with feeling. [Hamilton dissents, and thinks that sentiment means the higher feelings.] He says, if a moral judgment be no real judgment, but only a feeling, morals have no foundation but the arbitrary structure of the mind; there are no immutable moral distinctions; and no evidence for the moral character of the Deity.

We shall find the views of Reid substantially adopted, and a little more closely and concisely argued, by Stewart.

DUGALD STEWART. [1753-1828]

In his 'Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind,' Stewart introduces the Moral Faculty in the same way as Reid. BOOK SECOND is entitled ONE RATIONAL AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. Chapter I., on Prudence or Self-love, is unimportant for our present purpose, consisting of some desultory remarks on the connexion of happiness with steadiness of purpose, and on the meanings of the words 'self-love' and 'selfishness.'

Chapter II. is on the Moral Faculty, and is intended to show that it is an original principle of the mind. He first replies to the theory that identifies Morality with Prudence, or Self-love. His first argument is the existence in all languages of different words for *duty* and for *utility*. Secondly, The emotions arising from the contemplation of right and wrong are different from those produced by a regard to our own happiness. Thirdly, although in most instances a sense of duty, and an enlightened regard to our own happiness, would suggest to us the same line of conduct, yet this truth is not obvious to mankind generally, who are incapable of appreciating enlarged views and remote consequences. He repeats the common remark, that we secure our happiness best by not looking to it as the one primary end. Fourthly, moral judgments appear in children, long before they can form the general notion of happiness. His examples of this position, however, have exclusive reference to the sentiment of pity, which all moralists regard as a primitive feeling, while few admit it to be the same as the moral sense.

He then takes notice of the Association Theory of Hartley, Paley, and others, which he admits to be a great refinement of the old selfish system, and an answer to one of his arguments. He maintains, nevertheless, that the others are untouched by it, and more especially the third, referring to the amount of experience and reflection necessary to discover the tendency of virtue to promote our happiness, which is inconsistent with the early period when our moral judgments appear. [It is singular that he should not have remarked that the moral judgments of that early age, if we except what springs from the impulses of pity, are wholly communicated by others.] He quotes Paley's reasoning against the Moral Sense, and declares that he has as completely mis-stated the issue, as if one were to contend that because we are not born with the knowledge of light and colours, therefore the sense of seeing is not an original part of the frame. [It would be easy to retort that all that Paley's case demanded was the same power of *discrimination* in moral judgments, as the power of discriminating light and dark belonging to our sense of sight.]

Chapter III. continues the subject, and examines objections. The first objection taken up is that derived from the influence of education, with which he combines the farther objection (of Locke and his followers) arising from the diversity of men's moral judgments in various nations. With regard to education, he contends that there are limits to its influence, and that however it may modify, it cannot create our judgments of right and wrong, any more than our notions of beauty and deformity. As to the historical facts relating to the diversity of moral judgments, he considers it necessary to make full allowance for three circumstances—I.—Difference of situation with regard to climate and civilization. II.—Diversity of speculative opinions, arising from difference of intellectual capacity; and, III.—The different moral import of the same action under different systems of behaviour. On the first head he explains the indifference to theft from there being little or no fixed property; he adduces the variety of sentiments respecting Usury, as having reference to circumstances; and alludes to the differences of men's views as to political assassination. On the second head he remarks, that men may agree on *ends*, but may take different views as to means; they may agree in recognizing obedience to the Deity, but differ in their interpretations of his will. On the third point, as regards the different moral import of the same action, he suggests that

Locke's instance of the killing of aged parents is merely the recognized mode of filial affection; he also quotes the exceeding variety of ceremonial observances.

Chapter IV. comments farther on the objections to the reality and immutability of moral distinctions and to the universal diffusion of the moral faculty. The reference is, in the first instance, to Locke, and then to what he terms, after Adam Smith, the licentious moralists—La Rochefoucauld and Mandeville. The replies to these writers contain nothing special to Stewart.

Chapter V. is the Analysis of our Moral Perceptions and Emotions. This is a somewhat singular phrase in an author recognizing a separate inborn faculty of Right. His analysis consists in a separation of the entire fact into three parts:—(1) the perception of an action as right or wrong; (2) an emotion of pleasure or pain, varying according to the moral sensibility; (3) a perception of the merit or demerit of the agent. The first is of course the main question; and the author gives a long review of the history of Ethical doctrines from Hobbes downwards, interspersing reflections and criticisms, all in favour of the intuitive origin of the sense. As illustrative parallels, he adduces Personal Identity, Causation, and Equality; all which he considers to be judgments involving simple ideas, and traceable only to some primitive power of the mind. He could as easily conceive a rational being formed to believe the three angles of a triangle to be equal to one right angle, as to believe that there would be no injustice in depriving a man of the fruits of his labours.

On the second point—the pleasure and pain accompanying right and wrong, he remarks on the one-sidedness of systems that treat the sense of right and wrong as an intellectual judgment purely (Clarke, &c.), or those that treat it as a feeling purely (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume). His remarks on the sense of Merit and Demerit in the agent are trivial or commonplace.

Chapter VI. is 'Of Moral Obligation.' It is needless to follow him on this subject, as his views are substantially a repetition of Butler's Supremacy of Conscience. At the same time, it may be doubted whether Butler entirely and unequivocally detached this supremacy from the command of the Deity, a point peculiarly insisted on by Stewart. His words are these:—

'According to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief that virtue is enjoined by the command of

God. But how, it may be asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two answers can be given. Either that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author and the Governor of the universe; or that a rational self-love should induce us, from motives of prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the Almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery. On the first supposition we reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion, and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation.

The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence, although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favour. Among others it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest: 2. That a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral attributes.

But farther, the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it, but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

In the last place, if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to our situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future state be proved, or even rendered probable by the light of nature? or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The truth is, that the strongest presumption for such a state is deduced from our natural notions of right and wrong; of merit and demerit; and from a comparison between these and the general course of human affairs.

In a chapter (VII.) entitled 'certain principles co-operating with our moral powers,' he discusses (1) a regard to character, (2) Sympathy, (3) the Sense of the Ridiculous, (4) Taste. The important topic is the second, Sympathy; which, psychologically, he would appear to regard as determined by the pleasure that it gives. Under this head he introduces a criticism of the Ethical theory of Adam Smith; and, adverting to the inadequacy of the theory to distinguish the *right* from the *actual* judgments of mankind, he remarks on Smith's ingenious fiction 'of an *abstract man* within the breast;' and states that Smith laid much greater stress on this fiction in the last edition of the *Moral Sentiments* published before his death. It is not without reason that Stewart warns against grounding theories on metaphorical expressions, such as this of Smith, or the Platonic Commonwealth of the Soul.

In Book IV. of the *Active Powers*, Stewart discusses our

Duties to Men,—both our fellow-creatures and ourselves. Our duties to our fellows are summed up in Benevolence, Justice, and Veracity. He devotes a chapter to each. In Chapter I., on Benevolence, he re-opens the consideration of the Ethical systems founded on Benevolence or Utility, and argues against them; but merely repeats the common-place objections—the incompetency of individuals to judge of remote tendencies, the pretext that would be afforded for the worst conduct, and each one's consciousness that a sense of *duty* is different from enlightened benevolence.

Chapter II. is on Justice; defined as the disposition that leads a man, where his own interests or passions are concerned, to act according to the judgment he would form of another man's duty in his situation. He introduces a criticism on Adam Smith, and re-asserts the doctrine of an innate faculty, explained as the *power of forming moral ideas*, and not as the innate possession of ideas. For the most part, his exposition is didactic and desultory, with occasional disquisitions of a critical and scientific nature; as, for example, some remarks on Hume's theory that Justice is an artificial virtue, an account of the basis of Jurisprudence, and a few observations on the Right of Property.

In Chapter III., on Veracity, he contends that considerations of utility do not account for the whole force of our approbation of this virtue. [So might any one say that considerations of what money can purchase do not account for the whole strength of avarice].

In Chapter IV. he deals with Duties to ourselves, and occupies the chapter with a dissertation on Happiness. He first gives an account of the theories of the Stoics and the Epicureans, which connect themselves most closely with the problem of Happiness; and next advances some observations of his own on the subject.

His first remark is on the influence of the Temper, by which he means the Resentful or Irascible passion, on Happiness. As against a censorious disposition, he sets up the pleasure of the benevolent sentiments; he enjoins candour with respect to the motives of others, and a devoted attachment to truth and virtue for their intrinsic excellence; and warns us, that the causes that alienate our affections from our fellow-creatures, suggest gloomy and Hamlet-like conceptions of the order of the universe.

He next adverts to the influence of the Imagination on Happiness. On this, he has in view the addition made to

our enjoyments or our sufferings by the respective predominance of hope or of fear in the mind. Allowing for constitutional bias, he recognizes, as the two great sources of a desponding imagination, Superstition and Scepticism, whose evils he descants upon at length. He also dwells on the influence of casual *associations* on happiness, and commends this subject to the care of educators; giving, as an example, the tendency of associations with Greece and Rome to add to the courage of the classically educated soldier.

His third position is the Influence of our Opinions on Happiness. He here quotes, from Ferguson, examples of opinions unfavourable to Happiness; such as these: 'that happiness consists in having nothing to do,' 'that anything is preferable to happiness,' 'that anything can amuse us better than our duties.' He also puts forward as a happy opinion the Stoical view, 'I am in the station that God has assigned me.' [It must be confessed, however, that these prescriptions savour of the Platonic device of inculcating opinions, not because of their truth, but because of their supposed good consequences otherwise: a proceeding scarcely compatible with an Ethical system that proclaims veracity as superior to utility. On such a system, we are prohibited from looking to anything in an opinion but its truth; we are to suffer for truth, and not to cultivate opinions because of their happy results.]

Stewart remarks finally on the influence of the Habits, on which he notices the power of the mind to accommodate itself to circumstances, and copies Paley's observations on the *setting* of the habits.

In continuation of the subject of Happiness, he presents a classification of our most important pleasures. We give the heads, there being little to detain us in the author's brief illustration of them. I.—The pleasures of Activity and Repose; II.—The pleasures of Sense; III.—The pleasures of the Imagination; IV.—The pleasures of the Understanding; and V.—The pleasures of the Heart, or of the various benevolent affections. He would have added Taste, or Fine Art, but this is confined to a select few.

In a concluding chapter (V.), he sums up the general result of the Ethical enquiry, under the title, 'the Nature and Essence of Virtue.' No observation of any novelty occurs in this chapter. Virtue is doing our duty; the intentions of the agent are to be looked to; the enlightened discharge of our duty often demands an exercise of the Reason

to adjudge between conflicting claims; there is a close relationship, not defined, between Ethics and Politics.

The views of Stewart represent, in the chief points, although not in all, the Ethical theory that has found the greatest number of supporters.

I.—The Standard is internal, or intuitive—the judgments of a Faculty, called the Moral Faculty. He does not approve of the phrase ‘Moral Sense,’ thinking the analogy of the senses incorrect.

II.—As regards Ethical Psychology, the first question is determined by the remarks on the Standard.

On the second question, Free-will, Stewart maintains Liberty.

On the third question, he gives, like many others, an uncertain sound. In his account of Pity, he recognizes three things, (1) a painful feeling, (2) a selfish desire to remove the cause of the uneasiness, (3) a disposition grounded on benevolent concern about the sufferer. This is at best vague. Equally so is what he states respecting the pleasures of sympathy and benevolence (Book II., Chapter VII.). There is, he says, a pleasure attached to fellow-feeling, a disposition to accommodate our minds to others, wherever there is a benevolent affection; and, in all probability, the pleasure of sympathy is the pleasure of loving and of being beloved. No definite proposition can be gathered from such loose allegations.

III.—We have already abstracted his chapter on Happiness.

IV.—On the Moral Code, he has nothing peculiar.

V.—On the connexion with Religion, we have seen that he is strenuous in his antagonism to the doctrine of the dependence of morality on the will of God. But, like other moralists of the same class, he is careful to add:—‘Although religion can with no propriety be considered as the sole foundation of morality, yet when we are convinced that God is infinitely good, and that he is the friend and protector of virtue, this belief affords the most powerful inducements to the practice of every branch of our duty.’ He has (Book III.) elaborately discussed the principles of Natural Religion, but, like Adam Smith, makes no reference to the Bible, or to Christianity. He is disposed to assume the benevolence of the Deity, but considers that to affirm it positively is to go beyond our depth.

THOMAS BROWN. [1778-1820.]

Brown's Ethical discussion commences in the 73rd of his *Lectures*. He first criticises the multiplicity of expressions used in the statement of the fundamental question of morals—"What is it that constitutes the action *virtuous*?" "What constitutes the *moral obligation* to perform certain actions?" "What constitutes the *merit* of the agent?"—These have been considered questions essentially distinct, whereas they are the very same question. There is at bottom but one emotion in the case, the emotion of approbation, or of disapprobation, of an agent acting in a certain way.

In answer then to the question as thus simplified, "What is the ground of moral approbation and disapprobation?" Brown answers—a simple emotion of the mind, of which no farther explanation can be given than that we are so constituted. Thus, without using the same term, he sides with the doctrine of the Innate Moral Sense. He illustrates it by another elementary fact of the mind, involved in the conception of cause and effect on his theory of that relation—the belief that the future will resemble the past. Excepting a teleological reference to the Supreme Benevolence of the Deity, he admits no farther search into the nature of the moral sentiment.

He adduces, as another illustration, what he deems the kindred emotion of Beauty. Our feeling of beauty is not the mere perception of forms and colours, or the discovery of the uses of certain combinations of forms; it is an emotion arising from these, indeed, but distinct from them. Our feeling of moral excellence, in like manner, is not the mere perception of different actions, or the discovery of the physical good that these may produce; it is an emotion *sui generis*, superadded to them.

He adverts, in a strain of eloquent indignation, to the objection grounded on differences of men's moral judgment. There are philosophers, he exclaims, "that can turn away from the conspiring chorus of the millions of mankind, in favour of the great truths of morals, to seek in some savage island, a few indistinct murmurs that may seem to be discordant with the total harmony of mankind." He goes on to remark, however, that in our zeal for the immutability of moral distinctions, we may weaken the case by contending for too much; and proposes to consider the species of accordance that may be safely argued for.

He begins by purging away the realistic notion of Virtue, considered as a self-existing entity. He defines it—a term expressing the relation of certain actions to certain emotions in the minds contemplating them; its universality is merely co-extensive with these minds. He then concedes that all mankind do not, at every moment, feel precisely the same emotions in contemplating the same actions, and sets forth the limitations as follows;—

First, In moments of violent passion, the mind is incapacitated for perceiving moral differences; we must, in such cases appeal, as it were, from Philip drunk to Philip sober.

Secondly, Still more important is the limitation arising from the complexity of many actions. Where good and evil results are so blended that we cannot easily assign the preponderance, different men may form different conclusions. Partiality of views may arise from this cause, not merely in individuals, but in whole nations. The legal permission of theft in Sparta is a case in point. Theft, as theft, and without relation to the political object of inuring a warlike people, would have been condemned in Sparta, as well as with us. [The retort of Locke is not out of place here; an innate moral sentiment that permits a fundamental virtue to be set aside on the ground of mere state convenience, is of very little value.] He then goes on to ask whether men, in approving these exceptions to morality, approve them because they are immoral? [The opponents of a moral sense do not contend for an immoral sense.] Suicide is not commended because it deprives society of useful members, and gives sorrow to relations and friends; the exposure of infants is not justified on the plea of adding to human suffering.

Again, the differences of cookery among nations are much wider than the differences of moral sentiment; and yet no one denies a fundamental susceptibility to sweet and bitter. It is not contended that we come into the world with a knowledge of actions, but that we have certain susceptibilities of emotion, in consequence of which, it is impossible for us, in after life, unless from counteracting circumstances, to be pleased with the contemplation of certain actions, and disgusted with certain other actions. When the doctrine is thus stated, Paley's objection, that we should also receive from nature the notions of the actions themselves, falls to the ground. As well might we require an instinctive notion of all possible numbers, to bear out our instinctive sense of proportion.

A third limitation must be added, the influence of the

principle of Association. One way that this operates is to transfer, to a whole class of actions, the feelings peculiar to certain marked individuals. Thus, in a civilized country, where property is largely possessed, and under complicated tenures, we become very sensitive to its violation, and acquire a proportionably intense sentiment of Justice. Again, association operates in modifying our approval and disapproval of actions according to their attendant circumstances; as when we extenuate misconduct in a beloved person.

The author contends that, notwithstanding these limitations, we still leave unimpaired the approbation of unmixed good as good, and the disapprobation of unmixed evil as evil. His further remarks, however, are mainly eloquent declamation on the universality of moral distinctions.

He proceeds to criticise the moral systems from Hobbes downwards. His remarks (Lecture 76) on the province of Reason in Morality, with reference to the systems of Clarke and Wollaston, contain the gist of the matter well expressed.

He next considers the theory of Utility. That Utility bears a certain relation to Virtue is unquestionable. Benevolence means good to others, and virtue is of course made up, in great part, of this. But then, if Utility is held to be the *measure* of virtue, standing in exact proportion to it, the proposition is very far from true; it is only a small portion of virtuous actions wherein the measure holds.

He does not doubt that virtuous actions do all tend, in a greater or less degree, to the advantage of the world. But he considers the question to be, whether what we have *alone in view*, in approving certain actions, be the amount of utility that they bring; whether we have no other reason for commending a man than for praising a chest of drawers.

Consider this question first from the point of view of the agent. Does the mother, in watching her sick infant, think of the good of mankind at that moment? Is the pity called forth by misery a sentiment of the general good? Look at it again from the point of view of the spectator. Is his admiration of a steam-engine, and of an heroic human action, the same sentiment? Why do we not worship the earth, the source of all our utilities? The ancient worshippers of nature always gave it a soul in the first instance.

When the supporter of Utility arbitrarily confines his principles to the actions of living beings, he concedes the point in dispute; he admits an approvableness peculiar to *living and voluntary agents*, a capacity of exciting moral emo-

tions not commensurate with any utility. Hume says, that the sentiments of utility connected with human beings are mixed with affection, esteem, and approbation, which do not attach to the utility of inanimate things. Brown replies, that these are the very sentiments to be accounted for, the moral part of the case.

But another contrast may be made; namely, between the utility of virtue and the utility of talent or genius, which we view with very different and unequal sentiments; the inventors of the printing press do not rouse the same emotions as the charities of the Man of Ross.

Still, he contends, like the other supporters of innate moral distinctions, for a pre-established harmony between the two attributes. Utility and virtue are so intimately related, that there is perhaps no action generally felt by us as virtuous, but what is generally beneficial. But this is only discovered by reflecting men; it never enters the mind of the unthinking multitude. Nay, more, it is only the Divine Being that can fully master this relationship, or so prescribe our duties that they shall ultimately coincide with the general happiness.

He allows that the immediate object of the legislator is the general good; but then his relationship is to the community as a whole, and not to any particular individual.

He admits, farther, that the good of the world at large, if not the *only* moral object, is a moral object, in common with the good of parents, friends, and others related to us in private life. Farther, it may be requisite for the moralist to correct our moral sentiments by requiring greater attention to public, and less to private, good; but this does not alter the nature of our moral feelings; it merely presents new objects to our *moral discrimination*. It gives an exercise to our reason in disentangling the complicated results of our actions.

He makes it also an objection to Utility, that it does not explain *why* we feel approbation of the useful, and disapprobation of the hurtful; forgetting that Benevolence is an admitted fact of our constitution, and may fairly be assigned by the moralist as the source of the moral sentiment.

His next remarks are on the Selfish Systems, his reply to which is the assertion of Disinterested Affections. He distinguishes two modes of assigning self-interest as the sole motive of virtuous conduct. First, it may be said that in every so-called virtuous action, we see some good to self, near or remote. Secondly, it may be maintained that we become at last disinterested by the associations of our own interest.

He calls in question this alleged process of association. Because a man's own cane is interesting to him, it does not follow that every other man's cane is interesting. [He here commits a mistake of fact; other men's walking canes are interesting to the interested owner of a cane. It may not follow that this interest is enough to determine self-sacrifice.]

It will be inferred that Brown contends warmly for the existence of Disinterested Affection, not merely as a present, but as a primitive, fact of our constitution. He does not always keep this distinct from the Moral Sentiment; he, in fact, mixes the two sentiments together in his language, a thing almost inevitable, but yet inconsistent with the advocacy of a distinct moral sentiment.

He includes among the Selfish Systems the Ethical Theory of Paley, which he reprobates in both its leading points—everlasting happiness as the motive, and the will of God as the rule. On the one point, this theory is liable to all the objections against a purely selfish system; and, on the other point, he makes the usual replies to the founding of morality on the absolute will of the Deity.

Brown next criticises the system of Adam Smith. Admitting that we have the sympathetic feeling that Smith proceeds upon, he questions its adequacy to constitute the moral sentiment, on the ground that it is not a perpetual accompaniment of our actions. There must be a certain *vividness* of feeling or of the display of feeling, or at least a sufficient cause of vivid feeling, to call the sympathy into action. In the numerous petty actions of life, there is an absence of any marked sympathy.

But the essential error of Smith's system is, that it assumes the very moral feelings that it is meant to explain. If there were no antecedent moral feelings, sympathy could not afford them; it is only a mirror to reflect what is already in existence. The feelings that we sympathize with, are themselves moral feelings already; if it were not so, the reflexion of them from a thousand breasts would not give them a moral nature.

Brown thinks that Adam Smith was to some extent misled by an ambiguity in the word sympathy; a word applied not merely to the participation of other men's feelings, but to the further and distinct fact of the *approbation* of those feelings.

Although siding in the main with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Brown objects to their designation Moral Sense, as expressing the innate power of moral approbation. If 'Sense' be interpreted merely as susceptibility, he has nothing to say,

but if it mean a primary medium of perception, like the eye or the ear, he considers it a mistake. It is, in his view, an *emotion*, like hope, jealousy, or resentment, rising up on the presentation of a certain class of objects. He farther objects to the phrase 'moral ideas,' also used by Hutcheson. The moral emotions are more akin to love and hate, than to perception or judgment.

Brown gives an exposition of Practical Ethics under the usual heads: Duties to Others, to God, to Ourselves. Duties to others he classifies thus:—I.—*Negative*, or abstinence from injuring others in Person, Property, Affections, Character or Reputation, Knowledge (veracity), Virtue, and Tranquillity; II. *Positive*, or Benevolence; and III.—Duties growing out of our *peculiar ties*—Affinity, Friendship, Good offices received, Contract, and Citizenship.

To sum up—

I.—As regards the Standard, Brown contends for an Innate Sentiment.

II.—The Faculty being thus determined, along with the Standard, we have only to resume his views as to Disinterested action. For a full account of these, we have to go beyond the strictly Ethical lectures, to his analysis of the Emotions. Speaking of love, he says that it includes a desire of doing good to the person loved; that it is necessarily pleasurable because there must be some quality in the object that gives pleasure; but it is not the mere pleasure of loving that makes us love. The qualities are delightful to love, and yet impossible not to love. He is more explicit when he comes to the consideration of Pity, recognizing the existence of sympathy, not only without liking for the object, but with positive dislike. In another place, he remarks that we desire the happiness of our fellows simply as human beings. He is opposed to the theory that would trace our disinterested affections to a selfish origin. He makes some attempt to refer to the laws of Association, the taking in of other men's emotions, but thinks that there is a reflex process besides.

Although recognizing in a vague way the existence of genuine disinterested impulses, he dilates eloquently, and often, on the deliciousness of benevolence, and of all virtuous feelings and conduct.

WILLIAM PALEY. [1743-1805].

The First Book of Paley's 'Moral and Political Philosophy' is entitled 'PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS;' it is in fact an

unmethodical account of various fundamental points of the subject. He begins by defining Moral Philosophy as '*that science which teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it.*' The ordinary rules are defective and may mislead, unless aided by a scientific investigation. These ordinary rules are the Law of Honour, the Law of the Land, and the Scriptures.

He commences with the Law of Honour, which he views in its narrow sense, as applied to people of rank and fashion. This is of course a very limited code.

The Law of the Land also must omit many duties, properly compulsory, as piety, benevolence, &c. It must also leave unpunished many vices, as luxury, prodigality, partiality. It must confine itself to offences strictly definable.

The Scriptures lay down general rules, which have to be applied by the exercise of reason and judgment. Moreover, they pre-suppose the principles of natural justice, and supply new sanctions and greater certainty. Accordingly, they do not dispense with a scientific view of morals.

[The correct arrangement of the common rules would have been (1) the Law of the Land, (2) the Laws of Society generally, and (3) the Scriptures. The Law of Honour is merely one application of the comprehensive agency of society in punishing men, by excommunication, for what it prohibits.]

Then follows his famous chapter on the MORAL SENSE.

It is by way of giving an effective statement of the point in dispute that he quotes the anecdote of Caius Toranius, as an extreme instance of filial ingratitude, and supposes it to be put to the wild boy caught in the woods of Hanover, with the view of ascertaining whether he would feel the sentiment of disapprobation as we do. Those that affirm an innate moral sense, must answer in the affirmative; those that deny it, in the negative.

He then recites the arguments on both sides.

For the moral sense, it is contended, that we approve examples of generosity, gratitude, fidelity, &c., on the instant, without deliberation and without being conscious of any assignable reason; and that this approbation is uniform and universal, the same sorts of conduct being approved or disapproved in all ages and countries; which circumstances point to the operation of an instinct, or a moral sense.

The answers to these allegations are—

First, The *Uniformity* spoken of is not admitted as a fact. According to the authentic accounts of historians and travellers, there is scarcely a single vice that, in some age or country of

the world, has not been countenanced by public opinion. The murder of aged parents, theft, suicide, promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, and unmentionable crimes have been tolerated and approved. Among ourselves, Duelling is viewed with the most opposite sentiments; forgiveness of injuries is accounted by some people magnanimity, and by others meanness. In these, and in many other instances, moral approbation follows the fashions and institutions of the country, which institutions have themselves grown out of local circumstances, the arbitrary authority of some chieftain, or the caprice of the multitude.

Secondly, That, although, after allowing for these exceptions, it is admitted that some sorts of actions are more approved than others, the approbation being general, although not universal, yet this may be accounted for, without supposing a moral sense, thus:—

Having experienced a particular line of conduct as beneficial to ourselves, for example, telling the truth, a sentiment of approbation grows up in consequence, and this sentiment thereupon arises whenever the action is mentioned, and without our thinking of the consequences in each instance. The process is illustrated by the love of money, which is strongest in the old, who least of all think of applying it to its uses. By such means, the approval of certain actions is commenced; and being once commenced, the continuance of the feeling is accounted for by authority, by imitation, and by all the usages of good society. As soon as an entire society is possessed of an ethical view, the initiation of the new members is sure and irresistible. The efficacy of Imitation is shown in cases where there is no authority or express training employed, as in the likings and dislikings, or tastes and antipathies, in mere matters of indifference.

So much in reply to the alleged uniformity. Next come the positive objections to a Moral Instinct.

In the first place, moral rules are not absolutely and universally true; they bend to circumstances. Veracity, which is a natural duty, if there be any such, is dispensed with in case of an enemy, a thief, or a madman. The obligation of promises is released under certain circumstances.

In the next place, the Instinct must bear with it the *idea* of the actions to be approved or disapproved; but we are not born with any such ideas.

On the whole, either there exist no moral instincts, or they are undistinguishable from prejudices and habits, and

are not to be trusted in moral reasonings. Aristotle held it as self-evident that barbarians are meant to be slaves; so do our modern slave-traders. This instance is one of many to show that the convenience of the parties has much to do with the rise of a moral sentiment. And every system built upon instincts is more likely to find excuses for existing opinions and practices than to reform either.

Again: supposing these Instincts to exist, what is their authority or power to punish? Is it the infliction of remorse? That may be borne with for the pleasures and profits of wickedness. If they are to be held as indications of the will of God, and therefore as presages of his intentions, that result may be arrived at by a snorer road.

The next preliminary topic is HUMAN HAPPINESS.

Happiness is defined as the excess of pleasure over pain. Pleasures are to be held as differing only in *continuance*, and in *intensity*. A computation made in respect of these two properties, confirmed by the degrees of cheerfulness, tranquillity, and contentment observable among men, is to decide all questions as to human happiness.

I.—What Human Happiness does not consist in.

Not in the pleasures of Sense, in whatever profusion or variety enjoyed; in which are included sensual pleasures, active sports, and Fine Art.

1st, Because they last for a short time. [Surely they are good for the time they do last.] 2ndly, By repetition, they lose their relish. [Intermission and variety, however, are to be supposed.] 3rdly, The eagerness for high and intense delights takes away the relish from all others.

Paley professes to have observed in the votaries of pleasure a restless craving for variety, languor under enjoyment, and misery in the want of it. After all, however, these pleasures have their value, and may be too much despised as well as too much followed.

Next, happiness does not consist in the exemption from pain (?), from labour, care, business, and outward evils; such exemption leaving one a prey to morbid depression, anxiety, and hypochondria. Even a pain in moderation may be a refreshment, from giving a stimulus to pursuit.

Nor does it consist in greatness, rank, or station. The reason here is derived, as usual, from the doctrine of Relativity or Comparison, pushed beyond all just limits. The illustration of the dependence of the pleasure of superiority on comparison is in Paley's happiest style.

II.—What happiness does consist in. Allowing for the great difficulties of this vital determination, he proposes to be governed by a reference to the conditions of life where men appear most cheerful and contented.

It consists, 1st, In the exercise of the social affections. 2ndly, The exercise of our faculties, either of body or of mind, in the pursuit of some engaging end. [This includes the two items of occupation and plot-interest.] 3rdly, Upon the prudent constitution of the habits; the prudent constitution being chiefly in moderation and simplicity of life, or in demanding few stimulants; and 4thly, In Health, whose importance he values highly, but not too highly.

The consideration of these negative and positive conditions, he thinks, justifies the two conclusions: (1) That happiness is pretty equally distributed amongst the different orders of society; and (2) That in respect of this world's happiness, vice has no advantage over virtue.

The last subject of the First Book is VIRTUE. The definition of virtue is '*the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.*'

If this were strictly interpreted according to its form, it would mean that three things go to constitute virtue, any one of which being absent, we should not have virtue. Doing good to mankind alone is not virtue, unless coupled with a divine requirement; and this addition would not suffice, without the farther circumstance of everlasting happiness as the reward. But such is not his meaning, nor is it easy to fix the meaning. He unites the two conditions—Human Happiness and the Will of the Deity—and holds them to coincide and to explain one another. Either of the two would be a sufficient definition of virtue; and he would add, as an explanatory proposition and a guide to practice, that the one may be taken as a clue to the other. In a double criterion like this, everything depends upon the manner of working it. By running from one of the tests to another at discretion, we may evade whatever is disagreeable to us in both.

Book II., entitled MORAL OBLIGATION, is the full development of his views. Reciting various theories of moral right and wrong, he remarks, first, that they all ultimately coincide; in other words, all the theorists agree upon the same rules of duty—a remark to be received with allowances; and next, that they all leave the matter short; none provide an adequate motive or inducement. [He omits to mention the theory of the Divine Will, which is partly his own theory].

In proceeding to supply this want, he asks first 'what is meant by being obliged to do a thing;' and answers, '*a violent motive resulting from the command of another.*' The motive must be violent, or have some degree of force to overcome reluctance or opposing tendencies. It must also result from the *command* of another; not the mere offer of a gratuity by way of inducement. Such is the nature of Law; we should not obey the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments depended on our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, do what is right, or obey God.

He then resumes the general question, under a concrete case, 'Why am I obliged to keep my word?' The answer accords with the above explanation;—Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive (namely, the rewards and punishments of a future life), resulting from the command of God. Private happiness is the motive, the will of God the rule. [Although not brought out in the present connexion, it is implied that the will of God intends the happiness of mankind, and is to be interpreted accordingly.]

Previously, when reasoning on the means of human happiness, he declared it to be an established conclusion, that virtue leads to happiness; even in this life; now he bases his own theory on the uncertainty of that conclusion. His words are, 'They who would establish a system of morality, independent of a future state, must look out for some other idea of moral obligation, *unless they can show* that virtue conducts the possessor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.' He does not make the obvious remark that *human* authority, as far as it goes, is also a source of obligation; it works by the very same class of means as the divine authority.

He next proceeds to enquire into the means of determining the WILL of God. There are two sources—the express declarations of Scripture, when they are to be had; and the design impressed on the world, in other words, the light of nature. This last source requires him, on his system, to establish the Divine Benevolence; and he arrives at the conclusion that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures, and accordingly, that the method of coming at his will concerning any action is to enquire into the tendency of that action to promote or to diminish the general happiness.

He then discusses UTILITY, with a view of answering the objection that actions may be useful, and yet such as no man will allow to be right. This leads him to distinguish between

the *particular* and the *general* consequences of actions, and to enforce the necessity of GENERAL RULES. An assassin, by knocking a rich villain on the head, may do immediate and particular good; but the liberty granted to individuals to kill whoever they should deem injurious to society, would render human life unsafe, and induce universal terror. 'Whatever is expedient is right,' but then it must be expedient on the whole, in the long run, in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as immediate and direct. When the *honestum* is opposed to the *utile*, the *honestum* means the general and remote consequences, the *utile* the particular and the near.

The concluding sections of Book II. are occupied with the consideration of RIGHT and RIGHTS. A Right is of course correlative with an Obligation. Rights are Natural or Adventitious; Alienable or Inalienable; Perfect or Imperfect. The only one of these distinctions having any Ethical application is Perfect and Imperfect. The Perfect Rights are, the Imperfect are not, enforced by Law.

Under the 'general Rights of mankind,' he has a discussion as to our right to the flesh of animals, and contends that it would be difficult to defend this right by any arguments drawn from the light of nature, and that it reposes on the text of Genesis ix. 1, 2, 3.

As regards the chief bulk of Paley's work, it is necessary only to indicate his scheme of the Duties, and his manner of treating them.

Book III. considers RELATIVE DUTIES. There are three classes of these. First, Relative Duties that are *Determinate*, meaning all those that are strictly defined and enforced; these growing out of Promises, Contracts, Oaths, and Subscriptions to Articles of Religion. Secondly, Relative Duties that are *Indeterminate*, as Charity, in its various aspects of treatment of dependents, assistance to the needy, &c.; the checks on Anger and Revenge; Gratitude, &c. Thirdly, the Relative Duties growing out of the *Sins*.

Book IV. is DUTIES TO OURSELVES, and treats of Self-defence, Drunkenness, and Suicide.

Book V. comprises DUTIES TOWARDS GOD.

Book VI. is occupied with Politics and Political Economy. It discusses the Origin of Civil Government, the Duty of Submission to Government, Liberty, the Forms of Government, the British Constitution, the Administration of Justice, &c.

The Ethical Theory of Paley may be briefly resumed thus:—

I.—The Ethical Standard with him is the conjoined reference to the Will of the Deity, and to Utility, or Human Happiness. He is unable to construct a scheme applicable to mankind generally, until they are first converted to a belief in Revelation.

II.—The Psychology implied in his system involves his most characteristic features.

1. He is unmistakeable in repudiating Innate Moral Distinctions, and on this point, and on this only, is he thoroughly at one with the Utilitarians of the present day.

2. On the Theory of Will he has no remarks. He has an utter distaste for anything metaphysical.

3. He does not discuss Disinterested Sentiment; by implication, he denies it. 'Without the expectation of a future existence,' he says, 'all reasoning upon moral questions is vain.' He cannot, of course, leave out all reference to generosity. Under 'Pecuniary Bounty' he makes this remark—'They who rank pity amongst the original impulses of our nature, rightly contend, that when this principle prompts us to the relief of human misery, it indicates the Divine intention and our duty. Whether it be an instinct or a habit (?), it is, in fact, a property of our nature, which God appointed, &c.' This is his first argument for charity; the second is derived from the original title of mankind, granted by the Deity, to hold the earth in common; and the third is the strong injunctions of Scripture on this head. He cannot, it seems, trust human nature with a single charitable act apart from the intervention of the Deity.

III.—He has an explicit scheme of Happiness.

IV.—The Substance of his Moral Code is distinguished from the current opinions chiefly by his well-known views on Subscription to Articles. He cannot conceive how, looking to the incurable diversity of human opinion on all matters short of demonstration, the legislature could expect the perpetual consent of a body of ten thousand men, not to one controverted proposition, but to many hundreds.

His inducements to the performance of duty are, as we should expect, a mixed reference to Public Utility and to Scripture.

In the Indeterminate Duties, where men are urged by moral considerations, to the exclusion of legal compulsion, he sometimes appeals directly to our generous sympathies, as well as to self-interest, but usually ends with the Scripture authority.

V.—The relation of Ethics to Politics is not a prominent feature in Paley. He makes moral rules repose finally, not upon human, but upon Divine Law. Hence (VI.) the connexion of his system with Theology is fundamental.

JEREMY BENTHAM. [1749-1832.]

The Ethical System of Jeremy Bentham is given in his work, entitled 'An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,' first published in 1789. In a posthumous work, entitled 'Deontology,' his principles were farther illustrated, chiefly with reference to the minor morals and amiable virtues.

It is the first-named work that we shall here chiefly notice. In it, the author has principally in view Legislation; but the same common basis, Utility, serves, in his judgment, for Ethics, or Morals.

The first chapter, entitled 'THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY,' begins thus:—'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong; on the other, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The *principle of utility* recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hand of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.'

He defines Utility in various phrases, all coming to the same thing:—the tendency of actions to promote the happiness, and to prevent the misery, of the party under consideration, which party is usually the community where one's lot is cast. Of this principle no proof can be offered; it is the first axiom, on which alone we can found all arguments of a moral kind. He that attempts to combat it, usually assumes it, unawares. An opponent is challenged to say—(1) if he discards it wholly; (2) if he will act without any principle, or if there is any other that he would judge by; (3) if that other be really and distinctly separate from utility; (4) if he is inclined

to set up his own approbation or disapprobation as the rule; and if so, whether he will force that upon others, or allow each person to do the same; (5) in the first case, if his principle is not despotical; (6) in the second case, whether it is not anarchical; (7) supposing him to add the plea of reflection, let him say if the basis of his reflections excludes utility; (8) if he means to compound the matter, and take utility for part; and if so, for what part; (9) why he goes so far, with Utility, and no farther; (10) on what other principle a meaning can be attached to the words *motive* and *right*.

In Chapter II., Bentham discusses the PRINCIPLES ADVERSE TO UTILITY. He conceives two opposing grounds. The first mode of opposition is direct and constant, as exemplified in *Asceticism*. A second mode may be only occasional, as in what he terms the principle of *Sympathy and Antipathy* (Liking and Disliking).

The principle of *Asceticism* means the approval of an action according to its tendency to diminish happiness, or obversely. Any one reprobatng in any shape, pleasure as such, is a partisan of this principle. Asceticism has been adopted, on the one hand, by certain moralists, from the spur of philosophic pride; and on the other hand, by certain religionists, under the impulse of fear. It has been much less admitted into Legislation than into Morals. It may have originated, in the first instance, with hasty speculators, looking at the pains attending certain pleasures in the long run, and pushing the abstinence from such pleasures (justified to a certain length on prudential grounds) so far as to fall in love with pain.

The other principle, *Sympathy and Antipathy*, means the unreasoning approbation or disapprobation of the individual mind, where fancy, caprice, accidental liking or disliking, may mix with a regard to human happiness. This is properly the negation of a principle. What we expect to find in a principle is some *external* consideration, warranting and guiding our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation; a basis that all are agreed upon.

It is under this head that Bentham rapidly surveys and dismisses all the current theories of Right and Wrong. They consist all of them, he says, in so many contrivances for avoiding an appeal to any external standard, and for requiring us to accept the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The dictates of this principle, however, will often unintentionally coincide with utility; for what more natural

ground of hatred to a practice can there be than its mischievous tendency? The things that men suffer by, they will be disposed to hate. Still, it is not constant in its operation; for people may ascribe the suffering to the wrong cause. The principle is most liable to err on the side of severity; differences of taste and of opinion are sufficient grounds for quarrel and resentment. It will err on the side of lenity, when a mischief is remote and imperceptible.

The author reserves a distinct handling for the Theological principle; alleging that it falls under one or other of the three foregoing. The Will of God must mean his will as revealed in the sacred writings, which, as the labours of divines testify, themselves stand in need of interpretation. What is meant, in fact, is the *presumptive* will of God; that is, what is presumed to be his will on account of its conformity with another principle. We are pretty sure that what is right is conformable to his will, but then this requires us first to know what is right. The usual mode of knowing God's pleasure (he remarks) is to observe what is our own pleasure, and pronounce that to be his.

Chapter III.—ON FOUR SANCTIONS OR SOURCES OF PAIN AND PLEASURE whereby men are stimulated to act right; they are termed, *physical, political, moral, and religious*. These are the Sanctions of Right.

The *physical* sanction includes the pleasures and pains arising in the ordinary course of nature, unmodified by the will of any human being, or of any supernatural being.

The *political* sanction is what emanates from the sovereign or supreme ruling power of the state. The punishments of the Law come under this head.

The *moral* or *popular* sanction results from the action of the community, or of the individuals that each person comes in contact with, acting without any settled or concerted rule. It corresponds to public opinion, and extends in its operation beyond the sphere of the law.

The *religious* sanction proceeds from the immediate hand of a superior invisible being, either in the present, or in a future life.

The name Punishment is applicable only to the three last. The suffering that befalls a man in the course of nature is termed a *calamity*; if it happen through imprudence on his part, it may be styled a punishment issuing from the physical sanction.

Chapter IV. is the VALUE OF A LOT OF PLEASURE OR PAIN, HOW TO BE MEASURED. A pleasure or a pain is determined to

be greater or less according to (1) its *intensity*, (2) its *duration*, (3) its *certainty* or *uncertainty*, (4) its *propinquity* or *remoteness*; all which are obvious distinctions. To these are to be added (5) its *fecundity*, or the chance it has of being followed by other sensations of its own kind; that is pleasures if it be pleasure, pains if it be pain. Finally (6) its *purity*, or the chance of its being unmixed with the opposite kind; a pure pleasure has no mixture of pain. All the six properties apply to the case of an individual person; where a plurality are concerned, a new item is present, (7) the *extent*, or the number of persons affected. These properties exhaust the meaning of the terms expressing good and evil; on the one side, happiness, convenience, advantage, benefit, emolument, profit, &c.; and, on the other, unhappiness, inconvenience, disadvantage, loss, mischief, and the like.

Next follows, in Chapter V., a classified enumeration of PLEASURES AND PAINS. In a system undertaking to base all Moral and Political action on the production of happiness, such a classification is obviously required. The author professes to have grounded it on an analysis of human nature, which analysis itself, however, as being too metaphysical, he withholds,

The simple pleasures are:—1. The pleasures of sense. 2. The pleasures of wealth. 3. The pleasures of skill. 4. The pleasures of amity. 5. The pleasures of a good name. 6. The pleasures of power. 7. The pleasures of piety. 8. The pleasures of benevolence. 9. The pleasures of malevolence. 10. The pleasures of memory. 11. The pleasures of imagination. 12. The pleasures of expectation. 13. The pleasures dependent on association. 14. The pleasures of relief.

The simple pains are:—1. The pains of privation. 2. The pains of the senses. 3. The pains of awkwardness. 4. The pains of enmity. 5. The pains of an ill name. 6. The pains of piety. 7. The pains of benevolence. 8. The pains of malevolence. 9. The pains of the memory. 10. The pains of the imagination. 11. The pains of expectation. 12. The pains dependent on association.

We need not quote his detailed subdivision and illustration of these. At the close, he marks the important difference between *self-regarding* and *extra-regarding*; the last being those of benevolence and of malevolence.

In a long chapter (VI.), he dwells on CIRCUMSTANCES INFLUENCING SENSIBILITY. They are such as the following:—1. Health. 2. Strength. 3. Hardiness. 4. Bodily imperfection.

5. Quantity and Quality of knowledge. 6. Strength of intellectual powers. 7. Firmness of mind. 8. Steadiness of mind. 9. Bent of inclination. 10. Moral sensibility. 11. Moral biases. 12. Religious Sensibility. 13. Religious biases. 14. Sympathetic Sensibility. 15. Sympathetic biases. 16. Antipathetic sensibility. 17. Antipathetic biases. 18. Insanity. 19. Habitual occupations. 20. Pecuniary circumstances. 21. Connexions in the way of sympathy. 22. Connexions in the way of antipathy. 23. Radical frame of body. 24. Radical frame of mind. 25. Sex. 26. Age. 27. Rank. 28. Education. 29. Climate. 30. Lineage. 31. Government. 32. Religious profession.

Chapter VII. proceeds to consider HUMAN ACTIONS IN GENERAL. Right and wrong, good and evil, merit and demerit belong to actions. These have to be divided and classified with a view to the ends of the moralist and the legislator. Throughout this, and two other long chapters, he discusses, as necessary in apportioning punishment, the *act* itself, the *circumstances*, the *intention*, and the *consciousness*—or the knowledge of the tendencies of the act. He introduces many subdivisions under each head, and makes a number of remarks of importance as regards penal legislation.

In Chapter X., he regards pleasures and pains in the aspect of MOTIVES. Since every pleasure and every pain, as a part of their nature, induce actions, they are often designated with reference to that circumstance. Hunger, thirst, lust, avarice, curiosity, ambition, &c., are names of this class. There is not a complete set of such designations; hence the use of the circumlocutions, *appetite for*, *love of*, *desire of*—sweet odours, sounds, sights, ease, reputation, &c.

Of great importance is the *Order of pre-eminence among motives*. Of all the varieties of motives, Good-will, or Benevolence, taken in a general view, is that whose dictates are surest to coincide with Utility. In this, however, it is taken for granted that the benevolence is not so confined in its sphere, as to be contradicted by a more extensive, or enlarged, benevolence.

After good-will, the motive that has the best chance of coinciding with Utility, is Love of Reputation. The coincidence would be perfect, if men's likings and dislikings were governed exclusively by the principle of Utility, and not, as they often are, by the hostile principles of Asceticism, and of Sympathy and Antipathy. Love of reputation is inferior as a motive to Good-will, in not governing the secret actions. These last

are affected, only as they have a chance of becoming public, or as men contract a habit of looking to public approbation in all they do.

The desire of Amity, or of close personal affections, is placed next in order, as a motive. According as we extend the number of persons whose amity we desire, this prompting approximates to the love of reputation.

After these three motives, Bentham places the Dictates of Religion, which, however, are so various in their suggestions, that he can hardly speak of them in common. Were the Being, who is the object of religion, universally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise and powerful, and were the notions of his benevolence as correct as the notions of his wisdom and power, the dictates of religion would correspond, in all cases, with Utility. But while men call him benevolent in words, they seldom mean that he is so in reality. They do not mean that he is benevolent as man is conceived to be benevolent; they do not mean that he is benevolent in the only sense that benevolence has a meaning. The dictates of religion are in all countries intermixed, more or less, with dictates unconformable to utility, deduced from texts, well or ill interpreted, of the writings held for sacred by each sect. These dictates, however, gradually approach nearer to utility, because the dictates of the moral sanction do so.

Such are the four Social or Intelary Motives, the antagonists of the Dissocial and Self-regarding motives, which include the remainder of the catalogue.

Chapter XI. is on Dispositions. A man is said to be of a mischievous disposition, when he is presumed to be apt to engage rather in actions of an *apparently* pernicious tendency, than in such as are apparently beneficial. The author lays down certain Rules for indicating Disposition. Thus, 'The strength of the temptation being given, the mischievousness of the disposition manifested by the enterprise, is as the apparent mischievousness of the act,' and others to a like effect.

Chapter XII.—OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MISCHIEVOUS ACT, is meant as the concluding link of the whole previous chain of causes and effects. He defines the shapes that bad consequences may assume. The mischief may be *primary*, as when sustained by a definite number of individuals; or *secondary*, by extending over a multitude of unassignable individuals. The evil in this last case may be

either actual pain, or danger, which is the chance of pain. Thus, a successful robbery affects, primarily, a number of assignable persons, and secondarily, all persons in a like situation of risk.

He then proceeds to the theory of PUNISHMENT (XIII., XIV., XV.), to the classification of OFFENCES (XVI.), and to the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence (XVII.). The two first subjects—Punishments and Offences—are interesting chiefly in regard to Legislation. They have also a bearing on Morals; inasmuch as society, in its private administration of punishments, ought, no less than the Legislator, to be guided by sound scientific principles.

As respects Punishment, he marks off (1) cases where it is *groundless*; (2) where it is *inefficacious*, as in Insanity, Insanity, Intoxication, &c.; (3) cases where it is *unprofitable*; and (4) cases where it is *needless*. It is under this last head that he excludes from punishment the dissemination of what may be deemed pernicious principles. Punishment is needless here, because the end can be served by reply and exposure.

The first part of Chapter XVII. is entitled the 'Limits between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation;' and a short account of it will complete the view of the author's Ethical Theory.

Ethics at large, is defined the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view. Now, these actions may be a man's own actions, in which case they are styled the *art of self-government*, or *private ethics*. Or they may be the actions of other agents, namely, (1) Other human beings, and (2) Other Animals, whose interests Bentham considers to have been disgracefully overlooked by jurists as well as by mankind generally.

In so far as a man's happiness depends on his own conduct, he may be said to *owe a duty to himself*; the quality manifested in discharge of this branch of duty (if duty it is to be called) is PRUDENCE. In so far as he affects by his conduct the interests of those about him, he is under a *duty to others*. The happiness of others may be consulted in two ways. First, negatively, by forbearing to diminish it; this is called PROBITY. Secondly, in a positive way, by studying to increase it; which is expressed by BENEFICENCE.

But now the question occurs, how is it that under Private Ethics (or apart from legislation and religion) a man can be under a motive to consult other people's happiness? By what

obligations can he be bound to *probity* and *beneficence*? A man can have no *adequate* motives for consulting any interests but his own. Still there are motives for making us consult the happiness of others, namely, the purely social motive of Sympathy or Benevolence, and the semi-social motives of Love of Amity and Love of Reputation. [He does not say here whether Sympathy is a motive grounded on the pleasure it brings, or a motive irrespective of the pleasure; although from other places we may infer that he inclines to the first view.]

Private Ethics and Legislation can have but the same end, happiness. Their means, the actions prompted, must be nearly the same. Still they are different. There is no case where a man ought not to be guided by his own, or his fellow-creatures', happiness; but there are many cases where the legislature should not compel a man to perform such actions. The reason is that the Legislature works solely by Punishment (reward is seldom applied, and is not properly an act of legislation). Now, there are cases where the punishment of the political sanction ought not to be used; and if, in any of these cases, there is a propriety of using the punishments of private ethics (the moral or social sanction), this circumstance would indicate the line of division.

First, then, as to the cases where punishment would be *groundless*. In such cases, neither legislation nor private ethics should interfere.

Secondly. As to cases where it would be *inefficacious*, where punishment has no deterring motive power,—as in Infancy, Insanity, overwhelming danger, &c.,—the public and the private sanctions are also alike excluded.

Thirdly. It is in the cases where Legislative punishment would be *unprofitable*, that we have the great field of Private Ethics. Punishment is unprofitable in two ways. First, when the danger of detection is so small, that nothing but enormous severity, on detection, would be of avail, as in the illicit commerce of the sexes, which has generally gone unpunished by law. Secondly, when there is danger of involving the innocent with the guilty, from inability to define the crime in precise language. Hence it is that rude behaviour, treachery, and ingratitude are not punished by law; and that in countries where the voice of the people controls the hand of the legislature, there is a great dread of making *defamation*, especially of the government, an offence at law.

Private Ethics is not liable to the same difficulties as Legislation in dealing with such offences.

Of the three departments of Moral Duty—Prudence, Probity, and Beneficence—the one that least requires and admits of being enforced by legislative punishment is the first—*Prudence*. It can only be through some defect of the understanding, if people are wanting in duty to themselves. Now, although a man may know little of himself, is it certain the legislator knows more? Would it be possible to extirpate drunkenness or fornication by legal punishment? All that can be done in this field is to subject the offences, in cases of notoriety, to a slight censure, so as to cover them with a slight shade of artificial disrepute, and thus give strength and influence to the moral sanction.

Legislators have, in general, carried their interference too far in this class of duties; and the mischief has been most conspicuous in religion. Men, it is supposed, are liable to errors of judgment; and for these it is the determination of a Being of infinite benevolence to punish them with an infinity of torments. The legislator, having by his side men perfectly enlightened, unfettered, and unbiassed, presumes that he has attained by their means the exact truth; and so, when he sees his people ready to plunge headlong into an abyss of fire, shall he not stretch forth his hand to save them?

The second class of duties—the rules of *Probity*, stand most in need of the assistance of the legislator. There are few cases where it *would* be expedient to punish a man for hurting himself, and few where it *would not* be expedient to punish a man for hurting his neighbour. As regards offences against property, private ethics presupposes legislation, which alone can determine what things are to be regarded as each man's property. If private ethics takes a different view from the legislature, it must of course act on its own views.

The third class of duties—*Beneficence*—must be abandoned to the jurisdiction of private ethics. In many cases the beneficial quality of an act depends upon the disposition of the agent, or the possession by him of the extra-regarding motives—sympathy, amity, and reputation; whereas political action can work only through the self-regarding motives. In a word these duties must be *free or voluntary*. Still, the limits of law on this head might be somewhat extended; in particular, where a man's person is in danger, it might be made the duty of every one to save him from mischief, no less than to abstain from bringing it on him.

To resume the Ethics of Bentham. I.—The Standard or End of Morality is the production of Happiness, or Utility.

Bentham is thus at one in his first principle with Hume and with Paley; his peculiarity is to make it fruitful in numerous applications both to legislation and to morals. He carries out the principle with an unflinching rigour, and a logical force peculiarly his own.

II.—His Psychological Analysis is also studied and thorough-going.

He is the first person to provide a classification of pleasures and pains, as an indispensable preliminary alike to morals and to legislation. The ethical applications of these are of less importance than the legislative; they have a direct and practical bearing upon the theory of Punishment.

He lays down, as the constituents of the Moral Faculty, Good-will or Benevolence, the love of Amity, the love of Reputation, and the dictates of Religion—with a view to the Happiness of others; and Prudence—with a view to our own happiness. He gives no special account of the acquired sentiment of Obligation or Authority—the characteristic of Conscience, as distinguished from other impulses having a tendency to the good of others or of self. And yet it is the peculiarity of his system to identify morality with law; so that there is only one step to connecting conscience with our education under the different sanctions—legal and ethical.

He would of course give a large place to the Intellect or Reason in making up the Moral Faculty, seeing that the consequences of actions have to be estimated or judged; but he would regard this as merely co-operating with our sensibilities to pleasure and pain.

The Disinterested Sentiment is not regarded by Bentham as arising from any disposition to pure self-sacrifice. He recognizes *Pleasures of Benevolence* and *Pains of Benevolence*; thus constituting a purely interested motive for doing good to others. He describes certain pleasures of Imagination or Sympathy arising through Association—the idea of plenty, the idea of the happiness of animals, the idea of health, the idea of gratitude. Under the head of Circumstances influencing Sensibility, he adverts to Sympathetic Sensibility, as being the propensity to derive *pleasure from the happiness, and pain from the unhappiness, of other sensitive beings*. It cannot but be admitted, he says, that the only interest that a man at all times, and on all occasions, is sure to find *adequate* motives for consulting, is his own. He has no metaphysics of the Will. He uses the terms *free* and *voluntary* only with reference to spontaneous beneficence, as opposed to the compulsion of the law.

III.—As regards Happiness, or the *Summum Bonum*, he presents his scientific classification of Pleasures and Pains, without, however, indicating any plan of life, for attaining the one and avoiding the other in the best manner. He makes no distinction among pleasures and pains excepting what strictly concerns their value as such—intensity, duration, certainty, and nearness. He makes happiness to mean only the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. The renunciation of pleasure for any other motive than to procure a greater pleasure, or avoid a greater pain, he, disapprovingly, terms asceticism.

IV.—It being the essence of his system to consider Ethics as a Code of Laws directed by Utility, and he being himself a law reformer on the greatest scale, we might expect from him suggestions for the improvement of Ethics, as well as for Legislation and Jurisprudence. His inclusion of the interests of the lower animals has been mentioned. He also contends for the partly legislative and partly ethical innovation of Freedom of Divorce.

The inducements to morality are the motives assigned as working in its favour.

V.—The connexions of Ethics with Politics, the points of agreement and the points of difference of the two departments, are signified with unprecedented care and precision (Chap. XVII.).

VI.—As regards the connexions with Theology, he gives no uncertain sound. It is on this point that he stands in marked contrast to Paley, who also professes Utility as his ethjcal foundation.

He recognizes religion as furnishing one of the Sanctions of morality, although often perverted into the enemy of utility. He considers that the state may regard as offences any acts that tend to diminish or mis-apply the influence of religion as a motive to civil obedience.

While Paley makes a conjoined reference to Scripture and to Utility in ascertaining moral rules, Bentham insists on Utility alone as the final appeal. He does not doubt that if we had a clear unambiguous statement of the divine will, we should have a revelation of what is for human happiness; but he distrusts all interpretations of scripture, and so they coincide with a perfectly independent scientific investigation of the consequences of actions.

SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH. [1765-1832.]

In the 'Dissertation on the progress of Ethical Philosophy chiefly during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,' Mackintosh advocates a distinct Ethical theory. His views and arguments occur partly in the course of his criticism of the other moralists, and partly in his concluding General Remarks (Section VII.).

In Section I., entitled PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, he remarks on the universality of the distinction between Right and Wrong. On no subject do men, in all ages, coincide on so many points as on the general rules of conduct, and the estimable qualities of character. Even the grossest deviations may be explained by ignorance of facts, by errors with respect to the consequences of actions, or by inconsistency with admitted principles. In tribes where new-born infants are exposed, the abandonment of parents is condemned; the betrayal and murder of strangers is condemned by the very rules of faith and humanity, acknowledged in the case of countrymen.

He complains that, in the enquiry as to the foundation of morals, the two distinct questions—as to the Standard and the Faculty—have seldom been fully discriminated. Thus, Paley opposes Utility to a Moral Sense, not perceiving that the two terms relate to different subjects; and Bentham repeats the mistake. It is possible to represent Utility as the *criterion* of Right, and a Moral Sense as the *faculty*. In another place, he remarks that the schoolmen failed to draw the distinction.

In Section V., entitled 'Controversies concerning the Moral Faculty and the Social Affections,' and including the Ethical theories coming between Hobbes and Butler, namely, Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, &c., he gives his objections to the scheme that founds moral distinctions solely on the Reason. Reason, as such, can never be a motive to action; an argument to dissuade a man from drunkenness must appeal to the pains of ill-health, poverty, and infamy, that is, to Feelings. The influence of Reason is indirect; it is merely a channel whereby the objects of desire are brought into view, so as to operate on the Will.

The abused extension of the term Reason to the moral faculties, he ascribes to the obvious importance of Reason in choosing the means of action, as well as in balancing the ends, during which operation the feelings are suspended, delayed, and poised in a way favorable to our lasting interests. Hence the antithesis of Reason and Passion.

In remarking upon Leibnitz's view of Disinterested Sentiment, and the coincidence of Virtue with Happiness, he sketches his own opinion, which is that although every virtuous act may not lead to the greater happiness of the agent, yet the *disposition* to virtuous acts, in its intrinsic pleasures, far outweighs all the pains of self-sacrifice that it can ever occasion. 'The whole sagacity and ingenuity of the world may be fairly challenged to point out a case in which virtuous dispositions, habits, and feelings are not conducive in the highest degree to the happiness of the individual; or to maintain that he is not the happiest, whose moral sentiments and affections are such as to prevent the possibility of any unlawful advantage being presented to his mind.'

Section VI. is entitled 'Foundations of a more Just Theory of Ethics,' and embraces a review of all the Ethical writers, from Butler downwards. The most palpable defect in Butler's scheme, is that it affords no answer to the question, 'What is the distinguishing quality of right actions?' in other words, What is the Standard? There is a vicious circle in answering that they are commanded by Conscience, for Conscience itself can be no otherwise defined than as the faculty that *approves and commands right actions*. Still, he gives warm commendation to Butler generally; in connexion with him he takes occasion to give some farther hints as to his own opinion. Two positions are here advanced: 1st, The moral sentiments, in their mature state, are a class of feelings with no other objects than *the dispositions to voluntary actions, and the acts flowing from these dispositions*. We approve some dispositions and actions, and disapprove others; we desire to cultivate them, and we aim at them for *something in themselves*. This position receives light from the doctrine above quoted as to the supreme happiness of virtuous dispositions. His second position is that Conscience is an *acquired principle*; which he repeats and unfolds in subsequent places.

He finds fault with Hume for ascribing Virtue to qualities of the Understanding, and considers that this is to confound admiration with moral approbation. Hume's general Ethical doctrine, that Utility is a uniform ground of moral distinction, he says can never be impugned until some example be produced of a virtue generally pernicious, or a vice generally beneficial. But as to the theory of moral approbation, or the nature of the Faculty, he considers that Hume's doctrine of Benevolence (or, still better, Sympathy) does not account for our approbation of temperance and fortitude,

nor for the *supremacy* of the Moral Faculty over all other motives.

He objects to the theory of Adam Smith, that no allowance is made in it for the transfer of our feelings, and the disappearing of the original reference from the view. Granting that our approbation began in sympathy, as Smith says; certain it is, that the adult man approves actions and dispositions as right, while he is distinctly aware that no process of sympathy intervenes between the approval and its object. He repeats, against Smith, the criticism on Hume, that the sympathies have no *imperative* character of supremacy. He further remarks that the reference, in our actions, to the point of view of the spectator, is rather an expedient for preserving our impartiality than a fundamental principle of Ethics. It nearly coincides with the Christian precept of doing unto others as we would they should do unto us,—an admirable practical maxim, but, as Leibnitz has said truly, intended only as a correction of self-partiality. Lastly, he objects to Smith, that his system renders all morality relative to the pleasure of our coinciding in feeling with others, which is merely to decide on the Faculty, without considering the Standard. Smith shrinks from Utility as a standard, or ascribes its power over our feelings to our sense of the adaptation of means to ends.

He commends Smith for grounding Benevolence on Sympathy, whereas Butler, Hutcheson, and Hume had grounded Sympathy on Benevolence.

It is in reviewing Hartley, whose distinction it was to open up the wide capabilities of the principle of Association, that Mackintosh develops at greatest length his theory of the derived nature of Conscience.

Adverting to the usual example of the love of money, he remarks that the benevolent man might begin with an interested affection, but might end with a disinterested delight in doing good. Self-love, or the principle of permanent well-being, is gradually formed from the separate appetites, and is at last pursued without having them specially in view. So Sympathy may perhaps be the transfer, first, of our own personal feelings to other beings, and next, of their feelings to ourselves, thereby engendering the social affections. It is an ancient and obstinate error of philosophers to regard these two principles—Self-love and Sympathy—as the *source* of the impelling passions and affections, instead of being the last results of them.

The chief elementary feelings that go to constitute the

moral sentiments appear to be Gratitude, Pity, Resentment, and Shame. To take the example of Gratitude. Acts of beneficence to ourselves give us pleasure; we associate this pleasure with the benefactor, so as to regard him with a feeling of complacency; and when we view other beneficent beings and acts there is awakened within us our own agreeable experience. The process is seen in the child, who contracts towards the nurse or mother all the feelings of complacency arising from repeated pleasures, and extends these by similarity to other resembling persons. As soon as complacency takes the form of *action*, it becomes (according to the author's theory, connecting conscience with will), a part of the Conscience. So much for the development of Gratitude. Next as to Pity. The likeness of the outward signs of emotion makes us transfer to others our own feelings, and thereby becomes, even more than gratitude, a source of benevolence; being one of the first motives to impart the benefits connected with affection. In our sympathy with the sufferer, we cannot but approve the actions that relieve suffering, and the dispositions that prompt them. We also enter into his Resentment, or anger towards the causes of pain, and the actions and dispositions corresponding; and this sympathetic anger is at length detached from special cases and extended to all wrong-doers; and is the root of the most indispensable compound of our moral faculties, the 'Sense of Justice.'

To these internal growths, from Gratitude, Pity, and Resentment, must be added the education by means of well-framed penal laws, which are the lasting declaration of the moral indignation of mankind. These laws may be obeyed as mere compulsory duties; but with the generous sentiments concurring, men may rise above duty to *virtue*, and may contract that excellence of nature whence acts of beneficence flow of their own accord.

He next explains the growth of Remorse, as another element of the Moral Sense. The abhorrence that we feel for bad actions is extended to the agent; and, in spite of certain obstacles to its full manifestation, that abhorrence is prompted when the agent is self.

The theory of derivation is bound to account for the fact, recognized in the language of mankind, that the Moral Faculty is ONE. The principle of association would account for the fusion of many different sentiments into one product, wherein the component parts would cease to be discerned: but this is not enough. Why do these particular sentiments and no

others coalesce in the total—Conscience. The answer is what was formerly given with reference to Butler; namely, while all other feelings relate to outward objects, the feelings brought together in conscience, contemplate exclusively *the dispositions and actions of voluntary agents*. Conscience is thus an acquired faculty, but one that is *universally and necessarily* acquired.

The derivation is farther exemplified by a comparison with the feelings of Taste. These may have an original reference to fitness—as in the beauty of a horse—but they do not attain their proper character until the consideration of fitness disappears. So far they resemble the moral faculty. They differ from it, however, in this, that taste ends in passive contemplation or quiescent delight; conscience looks solely to the acts and dispositions of voluntary agents. This is the author's favourite way of expressing what is otherwise called the authority and supremacy of conscience.

To sum up:—the principal constituents of the moral sense are Gratitude, Sympathy (or Pity), Resentment, and Shame; the secondary and auxiliary causes are Education, Imitation, General Opinion, Laws and Government.

In criticising Paley, he illustrates forcibly the position, that Religion must pre-suppose Morality.

His criticism of Bentham gives him an opportunity of remarking on the modes of carrying into effect the principle of Utility as the Standard. He repeats his favourite doctrine of the inherent pleasures of a virtuous disposition, as the grand circumstance rendering virtue profitable and vice unprofitable. He even uses the Platonic figure, and compares vice to mental distemper. It is his complaint against Bentham and the later supporters of Utility, that they have *misplaced* the application of the principle, and have encouraged the too frequent appeal to calculation in the details of conduct. Hence arise sophistical evasions of moral rules; men will slide from general to particular consequences; apply the test of utility to actions and not to *dispositions*; and, in short, take too much upon themselves in settling questions of moral right and wrong. [He might have remarked that the power of perverting the standard to individual interests is not confined to the followers of Utility.] He introduces the saying attributed to Andrew Fletcher, 'that he would lose his life to *serve* his country, but would not do a base thing to *save* it.'

He farther remarks on the tendency of Bentham and his followers to treat Ethics too *juridically*. He would probably

admit that Ethics is strictly speaking a code of laws, but draws the line between it and the juridical code, by the distinction of dispositions and actions. We may have to approve the author of an injurious action, because it is well-meant; the law must nevertheless punish it. Herein Ethics has its alliance with Religion, which looks at the disposition or the heart.

He is disappointed at finding that Dugald Stewart, who made applications of the law of association and appreciated its powers, held back from, and discountenanced, the attempt of Hartley to resolve the Moral Sense, styling it 'an ingenious refinement on the Selfish system,' and representing those opposed to himself in Ethics as deriving the affections from 'self-love.' He repeats that the derivation theory affirms the disinterestedness of human actions as strongly as Butler himself; while it gets over the objection from the multiplication of original principles; and ascribes the result to the operation of a real agent.

In replying to Brown's refusal to accept the derivation of Conscience, on the ground that the process belongs to a time beyond remembrance, he affirms it to be a sufficient theory, if the supposed action *resembles* what we know to be the operation of the principle where we have direct experience of it.

His concluding Section, VII., entitled General Remarks, gives some farther explanations of his characteristic views.

He takes up the principle of Utility, at the point where Brown bogged at it; quoting Brown's concession, that Utility and virtue are so related, that there is *perhaps* no action generally felt to be virtuous that is not beneficial, and that every ease of benefit willingly done excites approbation. He strikes out Brown's word 'perhaps,' as making the affirmation either conjectural or useless; and contends that the two facts,—morality and the general benefit,—being co-extensive, should be reciprocally tests of each other. He qualifies, as usual, by not allowing utility to be, on all occasions, the immediate incentive of actions. He holds, however, that the main doctrine is an essential corollary from the Divine Benevolence.

He then replies specifically to the question, 'Why is utility not to be the sole end present to the mind of the virtuous agent?' The answer is found in the limits of man's faculties. Every man is not always able, on the spur of the moment, to calculate all the consequences of our actions. But it is not to be concluded from this, that the calculation of consequences is

impracticable in moral subjects. To calculate the general tendency of every sort of human action is, he contends, a possible, easy, and common operation. The general good effects of temperance, prudence, fortitude, justice, benevolence, gratitude, veracity, fidelity, domestic and patriotic affections, may be pronounced with as little error, as the best founded maxims of the ordinary business of life.

He vindicates the rules of sexual morality on the grounds of benevolence.

He then discusses the question, (on which he had charged Hume with mistake), 'Why is approbation confined to voluntary acts?' He thinks it but a partial solution to say that approbation and disapprobation are wasted on what is not in the power of the will. The full solution he considers to be found in the mode of derivation of the moral sentiment; which, accordingly, he re-discusses at some length. He produces the analogies of chemistry to show that compounds may be totally different from their elements. He insists on the fact that a derived pleasure is not the less a pleasure; it may even survive the primary pleasure. Self-love (improperly so called) is intelligible if its origin be referred to Association, but not if it be considered as prior to the appetites and passions that furnish its materials. And as the pleasure derived from low objects may be transferred to the most pure, so Disinterestedness may originate with self, and yet become as entirely detached from that origin as if the two had never been connected.

He then repeats his doctrine, that these social or disinterested sentiments prompt the will as the means of their gratification. Hence, by a farther transfer of association, the voluntary acts share in the delight felt in the affections that determine them. We then desire to experience *beneficent volitions*, and to cultivate the dispositions to these. Such dispositions are at last desired for their own sake; and, when so desired, constitute the Moral Sense, Conscience, or the Moral Sentiment, in its consummated form. Thus, by a fourth or fifth stage of derivation from the original pleasures and pains of our constitution, we arrive at this highly complex product, called our moral nature.

Nor is this all. We must not look at the side of indignation to the wrong-doer. We are angry at those who disappoint our wish for the happiness of others; we make their resentment our own. We hence approve of the actions and dispositions for punishing such offenders; while we so far

sympathize with the culprit as to disapprove of excess of punishment. Such moderated anger is the sense of Justice, and is a new element of Conscience. Of all the virtues, this is the one most *directly* aided by a conviction of general interest or utility. All laws profess it as their end. Hence the importance of good criminal laws to the moral education of mankind.

Among contributory streams to the moral faculty, he enumerates courage, energy, and decision, properly directed.

He recognizes 'duties to ourselves,' although condemning the expression as absurd. Intemperance, improvidence, timidity are morally wrong. Still, as in other cases, a man is not truly virtuous on such points, till he loves them for their own sake, and even performs them without an effort. These prudential qualities having an influence on the will, resemble in that the other constituents of Conscience. As a final result, all those sentiments whose object is a state of the will become intimately and inseparably blended in the unity of Conscience, the arbiter and judge of human actions, the lawful authority over every motive to conduct.

In this grand coalition of the public and the private feelings, he sees a decisive illustration of the reference of moral sentiments to the Will. He farther recognizes in it a solution of the great problem of the relation of virtue to private interest. Qualities useful to ourselves are raised to the rank of virtues; and qualities useful to others are converted into pleasures. In moral reasonings, we are enabled to bring home virtuous inducements by the medium of self-interest; we can assure a man that by cultivating the disposition towards other men's happiness he gains a source of happiness to himself.

The question, Why we do not morally approve involuntary actions, is now answered. Conscience is associated exclusively with the dispositions and actions of voluntary agents. Conscience and Will are co-extensive.

A difficulty remains. 'If moral approbation involve no perception of beneficial tendency, how do we make out the coincidence of the two?' It might seem that the foundation of morals is thus made to rest on a coincidence that is mysterious and fantastic. According to the author, the conclusive answer is this. Although Conscience rarely contemplates anything so distant as the welfare of all sentient beings, yet in detail it obviously points to the production of happiness. The social affections all promote happiness. Every one must observe the tendency of justice to the welfare

of society. The angry passions, as ministers of morality, remove hindrances to human welfare. The private desires have respect to our own happiness. Every element of conscience has thus some portion of happiness for its object. All the affections contribute to the general well-being, although it is not necessary, nor would it be fit, that the agent should be distracted by the contemplation of that vast and remote object.

To sum up Mackintosh:—

I.—On the Standard, he pronounces for Utility, with certain modifications and explanations. The Utility is the remote and final justification of all actions accounted right, but not the immediate motive in the mind of the agent. [It may justly be feared, that, by placing so much stress on the delights attendant on virtuous action, he gives an opening for the admission of *sentiment* into the consideration of Utility.]

II.—In the Psychology of Ethics, he regards the Conscience as a derived or generated faculty, the result of a series of associations. He assigns the primary feelings that enter into it, and traces the different stages of the growth. The distinctive feature of Conscience is its close relation to the Will.

He does not consider the problem of Liberty and Necessity.

He makes Disinterested Sentiment a secondary or derived feeling—a stage on the road to Conscience. While maintaining strongly the disinterested character of the sentiment, he considers that it may be fully accounted for by derivation from our primitive self-regarding feelings, and denies, as against Stewart and Brown, that this gives it a selfish character.

He carries the process of associative growth a step farther, and maintains that we re-convert disinterestedness into a lofty delight—the delight in goodness for its own sake; to attain this characteristic is the highest mark of a virtuous character.

III.—His *Summum Bonum*, or Theory of Happiness, is contained in his much iterated doctrine of the deliciousness of virtuous conduct, by which he proposes to effect the reconciliation of our own good with the good of others—prudence with virtue. Virtue is ‘an inward fountain of pure delight;’ the pleasure of benevolence, ‘if it could become lasting and intense, would convert the heart into a heaven;’ they alone are happy, or truly virtuous, that do not need the motive of a regard to outward consequences.

His chief Ethical precursor in this vein is Shaftesbury;

but he is easily able to produce from Theologians abundant iterations of it.

IV.—He has no special views as to the Moral Code. With reference to the inducements to virtue, he thinks he has a powerful lever in the delights that the virtuous disposition confers on its owner.

V.—His theory of the connexion of Ethics and Politics is stated in his account of Bentham, whom he charges with making morality too judicial.

VI.—The relations of Morality to Religion are a matter of frequent and special consideration in Mackintosh.

JAMES MILL. [1783-1836.]

The work of James Mill, entitled the 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' is distinguished, in the first place, by the studied precision of its definitions of all leading terms, giving it a permanent value as a logical discipline; and in the second place, by the successful carrying out of the principle of Association in explaining the powers of the mind. The author endeavours to show that the moral feelings are a complex product or growth, of which the ultimate constituents are our pleasurable and painful sensations. We shall present a brief abstract of the course of his exposition, as given in Chapters XVII.—XXIII. of the Analysis.

The pleasurable and painful sensations being assumed, it is important to take notice of their Causes, both immediate and remote, by whose means they can be secured or avoided. We contract a habit of passing rapidly from every sensation to its procuring cause; and, as in the typical case of money, these causes are apt to rank higher in importance, to take a greater hold on the mind, than the sensations themselves. The mind is not much interested in attending to the sensation; that can provide for itself. The mind is deeply interested in attending to the cause.

The author next (XIX.) considers the Ideas of the pleasurable sensations, and of the causes of them. The Idea of a pain is not the same as the pain; it is a complex state, containing, no doubt, an element of pain: and the name for it is Aversion. So the name for an idea of pleasure is Desire. Now, these states extend to the causes of pains and pleasures, though in other respects indifferent; we have an aversion for a certain drug, but there is in this a transition highly illustrative of the force of the associating principle; our real aversion

being to a bitter sensation, and not to the visible appearance of the drug.

Alluding (XX.) to the important difference between past and futuro time in our ideas of pleasure and pain, he defines Hope and Fear as the contemplation of a pleasurable or of a painful sensation, as futuro, but not certain.

When the immediate causes of pleasurable and painful sensations are viewed as past or future, we have a new series of states. In the past, they are called Love and Hatred, or Aversion; in the future, the idea of a pleasure, as certain in its arrival, is Joy—as probable, Hope; the idea of future pain (certain) is not marked otherwise than by the names Hatred, Aversion, Horror; the idea of the pain as probable is some form of dread.

The *remote* causes of our pleasures and pains are more interesting than the *immediate* causes. The reason is their wide command. Thus, Wealth, Power, and Dignity are causes of a great range of pleasures: Poverty, Impotence, and Contemptibility, of a wide range of pains. For one thing, the first are the means of procuring the services of our fellow-creatures; this fact is of the highest consequence in morals, as showing how deeply our happiness is entwined with the actions of other beings. The author illustrates at length the influence of these remote and comprehensive agencies; and as it is an influence entirely the result of association, it attests the magnitude of that power of the mind.

But our fellow-creatures are the subjects of affections, not merely as the instrumentality set in motion by Wealth, Power, and Dignity, but in their proper personality. This leads the author to the consideration of the pleasurable affections of Friendship, Kindness, Family, Country, Party, Mankind. He resolves them all into associations with our primitive pleasures. Thus, to take the example of Kindness, which will show how he deals with the disinterested affection;—The idea of a man enjoying a train of pleasures, or happiness, is felt by everybody to be a pleasurable idea; this can arise from nothing but the association of our own pleasures with the idea of his pleasures. The pleasurable association composed of the ideas of a man and of his pleasures, and the painful association composed of the idea of a man and of his pains, are both Affections included under one name Kindness; although in the second case it has the more specific name Compassion.

Under the other heads, the author's elucidation is fuller, but his principle is the same.

He next goes on (XXII.) to MOTIVES. When the idea of a Pleasure is associated with an action of our own as the cause, that peculiar state of mind is generated, called a motive. The idea of the pleasure, without the idea of an action for gaining it, does not amount to a motive. Every pleasure may become a motive, but every motive does not end in action; because there may be counter-motives; and the strength attained by motives depends greatly on education. The facility of being acted on by motives of a particular kind is a DISPOSITION. We have, in connexion with all our leading pleasures and pains, names indicating their motive efficacy. Gluttony is both motive and disposition; so Lust and Drunkenness; with the added sense of reprobation in all the three. Friendship is a name for Affection, Motive, and Disposition.

In Chapter XXIII., the author makes the application of his principles to Ethics. The actions emanating from ourselves, combined with those emanating from our fellow-creatures, exceed all other Causes of our Pleasures and Pains. Consequently such actions are objects of intense affections or regards.

The actions whence advantages accrue are classed under the four titles, Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Benevolence. The two first—Prudence and Fortitude [in fact, Prudence]—express acts useful to ourselves in the first instance, to others in the second instance. Justice and Benevolence express acts useful to others in the first instance, to ourselves in the second instance. We have two sets of association with all these acts, one set with them as our own, another set with them as other people's. With Prudence (and Fortitude) as our own acts, we associate good to ourselves, either in the shape of positive pleasure, or as warding off pain. Thus Labour is raised to importance by numerous associations of both classes. Further, Prudence, involving the foresight of a train of consequences, requires a large measure of knowledge of things animate and inanimate. Courage is defined by the author, incurring the chance of Evil, that is danger, for the sake of a preponderant good; which, too, stands in need of knowledge. Now, when the ideas of acts of Prudence and acts of Courage have been associated sufficiently often with beneficial consequences, they become pleasurable ideas, or Affections, and they have also, from the nature of the case, the character of Motives. In short, there is nothing in prudential conduct that may not be explained by a series of associations, grounded on our pleasurable and painful sensations, on the ideas of them, and on the ideas of their causes.

The real difficulty attaches to Justice and to Beneficence.

As to Justice. Men, in society, have found it essential for mutual benefit, that the powers of Individuals over the general causes of good should be fixed by certain rules, that is, Laws. Acts done in accordance with these rules are Just Acts; although, when duly considered, they are seen to include the main fact of beneficence, the good of others. To the performance of a certain class of just acts, our Fellow-creatures annex penalties; these, therefore, are determined partly by Prudence; others remain to be performed voluntarily, and for them the motive is Beneficence.

What then is the source of the motives towards Beneficence? How do the ideas of acts, having the good of our fellows for their end, become Affections and Motives? In the first place, we have associations of pleasure with all the pleasurable feelings of fellow-creatures, and hence, with such acts of ours as yield them pleasure. In the second place, those are the acts for procuring to ourselves the favourable Disposition of our Fellow-men, so that we have farther associations of the pleasures flowing from such favourable dispositions. Thus, by the union of two sets of influences—two streams of association—the Idea of our beneficent acts becomes a pleasurable idea, that is, an Affection, and, being connected with actions of ours, is also a Motive. Such is the genesis of Beneficent or Disinterested impulses.

We have next a class of associations with other men's performance of the several virtues. The Prudence and the Fortitude of others are directly beneficial to them, and indirectly beneficial to us; and with both these consequences we have necessarily agreeable associations. The Justice and the Beneficence of other men are so directly beneficial to the objects of them, that it is impossible for us not to have pleasurable associations with acts of Justice and Beneficence, first as concerns ourselves in particular, and next as concerns the acts generally. Hence, therefore, the rise of Affections and Motives in favour of these two virtues. As there is nothing so deeply interesting to me as that the acts of men, regarding myself immediately, should be acts of Justice and Beneficence, and the acts regarding themselves immediately, acts of Prudence and Fortitude; it follows that I have an interest in all such acts of my own as operate to cause those acts in others. By similar acts of our own, by the manifestation of dispositions to perform those acts, we obtain their reciprocal performance by others. There is thus a highly complex, concurring stimulus

to acts of virtue,—a large aggregate of influences of association, the power at bottom being still our own pleasurable and painful sensations. We must add the ascription of Praise, an influence remarkable for its wide propagation and great efficacy over men's minds, and no less remarkable as a proof of the range of the associating principle, especially in its character of Fame, which, in the case of future fame, is a purely ideal or associated delight. Equally, if not more, striking are the illustrations from Dispraise. The associations of Disgrace, even when not sufficient to restrain the performance of acts abhorred by mankind, are able to produce the horrors of Remorse, the most intense of human sufferings. The love of praise leads by one step to the love of Praiseworthiness; the dread of blame, to the dread of Blameworthiness.

Of these various Motives, the most constant in operation, and the most in use in moral training, are Praise and Blame. It is the sensibility to Praise and Blame—the joyful feelings associated with the one, and the dread associated with the other—that gives effect to POPULAR OPINION, or the POPULAR SANCTION, and, with reference to men generally, the MORAL SANCTION.

The other motives to virtue, namely, the association of our own acts of Justice and Beneficence, as cause, with other men's as effects, are subject to strong counteraction, for we can rarely perform such acts without sacrifice to ourselves. Still, there is in all men a certain surplus of motive from this cause, just as there is a surplus from the association of acts of ours, hostile to other men, with a return of hostility on their part.

The best names for the aggregate Affection, Motive, and Disposition in this important region of conduct, are *Moral Approbation* and *Disapprobation*. The terms *Moral Sense*, *Sense of Right and Wrong*, *Love of Virtue* and *Hatred of Vice*, are not equally appropriate. *Virtue* and *Morality* are other synonyms.

In the work entitled, 'A Fragment on Mackintosh,' there are afforded farther illustrations of the author's derivation of the Moral Sentiment, together with an exposition and defence of Utility as the standard, in which his views are substantially at one with Bentham. Two or three references will be sufficient.

In the statement of the questions in dispute in Morals, he objects to the words 'test' and 'criterion,' as expressing the standard. He considers it a mistake to designate as a 'test' what is the thing itself; the test of Morality is Morality.

Properly, the thing testing is one thing; the thing tested another thing. The same objection would apply to the use of the word Standard; so that the only form of the first question of Ethics would be, What is morality? What does it consist in? [The remark is just, but somewhat hypercritical. The illustration from Chemical testing is not true in fact; the test of gold is some essential attribute of gold, as its weight. And when we wish to determine as to a certain act, whether it is a moral act, we compare it with what we deem the essential quality of moral acts—Utility, our Moral Instinct, &c.—and the operation is not improperly called testing the act. Since, therefore, whatever we agree upon as the essence of morality, must be practically used by us as a test, criterion, or standard, there cannot be much harm in calling this essential quality the standard, although the designation is to a certain extent figurative.]

The author has some additional remarks on the derivation of our Disinterested feelings: he reiterates the position expressed in the 'Analysis,' that although we have feelings directly tending to the good of others, they are nevertheless the growth of feelings that are rooted in self. That feelings should be detached from their original root is a well known phenomenon of the mind.

His illustrations of Utility are a valuable contribution to the defence of that doctrine. He replies to most of the common objections. Mackintosh had urged that the reference to Utility would be made a dangerous pretext for allowing exceptions to common rules. Mill expounds at length (p. 246) the formation of moral rules, and retorts that there are rules expressly formed to make exceptions to other rules, as justice before generosity, charity begins at home, &c.

He animadvert with great severity on Mackintosh's doctrines, as to the delight of virtue for its own sake, and the special contact of moral feelings with the will. Allowance being made for the great difference in the way that the two writers express themselves, they are at one in maintaining Utility to be the ultimate standard, and in regarding Conscience as a derived faculty of the mind.

The author's handling of Ethics does not extend beyond the first and second topics—the STANDARD and the FACULTY. His Standard is Utility. The Faculty is based on our Pleasures and Pains, with which there are multiplied associations. Disinterested Sentiment is a real fact, but has its origin in our own proper pleasures and pains.

Mill considers that the existing moral rules are all based on our estimate, correct or incorrect, of Utility.

JOHN AUSTIN. [1790-1859.]

Austin, in his Lectures on 'The Province of Jurisprudence determined,' has discussed the leading questions of Ethics. We give an abstract of the Ethical part.

LECTURE I. Law, in its largest meaning, and omitting metaphorical applications, embraces Laws set by God to his creatures, and Laws set by man to man. Of the laws set by man to man, some are established by *political* superiors, or by persons exercising government in nations or political societies. This is law in the usual sense of the word, forming the subject of Jurisprudence. The author terms it *Positive Law*. There is another class of laws not set by political superiors in that capacity. Yet some of these are properly termed laws, although others are only so by a close analogy. There is no name for the laws proper, but to the others are applied such names as 'moral rules,' 'the moral law,' 'general or public opinion,' 'the law of honour or of fashion.' The author proposes for these laws the name *positive morality*. The laws now enumerated differ in many important respects, but agree in this—that all of them are set by intelligent and rational beings to intelligent and rational beings. There is a figurative application of the word 'law,' to the uniformities of the natural world, through which the field of jurisprudence and morals has been deluged with muddy speculation.

Laws properly so called are *commands*. A command is the signification of a desire or wish, accompanied with the power and the purpose to inflict evil if that desire is not complied with. The person so desired is *bound* or *obliged*, or placed under a *duty*, to obey. Refusal is disobedience, or violation of duty. The evil to be inflicted is called a *sanction*, or an *enforcement of obedience*; the term *punishment* expresses one class of sanctions.

The term *sanction* is improperly applied to a Reward. We cannot say that an action is *commanded*, or that obedience is *constrained* or *enforced* by the offer of a reward. Again, when a reward is offered, a *right* and not an obligation is created: the imperative function passes to the party receiving the reward. In short, it is only by conditional evil, that duties are *sanctioned* or *enforced*.

The correct meaning of *superior* and *inferior* is determined by command and obedience.

LECTURE II. The *Divine Laws* are the known commands of the Deity, enforced by the evils that we may suffer here or hereafter for breaking them. Some of these laws are *revealed*, others *unrevealed*. Paley and others have proved that it was not the purpose of Revelation to disclose the whole of our duties; the Light of Nature is an additional source. But how are we to interpret this Light of Nature?

The various hypotheses for resolving this question may be reduced to two: (1) an Innate Sentiment, called a Moral Sense, Common Sense, Practical Reason, &c.; and (2) the Theory of Utility.

The author avows his adherence to the theory of Utility, which he connects with the Divine Benevolence in the manner of Bentham. God designs the happiness of sentient beings. Some actions forward that purpose, others frustrate it. The first, God has enjoined; the second, He has forbidden. Knowing, therefore, the tendency of any action, we know the Divine command with respect to it.

The tendency of an action is all its consequences near and remote, certain and probable, direct and collateral. A petty theft, or the evasion of a trifling tax, may be insignificant, or even good, in the direct and immediate consequences; but before the full tendency can be weighed, we must resolve the question:—What would be the probable effect on the general happiness or good, if *similar* acts, or omissions, were general or frequent?

When the theory of Utility is correctly stated, the current objections are easily refuted. As viewed by the author, Utility is not the *fountain* or *source* of our duties; this must be commands and sanctions. But it is the *index* of the will of the law-giver, who is presumed to have for his chief end the happiness or good of mankind.

The most specious objection to Utility is the supposed necessity of going through a calculation of the consequences of every act that we have to perform, an operation often beyond our power, and likely to be abused to forward our private wishes. To this, the author replies first, that supposing utility our only index, we must make the best of it. Of course, if we were endowed with a moral sense, a special organ for ascertaining our duties, the attempt to displace that invincible consciousness, and to thrust the principle of utility into the vacant seat, would be impossible and absurd.

According to the theory of Utility, our conduct would conform to rules inferred from the tendencies of actions, but

would not be determined by a direct resort to the principle of general utility. Utility would be the ultimate, not the immediate test. To preface each act or forbearance by a conjecture and comparison of consequences were both superfluous and mischievous:—superfluous, inasmuch as the result is already embodied in a known rule; and mischievous, inasmuch as the process, if performed on the spur of the occasion, would probably be faulty.

With the rules are associated *sentiments*, the result of the Divine, or other, command to obey the rules. It is a gross and flagrant error to talk of *substituting* calculation for sentiment; this is to oppose the rudder to the sail. Sentiment without calculation were capricious; calculation without sentiment is inert.

There are cases where the *specific* consequences of an action are so momentous as to overbear the rule; for example, resistance to a bad government, which the author calls an *anomalous* question, to be tried not by the rule, but by a direct resort to the ultimate or presiding principle, and by a separate calculation of good and evil. Such was the political emergency of the Commonwealth, and the American revolution. It would have been well, the author thinks, if utility had been the sole guide in both cases.

There is a second objection to Utility, more perplexing to deal with. How can we know fully and correctly all the consequences of actions? The answer is that Ethics, as a science of observation and induction, has been formed, through a long succession of ages, by many and separate contributions from many and separate discoverers. Like all other sciences, it is progressive, although unfortunately, subject to special drawbacks. The men that have enquired, or affected to enquire, into Ethics, have rarely been impartial; they have laboured under prejudices or sinister interests; and have been the advocates of foregone conclusions. There is not on this subject a *concurrence or agreement of numerous and impartial enquirers*. Indeed, many of the legal and moral rules of the most civilized communities arose in the infancy of the human mind, partly from caprices of the fancy (nearly omnipotent with barbarians), and partly from an imperfect apprehension of general utility, the result of a narrow experience. Thus the diffusion and the advancement of ethical truth encounter great and peculiar obstacles, only to be removed by a better general education extended to the mass of the people. It is desirable that the community should be indoctrinated with

sound views of property, and with the dependence of wealth upon the true principle of population, discovered by Malthus, all which they are competent to understand.

The author refers to Paley's Moral Philosophy as an example of the perverting tendency of narrow and domineering interests in the domain of ethics. With many commendable points, there is, in that work, much ignoble truckling to the dominant and influential few, and a deal of shabby sophistry in defending abuses that the few were interested in upholding.

As a farther answer to the second objection, he remarks, that it applies to every theory of ethics that supposes our duties to be set by the Deity. Christianity itself is defective, considered as a system of rules for the guidance of human conduct.

He then turns to the alternative of a Moral Sense. This involves two assumptions.

First, Certain sentiments, or feelings of approbation or disapprobation, accompany our conceptions of certain human actions. These feelings are neither the result of our reflection on the tendencies of actions, nor the result of education; the sentiments would follow the conception, although we had neither adverted to the good or evil tendency of the actions, nor become aware of the opinions of others regarding them. This theory denies that the sentiments known to exist can be produced by education. We approve and disapprove of actions *we know not why*.

The author adapts Paley's supposition of the savage, in order to express strongly what the moral sense implies. But we will confine ourselves to his reasonings. Is there, he asks, any evidence of our being gifted with such feelings? The very putting of such a question would seem a sufficient proof that we are not so endowed. There ought to be no more doubt about them, than about hunger or thirst.

It is alleged in their favour that our judgments of rectitude and depravity are immediate and voluntary. The reply is that sentiments begotten by association are no less prompt and involuntary than our instincts. Our response to a money gain, or a money loss, is as prompt as our compliance with the primitive appetites of the system. We begin by loving knowledge as a means to ends; but, in time, the end is inseparably associated with the instrument. So a moral sentiment dictated by utility, if often exercised, would be rapid and direct in its operation.

It is farther alleged, as a proof of the innate character of

the moral judgments, that the moral sentiments of all men are precisely alike. The argument may be put thus :—No opinion or sentiment resulting from observation and induction is held or felt by all mankind : Observation and induction, as applied to the same subject, lead different men to different conclusions. Now, the judgments passed internally on the rectitude or pravity of actions, or the moral sentiments, are precisely alike with all men. Therefore, our moral sentiments are not the result of our inductions of the tendencies of actions ; nor were they derived from others, and impressed by authority and example. Consequently, the moral sentiments are instinctive, or ultimate and inscrutable facts.

To refute such an argument is superfluous ; it is based on a groundless assertion. The moral sentiments of men have differed to infinity. With regard to a few classes of actions, the moral judgments of most, though not of all, men have been alike. With regard to others, they have differed, through every shade or degree, from slight diversity to direct opposition.

But this is exactly what we should expect on the principle of utility. With regard to some actions, the dictates of utility are the same at all times and places, and are so obvious as hardly to admit of mistake or doubt. On the other hand, men's positions in different ages and nations are in many respects widely different ; so that what was useful there and then is useless or pernicious here and now. Moreover, since human tastes are various, and human reason is fallible, men's moral sentiments often widely differ in the same positions.

He next alludes to some prevailing misconceptions in regard to utility. One is the confusion of the *test* with the *motive*. The general good is the test, or rather the index to the ultimate measure or test, the Divine commands ; but it is not in all, or even in most cases, the motive or inducement.

The principle of utility does not demand that we shall always or habitually attend to the general good ; although it does demand that we shall not pursue our own particular good by means that are inconsistent with that paramount object. It permits the pursuit of our own pleasures as pleasure. Even as regards the good of others, it commonly requires us to be governed by partial, rather than by general benevolence ; by the narrower circle of family and friends rather than by the larger humanity that embraces mankind. It requires us to act where we act with the utmost effect ; that is, within the sphere best known to us. The limitations to this principle, the adjustment of the selfish to the social mo-

tives, of partial sympathy to general benevolence, belong to the detail of ethics.

The second misconception of Utility is to confound it with a particular hypothesis concerning the Origin of Benevolence, commonly styled the *selfish system*. Hartley and some others having affirmed that benevolence is not an ultimate fact, but an emanation from self-love, through the association of ideas, it has been fancied that these writers dispute the *existence* of disinterested benevolence or sympathy. Now, the selfish system, in its literal import, is flatly inconsistent with obvious facts, but this is not the system contended for by the writers in question. Still, this distortion has been laid hold of by the opponents of utility, and maintained to be a necessary part of that system; hence the supporters of utility are styled 'selfish, sordid, and cold-blooded calculators.' But, as already said, the theory of utility is not a theory of *motives*; it holds equally good whether benevolence be what it is called, or merely a provident regard to self: whether it be a simple fact, or engendered by association on self-regard. Paley mixed up Utility with self-regarding *motives*; but his theory of these is miserably shallow and defective, and amounted to a denial of genuine benevolence or sympathy.

Austin's Fifth LECTURE is devoted to a full elucidation of the meanings of Law. He had, at the outset, made the distinction, between Law's properly so called, and Laws improperly so called. Of the second class, some are closely allied to Laws proper, possessing in fact their main or essential attributes; others are laws only by metaphor. Laws proper, and those closely allied to them among laws proper, are divisible into three classes. The first are the *Divine Law* or Laws. The second is named *Positive Law* or Positive Laws; and corresponds with Legislation. The third he calls *Positive Morality*, or positive moral rules; it is the same as Morals or Ethics.

Reverting to the definition of Law, he gives the following three essentials:—1. Every law is a *command*, and emanates from a *determinate* source or another. 2. Every sanction is an eventual evil *annexed to a command*. 3. Every duty supposes a *command* whereby it is created. Now, tried by these tests, the laws of God are laws proper; so are positive laws, by which are meant laws established by monarchs as supreme political superiors, by subordinate political superiors, and by subjects, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights.

But as regards Positive Morality, or moral rules, some

have so far the essentials of an *imperative* law or rule, that they are rules set by men to men. But they are not set by men as political superiors, nor by men as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights; in this respect they differ from positive laws, they are not clothed with legal sanctions.

The most important department of positive morality includes the laws set or imposed by general opinion, as for example the laws of honour, and of fashion. Now these are not laws in the strict meaning of the word, because the authors are an *indeterminate* or uncertain aggregate of persons. Still, they have the closest alliance with Laws proper, seeing that being armed with a sanction, they impose a duty. The persons obnoxious to the sanction generally do or forbear the acts enjoined or forbidden; which is all that can happen under the highest type of law.

The author then refers to Locke's division of law, which, although faulty in the analysis, and inaptly expressed, tallies in the main with what he has laid down.

Of Metaphorical or figurative laws, the most usual is that suggested by the fact of *uniformity*, which is one of the ordinary consequences of a law proper. Such are the laws of nature, or the uniformities of co-existence and succession in natural phenomena.

Another metaphorical extension is to a model or pattern, because a law presents something as a guide to human conduct. In this sense, a man may set a law to himself, meaning a plan or model, and not a law in the proper sense of a command. So a rule of art is devoid of a sanction, and therefore of the idea of duty.

A confusion of ideas also exists as to the meaning of a sanction. Bentham styles the evils arising in the course of nature *physical* sanctions, as if the omission to guard against fire were a sin or an immorality, punished by the destruction of one's house. But although this is an evil happening to a rational being, and brought on by a voluntary act or omission, it is not the result of a law in the proper sense of the term. What is produced naturally, says Locke, is produced *without the intervention of a law*.

Austin is thus seen to be one of the most strenuous advocates of Utility as the Standard, and is distinguished for the lucidity of his exposition, and the force of his replies to the objections made against it.

He is also the best expounder of the relationship of Morality to Law.

WILLIAM WHEWELL. [1794-1866.]

Dr. Whewell's chief Ethical works are, 'Elements of Morality, including Polity,' and 'Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England.'

We may refer for his views to either work. The following abstract is taken from the latest (4th) edition of his *Elements* (1864).

In the Preface he indicates the general scope of the work. Morality has its root in the Common Nature of Man; a scheme of Morality must conform to the *Common Sense* of mankind, in so far as that is consistent with itself. Now, this Common Sense of Mankind has in every age led to two seemingly opposite schemes of Morality, the one making *Virtue*, and the other making *Pleasure*, the rule of action. On the one side, men urge the claims of Rectitude, Duty, Conscience, the Moral Faculty; on the other, they declare Utility, Expediency, Interest, Enjoyment, to be the proper guides.

Both systems are liable to objections. Against the scheme of Pleasure, it is urged that we never, in fact, identify virtue as merely useful. Against the scheme of Virtue, it is maintained that virtue is a matter of opinion, and that Conscience varies in different ages, countries, and persons. It is necessary that a scheme of Morality should surmount both classes of objections; and the author therefore attempts a reconciliation of the two opposing theories.

He prepares the way by asking, whether there are any actions, or qualities of actions, universally approved; and whether there are any moral rules accepted by the Common Sense of mankind as universally valid? The reply is that there are such, as, for example, the virtues termed Veracity, Justice, Benevolence. He does not enquire *why* these are approved; he accepts the fact of the approval, and considers that here we have the basis of a Moral System, not liable to either of the opposing objections above recited.

He supposes, however, that the alleged agreement may be challenged, *first*, as not existing; and *next*, as insufficient to reason from.

1. It may be maintained that the excellence of the three virtues named is not universally assented to; departures from them being allowed both in practice and in theory. The answer is, that the principles may be admitted, although the interpretation varies. Men allow Fidelity and Kindness to

he virtues, although in an early stage of moral progress they do not make the application beyond their own friends; it is only at an advanced stage that they include enemies. The Romans at first hold stranger and enemy to be synonymous; but afterwards they applauded the sentiment of the poet, *homo sum*, &c. Moral principles must be what we approve of, when we speak in the name of the whole human species.

2. It may be said that such principles are too vague and loose to reason from. A verbal agreement in employing the terms *truthful*, *just*, *humane*, does not prove a real agreement as to the actions; and the particulars must be held as explaining the generalities.

The author holds this objection to be erroneous; and the scheme of his work is intended to meet it. He proceeds as follows:—

He allows that we must fix what is meant by *right*, which carries with it the meaning of *Virtue* and of *Duty*. Now, in saying an action is right, there is this idea conveyed, namely, that we render such a *reason* for it, as shall be *paramount* to all other considerations. Right must be the *Supreme Rule*. How then are we to arrive at this rule?

The supreme rule is the authority over *all* the faculties and impulses; and is made up of the partial rules according to the separate faculties, powers, and impulses. We are to look, in the first instance, to the several faculties or departments of the mind; for, in connexion with each of these, we shall find an irresistible propriety inherent in the very nature of the faculty.

For example, man lives in the society of fellow-men; his actions derive their meaning from this position. He has the faculty of Speech, whereby his actions are connected with other men. Now, as man is under a supreme moral rule, [this the author appears to assume in the very act of proving it], there must be a rule of right as regards the use of Speech; which rule can be no other than truth and falsehood. In other words, *veracity* is a virtue.

Again, man, as a social being, has to divide with others the possession of the world, in other words, to possess *Property*; whence there must be a rule of Property, that is, each man is to have his own. Whence *Justice* is seen to be a virtue.

The author thinks himself at one with the common notions of mankind in pronouncing that the Faculty of Speech, the Desire of Possessions, and the Affections, are properly regu-

lated, not by any extraneous purposes or ends to be served by them, but by Veracity, Justice, and Humanity, respectively.

He explains his position farther, by professing to follow Butler in the doctrine that, through the mere contemplation of our human faculties and springs of action, we can discern certain relations which must exist among them by the necessity of man's moral being. Butler maintains that, by merely comparing appetite with conscience as springs of action, we see conscience is superior and ought to rule; and Whewell conceives this to be self-evident, and expresses it by stating that *the Lower parts of our nature are to be governed by the Higher*. Men being considered as social beings, capable of mutual understanding through speech, it is self-evident that their rule must include veracity. In like manner, it is self-evident from the same consideration of social relationship, that each man should abstain from violence and anger towards others, that is, *love his fellow-men*.

Remarking on the plea of the utilitarian, that truth may be justified by the intolerable consequences of its habitual violation, he urges that this is no reason against its being intuitively perceived; just as the axioms of geometry, although intuitively felt, are confirmed by showing the incongruities following on their denial. He repeats the common allegation in favour of *a priori* principles generally, that no consideration of evil consequences would give the sense of *universality* of obligation attaching to the fundamental moral maxims; and endeavours to show that his favourite antithesis of *Idea* and *Fact* conciliates the internal essence and the external conditions of morality. The *Idea* is invariable and universal; the *Fact*, or outward circumstances, may vary historically and geographically. Morality must in some measure be dependent on Law, but yet there is an *Idea* of Justice above law.

It very naturally occurred to many readers of Whewell's scheme, that in so far as he endeavours to give any reason for the foundations of morality, he runs in a vicious circle. He proposes to establish his supreme universal rule, by showing it to be only a summing up of certain rules swaying the several portions or departments of our nature—Veracity, Justice, &c., while, in considering the obligation of these rules, he assumes that man is a moral being, which is another way of saying that he is to be under a supreme moral rule. In his latest edition, the author has replied to this charge, but so briefly as to cast no new light on his position. He only repeats that

the Supreme rule of Human Action is given by the constitution and conditions of human nature. His ethical principle may be not unfairly expressed by saying, that he recognizes a certain intrinsic fitness in exercising the organ of speech according to its social uses, that is, in promoting a right understanding among men; and so with Justice, as the fitness of property, and Humanity, as the fitness of the Affections. This fitness is intuitively felt. Human happiness is admitted to be a consequence of these rules; but happiness is not a sufficient end in itself; morality is also an end in itself. Human happiness is not to be conceived or admitted, except as containing a moral element; in addition to the direct gratifications of human life, we must include the delight of virtue. [How men can be compelled to postpone their pleasurable sense of the good things of life, till they have contracted a delight in virtue for its own sake, the author does not say. It has been the great object of moralists in all ages to impart by *education* such a state of mind as to spoil the common gratifications, if they are viciously procured; the comparatively little success of the endeavour, shows that nature has done little to favour it.]

The foregoing is an abstract of the Introduction to the 4th Edition of the Elements of Morality. We shall present the author's views respecting the other questions of Morality in the form of the usual summary.

I.—As regards the Standard, enough has been already indicated.

II.—The Psychology of the Moral Faculty is given by Whewell as part of a classification of our Active Powers, or, as he calls them, Springs of Action. These are: I.—The *Appetites* or Bodily Desires, as Hunger and Thirst, and the desires of whatever things have been found to gratify the senses. II.—The *Affections*, which are directed to persons; they fall under the two heads Love and Anger. III.—The *Mental Desires*, having for their objects certain abstractions. They are the desire of Safety, including Security and Liberty; the desire of Having, or Property; the desire of Society in all its forms—Family Society and Civil Society, under which is included the need of Mutual Understanding; the desire of Superiority; and the Desire of Knowledge. IV.—The *Moral Sentiments*. Our judgment of actions as right or wrong is accompanied by certain Affections or Sentiments, named Approbation and Disapprobation, Indignation and Esteem; these are the Moral Sentiments. V.—The *Right Sentiments*,

namely, the desires of being Loved, of Esteem or Admiration, of our own Approval; and generally all springs of action designated by the word *self*—for example, self-love.

With regard to the Moral Sentiment, or Conscience, in particular, the author's resolution of Morality into Moral Rules, necessarily supposes an exercise of the Reason, together with the Affections above described. He expressly mentions 'the *Practical* Reason, which guides us in applying Rules to our actions, and in discerning the consequences of actions.' He does not allow Individual Conscience as an ultimate or supreme authority, but requires it to be conformed to the Supreme Moral Rules, arrived at in the manner above described.

On the subject of Disinterestedness, he maintains a modification of Paley's selfish theory. He allows that some persons are so far disinterested as to be capable of benevolence and self-sacrifice, without any motive of reward or punishment; but 'to require that all persons should be such, would be not only to require what we certainly shall not find, but to put the requirements of our Morality in a shape in which it cannot convince men.' Accordingly, like Paley, he places the doctrine that 'to promote the happiness of others will lead to our own happiness,' exclusively on the ground of Religion. He honours the principle that 'virtue is happiness,' but prefers for mankind generally the form, 'virtue is *the way* to happiness.' In short, he places no reliance on the purely Disinterested impulses of mankind, although he admits the existence of such.

III.—He discusses the *Summum Bonum*, or Happiness, only with reference to his Ethical theory. The attaining of the objects of our desires yields Enjoyment or Pleasure, which cannot be the supreme end of life, being distinguished from, and opposed to, Duty. Happiness is Pleasure and Duty combined and harmonized by Wisdom. 'As moral beings, our Happiness must be found in our Moral Progress, and in the consequences of our Moral Progress; we must be happy by being virtuous.'

He complains of the moralists that reduce virtue to Happiness (in the sense of human pleasure), that they fail to provide a measure of happiness, or to resolve it into definite elements; and again urges the impossibility of calculating the whole consequences of an action upon human happiness.

IV.—With respect to the Moral Code, Whewell's arrange-

ment is interwoven with his derivation of moral rules. He enumerates five Cardinal Virtues as the substance of morality:—*BENEVOLENCE*, which gives expansion to our *Love*; *JUSTICE*, as prescribing the measure of our *Mental Desires*; *TRUTH*, the law of *Speech* in connexion with its purpose; *PURITY*, the control of the *Bodily Appetites*; and *ORDER* (obedience to the Laws), which engages the *Reason* in the consideration of Rules and Laws for defining Virtue and Vice. Thus the five leading branches of virtue have a certain parallelism to the five chief classes of motives—*Bodily Appetites*, *Mental Desires*, *Love* and its opposite, the need of a Mutual Understanding, and *Reason*.

As already seen, he considers it possible to derive every one of these virtues from the consideration of man's situation with reference to each:—*Benevolence*, or *Humanity*, from our social relationship; *Justice*, from the nature of Property; *Truth*, from the employment of Language for mutual Understanding; *Purity*, from considering the lower parts of our nature (the *Appetites*) as governed by the higher; and *Order*, from the relation of Governor and Governed. By a self-evident, intuitive, irresistible consideration of the circumstances of the case, we are led to these several virtues in the detail; and their sum is the Supreme Rule of Life.

Not content with these five express moral principles, he considers that the Supreme Law requires, as adjuncts, two other virtues; to these he gives the names—*EARNESTNESS*, or *Zeal*, and *MORAL PURSUE*, meaning that everything whatsoever should be done for *moral ends*.

V.—The relation of Ethics to Politics in Whewell's system is one of intimacy, and yet of independence. The Laws of States supply the materials of human action, by defining property, &c., for the time being; to which definitions morality must correspond. On the other hand, morality supplies the Idea, or ideal, of Justice, to which the Laws of Society should progressively conform themselves. The Legislator and the Jurist must adapt their legislation to the point of view of the Moralist, and the moralist, while enjoining obedience to their dictates, should endeavour to correct the inequalities produced by laws, and should urge the improvement of Law, to make it conformable to morality. The Moral is in this way contrasted with the *Jural*, a useful word of the author's coining. He devotes a separate Book, entitled '*Rights and Obligations*,' to the foundations of Jurisprudence. He makes a five-fold division of Rights, grounded on his classification of the Springs

of Human Action; Rights of *Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage, Government*; and justifies this division as against others proposed by jurists.

VI.—He introduces the Morality of Religion as a supplement to the Morality of Reason. The separation of the two, he remarks, 'enables us to trace the results of the moral guidance of human Reason consistently and continuously, while we still retain a due sense of the superior authority of Religion.' As regards the foundations of Natural and Revealed Religion, he adopts the line of argument most usual with English Theologians.

JAMES FREDERICK FERRIER. [1808-64.]

In his 'Lectures on Greek Philosophy' (Remains, Vol. I.); Ferrier has indicated his views on the leading Ethical controversies.

These will appear, if we select his conclusions, on the three following points:—The Moral Sense, the nature of Sympathy, and the Summum Bonum.

1. He considers that the Sophists first distinctly broached the question—What is man by nature, and what is he by convention or fashion?

'This prime question of moral philosophy, as I have called it, is no easy one to answer, for it is no easy matter to effect the discrimination out of which the answer must proceed. It is a question, perhaps, to which no complete, but only an approximate, answer can be returned. One common mistake is to ascribe more to the natural man than properly belongs to him, to ascribe to him attributes and endowments which belong only to the social and artificial man. Some writers—Hutcheson, for example, and he is followed by many others—are of opinion that man naturally has a conscience or moral sense which discriminates between right and wrong, just as he has naturally a sense of taste, which distinguishes between sweet and bitter, and a sense of sight, which discriminates between red and blue, or a sentient organism, which distinguishes between pleasure and pain. That man has by nature, and from the first, the possibility of attaining to a conscience is not to be denied. That he has within him by birth-right something out of which conscience is developed, I firmly believe; and what this is I shall endeavour by-and-by to show when I come to speak of Sokrates and his philosophy as opposed to the doctrines of the Sophists. But that the man

is furnished by nature with a conscience ready-made, just as he is furnished with a ready-made sensational apparatus, this is a doctrine in which I have no faith, and which I regard as altogether erroneous. It arises out of the disposition to attribute more to the natural man than properly belongs to him. The other error into which inquirers are apt to fall in making a discrimination between what man is by nature, and what he is by convention, is the opposite of the one just mentioned. They sometimes attribute to the natural man less than properly belongs to him. And this, I think, was the error into which the Sophists were betrayed. They fell into it inadvertently, and not with any design of embracing or promulgating erroneous opinions.'

2. With reference to SYMPATHY, he differs from Adam Smith's view, that it is a native and original affection of the heart, like hunger and thirst. Mere feeling, he contends, can never take a man out of self. It is thought that overleaps this boundary; not the *feeling* of sensation, but the *thought* of one's self and one's sensations, gives the ground and the condition of sympathy. Sympathy has self-consciousness for its foundation. Very young children have little sympathy, because in them the idea of self is but feebly developed.

3. In his chapter on the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools, he discusses at length the summum bonum, or Happiness, and, by implication, the Ethical end, or Standard. He considers that men have to keep in view *two* ends; the one the maintenance of their own nature, as rational and thinking beings; the other their happiness or pleasure. He will not allow that we are to do right at all hazards, irrespective of utility; yet he considers that there is something defective in the scheme that sets aside virtue as the good, and enthrones happiness in its place. He sums up as follows:—

'We thus see that a complete body of ethics should embrace two codes, two systems of rules, the one of which we may call the fundamental or antecedent, or under-ground ethics, as underlying the other; and the other of which we may call the upper or subsequent, or above-ground ethics, as resting on, and modified by the former. The under-ground ethics would inculcate on man the necessity of being what he truly is, namely, a creature of reason and of thought; in short, the necessity of being a man, and of preserving to himself this status. Here the end is virtue, that is, the life and health of the soul, and nothing but this. The above-ground ethics would inculcate on man the necessity of being a happy man.'

It is not enough for man *to be*; he must, moreover, if possible, *be happy*. The fundamental ethics look merely to his being, i.e., his being rational; the upper ethics look principally to his being happy, but they are bound to take care that in all his happiness he does nothing to violate his rationality, the health and virtue of the soul.

HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL.

Mr. Mansel, in his 'Metaphysics,' has examined the question of a moral standard, and the nature of the moral faculty, accepting, with slight and unimportant modifications, the current theory of a moral sense.

1. *The Moral Faculty.* That the conceptions of right and wrong are *sui generis*, is proved (1) by the fact that in all languages there are distinct terms for 'right' and 'agreeable'; (2) by the testimony of consciousness; and (3) by the mutual inconsistencies of the antagonists of a moral sense. The moral faculty is not identical with Reason; for the understanding contributes to truth only one of its elements, namely, the concept; in addition, the concept must agree with the fact as presented in intuition. The moral sense is usually supposed to involve the perception of qualities only in so far as they are *pleasing* or *displeasing*. To this representation Mr. Mansel objects. In an act of moral consciousness two things are involved: a perception or judgment, and a sentiment or feeling. But the judgment itself may be farther divided into two parts: 'the one, an individual fact, presented now and here; the other, a general law, valid always and everywhere.' This is the distinction between *presentative* and *representative* Knowledge. In every act of consciousness there is some individual fact presented, and an operation of the understanding. 'A conscious act of pure moral sense, like a conscious act of pure physical sense, if it ever takes place at all, takes place at a time of which we have no remembrance, and of which we can give no account.' The intuitive element may be called *conscience*; the representing element is the *understanding*. On another point he differs from the ordinary theory. It is commonly said that we immediately perceive the moral character of acts, whether by ourselves or by others. But this would implicate two facts, neither of which we can be conscious of: (1) a law binding on a certain person, and (2) his conduct as agreeing or disagreeing with that law. Now, I can infer the existence of

such a law only by *representing* his mind as constituted like my own. We can, in fact, immediately perceive moral qualities only in our own actions.

2. *The Moral Standard.* This is treated as a branch of Ontology, and designated the 'Real in morality.' He declares that Kant's notion of an absolute moral law, binding by its inherent power over the mind, is a mere fiction. The difference between inclination and the moral imperative is merely a difference between lower and higher pleasure. The moral law can have no authority unless imposed by a superior, as a law emanating from a lawgiver. If man is not accountable to some higher being, there is no distinction between duty and pleasure. The standard of right and wrong is the moral *nature* (not the arbitrary will) of God.* Now, as we cannot know God—an infinite being,—so we have but a relative conception of morality. We may have lower and higher ideas of duty. Morality therefore admits of progress. But no advance in morality contradicts the *principles* previously acknowledged, however it may vary the acts whereby those principles are carried out. And each advance takes its place in the mind,

* 'The theory which places the standard of morality in the *Divine nature* must not be confounded with that which places it in the arbitrary will of God. God did not create morality by his will; it is inherent in his nature, and co-eternal with himself; nor can he be conceived as capable of reversing it.' The distinction here drawn does not avoid the fatal objection to the simpler theory, namely, that it takes away the moral character of God. The acts of a sovereign cannot, with any propriety, as Austin has shown, be termed either legal or illegal; in like manner, if God is a moral lawgiver, if 'he is accountable to no one,' then 'his duty and his pleasure are undistinguishable from each other,' and he cannot without self-contradiction be called a moral being. Even upon Mr. Mansel's own theory, it is hardly correct to say that 'God did not create morality by his will.' Morality involves two elements—one, rules of conduct, the other, an obligation to observe them. Now, the authority or obligatoriness of moral laws has been made to depend upon the will of God, so that, prior to that will, morality could not exist. Hence the only part of morality that can be co-eternal with God, is simply the rules of morality, without their obligatoriness, the salt without its savour. The closing assertion that God cannot reverse morality, may mean either that it would be inconsistent with his immutability to reverse the laws he had himself established, or that he is compelled by his nature to impose certain rules, and no others. The first supposition is a truism; the second is not proved. For, since Mr. Mansel has discarded as a fiction any 'absolute law of duty,' it is hard to conjecture whence he could derive any compulsory choice of rules. Why God commands some things in preference to others—whether from a regard to the happiness of all his creatures, or of some only; whether with a view to his own glory, or from conformity with some abstract notion—has been much disputed; and it is quite *conceivable* that he may not adopt any of those objects.

not as a question to be supported by argument, but as an axiom to be intuitively admitted. Each principle appears true and irreversible so far as it goes, but it is liable to be merged in a more comprehensive formula. It is an error of philosophers to imagine that they have an absolute standard of morals, and thereupon to set out *à priori* the criterion of a possibly true revelation. Kant said that the revealed commands of God could have no religious value, unless approved by the moral reason; and Fichte held that no true revelation could contain any intimation of future rewards and punishments, or any moral rule not deducible from the principles of the practical reason. But revelation has enlightened the practical reason, as by the maxim—to love God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself—a maxim, says Mr. Mansel, that philosophy in vain toiled after, and subsequently borrowed without acknowledgment.

JOHN STUART MILL.

Mr. J. S. Mill examines the basis of Ethics in a small work entitled *Utilitarianism*.

After a chapter of General Remarks, he proposes (Chapter II.) to enquire, What Utilitarianism is? This creed holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. The things included under pleasure and pain may require farther explanation; but this does not affect the general theory. To the accusation that pleasure is a mean and grovelling object of pursuit, the answer is, that human beings are capable of pleasures that are not grovelling. It is compatible with utility to recognize some *kinds* of pleasure as more valuable than others. There are pleasures that, irrespective of amount, are held by all persons that have experienced them to be preferable to others. Few human beings would consent to become beasts, or fools, or base, in consideration of a greater allowance of pleasure. Inseparable from the estimate of pleasure is a *sense of dignity*, which determines a preference among enjoyments.

But this distinction in kind is not essential to the justification of the standard of Utility. That standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. However little the higher virtues

might contribute to one's own happiness, there can be no doubt that the world in general gains by them.

Another objection to the doctrine is, that happiness is a thing unattainable, and that no one has a *right* to it. Not only can men do without happiness, but renunciation is the first condition of all nobleness of character.

In reply, the author remarks that, supposing happiness impossible, the prevention of unhappiness might still be an object, which is a mode of Utility. But the alleged impossibility of happiness is either a verbal quibble or an exaggeration. No one contends for a life of sustained rapture; occasional moments of such, in an existence of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a predominance of the active over the passive, and moderate expectations on the whole, constitute a life worthy to be called happiness. Numbers of mankind have been satisfied with much less. There are two great factors of enjoyment—tranquillity and excitement. With the one, little pleasure will suffice; with the other, considerable pain can be endured. It does not appear impossible to secure both in alternation. The principal defect in persons of fortunate lot is to care for nobody but themselves; this curtails the excitements of life, and makes everything dwindle as the end approaches. Another circumstance rendering life unsatisfactory is the want of mental cultivation, by which men are deprived of the inexhaustible pleasures of knowledge, not merely in the shape of science, but as practice and fine art. It is not at all difficult to indicate sources of happiness; the main stress of the problem lies in the contest with the positive evils of life, the great sources of physical and of mental suffering—indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of affection. Poverty and Disease may be contracted in dimensions; and even vicissitudes of fortune are not wholly beyond control.

It is unquestionably possible to do without happiness. This is the lot of the greater part of mankind, and is often voluntarily chosen by the hero or the martyr. But self-sacrifice is not its own end; it must be made to earn for others immunity from sacrifice. It must be a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that requires any one to serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of their own; yet undoubtedly while the world is in that imperfect state, the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue that can be found in man. Nay, farther, the conscious

ability to do without happiness, in such a condition of the world, is the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable. Meanwhile, self-devotion belongs as much to the Utilitarian as to the Stoic or the Transcendentalist; with the reservation that a sacrifice not tending to increase the sum of happiness is to be held as wasted. The golden rule, do as you would be done by, is the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. The means of approaching this ideal are, first, that laws and society should endeavour to place the interest of the individual in harmony with the interest of the whole; and, secondly, that education and opinion should establish in the mind of each individual an indissoluble association between his own good and the good of the whole.

The system of Utility is objected to, on another side, as being too high for humanity; men cannot be perpetually acting with a view to the general interests of society. But this is to mistake the meaning of a standard, and to confound the rule of action with the motive. Ethics tells us what are our duties, or by what test we are to know them; but no system of ethics requires that the motive of every action should be a feeling of duty; our actions are rightly done provided only duty does not condemn them. The great majority of actions have nothing to do with the good of the world—they end with the individual; it happens to few persons, and that rarely, to be public benefactors. Private utility is in the mass of cases all that we have to attend to. As regards abstinences, indeed, it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be aware that the action is one that, if practised generally, would be generally injurious, and to not feel a sense of obligation on that ground; but such an amount of regard for the general interest is required under every system of morals.

It is farther alleged against Utility, that it renders men cold and unsympathizing, chills the moral feelings towards individuals, and regards only the dry consequences of actions, without reference to the moral qualities of the agent. The author replies that Utility, like any other system, admits that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character. Still, he contends, in the long run, the best proof of a good character is good actions. If the objection means that utilitarians do not lay sufficient stress on the beauties of character, he replies that this is the accident of persons cultivating their moral feelings more than their sympathies and artistic perceptions, and may occur under every view of the foundation of morals.

The next objection considered is that Utility is a *godless* doctrine. The answer is, that whoever believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever he has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree.

Again, Utility is stigmatized as an immoral doctrine, by carrying out Expediency in opposition to Principle. But the Expedient in this sense means what is expedient for the agent himself, and, instead of being the same thing with the useful, is a branch of the hurtful. It would often be expedient to tell a lie, but so momentous and so widely extended are the utilities of truth, that veracity is a rule of transcendent expediency. Yet all moralists admit exceptions to it, solely on account of the manifest inexpediency of observing it on certain occasions.

The author does not omit to notice the usual charge that it is impossible to make a calculation of consequences previous to every action, which is as much as to say that no one can be under the guidance of Christianity, because there is not time, on the occasion of doing anything, to read through the Old and New Testaments. The real answer is (substantially the same as Austin's) that there has been ample time during the past duration of the species. Mankind have all that time been learning by experience the consequences of actions; on that experience they have founded both their prudence and their morality. It is an inference from the principle of utility, which regards morals as a practical art, that moral rules are improvable; but there exists under the ultimate principle a number of intermediate generalizations, applicable at once to the emergencies of human conduct. Nobody argues that navigation is not founded on astronomy, because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack.

As to the stock argument, that people will pervert utility for their private ends, Mr. Mill challenges the production of any ethical creed where this may not happen. The fault is due, not to the origin of the rules, but to the complicated nature of human affairs, and the necessity of allowing a certain latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent, for accommodation to circumstances. And in cases of conflict, utility is a better guide than anything found in systems whose moral laws claim independent authority.

Chapter III. considers the **ULTIMATE SANCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY.**

It is a proper question with regard to a supposed moral standard,—What is its sanction? what is the source of its

obligation? wherein lies its binding force? The customary morality is consecrated by education and opinion, and seems to be obligatory *in itself*; but to present, as the source of obligation, some general principle, not surrounded by the halo of consecration, seems a paradox; the superstructure seems to stand better without such a foundation. This difficulty belongs to every attempt to reduce morality to first principles, unless it should happen that the principle chosen has as much sacredness as any of its applications.

Utility has, or might have, all the sanctions attaching to any other system of morals. Those sanctions are either External or Internal. The External are the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure (1) from our fellow-creatures, or (2) from the Ruler of the Universe, along with any sympathy or affection for them, or love and awe of Him, inclining us apart from selfish motives. There is no reason why these motives should not attach themselves to utilitarian morality.

The Internal Sanction, under every standard of duty, is of one uniform character—a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, is *the essence of Conscience*; a complex phenomenon, involving associations from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from the recollections of childhood, and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement. This extreme complication is an obstacle to our supposing that it can attach to other objects than what are found at present to excite it. The binding force, however, is *the mass of feeling to be broken through* in order to violate our standard of right, and which, if we do violate that standard, will have to be afterwards encountered as remorse.

Thus, apart from external sanctions, the ultimate sanction, under Utility, is the same as for other standards, namely, the conscientious feelings of mankind. If there be anything innate in conscience, there is nothing more likely than that it should be a regard to the pleasures and pains of others. If so, the intuitive ethics would be the same as the utilitarian; and it is admitted on all hands that a *large portion* of morality turns upon what is due to the interests of fellow-creatures.

On the other hand, if, as the author believes, the moral feelings are not innate, they are not for that reason less

natural. It is natural to man to speak, to reason, to cultivate the ground, to build cities, though these are acquired faculties. So the moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth of it; capable, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously, and of being brought to a high pitch by means of cultivation. It is also susceptible, by the use of the external sanctions and the force of early impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direction, and of being perverted to absurdity and mischief.

The basis of natural sentiment capable of supporting the utilitarian morality is to be found in the *social feelings of mankind*. The social state is so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that he can hardly conceive himself otherwise than as a member of society; and as civilization advances, this association becomes more firmly riveted. All strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in consulting the welfare of others. Each comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being that *of course* pays regard to others. There is the strongest motive in each person to manifest this sentiment, and, even if he should not feel it strongly himself, to cherish it in everybody else. The smallest germs of the feeling are thus laid hold of, and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education; and by the powerful agency of the external sanctions there is woven around it a complete web of corroborative association. In an improving state of society, the influences are on the increase that generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him never think of anything for self, if they also were not included. Suppose, now, that this feeling of unity were taught as a religion, and that the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, were directed to make every person grow up surrounded with the profession and the practice of it; can there be any doubt as to the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality?

Even in our present low state of advancement, the deeply-rooted conception that each individual has of himself as a social being tends to make him wish to be in harmony with his fellow-creatures. The feeling may be, in most persons, inferior in strength to the selfish feelings, and may be altogether wanting; but to such as possess it, it has all the characters of a natural feeling, and one that they would not desire to be without.

Chapter IV. is OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY IS SUSCEPTIBLE. Questions about ends are questions as to what things are desirable. According to the theory of Utility, happiness is desirable as an end; all other things are desirable as means. What is the proof of this doctrine?

As the proof, that the sun is visible, is that people actually see it, so the proof that happiness is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, beyond the fact that each one desires their own happiness.

But granting that people desire happiness as *one* of their ends of conduct, do they never desire anything else? To all appearance they do; they desire virtue, and the absence of vice, no less surely than pleasure and the absence of pain. Hence the opponents of utility consider themselves entitled to infer that happiness is not the standard of moral approbation and disapprobation.

But the utilitarians do not deny that virtue is a thing to be desired. The very reverse. They maintain that it is to be desired, and that *for itself*. Although considering that what makes virtue is the tendency to promote happiness, yet they hold that the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state conducive to the general happiness, unless it has adopted this essential instrumentality so warmly as to love it for its own sake. It is necessary to the carrying out of utility that certain things, originally of the nature of means, should come by association to be a part of the final end. Thus health is but a means, and yet we cherish it as strongly as we do any of the ultimate pleasures and pains. So virtue is not originally an end, but it is capable of becoming so; it is to be desired and cherished not solely as a means to happiness, but as a part of happiness.

The notorious instance of money exemplifies this operation. The same may be said of power and fame; although these are ends as well as means. We should be but ill provided with happiness, were it not for this provision of nature, whereby things, originally indifferent, but conducive to the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure, of even greater value than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency and in the extent of their occupation of our life. Virtue is originally valuable as bringing pleasure and avoiding pain; but by association it may be felt as a good in itself, and be desired as intensely as any other good; with this superiority over money, power, or fame, that it makes

the individual a blessing to society, while these others may make him a curse.

With the allowance thus made for the effect of association, the author considers it proved that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is not desired for itself till it has become such. Human nature is so constituted, he thinks, that we desire nothing but what is either a part of happiness or a means of happiness; and no other proof is required that these are the only things desirable. Whether this psychological assertion be correct, must be determined by the self-consciousness and observation of the most practised observers of human nature.

It may be alleged that, although desire, always tends to happiness, yet Will, as shown by actual conduct, is different from desire. We persist in a course of action long after the original desire has faded. But this is merely an instance of that familiar fact, the power of habit, and is nowise confined to the virtuous actions. Will is amenable to habit; we may will from habit what we no longer desire for itself, or desire only because we will it. But the will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under the sway of habit. What is the result of habit may not be intrinsically good; we might think it better for virtue that habit did not come in, were it not that the other influences are not sufficiently to be depended on for unerring constancy, until they have acquired this farther support.

Chapter V. is ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND UTILITY.

The strongest obstacle to the doctrine of Utility has been drawn from the Idea of Justice. The rapid perception and the powerful sentiment connected with the Just, seem to show it as generically distinct from every variety of the Expedient.

To see whether the sense of justice can be explained on grounds of Utility, the author begins by surveying in the concrete the things usually denominated just. In the first place, it is commonly considered unjust to deprive any one of their personal liberty, or property, or anything secured to them by law: in other words, it is unjust to violate any one's legal rights. Secondly, The legal rights of a man may be such as *ought* not to have belonged to him; that is, the law conferring those rights may be a bad law. When a law is bad, opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it; some think that no law should be disobeyed by the indi-

vidual citizen; others hold that it is just to resist unjust laws. It is thus admitted by all that there is such a thing as *moral right*, the refusal of which is injustice. Thirdly, it is considered just that each person should receive what he *deserves* (whether good or evil). And a person is understood to deserve good if he does right, evil if he does wrong; and in particular to deserve good in return for good, and evil in return for evil. Fourthly, it is unjust to *break faith*, to violate an engagement, or disappoint expectations knowingly and voluntarily raised. Like other obligations, this is not absolute, but may be overruled by some still stronger demand of justice on the other side. Fifthly, It is inconsistent with justice to be *partial*; to show favour or preference in matters where favour does not apply. We are expected in certain cases to prefer our friends to strangers; but a tribunal is bound to the strictest impartiality; rewards and punishments should be administered impartially; so likewise the patronage of important public offices. Nearly allied to impartiality is the idea of *equality*. The justice of giving equal protection to the rights of all is maintained even when the rights themselves are very unequal, as in slavery and in the system of ranks or castes. There are the greatest differences as to what is equality in the distribution of the produce of labour; some thinking that all should receive alike; others that the neediest should receive most; others that the distribution should be according to labour or services.

To get a clue to the common idea running through all these meanings, the author refers to the etymology of the word, which, in most languages, points to something ordained by *law*. Even although there be many things considered just, that we do not usually enforce by law, yet in these cases it would give us pleasure if law could be brought to bear upon offenders. When we think a person bound in justice to do a thing, we should like to see him punished for not doing it; we lament the obstacles that may be in the way, and strive to make amends by a strong expression of our own opinion. The idea of legal constraint is thus the generating idea of justice throughout all its transformations.

The real turning point between morality and simple expediency is contained in the penal sanction. Duty is what we may *exact* of a person; there may be reasons why we do not exact it, but the person himself would not be entitled to complain if we did so. Expediency, on the other hand, points to things that we may wish people to do, may praise them for

doing, and despise them for not doing, while we do not consider it proper to bring in the aid of punishment.

There enters farther into the idea of Justice what has been expressed by the ill-chosen phrase, 'perfect obligation,' meaning that the duty involves a moral right on the part of some definite person, as in the case of a debt; an imperfect obligation is exemplified by charity, which gives no legal claim to any one recipient. Every such right is a case of Justice, and not of Beneficence.

The Idea of Justice is thus shown to be grounded in Law; and the next question is, does the strong feeling or sentiment of Justice grow out of considerations of utility? Mr. Mill conceives that though the notion of expediency or utility does not give birth to the sentiment, it gives birth to what is *moral* in it.

The two essentials of justice are (1) the desire to punish some one, and (2) the notion or belief that harm has been done to some definite individual or individuals. Now, it appears to the author that the desire to punish is a spontaneous outgrowth of two sentiments, both natural, and, it may be, instinctive; the impulse of *self-defence*, and the feeling of *sympathy*. We naturally *resent*, *repel*, and *retaliate*, any harm done to ourselves and to any one that engages our sympathies. There is nothing moral in mere resentment; the moral part is the subordination of it to our social regards. We are moral beings, in proportion as we restrain our private resentment whenever it conflicts with the interests of society. All moralists agree with Kant in saying that no act is right that could not be adopted as a law by all rational beings (that is, consistently with the well-being of society).

There is in Justice a rule of conduct, and a right on the part of some one, which right ought to be enforced by society. If it is asked why society *ought* to enforce the right, there is no answer but the general utility. If that expression seem feeble and inadequate to account for the energy of retaliation inspired by injustice, the author asks us to advert to the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility that is concerned. The interest involved is *security*, to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests. All other earthly benefits needed by one person are not needed by another; and many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or replaced by something else; but security no human being can possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of all and every good,

beyond the passing moment. Now, this most indispensable of all necessities, after physical nutriment, cannot be had unless the machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play. Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is often the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind. The claim assumes that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all other considerations, which constitute the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong, and that of ordinary expediency and in expediency.

Having presented his own analysis of the sentiment of Justice, the author proceeds to examine the *intuitive* theory. The charge is constantly brought against Utility, that it is an uncertain standard, differently interpreted by each person. The only safety, it is pretended, is found in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistakable dictates of Justice, carrying their evidence in themselves, and independent of the fluctuations of opinions. But so far is this from being the fact, that there is as much difference of opinion, and as much discussion, about what is just, as about what is useful to society.

To take a few instances. On the question of Punishment, some hold it unjust to punish any one by way of example, or for any end but the good of the sufferer. Others maintain that the good of the society is the only admissible end of punishment. Robert Owen affirms that punishment altogether is unjust, and that we should deal with crime only through education. Now, without an appeal to expediency, it is impossible to arbitrate among these conflicting views; each one has a maxim of justice on its side. Then as to the apportioning of punishments to offences. The rule that recommends itself to the primitive sentiment of justice is an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; a rule formally abandoned in European countries, although not without its hold upon the popular mind. With many, the test of justice, in penal infliction, is that it should be proportioned to the offence; while others maintain that it is just to inflict only such an amount of punishment as will deter from the commission of the offence.

Besides the differences of opinion already alluded to, as to the payment of labour, how many, and irreconcilable, are the standards of justice appealed to on the matter of taxation.

One opinion is, that taxes should be in proportion to pecuniary means; others think the wealthy should pay a higher proportion. In point of natural justice, a case might be made out for disregarding means, and taking the same sum from each, as the privileges are equally bestowed: yet from feelings of humanity and social expediency no one advocates that view. So that there is no mode of extricating the question but the utilitarian.

To sum up. The great distinction between the Just and the Expedient is the distinction between the essentials or well-being—the moral rules forbidding mankind to hurt one another—and the rules that only point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs. It is in the higher moralities of protection from harm that each individual has the greatest stake; and they are the moralities that compose the obligations of justice. It is on account of these that punishment, or retribution of evil for evil, is universally included in the idea. For the carrying out of the process of retaliation, certain maxims are necessary as instruments or as checks to abuse; as that involuntary acts are not punishable; that no one shall be condemned unheard; that punishment should be proportioned to the offence. Impartiality, the first of judicial virtues, is necessary to the fulfilment of the other conditions of justice: while from the highest form of doing to each according to their deserts, it is the abstract standard of social and distributive justice; and is in this sense a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, the principle of the greatest Happiness. All social inequalities that have ceased to be considered as expedient, assume the character, not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice.

Besides the 'Utilitarianism,' Mr. Mill's chief Ethical dissertations are his review of Whewell's *Moral Treatises (Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. II.)*, and parts of his *Essay on Liberty*. By collecting his views generally under the usual heads, we shall find a place for some points additional to what are given in the foregoing abstract.

I.—Enough has been stated as to his Ethical Standard, the Principle of Utility.

II.—We have seen his Psychological explanation of the Moral Faculty, as a growth from certain elementary feelings of the mind.

He has also discussed extensively the Freedom of the Will, maintaining the strict causation of human actions, and refuting the supposed fatalistic tendency of the doctrine.

He believes, as we have seen, in Disinterested impulses, but traces them to a purely self-regarding origin.

III.—He does not give any formal dissertation on Human Happiness, but indicates many of its important conditions, as in the remarks cited above, p. 702. In the chapter of the work on 'Liberty,' entitled Individuality, he illustrates the great importance of special tastes, and urges the full right of each person to the indulgence of these in every case where they do not directly injure others. He reclaims against the social tyranny prevailing on such points as dress, personal habits, and eccentricities.

IV.—As regards the Moral Code, he would repeal the legal and moral rule that makes marriage irrevocable. He would also abolish all restraints on freedom of thought, and on Individuality of conduct, qualified as above stated.

He would impose two new moral restraints. He considers that every parent should be bound to provide a suitable education for his own children. Farther, for any one to bring into the world human beings without the means of supporting them, or, in an over-peopled country, to produce children in such number as to depress the reward of labour by competition, he regards as serious offences.

SAMUEL BAILEY.

Mr. Samuel Bailey devotes the last four in his Third Series of 'Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind,' to the subject of the Moral Sentiments, or the feelings inspired in us by human conduct. He first sets down five facts in the human constitution, in which moral phenomena originate—

1. Man is susceptible of pleasure and pain of various kinds and degrees.

2. He likes and dislikes respectively the causes of them.

3. He desires to reciprocate pleasure and pain received, when intentionally given by other sentient beings.

4. He himself expects such reciprocation from his fellows, coveting it in the one case, and shunning it in the other.

5. He feels, under certain circumstances, more or less sympathy with the pleasures and pains given to others, accompanied by a proportionate desire that those affections should be reciprocated to the givers.

These rudimentary affections, states and operations of consciousness [he is careful to note that, besides feelings, intellectual conditions and processes are involved in them]

are found more or less developed in all, or nearly all the human race. In support of the limitation now made, he adduces what are given as authentic accounts of savages devoid of all gratitude and fellow-feeling; and then goes on to trace the nature and development of moral sentiment from the rudimentary powers and susceptibilities mentioned, in those that do possess them. In doing so, he follows the convenient mode of speech that takes actions for the objects that excite the susceptibilities, although, in reality, the objects are no other than human beings acting in particular ways.

The feelings he supposes to be modified in manner or degree, according as actions are (1) done by ourselves to others, or (2) done to others by others, or (3) done to others by ourselves; i.e., according as we ourselves are the subjects, the spectators, or doers of them.

First, then, he considers our feelings in regard to actions done to us by others, and the more carefully, because these lie at the foundation of the rest. When a fellow-creature intentionally contributes to our pleasure, we feel the pleasure; we feel a liking to the person intentionally conferring it, and we feel an inclination to give him pleasure in return. The two last feelings—liking and inclination to reciprocate, constitute the simplest form of moral approbation; in the contrary case, dislike and resentment give the rudimentary form of moral disapprobation. It is enough to excite the feelings, that the actions are merely *thought* to be done by the person. They are moral sentiments, even although it could be supposed that there were no other kinds of actions in the world except actions done to ourselves; but they are moral sentiments in the purely selfish form. That, for moral sentiment, mere liking and disliking must be combined with the desire to reciprocate good and evil, appears on a comparison of our different feelings towards animate and inanimate causes of pleasure and pain; there being towards inanimate objects no desire of reciprocation. To a first objection, that the violent sentiments, arising upon actions done to ourselves, should not get the temperate designation of moral approbation and disapprobation, he replies, that such extremes as the passions of gratitude and resentment must yet be identified in their origin with our cooler feelings, when we are mere spectators or actors. A second objection, that the epithet *moral* is inapplicable to sentiments involving purely personal feeling, and destitute of sympathy, he answers, by remarking that the word, *moral*, in philosophy, should not eulogistically be ap-

posed to *immoral*, but should be held as neutral, and to mean 'relating to conduct, whatever that conduct may be.' He closes the first head with the observation, that in savage life the violent desire of reciprocation is best seen; generally, however, as he gives instances to show, in the form of revenge and reciprocation of evil.

In the second place, he considers our feelings when we are spectators of actions done to others by others. These form the largest class of actions, but to us they have a meaning, for the most part at least, only as they have an analogy to actions done to ourselves. The variety of the resulting feelings, generally less intense than when we are the subjects of the actions, is illustrated first by supposing the persons affected to be those we love; in this case, the feelings are analogous to those already mentioned, and they may be even more intense than when we ourselves are personally affected. If those affected are indifferent to us, our feelings are less intense, but we are still led to feel as before, from a natural sympathy with other men's pains and pleasures—always supposing the sympathy is not (as often happens) otherwise counteracted or superseded; and also from the influence of association, if that, too, happen not to be counterbalanced. Of sympathy for human beings in general, he remarks that a certain measure of civilization seems required to bring it properly out, and he cites instances to prove how much it is wanting in savages. In a third case, where the persons affected are supposed to be those we hate, we are displeased when they are made to rejoice, and pleased when they suffer, unless we are overcome by our habitual associations with good and evil actions. Such associations weigh least with rude and savage peoples, but even the most civilized nations disregard them in times of war.

He takes up, in the third place, actions done by ourselves to others. Here, when the action is beneficent, the peculiarity is that an expectation of receiving good in return from our neighbours takes the place of a desire to reciprocate; we consider ourselves the proper object of grateful thoughts, &c., on the part both of receiver and of spectators. We are affected with the gratification of a benevolent desire, with self-complacency, and with undefined hopes. When we have inflicted injury, there is the expectation of evil, and a combination of feelings summed up in the word Remorse. But Remorse, like other sentiments, may fail in the absence of cultivation of mind or under special circumstances.

Having considered the three different kinds of actions separately, he next remarks that the sentiment prevailing in each case must be liable to a reflex influence from the other cases, whereby it will be strengthened or intensified; thus we come to associate certain intensities of moral sentiment with certain kinds of action, by whomsoever or to whomsoever performed. He also notes, that in the first and third cases, as well as in the second, there is a variation of the sentiment, according as the parties affected are friends, neutrals, or enemies. Finally, a peculiar and important modification of the sentiments results from the outward manifestations of them called forth from the persons directly or indirectly affected by actions. Such are looks, gestures, tones, words, or actions, being all efforts to gratify the natural desire of reciprocating pleasure or pain. Of these the most notable are the verbal manifestations, as they are mostly irrepressible, and can alone always be resorted to. While relieving the feelings, they can also become a most powerful, as they are often the only, instrument of reward and punishment. Their power of giving to moral sentiments greater precision, and of acting upon conduct like authoritative precepts, is seen in greatest force when they proceed from bodies of men, whether they are regarded as signs of material consequences or not. He ends this part of the subject by defending, with Butler, the place of resentment in the moral constitution.

He proceeds to inquire how it is that not only the perfection of moral sentiment that would apportion more approbation and disapprobation according to the real tendencies of actions, is not attained, but men's moral feelings are not seldom in extreme contrariety with the real effects of human conduct. First, he finds that men, from partial views, or momentarily, or from caprice, may bestow their sentiments altogether at variance with the real consequences of actions. Next there is the difficulty, or even impossibility, of calculating all the consequences far and near; whence human conduct is liable to be appreciated on whimsical grounds or on no discernible grounds at all, and errors in moral sentiment arise, which it takes increased knowledge to get rid of. In the third place, it is a fact that our moral sentiments are to a very great extent derived from tradition, while the approbation and disapprobation may have originally been wrongly applied. The force of tradition he illustrates by supposing the case of a patriarchal family, and he cannot too strongly represent its strength in overcoming

or at least struggling against natural feeling. The authoritative precept of a superior may also make actions be approved or disapproved, not because they are directly perceived or even traditionally held to be beneficial or injurious, but solely because they are commanded or prohibited. Lastly, he dwells upon the influence of superstition in perverting moral sentiment, finding, however, that it operates most strongly in the way of creating false virtues and false vices and crimes.

These circumstances, explaining the want of conformity in our moral sentiments to the real tendencies of actions, he next employs to account for discrepancies in moral sentiment between different communities. Having given examples of such discrepancies, he supposes the case of two families, endowed with the rudimentary qualities mentioned at the beginning, but placed in different circumstances. Under the influence of dissimilar physical conditions, and owing to the dissimilar personal idiosyncracies of the families, and especially of their chiefs, there will be left few points of complete analogy between them in the first generation, and in course of time they will become two races exceedingly unlike in moral sentiment, as in other respects. He warns strongly against making moral generalizations except under analogous circumstances of knowledge and civilization. Most men have the rudimentary feelings, but there is no end to the variety of their intensity and direction. As a highest instance of discrepant moral sentiment, he cites the fact that, in our own country, a moral stigma is still attached to intellectual error by many people, and even by men of cultivation.

He now comes to the important question of the test or criterion that is to determine which of these diverse sentiments are right and which wrong, since they cannot all be right from the mere fact of their existence, or because they are felt by the subjects of them to be right, or believed to be in consonance with the injunctions of superiors, or to be held also by other people. The foregoing review of the *genesis* of moral sentiments suggests a direct and simple answer. As they arise from likings and dislikings of actions that cause, or tend to cause, pleasure and pain, the first thing is to see that the likings and dislikings are well founded. Where this does not at once appear, examination of the real effects of actions must be resorted to; and, in dubious cases, men in general, when unprejudiced, allow this to be the natural test for applying moral approbation and disapprobation. If, indeed, the end of moral sentiment is to promote or to prevent the

actions, there can be no better way of attaining that end. And, as a fact, almost all moralists virtually adopt it on occasion, though often unconsciously; the greatest happiness-principle is denounced by its opponents as a *mischievous doctrine*.

The objection that the criterion of consequences is difficult of application, and thus devoid of practical utility, he rebuts by asserting that the difficulty is not greater than in other cases. We have simply to follow effects as far as we can; and it is by its ascertainable, not by its unascertainable, consequences, that we pronounce an action, as we pronounce an article of food or a statute, to be good or bad. The main effects of most actions are already very well ascertained, and the consequences to human happiness, when unascertainable, are of no value. If the test were honestly applied, ethical discrepancies would tend gradually to disappear.

He starts another objection:—The happiness-test is good as far as it goes, but we also approve and disapprove of actions as they are just or generous, or the contrary, and with no reference to happiness or unhappiness. In answering this argument, he confines himself to the case of Justice. To be morally approved, a just action must in itself be peculiarly pleasant or agreeable, irrespective of its other effects, which are left out: for on no theory can pleasantness or agreeableness be dissociated from moral approbation. Now, as Happiness is but a general appellation for all the agreeable affections of our nature, and unable to exist except in the shape of some agreeable emotion or combinations of agreeable emotions; the just action that is morally commendable, as giving naturally and directly a peculiar kind of pleasure independent of any other consequences, only produces one species of those pleasant states of mind that are ranged under the genus happiness. The test of justice therefore coincides with the happiness-test. But he does not mean that we are actually affected thus, in doing just actions; nor refuse to accept justice as a criterion of actions; only in the one case he maintains that, whatever association may have effected, the just act must originally have been approved for the sake of its consequences, and, in the other, that justice is a criterion, because proved over and over again to be a most beneficial principle.

After remarking that the Moral Sentiments of praise and blame may enter into accidental connection with other feelings of a distinct character, like pity, wonder, &c., he criticises the

use of the word *Utility* in Morals. He avoids the term as objectionable, because the *useful* in common language does not mean what is directly productive of happiness, but only what is instrumental in its production, and in most cases customarily or recurrently instrumental. A blanket is of continual utility to a poor wretch through a severe winter, but the benevolent act of the donor is not termed useful, because it confers the benefit and ceases. Utility is too narrow to comprehend all the actions that deserve approbation. We want an uncompounded substantive expressing the two attributes of *conferring* and *conducting to* happiness; as a descriptive phrase, *producing happiness* is as succinct as any. The term *useful* is, besides, associated with the notion of what is serviceable in the affairs and objects of common life, whence the philosophical doctrine that erects utility as its banner is apt to be deemed, by the unthinking, low, mean, and derogatory to human nature and aspirations, although its real import is wholly free from such a reproach. Notwithstanding, therefore, the convenience of the term, and because the associations connected with it are not easily eradicated, whilst most of the trite objections to the true doctrine of morals turn upon its narrow meanings, he thinks it should be as much as possible disused.

Mr. Bailey ends by remarking of the common question, whether our moral sentiments have their origin in Reason, or in a separate power called the Moral Sense, that in his view of man's sensitive and intellectual nature it is easily settled. He recognizes the feelings that have been enumerated, and, in connexion with them, intellectual processes of discerning and inferring; for which, if the Moral Sense and Reason are meant as anything more than unnecessary general expressions, they are merely fictitious entities. So, too, Conscience, whether as identified with the moral sense, or put for sensibility in regard to the moral qualities of one's own mind, is a mere personification of certain mental states. The summary of Bailey's doctrine falls within the two first heads.

I.—The Standard is the production of Happiness. [It should be remarked, however, that happiness is a wider aim than morality; although all virtue tends to produce happiness, very much that produces happiness is not virtue.]

II.—The Moral Faculty, while involving processes of discernment and inference, is mainly composed of certain sentiments, the chief being Reciprocity and Sympathy. [These are undoubtedly the largest ingredients in a mature, self-acting

conscience; and the way that they contribute to the production of moral sentiment deserved to be, as it has been, well handled. The great omission in Mr. Bailey's account is the absence of the element of *authority*, which is the main instrument in imparting to us the sense of obligation.] 71

HERBERT SPENCER.

Mr. Spencer's ethical doctrines are, as yet, nowhere fully expressed. They form part of the more general doctrine of Evolution which he is engaged in working out; and they are at present to be gathered only from scattered passages. It is true that, in his first work, *Social Statics*, he presented what he then regarded as a tolerably complete view of one division of Morals. But without abandoning this view, he now regards it as inadequate—more especially in respect of its basis.

Mr. Spencer's conception of Morality as a science, is conveyed in the following passages in a letter written by him to Mr. Mill; repudiating the title anti-utilitarian, which Mr. Mill had applied to him:—

'The note in question greatly startled me by implicitly classing me with Anti-utilitarians. I have never regarded myself as an Anti-utilitarian. My dissent from the doctrine of Utility as commonly understood, concerns not the object to be reached by men, but the method of reaching it. While I admit that happiness is the ultimate end to be contemplated, I do not admit that it should be the proximate end. The Expediency-Philosophy having concluded that happiness is a thing to be achieved, assumes that Morality has no other business than empirically to generalize the results of conduct, and to supply for the guidance of conduct nothing more than its empirical generalizations.

'But the view for which I contend is, that Morality properly so called—the science of right conduct—has for its object to determine *how* and *why* certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.

'Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning. During its early stages, planetary Astronomy consisted of nothing more than accumulated observations respecting the positions and motions of the sun and planets; from which accumulated observations it came by and by to be empirically predicted, with an approach to truth, that certain of the heavenly bodies would have certain positions at certain times. But the modern science of planetary Astronomy consists of deductions from the law of gravitation—deductions showing why the celestial bodies necessarily occupy certain places at certain times. Now, the kind of relation which thus exists between ancient and modern Astronomy, is analogous to the kind of relation which, I conceive, exists between the Expediency-Morality, and Moral Science properly so-called. And the objection which I have to the current Utilitarianism, is, that it recognizes no more developed form of morality—does not see that it has reached but the initial stage of Moral Science.

'To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to add that, corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed Moral Science, there have been, and still are, developing in the race, certain fundamental moral intuitions; and that, though these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of Utility, gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience. Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly-developed nervous organizations—just as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has practically become a form of thought, apparently quite independent of experience; so do I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility. I also hold that just as the space-intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of Geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them; so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of Moral Science, and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them.'

The relations between the Expediency-Morality, and Moral Science, conceived by Mr. Spencer to be, the one transitional, and the other ultimate, are further explained in the following passage from his essay on 'Prison-Ethics':—

'Progressing civilization, which is of necessity a succession of compromises between old and new, requires a perpetual re-adjustment of the compromise between the ideal and the practicable in social arrangements: to which end both elements of the compromise must be kept in view. If it is true that pure rectitude prescribes a system of things far too good for men as they are; it is not less true that mere expediency does not of itself tend to establish a system of things any better than that which exists. While absolute morality owes to expediency the checks which prevent it from rushing into utopian absurdities; expediency is indebted to absolute morality for all stimulus to improvement. Granted that we are chiefly interested in ascertaining what is *relatively right*; it still follows that we must first consider what is *absolutely right*; since the one conception presupposes the other. That is to say, though we must ever aim to do what is best for the present times, yet we must ever bear in mind what is abstractedly best; so that the changes we make may be *towards* it, and not *away* from it.'

By the word *absolute* as thus applied, Mr. Spencer does not mean to imply a right and wrong existing apart from Humanity and its relations. Agreeing with Utilitarians in the belief that happiness is the end, and that the conduct called moral is simply the best means of attaining it, he of course does not assert that there is a morality which is absolute in the sense of being true out of relation to human existence. By absolute morality as distinguished from relative, he here means the mode of conduct which, under the conditions arising from social union, must be pursued to achieve the greatest welfare of each and all. He holds, that the laws of Life, physiologically considered, being fixed, it necessarily follows that when a number of individuals have to live in social union, which necessarily involves fixity of conditions in the shape of mutual interferences and limitations, there result certain fixed principles by which conduct must be restricted, before the greatest sum of happiness can be achieved. These principles constitute what Mr. Spencer distinguishes as absolute Morality; and the absolutely moral man is the man who conforms to these principles, not by external coercion nor self-coercion, but who acts them out spontaneously.

To be fully understood, this conception must be taken along with the general theory of Evolution. Mr. Spencer argues that all things whatever are inevitably tending towards equilibrium; and that consequently the progress of mankind cannot cease until there is equilibrium between the human constitution and the conditions of human existence. Or, as he argues in *First Principles* (Second Edition, p. 512), 'The adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his existence cannot cease until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter. And the establishment of this equilibrium, is the arrival at a state of human nature and social organization, such that the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which the individual voluntarily respects. The progressive extension of the liberty of citizens, and the reciprocal removal of political restrictions, are the steps by which we advance towards this state. And the ultimate abolition of all limits to the freedom of each, save those imposed by the like freedom of all, must result from the complete equilibration between man's desires and the conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions.'

The conduct proper to such a state, which Mr. Spencer thus conceives to be the subject-matter of Moral Science, truly so-called, he proposes, in the *Prospectus* to his *System of Philosophy*, to treat under the following heads.

PERSONAL MORALS.—The principles of private conduct—physical, intellectual, moral, and religious—that follow from the conditions to complete individual life; or, what is the same thing, those modes of private action which must result from the eventual equilibration of internal desires and external needs.

JUSTICE.—The mutual limitation of men's actions necessitated by their co-existence as units of a society—limitations, the perfect observance of which constitutes that state of equilibrium forming the goal of political progress.

NEGATIVE BENEFICENCE.—Those secondary limitations, similarly necessitated, which, though less important and not cognizable by law, are yet requisite to prevent mutual destruction of happiness in various indirect ways: in other words—those minor self-restraints dictated by what may be called passive sympathy.

POSITIVE BENEFICENCE.—Comprehending all modes of conduct, dictated by active sympathy, which imply pleasure in giving pleasure—modes of conduct that social adaptation

has indeed and must render ever more general; and which, in becoming universal, must fill to the full the possible measure of human happiness.

This completes the long succession of British moralists during the three last centuries. It has been possible, and even necessary, to present them thus in an unbroken line, because the insular movement in ethical philosophy has been hardly, if at all, affected by anything done abroad. In the earlier part of the modern period, little of any kind was done in ethics by the great continental thinkers. Descartes has only a few allusions to the subject; the 'Ethica' of Spinoza is chiefly a work of speculative philosophy; Leibnitz has no systematic treatment of moral questions. The case is very different in the new German philosophy since the time of Kant; besides Kant himself, Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and many later and contemporary thinkers having devoted a large amount of attention to practical philosophy. But unless it be Kant—and he not to any great extent—none of these has influenced the later attempts at ethical speculation amongst ourselves: nor, again with the exception of Kant, are we as yet in a position properly to deal with them. One reason for proceeding to expound the ethical system of the founder of the later German philosophy, without regard to his successors, lies in the fact that he stood, on the practical side, in as definite a relation to the English moralists of last century, as, in his speculative philosophy, to Locke and Hume.

IMMANUEL KANT. [1724-1804.]

The ethical writings of Kant, in the order of their appearance, are—*Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785); *Critique of the Practical Reason* (1788); *Metaphysic of Morals* (1797, in two parts—(1) *Doctrine of Right* or Jurisprudence, (2) *Doctrine of Virtue* or Ethics proper). The third work contains the details of his system; the general theory is presented in the two others. Of these we select for analysis the earlier, containing, as it does, in less artificial form, an ampler discussion of the fundamental questions of morals; but towards the end it must be supplemented, in regard to certain characteristic doctrines, from the second, in some respects more developed, work.*

* For help in understanding Kant's peculiar phraseology and general point of view, the reader is referred to the short exposition of his Speculative Philosophy in Appendix B.

In the introduction to the *Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant distinguishes between the empirical and the rational mode of treating Ethics. He announces his intention to depart from the common plan of mixing up the two together, and to attempt for once to set forth the *pure* moral philosophy that is implied even in the vulgar ideas of duty and moral law. Because a moral law means an absolute necessity laid on all rational beings whatever, its foundation is to be sought, not in human nature or circumstances, but *a priori* in the conception of pure reason. The most universal precept founded on mere experience is only a practical rule, and never a moral law. A purely rational moral philosophy, or *Metaphysic of Morals*, will serve the double end of meeting a speculative requirement, and of furnishing the only true norm of practice. It investigates the idea and principles of a potentially pure Will, instead of the acts and conditions of human volition as known from psychology. Not a complete *Metaphysic of Morals*, however, (which would be a *Critique of the pure Practical Reason*), but merely a foundation for such will be given. The supreme principle of morality is to be established, apart from detailed application. First, common notions will be analyzed in order to get at this highest principle; and then, when the principle has been sought out, they will be returned upon by way of synthesis.

In the first of the three main sections of the work, he makes the passage from Common Rational Knowledge of Morals to Philosophical. Nothing in the world, he begins, can without qualification be called good, except *Will*. Qualities of temperament, like courage, &c., gifts of fortune, like wealth and power, are good only with reference to a good will. As to a good will, when it is really such, the circumstance that it can, or cannot, be executed does not matter; its value is independent of the utility or fruitlessness of it.

This idea of the absolute worth of mere Will, though it is allowed even by the vulgar understanding, he seeks to establish beyond dispute, by an argument from the natural *subjection* of Will to Reason. In a being well-organized, if Conservation or Happiness were the grand aim, such subjection would be a great mistake. When Instinct could do the work far better and more surely, Reason should have been deprived of all practical function. Discontent, in fact, rather than happiness comes of pursuit of mere enjoyment by rational calculation; and to make light of the part contributed by Reason to happiness, is really to make out that it exists for a

nobler purpose. But now, since Reason is a practical faculty and governs the will, its function can only be to produce a Will good in itself. Such a Will, if not the only good, is certainly the highest; and happiness, unattainable by Reason as a primary aim, and subject in this life altogether to much limitation, is to be sought only in the contentment that arises from the attainment by Reason of its true aim, at the sacrifice often of many a natural inclination.

He proceeds to develop this conception of a Will in itself good and estimable, by dealing with the commonly received ideas of Duty. Leaving aside profitable actions that are plain violations of duty, and also actions conformed to duty, but, while not prompted directly by nature, done from some special inclination—in which case it is easy to distinguish whether the action is done from duty or from self-interest; he considers those more difficult cases where the same action is at once duty, and prompted by direct natural inclination. In all such, whether it be duty of self-preservation, of benevolence, of securing one's own happiness (this last a duty, because discontent and the pressure of care may easily lead to the transgression of other duties), he lays it down that the action is not allowed to have true moral value, unless done in the abeyance or absence of the natural inclination prompting to it. A second position is, that the moral value of an action done from duty lies not in the intention of it, but in the maxim that determines it; not in the object, but in the *principle of Volition*. That is to say, in action done out of regard to duty, the will must be determined by its *formal à priori* principle, not being determined by any *material à posteriori* motive. A third position follows then from the other two; Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for Law. Towards an object there may be inclination, and this inclination may be matter for approval or liking; but it is Law only—the ground and not the effect of Volition, bearing down inclination rather than serving it—that can inspire *Respect*. When inclination and motives are both excluded, nothing remains to determine Will, except Law objectively; and, subjectively, pure respect for a law of practice—i.e., the maxim to follow such a law, even at the sacrifice of every inclination. The conception of Law-in-itself alone determining the will, is, then, the surpassing good that is called moral, which exists already in a man before his action has any result. Conformity to Law in general, all special motive to follow any single law being excluded, remains as

the one principle of Volition: I am never to act otherwise, than so as to be able also to wish that my maxim (*i.e.*, my subjective principle of volition) should become a universal law. This is what he finds implied in the common notions of Duty.

Having illustrated at length this reading, in regard to the duty of keeping a promise, he contrasts, at the close of the section, the all but infallibility of common human reason in practice with its helplessness in speculation. Notwithstanding, it finds itself unable to settle the contending claims of Reason and Inclination, and so is driven to devise a practical philosophy, owing to the rise of a 'Natural Dialectic' or tendency to refine upon the strict laws of duty in order to make them more pleasant. But, as in the speculative region, the Dialectic cannot be properly got rid of without a complete Critique of Reason.

In Section II. the passage is made from the popular moral philosophy thus arising to the metaphysic of morals. He denies that the notion of duty that has been taken above from common sense is empirical. It is proved not to be such from the very assertions of philosophers that men always act from more or less refined self-love; assertions that are founded upon the difficulty of proving that acts most apparently conformed to duty are really such. The fact is, no act *can* be proved by experience to be absolutely moral, *i.e.*, done solely from regard to duty, to the exclusion of all inclination; and therefore to concede that morality and duty are ideas to be had from experience, is the surest way to get rid of them altogether. Duty, and respect for its law, are not to be preserved at all, unless Reason is allowed to lay *absolute* injunctions on the will, whatever experience says of their non-execution. How, indeed, is experience to disclose a moral law, that, in applying to all rational beings as well as men, and to men only as rational, must originate *à priori* in pure (practical) Reason? Instead of yielding the principles of morality, empirical examples of moral conduct have rather to be judged by these.

All supreme principles of morality, that are genuine, must rest on pure Reason solely; and the mistake of the popular practical philosophies in vogue, one and all—whether advancing as their principle a special determination of human nature, or Perfection, or Happiness, or Moral Feeling, or Fear of God, or a little of this and a little of that—is that there has been no previous consideration whether the principles of morality are to be sought for in our empirical knowledge of human

nature at all. Such consideration would have shown them to be altogether *a priori*, and would have appeared as a *pure* practical philosophy or metaphysic of morals (upon the completion of which any popularizing might have waited), kept free from admixture of Anthropology, Theology, Physics, Hyperphysics, &c., and setting forth the conception of Duty as purely rational, without the confusion of empirical motives. To a metaphysic of this kind, Kant is now to ascend from the popular philosophy, with its stock-in-trade of single instances, following out the practical faculty of Reason from the general rules determining it, to the point where the conception of Duty emerges.

While things in nature work according to laws, rational beings alone can act according to a conceived idea of laws, *i.e.*, to principles. This is to have a Will, or, what is the same, Practical Reason, reason being required in deducing actions from laws. If the Will follows Reason exactly and without fail, actions objectively necessary are necessary also subjectively; if, through subjective conditions (inclinations, &c.), the Will does not follow Reason inevitably, objectively necessary actions become subjectively contingent, and towards the objective laws the attitude of the will is no longer unailing choice, but *constraint*. A constraining objective principle mentally represented, is a *command*; its formula is called *Imperative*, for which the expression is *Ought*. A will perfectly good—*i.e.*, subjectively determined to follow the objective laws of good as soon as conceived—knows no Ought. Imperatives are only for an imperfect, such as is the human, will. *Hypothetical* Imperatives represent the practical necessity of an action as a means to an end, being *problematical* or *assertory* principles, according as the end is possible or real. *Categorical* Imperatives represent an action as objectively necessary for itself, and count as *apodeictical* principles.

To the endless number of possible aims of human action correspond as many Imperatives, directing merely how they are to be attained, without any question of their value; these are Imperatives of *Fitness*. To one real aim, existing necessarily for all rational beings, *viz.*, Happiness, corresponds the Imperative of *Prudence* (in the narrow sense), being assertory while hypothetical. The categorical Imperative, enjoining a mode of action for itself, and concerned about the form and principle of it, not its nature and result, is the Imperative of *Morality*. These various kinds of Imperatives, as influencing the will may be distinguished as *Rules* (of fitness). *Counsels*

(of prudence), *Commands* or *Laws* (of morality); also as *technical, pragmatical, moral*.

Now, as to the question of the possibility of these different Imperatives—how they can be supposed able to influence or act upon the Will—there is in the first case no difficulty; in wishing an end it is necessarily implied that we wish the indispensable means, when this is in our power. In like manner, the Imperatives of Prudence are also *analytical* in character (*i.e.*, given by implication), if only it were possible to have a definite idea of the end sought, *viz.*, happiness. But, in fact, with the elements of happiness to be got from experience at the same time that the idea requires an absolute whole, or maximum, of satisfaction now and at every future moment, no finite being can know precisely what he wants, or what may be the effect of any of his wishes. Action, on fixed principles, with a view to happiness, is, therefore, not possible; and one can only follow empirical directions, about Diet, Frugality, Politeness, &c., seen on the whole to promote it. Although, however, there is no certainty of causing happiness, and the Imperatives with reference thereto are mere counsels, they retain their character of analytical propositions, and their action on the will is not less possible than in the former case.

To prove the possibility of the Imperative of morality is more difficult. As categorical, it presupposes nothing else to rest its necessity upon; while by way of experience, it can never be made out to be more than a prudential precept—*i.e.*, a pragmatic or hypothetic principle. Its possibility must therefore be established *à priori*. But the difficulty will then appear no matter of wonder, when it is remembered (from the Critique of Pure Reason) how hard it is to establish synthetic propositions *à priori*.

The question of the possibility, however, meanwhile postponed, the mere conception of a categorical Imperative is found to yield the one formula that can express it, from its not being dependent, like a hypothetical Imperative, on any external condition. Besides the Law (or objective principle of conduct), the only thing implied in the Imperative being the necessity laid upon the *Maxim* (or subjective principle) to conform to the law—a law limited by no condition; there is nothing for the maxim to be conformed to but the universality of a law in general, and it is the conformity alone that properly constitutes the Imperative necessary. The Imperative is thus single, and runs: *Act according to that maxim only which you can wish at the same time to become a*

universal law. Or, since universality of law as determining effects is what we understand by nature: *Act as if the maxim of your action ought by your will to become the universal law of nature.*

Taking cases of duties according to the common divisions of duties to ourselves and to others, perfect and imperfect, he proceeds to show that they may be all deduced from the single Imperative; the question of the *reality* of duty, which is the same as the establishment of the possibility of the Imperative as a synthetic practical proposition *a priori*, at present altogether apart. Suppose a man tempted to commit suicide, with the view of bettering his evil condition; but it is contradictory that the very principle of self-conservation should lead to self-destruction, and such a maxim of conduct cannot therefore become a universal law of nature. Next, the case of a man borrowing without meaning to repay, has only to be turned into a universal law, and the thing becomes impossible; nobody would lend. Again, to neglect a talent that is generally useful for mere ease and self-gratification, can indeed be supposed a universal practice, but can never be wished to be. Finally, to refuse help to others universally might not ruin the race, but can be wished by no one that knows how soon he must himself need assistance. Now, the rule was, that a maxim of conduct should be *wished* to become the universal law. In the last two cases, it cannot be wished; in the others, the maxim cannot even be conceived in universal form. Thus, two grades of duty, one admitting of merit, the other so strict as to be irremissible, are established on the general principle. The principle is moreover confirmed in the case of transgression of duty: the transgressor by no means wishes to have his act turned into a general rule, but only seeks special and temporary exemption from a law allowed by himself to be universal.

Notwithstanding this force and ease of application, a categorical Imperative has not yet been proved *a priori* actually existent; and it was allowed that it could not be proved empirically, elements of inclination, interest, &c., being inconsistent with morality. The real question is this: Is it a necessary law that all rational beings should act on maxims that they can wish to become universal laws? If so, this must be bound up with the very notion of the will of a rational being; the relation of the will to itself being to be determined *a priori* by pure Reason. The Will is considered as a power of self-determination to act according to certain laws as repre-

sented to the mind, existing only in rational beings. And, if the objective ground of self-determination, or *End*, is supplied by mere Reason, it must be the same for all rational beings. *Ends* may be divided into *Subjective*, resting upon individual *Impulses* or subjective grounds of desire; and *Objective*, depending on *Motives* or objective grounds of Volition valid for all rational beings. The principles of action are, in the one case, *Material*, and, in the other, *Formal*, i.e., abstracted from all subjective ends. Material ends, as relative; beget only hypothetical Imperatives. But, supposed some thing, the presence of which in itself has an absolute value, and which, as *End-in-itself*, can be a ground of fixed laws; there, and there only, can be the ground of a possible categorical Imperative, or Law of Practice.

Now, such an *End-in-itself* (not a thing with merely conditional value,—a means to be used arbitrarily) is Man and every rational being, as *Person*. There is no other objective end with absolute value that can supply to the Reason the supreme practical principle requisite for turning subjective principles of action into objective principles of volition. Rational Nature as *End-in-itself* is a subjective principle to a man having this conception of his own being, but becomes objective when every rational being has the same from the same ground in Reason. Hence a new form (the second) to the practical Imperative: *Act so as to use Humanity (Human Nature) as well in your own person, as in the person of another, ever as end also, and never merely as means.*

To this new formula, the old examples are easily squared. Suicide is using one's person as a mere means to a tolerable existence; breaking faith to others is using them as means, not as ends-in-itself; neglect of self-cultivation is the not furthering human nature as end-in-itself in one's own person; withholding help is refusing to further Humanity as end-in-itself through the medium of the aims of others. [In a note he denies that 'the trivial, Do to others as you would,' &c., is a full expression of the law of duty: it contains the ground, neither of duties to self; nor of duties of benevolence to others, for many would forego receiving good on conditions of not conferring it; nor of the duty of retribution, for the malefactor could turn it against his judge, &c.].

The universality of this principle of Human and Rational Nature as *End-in-itself*, as also its character of objective end limiting merely subjective ends, prove that its source is in pure Reason. Objectively, the ground of all practical legislation is

Rule and the Form of Universality that enables rule to be law (of Nature), according to principle first (in its double form); subjectively, it is End, the subject of all ends being every rational being as End-in-itself, according to principle second. Hence follows the third practical principle of the Will, as supreme condition of its agreement with universal practical Reason—the *idea of the Will of every rational being as a Will that legislates universally*. The Will, if subject to law, has first itself imposed it.

This new idea—of the Will of every rational being as universally legislative—is what, in the implication of the Categorical Imperative, specifically marks it off from any Hypothetical: Interest is seen to be quite incompatible with Duty, if Duty is Volition of this kind. A will merely subject to laws can be bound to them by interest; not so a will itself legislating supremely, for that would imply another law to keep the interest of self-love from trenching upon the validity of the universal law. Illustration is not needed to prove that a Categorical Imperative, or law for the will of every rational being, if it exist at all, cannot exclude Interest and be unconditional, except as enjoining everything to be done from the maxim of a will that in legislating universally can have itself for object. This is the point that has been always missed, that the laws of duty shall be at once self-imposed and yet universal. Subjection to a law not springing from one's own will implies interest or constraint, and constitutes a certain necessity of action, but never makes Duty. Be the interest one's own or another's, the Imperative is conditional only. Kant's principle is the *Autonomy of the Will*; every other its *Heteronomy*.

The new point of view opens up the very fruitful conception of an *Empire* or *Realm of Ends*. As a Realm is the systematic union of rational beings by means of common laws, so the ends determined by the laws may, abstractly viewed, be taken to form a systematic whole. Rational beings, as subject to a law requiring them to treat themselves and others as ends and never merely as means, enter into a systematic union by means of common objective laws, i.e. into an (ideal) Empire or Realm of Ends, from the laws being concerned about the mutual relations of rational beings as Ends and Means. In this Realm, a rational being is either Head or Member: Head, if legislating universally and with complete independence; Member, if also universally, but at the same time subject to the laws. When now the maxim of the will does not

by nature accord necessarily with the demand of the objective principle—that the will through its maxim be able to regard itself at the same time as legislating universally—a practical constraint is exerted by the principle, which is *Duty*, lying on every Member in the Realm of Ends (not on the Head) alike. This necessity of practice reposes, not on feeling, impulse, or inclination, but on the relation between rational beings arising from the fact that each, as End-in-itself, legislates universally. The Reason gives a universal application to every maxim of the Will; not from any motive of interest, but from the idea of the *Dignity* of a rational being that follows no law that it does not itself at the same time give.

Everything in the Realm of Ends has either a *Price* or a *Dignity*. Skill, Diligence, &c., bearing on human likings and needs, have a *Market-price*; Qualities like Wit, Fancy, &c., appealing to Taste or Emotional Satisfaction, have an *Affection-price*. But Morality, the only way of being End-in-itself, and legislating member in the Realm of Ends, has an intrinsic *Worth or Dignity*, calculable in nothing else. Its worth is not in results, but in dispositions of Will; its actions need neither recommendation from a subjective disposition or taste, nor prompting from immediate tendency or feeling. Being laid on the Will by Reason, they make the Will, in the execution, the object of an immediate *Respect*, testifying to a *Dignity* beyond all price. The grounds of these lofty claims in moral goodness and virtue are the participation by a rational being in the universal legislation, fitness to be a member in a possible Realm of Ends, subjection only to self-imposed laws. Nothing having value but as the law confers it, an unconditional, incomparable worth attaches to the giving of the law, and *Respect* is the only word that expresses a rational being's appreciation of that. Autonomy is thus the foundation of the dignity of human and of all rational nature.

The three different expressions that have been given to the one general principle of morality imply each the others, and differ merely in their mode of presenting one idea of the Reason to the mind. *Universal application of the Maxim of Conduct, as if it were a law of nature*, is the formula of the Will as absolutely good; *universal prohibition against the use of rational beings ever as means only*, has reference to the fact that a good will in a rational being is an altogether independent and ultimate End, an End-in-itself in all; *universal legislation of each for all* recognizes the prerogative or special dignity of rational beings, that they necessarily

take their maxims from the point of view of all, and must regard themselves, being Ends-in-self, as members in a Realm of Ends (analogous to the Realm or Kingdom of Nature), which, though merely an ideal and possible conception, none the less really imposes an imperative upon action. *Morality*, he concludes, is *the relation of actions to the Autonomy of the Will, i.e., to possible universal legislation through its maxims.* Actions that can co-exist with this autonomy are *allowed*; all others are not. A will, whose maxims necessarily accord with the laws of Autonomy, is holy, or absolutely good; the dependence of a will not thus absolutely good is *Obligation*. The objective necessity of an action from obligation is *Duty*. *Subjection to law* is not the only element in duty; the fact of the law being self-imposed gives *Dignity*.

The Autonomy of the will is its being a law to itself, without respect to the objects of volition; the principle of autonomy is to choose only in such a way as that the maxims of choice are conceived at the same time as a universal law. This rule cannot be proved analytically to be an Imperative, absolutely binding on every will; as a synthetic proposition it requires, besides a knowledge of the objects, a critique of the subject, i.e., pure practical Reason, before, in its apodeictic character, it can be proved completely *a priori*. Still the mere analysis of moral conceptions has sufficed to prove it the sole principle of morals, because this principle is seen to be a categorical Imperative, and a categorical Imperative enjoins neither more nor less than this Autonomy. If, then, Autonomy of Will is the supreme principle, Heteronomy is the source of all ungenneine principles, of Morality. Heteronomy is whenever the Will does not give itself laws, but some object, in relation to the Will, gives them. There is then never more than a hypothetical Imperative: I am to do something because I wish something else.

There follows a division and criticism of the various possible principles of morality that can be set up on the assumption of Heteronomy, and that have been put forward by human Reason in default of the required Critique of its pure use. Such are either *Empirical* or *Rational*. The Empirical, embodying the principle of *Happiness*, are founded on (1) *physical* or (2) *moral feeling*; the Rational, embodying the principle of *perfection*, on (1) the rational conception of it as a possible result, or (2) the conception of an independent perfection (the Will of God), as the determining cause of the will. The Empirical principles are altogether to be rejected,

because they can give no universal law for all rational beings; of the Rational principles, the first, though setting up an empty and indefinite conception, has the merit of at least making an appeal from sense to pure reason. But the fatal objection to all four is their implying Heteronomy; no imperative founded on them can utter moral, *i.e.*, categorical commands.

That the absolutely good Will must be autonomous—*i.e.*, without any kind of motive or interest, lay commands on itself that are at the same time fit to be laws for all rational beings, appears, then, from a deeper consideration of even the popular conceptions of morality. But now the question can no longer be put off: Is Morality, of which this is the only conception, a reality or a phantom? All the different expressions given to the Categorical Imperatives are synthetic practical propositions *a priori*; they postulate a possible synthetic use of the pure practical reason. Is there, and how is there, such a possible synthetic use? This is the question (the same as the other) that Kant proceeds to answer in the Third Section, by giving, in default of a complete Critique of the faculty, as much as is necessary for the purpose. But here, since he afterwards undertook the full Critique, it is better to stop the analysis of the earlier work, and summarily draw upon both for the remainder of the argument, and the rather because some important points have to be added that occur only in the later treatise. The foregoing is a sufficient example of his method of treatment.

The synthetic use of the pure practical reason, in the Categorical Imperative, is legitimized; Autonomy of the Will is explained; Duty is shown to be no phantom—through the conception of Freedom of Will, properly understood. Theoretically (speculatively), Freedom is undemonstrable; being eternally met, in one of the (cosmological) Antinomies of the Pure Reason, by the counter-assertion that everything in the universe takes place according to unchanging laws of nature. Even theoretically, however, Freedom is not inconceivable, and morally we become certain of it; for we are conscious of the 'ought' of duty, and with the 'ought' there must go a 'can.' It is not, however, as Phenomenon or Sensible Ens that a man 'can,' is free, has an absolute initiative; all phenomena or Sensible Entia, being in space and time, are subject to the Natural Law of Causality. But man is also Noumenon, Thing-in-self, Intelligible Ens; and as such, being free from conditions of time and space, stands outside of the sequence

of Nature. Now, the Noumenon or Ens of the Reason (he assumes) stands higher than, or has a value above, the Phenomenon or Sensible Ens (as much as Reason stands higher than Sense and Inclination); accordingly, while it is only man as Noumenon that 'can,' it is to man as Phenomenon that the 'ought' is properly addressed; it is upon man as Phenomenon that the law of Duty, prescribed, with perfect freedom from motive, by Man as Noumenon, is laid.

Freedom of Will in Man as Rational End or Thing-in-itself is thus the great Postulate of the pure Practical Reason; we can be sure of the fact (although it must always remain speculatively undemonstrable), because also there could be no explanation of the Categorical Imperative of Duty. But inasmuch as the Practical Reason, besides enjoining a law of Duty, must provide also a final end of action in the idea of an unconditioned Supreme Good, it contains also two other Postulates: Man being a sentient as well as a rational being, Happiness as well as Perfect Virtue or Moral Perfection must enter into the Summum Bonum (not, one of them to the exclusion of the other, as the Stoics and Epicureans, in different senses, declared). Now, since there is no such necessary conjunction of the two in nature, it must be sought otherwise. It is found in postulating *Immortality* and *God*.

Immortality is required to render possible the attainment of moral perfection. Virtue out of respect for law, with a constant tendency to fall away, is all that is attainable in life. The *Holiness*, or complete accommodation of the will to the Moral Law, implied in the Summum Bonum, can be attained to only in the course of an infinite progression; which means personal Immortality. [As in the former case, the *speculative* impossibility of proving the immateriality, &c., of the supernatural soul is not here overcome; but Immortality is *morally* certain, being demanded by the Practical Reason.]

Moral perfection thus provided for, *God* must be postulated in order to find the ground of the required conjunction of Felicity. Happiness is the condition of the rational being in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will; and this is not the condition of man, for in him observance of the moral law is not conjoined with power of disposal over the laws of nature. But, as Practical Reason demands the conjunction, it is to be found only in a being who is the author at once of Nature and of the Moral Law; and this is God. [The same remark once more applies, that here what is obtained is a *moral* certainty of the existence of the Deity:

the negative result of the Critique of the Pure (*speculative*) Reason abides what it was.]

We may now attempt to summarize this abstruse Ethical theory of Kant.

I.—The STANDARD of morally good action (or rather Will), as expressed in the different forms of the Categorical Imperative, is the possibility of its being universally extended as a law for all rational beings. His meaning comes out still better in the obverse statement: The action is bad that *cannot be*, or at least *cannot be wished to be*, turned unto a universal law.

II.—Kant would expressly demur to being questioned as to his PSYCHOLOGY of Ethics; since he puts his own theory in express opposition to every other founded upon any empirical view of the mental constitution. Nevertheless, we may extract some kind of answers to the usual queries.

The Faculty is the (pure Practical) Reason. The apprehension of what is morally right is entirely an affair of Reason; the only element of Feeling is an added Sentiment of Awe or Respect for the law that Reason imposes, this being a law, not only for me who impose it on myself, but at the same time for every rational agent. [The Pure Reason, which means with Kant the Faculty of Principles, is *Speculative* or *Practical*. As *Speculative*, it *requires* us to bring our knowledge (of the understanding) to certain higher unconditioned unities (Soul, Cosmos, God); but there is error if these are themselves regarded as facts of knowledge. As *Practical*, it sets up an unconditional law of Duty in Action (unconditioned by motives); and in this and in the related conception of the Summum Bonum is contained a moral certainty of the Immortality (of the soul), Freedom (in the midst of Natural Necessity), and of God as existent.]

As to the point of Free-will, nothing more need be said.

Disinterested Sentiment, as *sentiment*, is very little regarded: disinterested *action* is required with such rigour that every act or disposition is made to lose its character as moral, according as any element of interested feeling of any kind enters into it. Kant obliterates the line between Duty and Virtue, by making a duty of every virtue; at least he conceives clearly that there is no Virtue in doing what we are strongly prompted to by inclination—that virtue must involve self-sacrifice.

III.—His position with respect to Happiness is peculiar. Happiness is not the end of action: the end of action is rather the self-assertion of the rational faculty over the lower man

If the constituents of Happiness could be known—and they cannot be—there would be no *morality*, but only *prudence* in the pursuit of them. To promote our own happiness is indeed a duty, but in order to keep us from neglecting our other duties.

Nevertheless, he conceives it necessary that there should be an ultimate equation of Virtue and Happiness; and the need of Happiness he then expressly connects with the sensuous side of our being.

IV.—His MORAL CODE may here be shortly presented from the second part of his latest work, where it is fully given. Distinguishing Moral Duties or (as he calls them) '*Virtue-duties*,' left to be enforced internally by Conscience; from *Legal Duties* (*Rechtspflichten*), externally enforced, he divides them into two classes—(A) Duties to *Self*; (B) Duties to *Others*.

(A) Duties to *Self*. These have regard to the one *private* Aim or End that a man can make a duty of, viz., his own *Perfection*; for his own *Happiness*, being provided for by a natural propensity or inclination, is to himself no duty. They are (a) *perfect* (negative or restrictive) as directed to mere Self-Conservation; (b) *imperfect* (positive or extensive) as directed to the Advancement or Perfecting of one's being. The *perfect* are concerned about Self (a), as an *Animal* creature, and then are directed against—(1) *Self-destruction*, (2) *Sexual Excess*, (3) *Intemperance in Eating and Drinking*; (β) as a *Moral* creature, and then are directed against—(1) *Lying*, (2) *Avarice*, (3) *Servility*. The *imperfect* have reference to (a) *physical*, (β) *moral* advancement or perfection (subjectively, *Purity* or *Holiness*).

(B) Duties to *Others*. These have regard to the only Aim or End of others that a man can make a duty of, viz., their *Happiness*; for their *Perfection* can be promoted only by themselves. Duties to others as *men* are metaphysically deducible: and application to *special conditions* of men is to be made empirically. They include (a) Duties of *Love*, involving *Merit* or *Desert* (i.e., return from the objects of them) in the performance: (1) *Beneficence*, (2) *Gratitude*, (3) *Pillow-felting*; (b) Duties of *RESPECT*, absolutely *due* to others as men; the opposites are the *vices*: (1) *Unoughtiness*, (2) *Slander*, (3) *Scornfulness*. In *Friendship*, *Love* and *Respect* are combined in the highest degree. Lastly, he notes *Social* duties in human intercourse (*Affability*, &c.)—these being *outworks* of morality.

He allows no special Duties to God, or Inferior Creatures, beyond what is contained in Moral Perfection as Duty to Self.

V.—The conception of Law enters largely into Kant's theory of morals, but in a sense purely transcendental, and not as subjecting or assimilating morality to positive political institution. The *Legality* of external actions, as well as the *Morality* of internal dispositions, is determined by reference to the one universal moral Imperative. The principle underlying all *legal* or *jural* (as opposed to moral or ethical) provisions, is the necessity of uniting in a universal law of freedom the spontaneity of each with the spontaneity of all the others: individual freedom and freedom of all must be made to subsist together in a universal law.

VI.—With Kant, Religion and Morality are very closely connected, or, in a sense, even identified; but the alliance is not at the expense of Morality. So far from making this dependent on Religion, he can find nothing but the moral conviction whereon to establish the religious doctrines of Immortality and the Existence of God; while, in a special work, he declares further that Religion consists merely in the practice of Morality as a system of divine commands, and claims to judge of all religious institutions and dogmas by the moral consciousness. Besides, the Postulates themselves, in which the passage to Religion is made, are not all equally imperative,—Freedom, as the ground of the fact of Duty, being more urgently demanded than others; and he even goes so far as to make the allowance, that whoever has sufficient moral strength to fulfil the Law of Reason without them, is not required to subscribe to them.

The modern French school, that has arisen in this century under the combined influence of the Scotch and the German philosophy, has bestowed some attention on Ethics. We end by noticing under it Cousin and Jouffroy.

VICTOR COUSIN. [1792-1867.]

The analysis of Cousin's ethical views is made upon his historical lectures *Sur les Idées du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien*, as delivered in 1817-18. They contain a dogmatic exposition of his own opinions, beginning at the 20th lecture; the three preceding lectures, in the section of the whole course devoted to the Good, being taken up with the preliminary review of other opinions required for his eclectic purpose.

He determines to consider, by way of psychological analysis, the ideas and sentiments of every kind called up by the spec-

tales of human actions; and first he notes actions that please and displease the senses, or in some way affect our interest: those that are agreeable and useful we naturally choose, avoiding the opposites, and in this we are *prudent*. But there is another set of actions, having no reference to our own personal interest, which yet we qualify as good or bad. When an armed robber kills and spoils a defenceless man, we, though beholding the sight in safety, are at once stirred up to disinterested horror and indignation. This is no mere passing sentiment, but includes a two-fold judgment, pronounced then and ever after; that the action is in itself bad, and that it ought not to be committed. Still farther, our anger implies that the object of it is conscious of the evil and the obligation, and is therefore responsible; wherein again is implied that he is a free agent. And, finally, demanding as we do that he should be punished, we pass what has been called a judgment of merit and demerit, which is built upon an idea in our minds of a supreme law, joining happiness to virtue and misfortune to crime.

The analysis thus far he claims to be strictly scientific; he now proceeds to vary the case, taking actions of our own. I am supposed entrusted by a dying friend with a deposit for another, and a struggle ensues between interest and probity as to whether I should pay it. If interest conquers, remorse ensues. He paints the state of remorse, and analyzes it into the same elements as before, the idea of *good* and *evil*, of an *obligatory law*, of *liberty*, of *merit* and *demerit*; it thus includes the whole phenomenon of morality. The exactly opposite state that follows upon the victory of probity, is proved to imply the same facts.

The Moral Sentiment, so striking in its character, has by some been supposed the foundation of all morality, but in point of fact it is itself constituted by these various judgments. Now that they are known to stand as its elements, he goes on to subject each to a stricter analysis, taking first the judgment of *good* and *evil*, which is at the bottom of all the rest. It lies in the original constitution of human nature, being simple and indecomposable, like the judgment of the True and the Beautiful. It is absolute, and cannot be withheld in presence of certain acts; but it only declares, and does not constitute, good and evil, these being real and independent qualities of actions. Applied at first to special cases, the judgment of good gives birth to general principles that become rules for judging other actions. Like

other sciences, morality has its axioms, justly called moral truths; if it is good to keep an oath, it is also true, the oath being made with no other purpose than to be kept. Faithful guarding as much belongs to the idea of a deposit, as the equality between its three angles and two right angles to the idea of a triangle. By no caprice or effort of will can a moral verity be made in the smallest degree other than it is.

But, he goes on, a moral verity is not simply to be believed; it must also be practised, and this is *obligation*, the second of the elements of moral sentiment. Obligation, like moral truth, on which it rests, is absolute, immutable, universal. Kant even went so far as to make it the principle of our morality; but this was subjectivizing good, as he had subjectivized truth. Before there is an obligation to act, there must be an intrinsic goodness in the action; the real first truth of morality is justice, *i.e.*, the essential distinction of good and evil. It is justice, therefore, and not duty, that strictly deserves the name of a principle.

The next element is *liberty*. Obligation implies the faculty of resisting desire, passion, &c., else there would be a contradiction in human nature. But the truest proof of liberty is to be sought in the constant testimony of consciousness, that, in wishing this or that, I am equally able to will the contrary. He distinguishes between the power of willing and the power of executing; also between will and desire, or passion. In the conflict between will and the tyranny of desire lies liberty; and the aim of the conflict is the fulfilment of duty. For the will is never so free, never so much itself, as when yielding to the law of duty. Persons are distinguished from Things in having responsibility, dignity, intrinsic value. Because there is in me a being worthy of respect, I am bound in duty to respect myself, and have the *right* to be respected by you. My duty (he means, of course, what I owe to self) is the exact measure of my right. The character of being a *person* is inviolable, is the foundation of property, is inalienable by self or others, and so forth.

He passes to the last element of the phenomenon of morality, the judgment of *merit* and *demerit*. The judgment follows, as the agent is supposed free, and it is not affected by lapse of time. It depends also essentially on the idea that the agent knows good from evil. Upon itself follow the notions of reward and punishment. Merit is the natural right to be rewarded; demerit, paradox as it may appear, the *right* to be punished. A criminal would claim to be punished, if

he could comprehend the absolute necessity of expiation; and are there not real cases of such criminals? But as there can be merit without actual reward, so to be rewarded does not constitute merit.

If good, he continues, is good in itself, and ought to be done without regard to consequences, it is no less true that the consequences of good cannot fail to be happy. Virtue without happiness and crime without misfortune are a contradiction, a disorder; which are hardly met with in the world, even as it is, or, where in a few cases they are found, are sure to be righted in the end by eternal justice. The sacrifice supposed in virtue, if generously accepted and courageously undergone, has to be recompensed in respect of the amount of happiness sacrificed.

Once more, he takes up the *Sentiment*, which is the general echo of all the elements of the phenomenon. Its end is to make the mind sensible of the bond between virtue and happiness; it is the direct and vivid application of the law of merit. Again, he touches the states of moral satisfaction and remorse, speaks of our sympathy with the moral goodness of others and our benevolent feeling that arises towards them—emotions all, but covering up judgments; and this is the end of his detailed analysis of the actual facts of the case. But he still goes on to sum up in exact expressions the foregoing results, and he claims especially to have overlooked neither the part played by Reason, nor the function of Sentiment. The rational character of the idea of good gives morality its firm foundation; the lively sentiment helps to lighten the often heavy burden of duty, and stirs up to the most heroic deeds. Self-interest too is not denied its place. In this connexion, led again to allude to the happiness appointed to virtue here or at least hereafter, he allows that God may be regarded as the fountain of morality, but only in the sense that his will is the expression of his eternal wisdom and justice. Religion crowns morality, but morality is based upon itself. The rest of the lecture is in praise of Eclecticism, and advocates consideration of all the facts involved in morality, as against exclusive theories founded upon only some of the facts.

Lectures 21st and 22nd, compressed into one (Ed. 1846) contain the application of the foregoing principles, and the answer to the question, what our duties are. Duty being absolute, truth becomes obligatory, and absolute truth being known by the reason only, to obey the law of duty is to obey

reason. But what actions are conformable to reason? The characteristic of reason he takes to be Universality, and this will appear in the motives of actions, since it is these that confer on actions their morality. Accordingly, the sign whereby to discover whether an action is duty, is, if its motive when generalized appear to the reason to be a maxim of universal legislation for all free and intelligent beings. This, the norm set up by Kant, as certainly discovers what is and is not duty, as the syllogism detects the error and truth of an argument.

To obey reason is, then, the first duty, at the root of all others, and itself resting directly upon the relation between liberty and reason; in a sense, to remain reasonable is the sole duty. But it assumes special forms amid the diversity of human relations. He first considers the relations wherein we stand to ourselves and the corresponding duties. That there should be any such duties is at first sight strange, seeing we belong to ourselves; but this is not the same as having complete power over ourselves. Possessing liberty, we must not abdicate it by yielding to passions, and treat ourselves as if there were nothing in us that merits respect. We are to distinguish between what is peculiar to each of us, and what we share with humanity. Individual peculiarities are things indifferent, but the liberty and intelligence that constitute us persons, rather than individuals, demand to be respected even by ourselves. There is an obligation of self-respect imposed upon us as moral persons that was not established, and is not to be destroyed, by us. As special cases of this respect of the moral person in us, he cites (1) the duty of *self-control* against anger or melancholy, not for their pernicious consequences, but as trenching upon the moral dignity of liberty and intelligence; (2) the duty of *prudence*, meaning providence in all things, which regulates courage, enjoins temperance, is, as the ancients said, the mother of all the virtues,—in short, the government of liberty by reason; (3) *veracity*; (4) duty towards the *body*; (5) duty of *perfecting* (and not merely keeping intact) the intelligence, liberty, and sensibility that constitute us moral beings.

But the same liberty and intelligence that constitute me a moral person, and need thus to be respected even by myself, exist also in others, conferring rights on them, and imposing new duties of respect on me relatively to them. To their intelligence I owe *Truth*; their liberty I am bound to respect, sometimes even to the extent of not hindering them from

making a wrong use of it. I must respect also their affections (family, &c.) which form part of themselves; their bodies; their goods, whether acquired by labour or heritage. All these duties are summed up in the one great duty of *Justice* or respect for the rights of others; of which the greatest violation is slavery.

The whole of duty towards others is not however comprehended in justice. Conscience complains, if we have only not done injustice to one in suffering. There is a new class of duties—*consolation, charity, sacrifice*—to which indeed correspond no rights, and which therefore are not so obligatory as justice, but which cannot be said not to be obligatory. From their nature, they cannot be reduced to an exact formula; their beauty lies in liberty. But in charity, he adds, there is also a danger, from its effacing, to a certain extent, the moral personality of the object of it. In acting upon others, we risk interfering with their natural rights; charity is therefore to be proportioned to the liberty and reason of the person benefited, and is never to be made the means of usurping power over another.

Justice and Charity are the two elements composing social morality. But what is social? and on what is Society founded, existing as it does everywhere, and making man to be what he is? Into the hopeless question of its origin he refuses to enter; its present state is to be studied by the light of the knowledge of human nature. Its invariable foundations are (1) the need we have of each other, and our social instincts, (2) the lasting and indestructible idea and sentiment of right and justice. The need and instinct, of which he finds many proofs, begin society; justice crowns the work. The least consideration of the relations of man to man, suggest the essential principles of Society—justice, liberty, equality, government, punishment. Into each of these he enters. Liberty is made out to be assured and developed in society, instead of diminished. Equality is established upon the character of moral personality, which admits of no degree. The need of some repression upon liberty, where the liberty of others is trenched upon, conducts to the idea of Government—a disinterested third party armed with the necessary power to assure and defend the liberty of all. To government is to be ascribed, first its inseparable function of protecting the common liberty (without unnecessary repression), and next, beneficent action, corresponding to the duty of charity. It requires, for its guidance, a rule superior to itself, i.e., law, the expres-

sion of universal and absolute justice. Here follows the usual distinction of positive and natural law. The sanction of law is punishment; the right of punishing, as was seen, depending on the idea of demerit. Punishment is not mere vengeance, but the expiation by the criminal of violated justice; it is to be measured therefore chiefly by the demerit and not by the injury only. Whether, in punishing, allowance should be made for correction and amelioration, is to put the same case over again of charity coming in after justice.

Here the philosopher stops on the threshold of the special science of politics. But already the fixed and invariable principles of society and government have been given, and, even in the relative sphere of politics, the rule still holds that all forms and institutions are to be moulded as far as possible on the eternal principles supplied by philosophy.

The following is a summary of Cousin's views:—

I.—The Standard is the judgment of good or evil in actions. Cousin holds that good and evil are qualities of actions independent of our judgment, and having a sort of objective existence.

II.—The Moral Faculty he analyzes into four judgments: (1) good and evil; (2) obligation; (3) freedom of the will; and (4) merit and demerit. The moral sentiment is the emotions connected with those judgments, and chiefly the feeling connected with the idea of merit. [This analysis is obviously redundant. 'Good' and 'evil' apply to many things outside ethics, and to be at all appropriate, they must be qualified as *moral* (i.e., *obligatory*) good and evil. The connexion between obligation and demerit has been previously explained.]

III.—In regard to the *Summum Bonum*, Cousin considers that virtue must bring happiness here or hereafter, and vice, misery.

IV.—He accepts the criterion of duties set forth by Kant. He argues for the existence of duties towards ourselves.

V. and VI. require no remark.

THÉODORE SIMON JOUFFROY. [1796-1842.]

In the Second Lecture of his unfinished *Cours de Droit Naturel*, Jouffroy gives a condensed exposition of the Moral Facts of human nature from his own point of view.

What distinguishes, he says, one being from another, is its Organization; and as having a special nature, every creature has

a special end. Its end or destination is its good, or its good consists in the accomplishment of its end. Further, to have an end implies the possession of faculties wherewith to attain it; and all this is applicable also to man. In man, as in other creatures, from the very first, his nature tends to its end, by means of purely instinctive movements, which may be called primitive and instinctive tendencies of human nature; later they are called passions. Along with these tendencies, and under their influence, the intellectual faculties also awake and seek to procure for them satisfaction. The faculties work, however, at first, in an indeterminate fashion, and only by meeting obstacles are driven to the concentration necessary to attain the ends. He illustrates this by the case of the intellectual faculty seeking to satisfy the desire of knowledge, and not succeeding until it concentrates on a single point its scattered energies. This spontaneous concentration is the first manifestation of Will, but is proved to be not natural from the feeling of constraint always experienced, and the glad rebound, after effort, to the indeterminate condition. One fact, too, remains even after everything possible has been done, viz., that the satisfaction of the primitive tendencies is never quite complete.

When, however, such satisfaction as may be, has been attained, there arises pleasure; and pain, when our faculties fail to attain the good or end they sought. There could be action, successful and unsuccessful, and so good and evil, without any sensibility, wherefore good and evil are not to be confounded with pain and pleasure; but constituted as we are, there is a sensible echo that varies according as the result of action is attained or not. Pleasure is, then, the consequence, and, as it were, the sign of the realization of good, and pain of its privation.

He next distinguishes Secondary passions from the great primary tendencies and passions. These arise *apropos* of external objects, as they are found to further or oppose the satisfaction of the fundamental tendencies. Such objects are then called *useful* or *pernicious*. Finally, he completes his account of the infantile or primitive condition of man, by remarking that some of our natural tendencies, like Sympathy, are entirely disinterested in seeking the good of others. The main feature of the whole primitive state is the exclusive domination of passion. The will already exists, but there is no liberty; the present passion triumphs over the future, the stronger over the weaker.

He now passes to consider the double transformation of this original state, that takes place when reason appears. Reason is the faculty of *comprehending*, which is different from knowing, and is peculiar to man. As soon as it awakes in man, it comprehends, and penetrates to the meaning of, the whole spectacle of human activity. It first forms the general idea of *Good*, as the resultant of the satisfaction of all the primary tendencies, and as the true End of man. Then, comprehending the actual situation of man, it resolves this idea into the idea of the *greatest possible good*. All that conduces to the attainment of this good, it includes under the general idea of the *Useful*; and finally, it constructs the general idea of *Happiness* out of all that is common to the agreeable sensations that follow upon the satisfaction of the primary tendencies.

But besides forming these three perfectly distinct ideas, and exploring the secret of what has been passing within, the reason also comprehends the necessity of subjecting to control the faculties and forces that are the condition of the greatest satisfaction of human nature. In the place of the merely mechanical impulsion of passion, which is coupled with grave disadvantages, it puts forward, as a new principle of action, the rational calculation of interest. The faculties are brought into the service of this idea of the reason, by the same process of concentration as was needful in satisfying the passions; only now voluntarily instead of spontaneously. Being an idea instead of a passion, the new principle supplies a real *motive*, under whose guidance our natural power over our faculties is developed and strengthened. All partial ends are merged in the one great End of Interest, to which the means is self-control. The first great change thus wrought by reason is, that it takes the direction of the human forces into its own hand, and although, even when by a natural transformation the new system of conduct acquires all the force of a passion, it is not able steadily to procure for the idea of interest the victory over the single passions, the change nevertheless abides. To the state of Passion has succeeded the state of Egoism.

Reason must, however, he thinks, make another discovery before there is a truly moral state—must form general ideas rise to ideas that are universal and absolute. There is no real equation, he holds, between Good and the satisfaction of the primitive tendencies, which is the good of egoism. Not till the special ends of all creatures are regarded as elements

of one great End of creation, of Universal Order, do we obtain an idea whose equivalence to the idea of the Good requires no proof. The special ends are good, because, through their realization, the end of creation, which is the absolute Good, is realized; hence they acquire the sacred character that it has in the eye of reason.

No sooner is the idea of Universal Order present to the reason, than it is recognized as an absolute law; and, in consequence, the special end of our being, by participation in its character of goodness and sacredness, is henceforth pursued as a duty, and its satisfaction claimed as a right. Also every creature assumes the same position, and we no longer merely concede that others have tendencies to be satisfied, and consent from Sympathy or Egoism to promote their good; but the idea of Universal Order makes it as much our duty to respect and contribute to the accomplishment of their good as to accomplish our own. From the idea of good-in-itself, i.e., Order, flow all duty, right, obligation, morality, and natural legislation.

He carries the idea of Order still farther back to the Deity, making it the expression of the divine thought, and opening up the religious side of morality; but he does not mean that its obligatoriness as regards the reason is thereby increased. He also identifies it, in the last resort, with the ideas of the Beautiful and the True.

We have now reached the truly moral condition, a state perfectly distinct from either of the foregoing. Even when the egoistic and the moral determination pre-cribe the same conduct, the one only counsels, while the other obliges. The one, having in view only the greatest satisfaction of our nature, is personal even when counselling benefits to others; the other regarding only the law of Order, something distinct from self, is impersonal, even when prescribing our own good. Hence there is in the latter case *déroutement* of self to something else, and it is exactly the *déroutement* to a something that is not self, but is regarded as good, that gets the name of virtue or moral good. Moral good is voluntary and intelligent obedience to the law that is the rule of our conduct. As an additional distinction between the egoistic and the moral determination, he mentions the judgment of merit or demerit that ensues upon actions when, and only when, they have a moral character. No remorse follows an act of mere imprudence involving no violation of universal order.

He denies that there is any real contradiction among the

three different determinations. Nothing is prescribed in the moral law that is not also in accordance with some primitive tendency, and with self-interest rightly understood; if it were not so, it would go hard with virtue. On the other hand, if everything not done from regard to duty were opposed to moral law and order, society could not only not subsist, but would never have been formed. When a struggle does ensue between passion and self-interest, passion is blind; when between egoism and the moral determination, egoism is at fault. It is in the true interest of Passion to be sacrificed to Egoism, and of Egoism to be sacrificed to Order.

He closes the review of the various moral facts by explaining in what sense the succession of the three states is to be understood. The state of Passion is historically first, but the Egoistic and the Moral states are not so sharply defined. As soon as reason dawns it introduces the moral motive as well as the egoistic, and to this extent the two states are contemporaneous. Only, so far is the moral law from being at this stage fully conceived, that, in the majority of men, it is never conceived in its full clearness at all. Their confused idea of moral law is the so-called moral *conscience*, which works more like a sense or an instinct, and is inferior to the clear rational conception in everything except that it conveys the full force of obligation. In its grades of guilt human justice rightly makes allowance for different degrees of intelligence. The Egoistic determination and the Moral state, such as it is, once developed, passion is not to be supposed abolished, but henceforth what really takes place in all is a perpetual alternation of the various states. Yet though no man is able exclusively to follow the moral determination, and no man will constantly be under the influence of any one of the motives, there is one motive commonly uppermost whereby each can be characterized. Thus men, according to their habitual conduct, are known as passionate, egoistic, or virtuous.

We now summarize the opinions of Jouffroy:—

I.—The Standard is the Idea of Absolute Good or Universal Order in the sense explained by the author. Like Cousin, he identifies the 'good' with the 'true.' What, then, is the criterion that distinguishes moral from other truths? If *obligation* be selected as the *differentia*, it is in effect to give up the attempt to determine what truths are obligatory. The idea of 'good' is obviously too vague to be a *differentia*. How far the idea of 'Universal Order' gets us

out of the difficulty may be doubted, especially after the candid admission of the author, that it is an idea of which the majority of men have never any very clear notions.

II.—The moral faculty is Reason; Conscience is hardly more than a confused feeling of obligatoriness.

Sympathy is one of the primitive tendencies of our nature. Jouffroy's opinion on the subject is open to the objections urged against Butler's psychology.

He upholds the freedom of the Will, but embarrasses his argument by admitting, like Reid, that there is a stage in our existence when we are ruled by the passions, and are destitute of liberty.

III.—The *Summum Bonum* is the *end* of every creature; the passions ought to be subordinated to self-interest, and self-interest to morality.

In regard to the other points, it is unnecessary to continue the summary.

APPENDIX.

A.—*History of Nominalism and Realism*, p. 181.

THE controversy respecting Universals first obtained its place in philosophy from the colloquies of Sokrates, and the writings and teachings of Plato. We need not here touch upon their predecessors Parmenides and Heraeleitus, who, in a confused and unsystematic manner, approached this question from opposite sides, and whose speculations worked much upon the mind of Plato in determining both his aggressive dialectic, and his constructive theories. Parmenides of Elea, improving upon the ruder conceptions of Xenophanes, was the first to give emphatic proclamation to the celebrated Eleatic doctrine, Absolute *Eine* as opposed to Relative *Fientia*: i.e., the Cogitable, which Parmenides conceived as the One and All of reality, *Ἐν καὶ Πᾶν*, enduring and unchangeable, of which the negative was unmeaning; and the Sensible or Perceivable, which was in perpetual change, succession, and multiplicity, without either unity, or reality, or endurance. To the last of these two departments Heraeleitus assigned especial prominence. In place of the permanent underlying *Eine*, which he did not recognize, he substituted a cogitable process of change, or generalized concept of what was common to all the successive phases of change—a perpetual stream of generation and destruction, or implication of contraries, in which everything appeared only that it might disappear, without endurance or uniformity. In this doctrine of Heraeleitus, the world of sense and particulars could not be the object either of certain knowledge or even of correct probable opinion; in that of Parmenides, it was recognized as an object of probable opinion, though not of certain knowledge. But in both doctrines, as well as in the theories of Democritus, it was degraded, and presented as incapable of yielding satisfaction to the search of a philosophizing mind, which could find neither truth nor reality except in the world of Concepts and Cogitata.

Besides the two theories above-mentioned, there were current in the Hellenic world, before the maturity of Sokrates, several other veins of speculation about the Cosmos, totally divergent one from the other, and by that very divergence sometimes stimulating curiosity, sometimes discouraging all study, as though the

problems were hopeless. But Parmenides and Heracleitus, together with the arithmetical and geometrical hypotheses of the Pythagoreans, are expressly noticed by Aristotle as having specially contributed to form the philosophy of Plato.

Neither Parmenides, nor Heracleitus, nor the Pythagoreans, were Dialecticians. They gave out their own thoughts in their own way, with little or no regard to dissentients. They did not cultivate the art of argumentative attack or defence, nor the correct application and diversified confrontation of universal terms, which are the great instruments of that art. It was Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides, that first employed Dialectic in support of his master's theory, or rather against the counter theories of opponents. He showed, by arguments memorable for their subtlety, that the hypothesis of an Absolute, composed of *Entia Plura Discontinua*, led to consequences even more absurd than those that opponents deduced from the Parmenidean hypothesis of *Ens Unum Continuum*. The Dialectic, thus inaugurated by Zeno, reached still higher perfection in the colloquies of Sokrates; who not only employed a new method, but also introduced new topics of debate—ethical, political, and social matters instead of physics and the Cosmos.

The peculiar originality of Sokrates is well known: a man who wrote nothing, but passed his life in indiscriminate colloquy with every one; who professed to have no knowledge himself, but interrogated others on matters that they talked about familiarly and professed to know well; whose colloquies generally ended by puzzling the respondents, and by proving to themselves that they neither knew nor could explain even matters that they had begun by affirming confidently as too clear to need explanation. Aristotle tells us* that Sokrates was the first that set himself expressly and methodically to scrutinize the definitions of general or universal terms, and to confront them, not merely with each other, but also, by a sort of inductive process, with many particular cases that were, or appeared to be, included under them. And both Xenophon and Plato give us abundant examples of the terms to which Sokrates applied his interrogatories:—What is the Holy? What is the Unholy? What is the Beautiful or Honourable? What is the Ugly or Base? What is Justice—Injustice—Temperance—Madness—Courage—Cowardice—A City—A man fit for civil life? What is the Command of Men? What is the character fit for commanding men? Such are the specimens, furnished by a hearer,† of the universal terms whereon the interrogatories of Sokrates bore. All of them were terms spoken and heard familiarly by citizens in the market-place, as if each understood them perfectly; but when Sokrates, professing his own ignorance, put questions asking for solutions of difficulties that perplexed his own mind, the answers showed that these

* Metaphysics, A. 987. b. 2; M. 1078, b. 18.

† Xenophon Memorab. I. 1, 16; IV. 6, 1-13.

difficulties were equally insoluble by respondents, who had never thought of them before. The confident persuasion of knowledge, with which the colloquy began, stood exposed as a false persuasion without any basis of reality. Such illusory semblance of knowledge was proclaimed by Sokrates to be the chronic, though unconscious, intellectual condition of his contemporaries. How he undertook, as the mission of a long life, to expose it, is impressively set forth in the Platonic Apology.

It was thus by Sokrates that the meaning of universal terms and universal propositions, and the relation of each respectively to particular terms and particular propositions, were first made a subject of express enquiry and analytical interrogation. His influence was powerful in imparting the same dialectic impulse to several companions: but most of all to Plato: who not only enlarged and amplified the range of Sokratic enquiry, but also brought the meaning of universal terms into something like system and theory, as a portion of the conditions of trustworthy science. Plato was the first to affirm the doctrine afterwards called REALISM, as the fundamental postulate of all true and proved cognition. He affirmed it boldly, and in its most extended sense, though he also produces (according to his frequent practice) many powerful arguments and unsolved objections against it. It was he (to use the striking phrase of Milton *) that first imported into the schools the portent of Realism. The doctrine has been since opposed, confuted, curtailed, transformed, diversified in many ways: but it has maintained its place in logical speculation, and has remained, under one phraseology or another, the creed of various philosophers, from that time down to the present.

The following account of the problems of Realism was handed down to the speculations of the mediæval philosophers, by Porphyry (between 270-300 A.D.), in his Introduction to the treatise of Aristotle on the Categories. After informing Chrysaorius that he will prepare for him a concise statement of the doctrines of the old philosophers respecting Genus, Differentia, Species, Proprium, Accidens—'abstaining from the deeper enquiries, but giving suitable development to the more simple,'—Porphyry thus proceeds—'For example. I shall decline discussing, in respect to Genera and Species—(1) Whether they have a substantive existence, or reside merely in naked mental conceptions; (2) Whether, assuming them to have substantive existence, they are bodies or incorporeals; (3) Whether their substantive existence is in and along with the objects of sense, or apart and separable. Upon this task I shall not enter, since it is of the greatest depth, and requires another larger investigation; but shall try at once to show you how the ancients (especially

* See the Latin verses—*De Ideâ Platonicâ quemadmodum Aristoteles intellexit*—

'At tu, perenne ruris Academi decus,
Hæc monstra ei tu primus induisti schollæ,' &c.

the Peripatetics), with a view to logical discourse, dealt with the topics now propounded.*

Before Porphyry, all these three problems had been largely debated, first by Plato, next by Aristotle against Plato, again by the Stoics against both, and lastly by Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists as conciliators of Plato with Aristotle. After Porphyry, problems the same, or similar, continued to stand in the foreground of speculation, until the authority of Aristotle became discredited at all points by the influences of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But in order to find the beginning of them, as questions provoking curiosity and opening dissentient points of view to inventive dialecticians, we must go back to the age and the dialogues of Plato.

The real Sokrates (*i.e.*, as he is described by Xenophon) inculcated in his conversation steady reverence for the invisible, as apart from and overriding the phenomena of sensible experience: but he interpreted the term in a religious sense, as signifying the agency of the personal gods, employed to produce effects beneficial or injurious to mankind.† He also puts forth his dialectic acuteness to prepare consistent and tenable definitions of familiar general terms (of which instances have already been given), at least so far as to make others feel, for the first time, that they did not understand these terms, though they had been always talking like persons that *did* understand. But the Platonic Sokrates (*i.e.*, as spokesman in the dialogues of Plato) enlarges both these discussions materially. Plato recognizes, not simply the invisible persons or gods, but also a separate world of invisible, impersonal entities or objects: one of which he postulates as the objective reality, though only a cogitable reality, correlating with each *general term*. These Entia he considers to be not merely distinct realities, but the only true and knowable realities: they are eternal and unchangeable, manifested by the fact that particulars partake in them, and imparting a partial show of stability to the indeterminate flux of particulars: and unless such separate Universal Entia be supposed, there is nothing whereon cognition can fasten, and consequently there can be no cognition at all.‡ These are the substantive, self-existent Ideas or Forms that Plato first presented to the philosophical world: sometimes with logical acuteness, oftener still with rich poetical and imaginative colouring. They constitute the main body and characteristic of the hypothesis of Realism.

But though the main hypothesis is the same, the accessories and manner of presentation differ materially among its different advocates. In these respects, indeed, Plato differs not only from others, but also from himself. Systematic teaching or exposition is not his purpose, nor does he ever give opinions in

* Porphyry—*Introd. in Categor. init.*

† Xenophon *Memorabil.* I. 4, 9-17; IV. 3. 14.

‡ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* I. 6, p. 987. b. 5; XIII. 4, p. 1078, b. 15.

his own name. We have from him an aggregate of detached dialogues, in many of which this same hypothesis is brought under discussion. But in each dialogue, the spokesmen approach it from a different side: while in others (distinguished by various critics as the Sokratic dialogues), it does not come under discussion at all; Plato being content to remain upon the Sokratic platform, and to debate the meaning of general terms without postulating in correlation with them an objective reality, apart from their respective particulars.

At the close of the Platonic dialogue called KRATYLUS, Sokrates is introduced as presenting the hypothesis of self-existent, eternal, unchangeable Ideas (exactly in the way that Aristotle ascribes to Plato) as the counter-proposition to the theory of universal flux and change announced by Heraclitus. Particulars are ever changing (it is here argued) and are thus out of the reach of cognition; but unless the Universal Ideas above them, such as the Self-beautiful, the Self-good, &c., be admitted as unchangeable objective realities, there can be nothing either nameable or knowable: cognition becomes impossible.

In the TIMÆUS, Plato describes the construction of the Cosmos by a divine Architect, and the model followed by the latter in his work. The distinction is here again brought out, and announced as capital, between the permanent, unalterable *Entia*, and the transient, ever-fluctuating, *Phantia*, which come and go, but never really are. *Entia* are apprehended by the cogitant or intelligent soul of the Kosmos, *Phantia* by the sentient or perceptive soul; the cosmical soul as a whole, in order to suffice for both these tasks, is made up of diverse component elements—*Idem*, correlating with the first of the two—*Diversum*, correlating with the second—and *Idem* implicated with *Diversum*, corresponding to both in conjunction. The Divine Architect is described as constructing a Cosmos, composed both of soul and body, upon the pattern of the grand pre-existent Idea—Auto-zoon or the Self-animal: which included in it-self as a genus the four distinct species—celestial (gods, visible and invisible), terrestrial, aerial, and aquatic.

The main point that Plato here insists upon is, the eternal and unchangeable reality of the cogitable objects called Ideas, prior both in time and in logical order to the transient objects of sight and touch, and serving as an exemplar to which these latter are made to approximate imperfectly. He assumes such priority, without proof, in the case of the Idea of Animal; but when he touches upon the four elements—Fire, Air, Water, Earth—he hesitates to make the same assumption, and thinks himself required to give a reason for it. The reason that he assigns (announced distinctly as his own) is as follows: If intellection (cogitation, *Noûs*), and true opinion, are two genera distinct from each other, there must clearly exist Forms or Ideas imperceptible to our senses, and apprehended only by cogitation or intellection: But if, as some persons think, true opinion is noway different

from intellection, then we must admit all the objects perceived by our senses as firm realities. Now, the fact is (he proceeds to say) that true opinion is not identical with intellection, but quite distinct, separate, and unlike to it. Intellection is communicated by teaching, through true reasoning, and is unshakeable by persuasion; true opinion is communicated by persuasion and removed by counter-persuasion, without true reasoning. True opinion may belong to any man; but intellection is the privilege only of gods and of a small section of mankind. Accordingly, since the two are distinct, the objects correlating with each of them must also be distinct from each other. There must exist, first, primary, eternal, unchangeable Forms, apprehended by intellect or cogitation, but imperceptible by sense; and, secondly, resemblances of these bearing the same name, generated and destroyed each in some place, and apprehended first by sense, afterwards by opinion. Thirdly, there must be the place wherein such resemblances are generated; a place itself imperceptible by sense, yet postulated, as a receptacle indispensable for them, by a dreamy and spurious kind of computation.

We see here that the proof given by Plato, in support of the existence of Forms as the primary realities, is essentially *psychological*: resting upon the fact that there is a distinct mental energy or faculty called Intellection (apart from sense and opinion), which must have its distinct objective correlate; and upon the farther fact, that Intellection is the high prerogative of the gods, shared only by a few chosen men. This last point of the case is more largely and emphatically brought out in the *PHÆDRUS*, where Sokrates delivers a highly poetical effusion respecting the partial inter-communion of the human soul with these eternal intellectual Realia. To contemplate them is the constant privilege of the gods; to do so is also the aspiration of the immortal soul of man generally, in the pre-existent state, prior to incorporation with the human body; though only in a few cases is such aspiration realized. Even those few human souls, that have succeeded in getting sight of the intellectual Ideas (essences without colour, figure, or tactile properties), lose all recollection of them when first entering into partnership with a human body; but are enabled gradually to recall them, by combining repeated impressions and experience of their resemblances in the world of sense. The revival of these divine elements is an inspiration of the nature of madness—though it is a variety of madness as much better than uninspired human reason as other varieties are worse. The soul, becoming insensible to ordinary pursuits, contracts a passionate devotion to these Universal Ideas, and to that dialectic communion especially with some pregnant youthful mind, that brings them into clear separate contemplation, disengaged from the limits and confusion of sense.

Here philosophy is represented as the special inspiration of a few, whose souls during the period of pre-existence have sufficiently caught sight of the Universal Ideas or Essences; so that these

last, though overlaid and buried when the soul is first plunged in a body, are yet revivable afterwards under favourable circumstances, through their imperfect copies in the world of sense: especially by the sight of personal beauty in an ingenuous and aspiring youth, in which case the visible copy makes nearest approach to the perfection of the Universal Idea or Type. At the same time, Plato again presents to us the Cogitable Universals as the only objects of true cognition—the Sensible Particulars being objects merely of opinion.

In the *PHÆDON*, Sokrates advances the same doctrine, that the perceptions of sense are full of error and confusion, and can at best suggest nothing higher than opinion; that true cognition can never be attained except when the Cogitant Mind disengages itself from the body and comes into direct contemplation of the Universal Entia, objects eternal and always the same—The Self-beautiful, Self-good, Self-just, Self-great, Healthy, Strong, &c., all which objects are invisible, and can be apprehended only by the cognition or intellect. It is this cogitable Universal that is alone real; Sensible Particulars are not real, nor lasting, nor trustworthy. None but a few philosophers, however, can attain such pure mental energy during this life; nor even they, fully and perfectly. But they will attain it fully after death, (their souls being immortal), if their lives have been passed in sober philosophical training. And their souls enjoyed it before birth, during the period of pre-existence: having acquired, before junction with the body, the knowledge of these Universals, which are forgotten during childhood, but recalled in the way of *remembrance*, by sensible perceptions that make a distant approach to them. Thus, according to the *Phædon* and some other dialogues, all learning is merely reminiscence; the mind is brought back, by the laws of association, to the knowledge of Universal Realities that it had possessed in its state of pre-existence. Particulars of sense participate in these Universals to a certain extent, or resemble them imperfectly; and they are therefore called by the same name.

In the *REPUBLIC*, we have a repetition and copious illustration of this antithesis between the world of Universals or Cogitabilia, which are the only unchangeable realities, and the only objects of knowledge,—and the world of Sensible Particulars, which are transitory and confused shadows of these Universals, and are objects of opinion only. Full and Real *Ens* is knowable, *Non-Ens* is altogether unknowable; what is midway between the two is matter of opinion, and in such midway are the particulars of sense.* Respecting these last, no truth is attainable; whenever you affirm a proposition respecting any of them, you may with equal truth affirm the contrary at the same time. Nowhere is the contrast between the Universals or Real Ideas (among which the Idea of Good is the highest, predominant over all the rest), and the unreal Particulars, or Percepts of sense, more forcibly in-

* Plato *Republ. V.* p. 477-478.

sisted upon than in the Republic. Even the celestial bodies and their movements, being among these *Percepta* of sense, are ranked among phantoms interesting but useless to observe; they are the best of all *Percepta*, but they fall very short of the perfection that the mental eye contemplates in the Ideal—in the true Figures and Numbers, in the Real Velocity and the Real Slowness. In the simile commencing the seventh book of the Republic, Plato compares mankind to prisoners in a cave, chained in one particular attitude, so as to behold only an ever-varying multiplicity of shadows, projected, through the opening of the cave, upon the wall before them, by certain unseen Realities behind. The philosopher is one among a few, who by training or inspiration, have been enabled to face about from this original attitude, and to contemplate with his mind the real unchangeable Universals, instead of having his eye fixed upon their particular manifestations, at once shadowy and transient. By such mental revolution he comes round from the perceivable to the cogitable, from opinion to knowledge.

The distinction between these two is farther argued in the elaborate dialogue called *THEÆTETUS*, where Sokrates, trying to explain what Knowledge or Cognition is, refutes three proposed explanations; and shows, to his own satisfaction, that it is not sensible perception, that it is not true opinion, that it is not true opinion coupled with rational explanation. But he confesses himself unable to show what Knowledge or Cognition is, though he continues to announce it as correlating with realities Cogitable and Universal only.*

In the passages above noticed, and in many others besides, we find Plato drawing a capital distinction between Universals eternal and unchangeable—(each of them a Unit as well as a Universal),† which he affirms to be the only Real *Entia*—and Particulars transient and variable, which are not *Entia* at all, but are always coming or going; the Universals being objects of cogitation and of a psychological fact called Cognition, which he declares to be infallible; and the Particulars being objects of sense, and of another psychological fact radically different, called Opinion, which he pronounces to be fallible and misleading. Plato holds, moreover, that the Particulars, though generically distinct and separate from the Universals, have nevertheless a certain communion or participation with them, by virtue of which they become half-existent and half-cognizable, but never attain to full reality or cognizability.

This is the first statement of the theory of complete and un-

* Plato *Theætét.*, p. 173, 176, 186. Grote's Plato, vol. II. ch. 26, p. 370-395.

† Plato *Philêbus*, p. 15, A—B, *ἐν ἁδὼν μονάδας, μίαν ἐκάστην οὖσαν ἑαυτῇ αὐτῇ, &c.*, Republic X., p. 596, A. The phrase of Milton—*Unus et Universus*—expresses this idea:—

'Sed quamlibet natura sit communior,
Tamen scorsus extat ad modum unius,' &c.

qualified Realism, which came to be known in the Middle Ages under the phrase *Universalia ante rem* or *extra rem*, and to be distinguished from the two counter theories *Universalia in re* (Aristotelian), and *Universalia post rem* (Nominalism). Indeed, the Platonic theory goes even farther than the phrase *Universalia ante rem*, which recognizes the particular as a reality, though posterior and derivative, for Plato attenuates it into phantom and shadow. The problem was now clearly set out in philosophy—What are the objects correlating with Universal terms, and with Particular terms? What is the relation between the two? Plato first gave to the world the solution called Realism, which lasted so long after his time. We shall presently find Aristotle taking issue with him on both the affirmations included in his theory.

But though Plato first introduced this theory into philosophy, he was neither blind to the objections against it, nor disposed to conceal them. His mind was at once poetically constructive and dialectically destructive; to both these impulses the theory furnished ample scope, while the form of his compositions (separate dialogues, with no mention of his own name) rendered it easy to give expression either to one or the other. Before Aristotle arose to take issue with him, we shall find him taking issue with himself, especially in the dialogues called *Sophistes* and *Parmenides*, not to mention the *Philèbus*, wherein he breaks down the unity even of his sovereign Idea, which in the *Republic* governs the Cogitable World—the Idea of Good.*

Both in the *Sophistes* and in the *Parmenides*, the leading disputant introduced by Plato is not Sokrates, but Parmenides and another person (unnamed) of the Eleatic school. In both dialogues objections are taken against the Realistic theory elsewhere propounded by Plato, though the objections adduced in the one are quite distinct from those noticed in the other. In the *Sophistes*, the Eleatic reasoner impugns successfully the theories of two classes of philosophers, one the opposite of the other: first, the Materialists, who recognized no *Entia* except the *Peccepta* of Sense; next, the Realistic Idealists, who refused to recognize these last as real *Entia*, or as anything more than transient and mutable *Generata* or *Fientia*, while they confined the title of *Entia* to the Forms, cogitable, incorporeal, eternal, immutable, neither acting on anything, nor acted upon by anything. These persons are called in the *Sophistes* 'Friends of Forms,' and their theory is exactly what we have already cited out of so many other dialogues of Plato, drawing the marked line of separation between *Entia* and *Fientia*; between the Immutable, which alone is real and cognizable, and the Mutable, neither real nor cognizable. The Eleate in the *Sophistes* controverts this Platonic theory, and maintains—that among the Universal *Entia* there are included items mutable as well as immutable; that both are real

* Plato *Philèbus*, p. 65-66; see Grote's *Plato*, vol. II. ch. 39, p. 584-585.

and both cognizable; that *Non-Ens* (instead of being set in glaring contrast with *Ens*, as the totally incogitable against the infallibly cognizable)* is one among the multiplicity of Real Forms, meaning only what is different from *Ens*, and therefore cognizable not less than *Ens*; that *Percepta* and *Cogitata* are alike real, yet both only relatively real, correlating with minds perceiving and cogitant. Thus, the reasoning in the *Sophistes*, while it sets aside the doctrine of *Universalia ante rem*, does not mark out any other relation between Universals and Particulars (neither *in re* nor *post rem*). It discusses chiefly the intercommunion or reciprocal exclusion of Universals with respect to each other; and, upon this point, far from representing them as Objects of infallible Cognition as contrasted with Opinion, it enrolls both Opinion and Discourse among the Universals themselves, and declares both of them to be readily combinable with *Non-Ens* and Falsehood. So that we have here error and fallibility recognized in the region of Universals, as well as in that of Particulars.

But it is principally in the dialogue *PARMENIDES* that Plato discusses with dialectical acuteness the relation of Universals to their Particulars; putting aside the intercommunion (affirmed in the *Sophistes*) or reciprocal exclusion between one Universal and another, as an hypothesis at least supremely difficult to vindicate, if at all admissible.† In the dialogue, Sokrates is introduced in the unusual character of a youthful and ardent aspirant in philosophy, defending the Platonic theory of Ideas, as we have seen it proclaimed in the *Republic* and in *Timæus*. The veteran Parmenides appears as the opponent to cross-examine him; and not only impugns the theory by several interrogatories which Sokrates cannot answer, but also intimates that there remain behind other objections equally serious requiring answer. Yet at the same time he declares that unless the theory be admitted, and unless *Universalia ante rem* can be sustained as existent, there is no trustworthy cognition attainable, nor any end to be served by philosophical debate. Moreover, Parmenides warns Sokrates that before he can acquire a mental condition competent to defend the theory, he must go through numerous preliminary dialectical exercises; following out both the affirmative and the negative hypotheses in respect to a great variety of *Universalia* severally. To illustrate the course prescribed, Parmenides gives a long specimen of this dialectic in handling his own doctrine of *Ens Unum*. He takes first the hypothesis *Si Unum Est*—next, the hypothesis *Si Unum non est*; and he deduces from each, by ingenious subtleties, double and contradictory conclusions. These he sums up at the end, challenging Sokrates to solve the puzzles before affirming his thesis.

Apart from these antinomies at the close of the dialogue, the

* Plato *Republic*, V., 478-479.

† Plato *Parmenid.* p. 129 E; with Stallbaum's *Prolegomena* to that Dialogue, p. 38-42.

cross-examination of Sokrates by Parmenides, in the middle of it, brings out forcibly against the Realistic theory objections such as those urged against it by the Nominalists of the Middle Ages. In the first place, we find that Plato conceived the theory itself differently from Porphyry and the philosophers that wrote subsequently to the Peripatetic criticism. Porphyry and his successors put the question, Whether Genera and Species had a separate existence, apart from the individuals composing them? Now, the world of Forms (the Cogitable or Ideal world as opposed to the Sensible), is not here conceived by Plato as peopled in the first instance by Genera and Species. Its first tenants are *attributes*, and attributes distinctly *relative*—Likeness, One and Many, Justice, Beauty, Goodness, &c. Sokrates, being asked by Parmenides whether he admits Forms corresponding with these names, answers unhesitatingly in the affirmative. He is next asked whether he admits Forms corresponding to the names Man, Fire, Water, &c., and instead of replying in the affirmative, intimates that he does not feel sure. Lastly, the question is put whether there are Forms corresponding to the names of mean objects—mud, hair, dirt, &c. At first he answers emphatically in the negative, and treats the affirmative as preposterous; there exists no cogitable hair, &c., but only the object of sense that we so denominate. Yet, on second thoughts, he is not without mis-giving that there may be Forms even of these; though the supposition is so repulsive to him that he shakes it off as much as he can. Upon this last expression of sentiment Parmenides comments, ascribing it to the juvenility of Sokrates, and intimating that when Sokrates has become more deeply imbued with philosophy, he will cease to set aside any of these objects as unworthy.

Here we see that in the theory of Realism as conceived by Sokrates, the Self-Existent Universals are not Genera and Species as such, but Attributes (not Second Substances or Essences, but Accidents or Attributes, *e.g.*, Quality, Quantity, Relation, &c. to use the language afterwards introduced by the Aristotelian Categories); that no Genera or Species are admitted except with hesitation; and that the mean and undignified among them are scarcely admissible at all. This sentiment of dignity, associated with the *Universalis ante rem*, and the emotional necessity for tracing back particulars to an august and respected origin—is to be noted as a marked and lasting feature of the Realistic creed; and it even pressed on to the *Universalis in re* as afterwards affirmed by Aristotle. Parmenides here takes exception to it (and so does Plato elsewhere*) as inconsistent with faithful adherence to scientific analogy.

Parmenides then proceeds (interrogating Sokrates) first to state what the Realistic theory is (Universals apart from Particulars—Particulars apart from Universals, yet having some participation in them, and named after them), next to bring out the

* Plato Sophist. 227 A. Politikon, p. 266 D.

difficulties attaching to it. The Universal or Form (he argues) cannot be entire in each of its many separate particulars; nor yet is it divisible, so that a part can be in one particular, and a part in another. For take the Forms *Great*, *Equal*, *Small*; Equal magnitudes are equal because they partake in the Form of equality. But how can a part of the Form Equality, less than the whole Form, cause the magnitudes to be equal? How can the Form Smallness have any parts less than itself, or how can it be greater than anything?

The Form cannot be divided, nor can it co-exist undivided in each separate particular; accordingly, particulars can have no participation in it at all.

Again, you assume a Form of Greatness, because you see many particular objects, each of which appears to you great; this being the point of resemblance between them. But if you compare the Form of Greatness with any or all of the particular great objects, you will perceive a resemblance between them; this will require you to assume a higher Form, and so on upward, without limit.

Sokrates, thus embarrassed, starts the hypothesis that perhaps each of these Forms may be a cogitation, and nothing more, existing only within the mind. How? rejoins Parmenides. Can there be a cogitation of nothing at all? Must not each cogitation have a real *cogitatum* correlating with it—in this case, the one Form that is identical throughout many particulars? If you say that particulars partake in the Form, and that each Form is nothing but a cogitation, does not this imply that each particular is itself cogitant?

Again, Sokrates urges that the Forms are constant, unalterable, stationary in nature; that particulars resemble them, and participate in them only so far as to resemble them. But (rejoins Parmenides) if particulars resemble the Form, the Form must resemble them; accordingly, you must admit another and higher Form, as the point of resemblance between the Form and its particulars; and so on, upwards.

And farther (continues Parmenides), even admitting these Universal Forms as self-existent, how can we know anything about them? Forms can correlate only with Forms, Particulars only with Particulars. Thus, if I, an individual man, am master, I correlate with another individual man, who is my servant, and he on his side with me. But the Form of mastership, the universal self-existent master, must correlate with the Form of servanthip, the universal servant. The correlation does not subsist between members of the two different worlds, but between different members of the same world respectively. Thus the Form of Cognition correlates with the Form of Truth; and the Form of each variety of Cognition, with the Form of the corresponding variety of Truth. But we, as individual subjects, do not possess in ourselves the Form of Cognition; our Cognition is our own, correlating with such truth as belongs to it and to ourselves. Our Cognition cannot reach to the Form of Truth, nor therefore to any other

Form; we can know nothing of the Self-good, Self-beautiful, Self-just, &c., even supposing such Forms to exist.

These acute and subtle arguments are nowhere answered by Plato. They remain as unsolved difficulties, embarrassing the Realistic theory; they are reinforced by farther difficulties no less grave, included in the dialectic Antinomies of Parmenides at the close of the dialogue, and by an unknown number of others indicated as producible, though not actually produced. Yet still Plato, with full consciousness of these difficulties, asserts unequivocally, that unless the Realistic theory can be sustained, philosophical research is fruitless, and truth cannot be reached. We see thus that the author of the theory has also left on record some of the most forcible arguments against it. It appears from Aristotle (though we do not learn the fact from the Platonic dialogues), that Plato, in his later years, symbolized the Ideas or Forms under the denomination of Ideal Numbers, generated by implication of The One with what he called The Great and Little, or the Indeterminate Dyad. This last, however, is not the programme wherein the Realistic theory stands opposed to Nominalism.

But the dialogue Parmenides, though full of acuteness on the negative side, not only furnishes no counter-theory, but asserts continued allegiance to the Realistic theory, which passed as Plato's doctrine to his successors. To impugn, forcibly and even unanswerably, a theory at once so sweeping and so little fortified by positive reasons, was what many dialecticians of the age could do. But to do this, and at the same time to construct a counter-theory, was a task requiring higher powers of mind. One, however, of Plato's disciples and successors was found adequate to the task—ARISTOTLE.

The Realistic Ontology of Plato is founded (as Aristotle himself remarks) upon *mistrust* and *contempt* of perception of *rem*, as bearing entirely on the flux of particulars, which never stand still so as to become objects of knowledge. All reality, and all cognoscibility, were supposed to reside in the separate world of Cogitable Universals (*extra rem* or *ante rem*), of which, in some confused manner, particulars were supposed to partake. The Universal, apart from its particulars, was clearly and fully knowable, furnishing propositions constantly and infallibly true: the Universal, as manifested in its particulars, was never fully knowable, nor could ever become the subject of propositions, except such as were sometimes true and sometimes false.

Against this separation of the Universal from its Particulars, Aristotle entered a strong protest: as well as against the subsidiary hypothesis of a participation of the latter in the former: which participation, when the two had been declared separate, appeared to him not only untenable and uncertified, but unintelligible. His arguments are interesting, as being among the earliest objections known to us against Realism.

1. Realism is a useless multiplication of existences, serving purpose. Wherever a number of particulars—be they sub-

stances eternal or perishable—be they substances, qualities, or relations—bear the same name, and thus have a Universal in *re* predicable of them in common—in every such case Plato assumes a Universal *extra rem*, or a separate self-existent Form; which explains nothing, and merely doubles the total to be summed up.*

2. Plato's arguments in support of Realism are either inconclusive, or prove too much. Wherever there is cognition (he argues), there must exist an eternal and unchangeable object of cognition, apart from particulars, which are changeable and perishable. No, replies Aristotle: cognition does not require the *Universalia extra rem*: for the *Universalia in re*, the constant predicate of all the particulars, is sufficient as an object of cognition. Moreover, if the argument were admitted, it would prove that there existed separate Forms or Universals of mere negations—for many of the constant predicates are altogether negative. Again, if Self-Existent Universals are to be assumed corresponding to all our cogitations, we must assume Universals of extinct particulars, and even of fictitious particulars, such as Hippocentaurs or Chimeras: for of these, too, we have phantasms or concepts in our minds.†

3. The most subtle disputants on this matter include *Relata*, among the Universals Ideas or Forms. This is absurd, because these do not constitute any Genus by themselves. These disputants have also urged against the Realistic theory that powerful and unsolved objection, entitled *The Third Man*.‡

4. The supporters of these Self-Existent Universals trace them to two *principia*—The One, and the Indeterminate Dyad; which they affirm to be prior in existence even to the Universals themselves. But this can never be granted: for in the first place, the Idea of Number must be logically prior to the Idea of the Dyad; but the Idea of Number is relative, and the Relative can never be prior to the Absolute or Self-Existent.

5. If we grant that wherever there is one constant predicate belonging to many particulars, or wherever there is stable and trustworthy cognition, in all such cases a Self-Existent Universal correlate *extra rem* is to be assumed, we shall find that this applies not merely to Substances or Essences, but also to the other Categories—Quality, Quantity, Relation, &c. But hereby we exclude the possibility of participation in them by Particulars:

* Aristot. *Metaph.* A. 990, a. 34; M. 1079, a. 2. Here we have the first appearance of the argument that William of Ockham, the Nominalist, put in the foreground of his case against Realism—'*Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*,' &c.

† Aristot. *Metaphys.* A. 990, b. 14; Scholia, p. 565, b. 10. Brandit.

‡ Aristot. *Metaph.* A. 990, b. 15, *οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων*. Both the points here noticed appear in the *Parmenides* of Plato.

The objection called *The Third Man*, is expressed by saying, that if there be a Form of man, resembling individual men, you must farther postulate some higher Form, marking the point of resemblance between the two: and so on higher, without end.

since from such participation the Particular derives its Substance or Essence alone, not its accidental predicates. Thus the Self-Existent Universal Dyad is eternal: but a particular pair, which derives its essential property of doubleness from partaking in this Universal Dyad, does not at the same time partake of eternity, unless by accident. Accordingly, there are no Universal Ideas, except of Substances or Essences: the common name, when applied to the world of sense and to that of cogitation, signifies the same thing—substance or essence. It is unmeaning to talk of anything else as signified—any other predicate common to many. Well then, if the Form of the Universals, and the Form of those particulars that participate in the Universals, be the same, we shall have something common to both the one and the other, so that the objection called *The Third Man* will become applicable, and a higher Form must be postulated. But if the Form of the Universals and the Form of the participating particulars, be not identical, then the same name, as signifying both, will be used equivocally; just as if you applied the same denomination *Man* to Kallias and to a piece of wood, without any common property to warrant it.

6. But the greatest difficulty of all is to understand how these Cogitable Universals, not being causes of any change or movement, contribute in any way to the objects of sense, either to the eternal or to the perishable: or how they assist us towards the knowledge thereof, being not in them, and therefore not their substance or essence: or how they stand in any real relation to their participants, being not immanent therein. Particulars certainly do not proceed from these Universals, in any intelligible sense. To say that the Universals are archetypes, and that particulars partake in them, is unmeaning, and mere poetic metaphor. For where is the working force to mould them in conformity with the Universals? Any one thing may *be* like, or may *become* like, to any other particular thing, by accident; or without any regular antecedent cause to produce such assimilation. The same particular substance, moreover, will have not one Universal archetype only, but several. Thus, the same individual man will have not only the Self-animal and the Self-biped, but also the Self-man, as Archetype. Then again, there will be Universal Archetypes, not merely for particular sensible objects, but also for Universals themselves: thus the Genus will be an archetype for its various species: so that the same which is now archetype, will, under other circumstances, be copy.

7. Furthermore, it seems impossible that what is Substance or Essence can be separate from that whereof it is the Substance or Essence. How then can the Universals, if they be the Essences of Sensible things, have any existence apart from these Sensible things? Plato tells us in the *Phædon*, that the Forms or Universals are the causes why particulars both exist at all, and come into such or such modes of existence. But even if we assume Universals as existing, still the Particulars participant therein will not come into being, unless there be some efficient cause to

produce movement; moreover, many other things come into being, though there be no Universals correlating therewith, e.g., a house, or a ring. The same causes that were sufficient to bring these last into being, will be sufficient to bring all particulars into being, without assuming any Universals *extra rem* at all.

8. Again, if the Universals or Forms are Numbers, how can they ever be causes? Even if we suppose Particulars to be Numbers also, how can one set of Numbers be causes to the others? There can be no such causal influence, even if one set be eternal, and the other perishable.*

Out of the many objections raised by Aristotle against Plato, we have selected such as bore principally upon the theory of Realism: that is, upon the theory of *Universalia ante rem* or *extra rem*—self-existent, archetypal, cogitable substances, in which Particulars faintly participated. The objections are not superior in acuteness, and they are decidedly inferior, in clearness of enunciation, to those that Plato himself produces in the *Parmenides*. Moreover, several of them are founded upon Aristotle's point of view, and would have failed to convince Plato. The great merit of Aristotle is, that he went beyond the negative of the *Parmenides*, asserted this new point of view of his own, and formulated it into a counter-theory. He rejected altogether the separate and exclusive reality which Plato had claimed for his Absolutes of the Cogitable world, as well as the derivative and unreal semblance that alone Plato accorded to the sensible world. Without denying the distinction of the two, as conceivable and nameable, he maintained that truth and cognition required that they should be looked at in implication with each other. And he went even a step farther, in antithesis to Plato, by reversing the order of the two. Instead of considering the Cogitable Universals alone as real and complete in themselves, and the Sensible Particulars as degenerate and confused semblances of them, he placed complete reality in the sensible particulars alone,† and treated the cogitable universals as contributory appendages thereto; some being essential,

* *Aristot. Metaph.*, A. 991, b. 13. Several other objections are made by Aristotle against that variety of the Platonic theory whereby the Ideas were commuted into Ideal numbers. These objections do not belong to the controversy of Realism against Nominalism.

† Aristotle takes pains to vindicate against both Plato and the Heracliteans the dignity of the Sensible World. They that depreciate sensible objects as perpetually changing, unstable, and unknowable, make the mistake (he observes) of confining their attention to the sublunary interior of the Cosmos, where, indeed, generation and destruction largely prevail. But this is only a small portion of the entire Cosmos. In the largest portion—the visible, celestial, superlunary regions—there is no generation or destruction at all, nothing but permanence and uniformity. In appreciating the sensible world (Aristotle says), philosophers ought to pardon the shortcomings of the smaller portion on account of the excellencies of the larger; and not condemn both together on account of the smaller—(*Metaphys.*, Γ. 1010, a. 32).

others non-essential, but all of them relative, and none of them independent integers. His philosophy was a complete revolution as compared with Parmenides and Plato; a revolution, too, the more calculated to last, because he embodied it in an elaborate and original theory of Logic, Metaphysics, and Ontology. He was the first philosopher that, besides recognizing the equivocal character of those general terms whereon speculative debate chiefly turns, endeavoured methodically to set out and compare the different meanings of each term, and their relations to each other.

However much the Ontology of Aristotle may fail to satisfy modern exigencies, still, as compared with the Platonic Realism, it was a considerable improvement. Instead of adopting *Ens* as a self-explaining term, contrasted with the Generated and Perishable (the doctrine of Plato in the Republic, Phædon, and Timæus), he discriminates several distinct meanings of *Ens*: a discrimination not always usefully pursued, but tending in the main towards a better theory. The distinction between *Ens* potential, and *Ens* actual, does not belong directly to the question between Realism and Nominalism, yet it is a portion of that philosophical revolution wrought by Aristotle against Plato—displacement of the seat of reality, and transfer of it from the Cogitable Universal to the Sensible Particular. The direct annunciation of this change is contained in his distinction of *Ens* into Fundamental and Concomitant (*συμβεβηκός*), and his still greater refinement on the same principle by enumerating the ten varieties of *Ens* called Categories or Predicaments.* He will not allow *Ens* (nor *Unum*) to be a Genus, partible into Species; he recognizes it only as a word of many analogous meanings, one of them principal and fundamental, the rest derivative and subordinate thereto, each in its own manner. Aristotle thus establishes a graduated scale of Entia, each having its own value and position, and its own mode of connexion with the common centre. That common centre, Aristotle declared to be of necessity some individual object—*Hoc Aliquid*, That Man, This Horse, &c. This was the common Subject, to which all the other Entia belonged as predicates, and without which none of them had any reality. We here fall into the language of Logic, the first theory of which we owe to Aristotle. His ontological classification was adapted to that theory.

As we are here concerned only with the different ways of conceiving the relation between the Particular and the Universal, we are not called on to criticise the well known decuple enumeration of Categories or Predicaments given by Aristotle, both in his Treatise called by that name and elsewhere. For our purpose it

* In enumerating the ten Categories, Aristotle takes his departure from the proposition—*Homo currit*—*Homo cinxit*. He assumes a particular individual as Subject: and he distributes, under ten general heads, all the information that can be asked or given about that Subject—all the predicates that can be affirmed or denied thereof.

is enough to point out that the particular sensible *Hoc Aliquid* is declared to be the ultimate subject, to which all Universals attach, as determinants or accompaniments; and that if this condition be wanting, the unattached Universal cannot rank among complete *Entia*. The Subject or *First Substance*, which can never become a predicate, is established as the indispensable ultimate subject for all predicates; if that disappears, all predicates disappear along with it. The Particular thus becomes the keystone of the arch whereon all Universals rest. Aristotle is indeed careful to point out a gradation in these predicates; some are essential to the subject, and thus approach so near to the First Substance that he calls them *Second Substances*; others, and the most in number, are not thus essential; these last are *Concomitants* or *Accidents*, and some of them fall so much short of complete Entity that he

These ten κατηγορίαι—γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν, sometimes simply τὰ γένη—σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν—*Prædicamenta* in Latin—are as follows:—

1. Οὐσία—*Substantia*—Substance.
2. Ποσόν—*Quantum*—Quantity.
3. Ποιόν—*Quale*—Quality.
4. Πρὸς τι—*Ad aliquid*—Relation.
5. Ποῦ—*Ubi*—Location.
6. Πότε—*Quando*—Period of Time.
7. Κεῖσθαι—*Jacere*—Attitude, Posture.
8. Ἐχεν—*Habere*—Equipment, Appurtenances, Property.
9. Ποιεῖν—*Facere*—Active occupation.
10. Πάσχειν—*Pati*—Passive occupation.

1. The first Category, Substance, is distributed into *Prima* and *Secunda*. *Prima*, which is Substance *par excellence*, can only serve as a Subject in propositions, and can never be a Predicate. It is indispensable as a substratum for predicates; though alone and without some of them, it is a mere unmeaning term. *Substantia Secunda* describes the Species or Genus that includes the First. Respecting an unknown Subject—*Kallias*—you ask, What is *Kallias*? Answer is made by declaring the Second Substance, the Species he belongs to—*Kallias* is a man.

2. *Quantum*—How large is he? To this question answer is made under the same Category—He is six feet high, as thin as *Kinesias*, &c.

3. *Quale*—What manner of man is he? Answer the third Category—He is fair, flat-nosed, muscular, &c.

4. *Relata*—What are the relations that he stands in? He is father, master, director, &c.

5. *Ubi*—Where is he? In his house, in the market-place, &c.

6. *Quando*—Of what point of time do you speak? Yesterday, last year, now, &c.

7. *Jacere*—In what attitude or posture is he? He is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, &c.

8. *Habere*—What has he in the way of clothing, equipment, arms, property? He has boots, sword and shield, an axe, a house, &c.

9. *Facere*—In what is he actively occupied? He is speaking, writing, fencing, cutting wood, &c.

10. *Pati*—In what is he passively occupied? He is being beaten, reproved, rubbed, having his hair out, &c.

describes them as near to Non-Entia.* But all of them, essential or unessential, are alike constituents or appendages of the First Substance or Particular Subject, and have no reality in any other character.

We thus have the counter-theory of Aristotle against the Platonic Realism. Instead of separate Universal substances, containing in themselves full reality, and forfeiting much of that reality when they faded down into the shadowy copies called Particulars, he inverts the Platonic order, announces full reality to be the privilege of the Particular Sensible, and confines the function of the Universal to that of a Predicate, in or along with the Particular. There is no doctrine that he protests against more frequently, than the ascribing of separate reality to the Universal. The tendency to do this, he signalizes as a natural but unfortunate

Such is the list of Categories, or decuplo classification of predicates, drawn up by Aristotle, seemingly from the comparison of many different propositions. He himself says, that there are various predicates that might be referred to more than one of the several heads; and he does not consider this as an objection to the classification. The fourth class—*Relata*—ought to be considered as including them all; the first Category is the common and indispensable Correlate to all the others. Aristotle's conception of relation is too narrow, and tied down by grammatical conjunctions of words. Yet it must be said, that the objections to his classification on this ground, are applicable also to the improved classifications of modern times, which dismiss the six last heads, and retain only the four first—Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation. Of these four, the three first properly rank under the more general head of *Relata*.

Among all the ten heads of the Aristotelian scheme, the two that have been usually considered as most incongruous, and least entitled to their places, are, No. 7 and 8—*Accidents* and *Habits*. They are doubtless peculiarities; and they may fairly be considered as revealing the first projection of the scheme in Aristotle's mind. He began by conceiving an individual man as the Subject, and he tried to classify the various predicates applicable in reply to questions respecting the same. Now, at this point of view, the seventh and eighth Categories will be found important; referring to facts constantly varying, and often desirable to know; moreover not fit to rank under any of the other general heads, except under *Relata*, which comprises them as well as all the rest. But Aristotle afterwards proceeded to stretch the application of the scheme, so as to comprehend philosophy generally, and other subjects of Predication besides the individual man. Here undoubtedly the seventh and eighth heads appear narrow and trivial. Aristotle probably would never have introduced them, had such enlarged purpose been present to his mind from the beginning. Probably, too, he was not invisible to the perfection of the number ten.

* Aristot. Metaph., E. 1026, b. 21. *παύται γὰρ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἴσως τὸ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.*

There cannot be a stronger illustration of the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian point of view, than the fact that Plato applies the same designation to all particular objects of sense—that they are only mid-way between Entia and Non-Entia. (*Republic*, v. 478-479).

illusion, lessening the beneficial efficacy of universal demonstrative reasoning.* And he declares it to be a corollary, from this view of the Particular as indispensable subject, along with the Universal as its predicate:—That the first principles of demonstration in all the separate theoretical sciences, must be obtained by induction from particulars: first by impressions of sense preserved in the memory; then by multiplied remembrances enlarged into one experience; lastly, by many experiences generalized into one principle by the *Noûs*.†

While Aristotle thus declares Induction to be the source from whence demonstration in these separate sciences draws its first principles, we must at the same time acknowledge that his manner of treating science is not always conformable to this declaration, and that he often seems to forget Induction altogether. This is the case not only in his First Philosophy, or Metaphysics, but also in his Physics. He there professes to trace out what he calls beginnings, causes, elements, &c., and he analyzes most of the highest generalities. Yet still these analytical enquiries (whatever be their value) are usually, if not always, kept in subordination to the counter-theory that he had set up against the Platonic Realism. Complete reality resides (he constantly repeats) only in the particular sensible substances and sensible facts or movements that compose the aggregate Cosmos; which is not generated, but eternal, both as to substance and as to movement. If these sensible substances disappear, nothing remains. The beginnings and causes exist only relatively to these particulars. Form, Matter, Privation, are not real Beings, antecedent to the Cosmos, and pre-existent generators of the substances constituting the Cosmos; they are logical fragments or factors, obtained by mental analysis and comparison, assisting to methodize our philosophical point of view or conception of those substances; but incapable of being understood, and having no value of their own apart from the substances. Some such logical analysis (that of Aristotle or some other) is an indispensable condition even of the most strictly inductive philosophy.

There are some portions of the writings of Aristotle (especially the third book *De Animâ* and the twelfth book of the *Metaphysica*) where he appears to lose sight of the limit here indicated; but with few exceptions, we find him constantly remembering, and often repeating, the great truth formulated in his *Categories*—that full or substantive reality resides only in the *Hoc Aliquid*, with its predicates implicated with it—and that even the highest of these predicates (Second Substances) have no reality apart from some one of their particulars. We must recollect that though Aristotle

* Aristot. *Analyt. Poster.*, I., p. 85, a. 31, b. 19.

† See the concluding chapter of the *Analytica Posteriora*.

A similar doctrine is stated by Plato in the *Phædon* (p. 96 B.), as one among the intellectual phases that Sokrates had passed through in the course of his life, without continuing in them.

denies to the predicates a *separate* reality, he recognizes in them an *adjective* reality, as accompaniments and determinants: he contemplates all the ten Categories as distinct varieties of existence.* This is sufficient as a basis for abstraction, whereby we can name them and reason upon them as distinct objects of thought or points of view, although none of them come into reality except as implicated with a sensible particular. Of such reasoning Aristotle's First Philosophy chiefly consists; and he introduces peculiar phrases to describe this distinction of reason, between two different points of view, where the real object spoken of is one and the same. The frequency of the occasions taken to point out that distinction, mark his anxiety to keep the First Philosophy in harmony with the theory of reality announced in his Categories.

The Categories of Aristotle appear to have become more widely known than any other part of his philosophy. They were much discussed † after him; and even when not adopted, were † minds as a scheme to be amended.† Most of the arguments turned upon the nine later Categories; it was debated whether these were properly enumerated and discriminated, and whether the enumeration as a whole was exhaustive.

With these details, however, the question between Realism and its counter-theory (whether Conceptualism or Nominalism) is not materially concerned. The standard against Realism was raised by Aristotle in the First Category, when he proclaimed the *Hoc Aliquid* to be the only complete *Ens*, and the Universal to exist only along with it as a predicate, being nothing in itself apart; and when he enumerated *Quality* as one among the predicates, and nothing beyond. In the Platonic Realism (Phædon, Timæus, Parmenides) what Aristotle called *Quality* was the highest and most incontestable among all Substances—the Good, the Beautiful, the Just, &c.; what Aristotle called *Second Substance* was also Substance in the Platonic Realism, though not so incontestably; but what Aristotle called *First Substance* was in the Platonic Realism no Substance at all, but only one among a multitude of confused and transient shadows. It is in the First and Third Categories that the capital antithesis of Aristotle against the Platonic Realism is contained. As far as that antithesis is concerned, it matters little whether the aggregate of predicates be subdivided under nine general heads (Categories) or under three.

In the century succeeding Aristotle, the Stoic philosophers altered his Categories, and drew up a new list of their own, containing only four distinct heads instead of ten. We have no record or explanation of the Stoic Categories from any of their

* Aristot. *Metaphys.*, A. 1017, a. 24. ὁμοῦ γὰρ λήγεται (τὰ ἐχρήματα τῆς κατηγορίας) τοσαύτως τὸ ἵνα σημαίται.

† This is the just remark of Trendelenburg—*Kategorienlehre*—p. 217.

authors; so that we are compelled to accept the list on secondary authority, from the comments of critics, mostly opponents. But, as far as we can make out, they retained in their First Category the capital feature of Aristotle's First Category; the primacy of the First Substance or *Hoc Aliquid*, and its exclusive privilege of imparting reality to all the other Categories. Indeed, the Stoics seem not only to have retained this characteristic, but to have exaggerated it. They did not recognize so close an approach of the Universal to the Particular, as is implied by giving to it a second place in the same Category, and calling it Second Substance. The First Category of the Stoics (Something or Subject) included only particular substances; all Universals were by them ranked in the other Categories, being regarded as negations of substances, and designated by the term *Non-Somethings—Non-Substances*.*

The Neo-Platonist PLOTINUS, in the third century after the Christian era, agreed with the Stoics (though looking from the opposite point of view) in disapproving Aristotle's arrangement of Second Substance in the same Category with First Substance.† He criticises at some length both the Aristotelian list of Categories, and the Stoic list; but he falls back into the Platonic and even the Parmenidean point of view. His capital distinction is between Cogitables and Sensibles. The Cogitabilia are in his view the most real; (i.e. the Aristotelian Second Substance is more real than the First;) among them the highest, *Unum* or *Bonum*, is the grand fountain and sovereign of all the rest. Plotinus thus departed altogether from the Aristotelian Categories; and revived the Platonic or Parmenidean Realism; yet not without some Aristotelian modifications. But it is remarkable that in this departure his devoted friend and scholar PORPHYRY did not follow him. Porphyry not only composed an Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle, but also vindicated them at great length, in a separate commentary, against the censures of Plotinus: Dexippus, Jamblichus, and Simplicius, followed in the same track.‡ Still, though Porphyry stood forward both as admirer and champion of the Aristotelian Categories, he did not consider that the question raised by the First Category of Aristotle against the Platonic Realism was finally decided. This is sufficiently proved by the three problems cited above out of the Introduction of Porphyry; where he proclaims it to be a deep and difficult inquiry, whether Genera and Species had not a real substantive existence apart from the individuals composing them. Aristotle, both in the Categories and in many other places, had declared his opinion distinctly in the negative, against Plato: but Porphyry had not made up his mind between

* Prantl—*Gesch. der Logik*. Vol. I. sect. vi. p. 420. οὐτινα τὰ κοινὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς λέγεται, &c.

† Plotinus. *Ennead*. VI. 1, 2.

‡ Simplicius. *Schol. in Aristotel. Categ.*—p. 40 a-b. Brandis.

the two, though he insists, in language very Aristotelian, on the distinction between First and Second Substance.*

Through the translations and manuals of Boëthius and others, the Categories of Aristotle were transmitted to the Latin Churchmen, and continued to be read even through the darkest ages, when the Analytica and the Topica were unknown or neglected. The Aristotelian discrimination between First and Second Substance was thus always kept in sight, and Boëthius treated it much in the same manner as Porphyry had done before him.† Alcuin, Rhabanus Maurus, and Eric of Auxerre,‡ in the eighth and ninth centuries, repeated what they found in Boëthius, and upheld the Aristotelian tradition unimpaired. But SCOTUS ERIGENA (d. 880 A.D.) took an entirely opposite view, and reverted to the Platonic traditions, though with a large admixture of Aristotelian ideas. He was a Christian Platonist, blending the transcendentalism of Plato and Plotinus with theological dogmatic influences (derived from the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita and others) and verging somewhat even towards Pantheism. Scotus Erigena revived the doctrine of Cogitable *Universalia extra rem* and *ante rem*. He declared express opposition to the arrangement of the First Aristotelian Category, whereby the individual was put first, in the character of subject; the Universal second, in the character only of predicate; complete reality belonging to the two in conjunction. Scotus maintained that the Cogitable or Incorporeal Universal was the first, the true and complete real from whence the sensible individuals were secondary, incomplete, multiple, derivatives.¶ But though he thus adopts and enforces the Platonic theory of *Universalia ante rem* and *extra rem*, he does not think himself obliged to deny that *Universalia* may be *in re* also.

The contradiction of the Aristotelian traditions, so far as concerns the First Category, thus proclaimed by Scotus Erigena, appears to have provoked considerable opposition among his immediate successors. Nevertheless, he also obtained partisans. Remigius of Auxerre and others not only defended the Platonic Realism, but carried it as far as Plato himself had done; affirming that not only Universal Substances, but also Universal Accidents, had a real separate existence, apart from and anterior to individuals.§ The controversy for and against the Platonic Realism was thus distinctly launched in the schools of the middle ages.

* Prantl—Geschichte der Logik. Vol. I., sect. 11, p. 631, n. 62. Upon this account, Prantl finds Porphyry guilty of 'empiricism in its extreme crudeness'—'jene äusserste Rohheit des Empirismus.'

† Prantl—Geschichte der Logik. Vol. I., sect. 12, p. 685: Vol. II., sect. 1, p. 4-7. Trendelenburg—Kategorienlehre, p. 245.

‡ Ueberweg—Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen und scholastischen Zeit, sect. 21, p. 115, ed. 2nd.

¶ Prantl—Gesch. der Logik. Vol. II., ch. 13, p. 29-31.

§ Ueberweg—Geschichte der Philos., sect. 21, p. 113. Prantl—Gesch. der Logik, Vol. II., ch. 13, 44, 45-47.

It was upheld both as a philosophical revival, and as theologically orthodox, entitled to supersede the traditional counter-theory of Aristotle.

It has been stated above, that it was through Porphyry's *Isagoge* (in the translation of Boëthius) that the schoolmen became acquainted with the ancient dispute as to the nature of Universals. Of Plato's doctrines, except in a translation of part of the *Timæus*, they had for a long time only second-hand knowledge, chiefly through St. Augustin; of Aristotle, they knew down to the middle of the twelfth century, only the *Categories* and the *De Interpretatione* in translation, and not, until the beginning of the thirteenth, others besides the logical works. Down to about this time, logic or dialectic being the whole of philosophy, the question as to Universals almost excluded every other; and, even later, when the field of philosophy became much wider, it never lost the first place as long as scholasticism remained dominant.

Rather more than two centuries after the death of Scotus Erigena (about the end of the eleventh), the question was eagerly disputed, in its bearings upon the theological dogma of the Trinity, between ROSCELLIN, a canon of Compiègne, and ANSELM, Archbishop of Canterbury. Anselm maintained that all individual men were *in specie homo unus*, and formed a real unity; so too, although every person in the Godhead was perfect God, they were but one God. To this realistic doctrine, Roscellin (of whom very little is known), founding upon some of his immediate precursors, opposed a theory different from the Aristotelian. Maintaining with Aristotle, and even more strongly than Aristotle, that the individual particulars were the only real entities, he declared that, in genera and species, the individuals were held together only subjectively by means of a general name, bestowed upon them for their points of similarity. The Universals were neither *ante rem* (with Plato), nor *in re* (with Aristotle), but *post rem*; and in themselves were nothing at all beyond *voces* or *nomina*. Roscellin appears to have carried out the theory consistently, and not merely with reference to the special theological question. So far as that was concerned, he was not afraid to pronounce that the three persons were three individual Gods; and thereupon, his theology being condemned by an ecclesiastical council, the theory became suspect, and so remained until the late period of scholasticism. Its supporters were called by the name *vocales* or *nominales*, Nominalists; and it was at the same period of excited feeling that the name *realis*, Realist, was first used to designate the upholders of the ancient doctrine, as held either in the Platonic or the Aristotelian form.

To what lengths the discussion of the question was carried in the century that elapsed from the time of Anselm and Roscellin till the beginning of the second period of scholasticism, may be seen in a list drawn up by Prantl (*Gesch. d. Log.* II., pp. 118-21) of not less than thirteen distinct opinions, or shades of opinion, held by different schoolmen. Of these, the most distinguished

was ABAELARD (1079-1142), who took up a position between the extremes of Realism and Nominalism. On the one hand, he denied the independent existence of Universals, and inclined rather to the Aristotelian view of their immanence in *rebus*; on the other, he inveighed against the nominalism of Roscellin, and pronounced that the Universals were not mere *voces*, but *sermones* or predications. Yet it is a mistake to describe him as a Conceptualist, the name conferred upon such as, agreeing with the Nominalists in regard to the purely subjective character (*post rem*) of the Universals, differed from these in ascribing to the mind the power of fashioning a Concept or notion correspondent to the general name.

In the 13th century, when Scholasticism reached its highest development, the supremacy of Aristotle was firmly established. We find accordingly in THOMAS AQUINAS (1226-74) a supporter of the Aristotelian doctrine of the Universals as immanent in *re*; but, at the same time, he declared that the intellect, by abstracting the essential attributes (quiddities) of things from their accidental attributes, forms Universals *post rem*; and, although he utterly rejected the Platonic assumption of ideas as real—the only truly real—*entia*, he yet maintained that the ideas or thoughts of things in the Divine mind, antecedent to creation, were *Universalia ante rem*.

His great rival in the next generation, DUNS SCOTUS (d. 1300), admitting the Universals in the same three-fold sense, determined the various related questions in a way peculiar to himself. Especially in regard to the question of the relation of the universal to the singular or individual, was he at war with his predecessors. Thomas had declared that in the individual, composed of form and matter (*materia signata*), the form was the Universal, or element common to all the individuals; what marked off one individual from another—the so-called principle of individuation—was the matter, e.g. in Sokrates, *hæc caro, hæc ossa*. But as matter bore the character of defect or imperfection, Scotus complained that this was to represent the individual as made imperfect in being individualized, whereas it was the *ultima realitas*, the most truly perfect form of Existence. The principle of individuation must be something positive, and not, like matter, negative. The quidditas, or universal, must be supplemented by a *hæcceitas* to make it singular or individual; Sokrates was made individual by the addition of *Sokratitas* to his specific and generic characteristics as man and animal.

The next name is of the greatest importance. WILLIAM of OCKHAM (d. 1347), an Englishman and pupil of Duns Scotus, revived the nominalistic doctrine that had been so long discredited amongst the leading schoolmen and frowned upon by the Church. From him, if not earlier, is to be dated the period of the downfall of Scholasticism; severance beginning to be made of reason from faith, and philosophy being no longer prosecuted in the sole interest of theological dogma.

Universals (genera, species, and the like) were, he held, nothing real *extra animam*, but were only *in mente*. Calling everything that existed in or out of the mind a singular or individual, he asked how a term (*terminus*) like *homo* could be predicated of a number of individuals. The answers of every form of Realism, that of Duns Scotus included, led to absurdity; the Realists all began with the universal, and sought to explain from it the individual, whereas they ought to begin with the singular, which alone really exists, and ascend to the explanation of the universal. The true doctrine was that the universals were not at all in things, but in the mind; and in the proposition *homo est risibilis*, the term *homo* stood not for any universal man, but for the real individual man, who alone could laugh. As to the mode of existence of the universals in the mind, he contented himself with enumerating various opinions that were or might be held, without deciding for one in particular. But he was ever ready with the warning: *Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*. Though he was not a nominalist pure and simple,—in refusing to regard the universals as mere words or names and nothing more—it would be committing him to more than he has committed himself to, if we should call him, with some, a Conceptualist.

From the time of William of Ockham, the nominalistic doctrine, in some shape or other, remained triumphant in the schools. Formerly suspected and condemned, and revived by a determined opponent of the papal see, it yet became so firmly established as a philosophical tenet, that it was accepted by the most orthodox theologians; and, in the last days of scholasticism, it was actually Realism that became the suspicious doctrine. In fact, with philosophy growing more and more independent, and entering upon discussions that had no reference to religious dogma; it became possible for the later schoolmen to be Nominalists in regard to the question of Universals, while they were at the same time devout believers in the region of faith. It was when the question thus became an open one, that Realism, as a theory of Universals, fell into discredit: as a tendency of the human mind, Realism remained active as before, and upon the extension of the field of philosophy at the beginning of the modern period, it occupied new strongholds, from which it has not yet been dislodged.

Since the age of Descartes, Nominalism or Conceptualism has been professed by the great majority of thinkers; but the question has been allowed to sink into the second rank. In its stead, the discussion of the Origin of Knowledge,—in or before experience,—has risen into importance. When it was regarded as philosophically settled that Universals had no subsistence apart from the mind, it was a natural transition to pass to the consideration of their origin. But here, as in the question of perception, there has, during the whole modern period, been too little disposition to turn to account the results of the long mediæval struggle. In the question of Innate Ideas the old question is directly involved.

HOBBS is one of the few in later times to whom the question

had lost none of its significance, and he is besides remarkable as perhaps the most outspoken representative of extreme Nominalism. His view cannot be better or more shortly given than in his own words: 'Of names, some are *common* to many things, as a *man*, a *tree*; others *proper* to one thing, as he *that writ the Iliad*, *Homer*, *this man*, *that man*. And a common name, being the name of many things severally taken, but not collectively of all together (as *man* is not the name of all mankind, but of every one, as of Peter, John, and the rest severally), is therefore called an *universal name*; and therefore this word *universal* is never the name of anything existent in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when a *living creature*, a *stone*, a *spirit*, or any other thing, is said to be *universal*, it is not to be understood that any *man*, *stone*, &c., ever was or can be universal, but only that these words, *living creature*, *stone*, &c., are *universal names*, that is, names common to many things; and the conceptions answering to them in our mind, are the images and phantasms of several living creatures or other things. And, therefore, for the understanding of the extent of an universal name, we need no other faculty but *imagination*, by which we remember that such names sometimes answer to one thing, sometimes another, into our mind.' (10.)

LOCKE's view of Abstraction is contained in the Third Book of his Essay. In Chap. III., 'Of General Terms,' he asks (§ 6), 'how general words came to be made, seeing that all existing things are particular.' He replies, 'Words become general by being made the signs of general *ideas*; and Ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of Time and Place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence.' He goes on to say:—Children know nothing but particulars; at first they know, for example, a small number of persons; as their experience grows they become acquainted with a greater number, and discern their agreements; they then frame an idea to comprise these points of agreement, which is to them the meaning of the general term '*man*;' they leave out of the Idea what is peculiar to Peter, James, and Mary, and retain what is common. The same process is repeated for still higher generalities, as '*animal*.' A general is nothing but the power of representing so many particulars. Essences and Species are only other names for these abstract ideas. The sorting of things under names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion from the similitude it observes among them, to make abstract general ideas; and to set them up in the mind as Patterns or Forms, to which they are found to agree. That the generalities are mere ideas, or mental products, and not real existences, is shown by the different composition of complex ideas in different minds; the idea of Covetousness in one man is not what it is in another.

Locke is thus substantially a Nominalist, but does not go deep into the psychological nature of general ideas. He remarks justly

that the general idea proceeds upon similitude, designating the agreements of things, and leaving out the differences; but he does not affirm that the mental notion is still a notion of one or more particulars. That he does not see the bearings of a thorough-going Nominalism, is evident from his making little use of it, in arguing against Innate Ideas.

BERKELEY'S Nominalism is notorious and pronounced, and was in reality the wedge that split up, in his mind, the received theory of Perception. In the well-known passage in the Introduction to his 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' he quotes the conceptualist doctrine,—as implying that the mind can form an idea of colour in the abstract by sinking every individual colour, and of motion in the abstract without conceiving a body moved, or the figure, direction, and velocity of the motion,—and comments upon the doctrine in these terms:—'Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell. For myself, I find, indeed, I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper part of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise, the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny; a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid, which two last are the proper acceptations of abstractions.'

Berkeley recognizes in particular objects a power of *representing* a class; as when the geometer demonstrates a proposition upon a particular triangle, and infers it for all triangles. In this way, he says, the particular *may become general*, by standing for a whole class. The expression is incantious on his part; a *general particular* is an anomaly and a contradiction.

HUME follows Berkeley's Nominalism with avidity and admiration, and inadvertently ascribes to Berkeley the authorship of the doctrine. 'A very material question,' he says, 'has been started concerning abstract or general ideas, whether they be general or

particular in the mind's conception of them. A great philosopher (Dr. Berkeley) has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy.'

He states his view thus:—'All general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals which are similar to them [488]. A particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general term, that is, to a term which, from a customary conjunction, has a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily recalls them in the imagination. Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, though the application of it in our reasoning be the same as if it was universal.'

REID (INTELLECTUAL POWERS—Essay on Abstraction) contends for the mind's power of forming general conceptions. He starts from the faculties of discerning difference and agreement; by these we are enabled to form classes, the names of which are *general names*. Such general names may be presumed to be the signs of general conceptions. We are able to form distinct conceptions of the separate attributes of anything, as length, breadth, figure, and so on. Indeed, our knowledge of a thing consists of the knowledge of those attributes; we know nothing of the essence of an individual apart from these. We can conceive a triangle, not merely as an individual, with its attributes of size, place, and time, but to the exclusion of these individualizing attributes. Attributes, inseparable in nature, may yet be disjoined in our conception. The general names of attributes are applicable to many individuals in the same sense, which cannot be if there are no general conceptions.

Reid refers to the history of the question of Realism and Nominalism. He dwells chiefly on the views of Berkeley and of Hume, declaring them to be no other than the opinions of the Nominalists and of Hobbes. On the whole, he confesses his ignorance of the 'manner how we conceive universals,' admitting, at the same time, that it cannot be by images of them, for 'there can be no image of a universal. In fact, Reid's position coincides very nearly with Conceptualism.

DUGALD STEWART avows himself on the side of Nominalism, and deduces from the doctrine what he considers important consequences. There are two ways of seizing hold of general truths; either by fixing the attention on one individual in such a manner,

that our reasoning may involve no circumstances but what are common to the whole genus,—or, (laying aside entirely the consideration of things), by means of general terms. In either case, our conclusions must be general. The first method is exemplified in the diagrams of Geometry; the second in the symbols of Algebra.

The Abstract Idea is nothing more than the quality or qualities wherein different individuals resemble one another. Abstraction is the power of attending to the resembling attributes, and neglecting the points of difference.

Although Stewart is thus an avowed nominalist, he yet failed to see the incompatibility between his doctrine and the theory of innate ideas, or the origin he assigns to such notions as 'causation, time, number, truth, certainty, probability, extension;' which relate, he says, to things bearing no resemblance either to any of the sensible qualities of matter, or to any continuous mental operation. In short, we can have no idea of cause, apart altogether from causation in the concrete, as given us by perception through sense.

THOMAS BROWN expresses the generalizing process thus: There is, in the first place, the perception of two or more objects; in the second place, the feeling or notion [better *consciousness*] of their resemblance; and, lastly, the expression of this common relative feeling by a name, afterwards used as a general name for all those objects, the perception of which is followed by the same common feeling of resemblance. Brown thus approaches to the main position of Nominalism, the affirmation of Resemblance among particular objects; but he lays himself open to criticism by his mode of expressing this fact of resemblance; he calls it 'a feeling,' 'a general notion,' 'a common relative feeling,' 'a common feeling of relation;' all which are awkward and confused modes of stating that we perceive or discern the likeness of the particulars in question. The term 'feeling' is inappropriate as giving an emotional character to an intellectual fact.

In criticising Berkeley's handling of geometrical demonstration, Brown maintains that we have still a general notion, or 'relative feeling,' of the circumstances of agreement of particular things; without which general notion of a line, or a triangle, he thinks the demonstrations impossible and absurd. He says it is the very nature of a general notion not to be particular: for who can paint or particularize a mere relation? This is, on Brown's part, the vague mode of affirming that a general word designates certain particulars, together with the fact of their resemblance. As to the difficulty connected with mathematical demonstration, the remark may be made, that if the use of the general word 'triangle' *implies* the resemblance of a given figure to a great number of other figures, then so far as that resemblance goes, what is proved of one is proved of all; and no fictitious triangle in the abstract is required. The affirmation of resemblance carries with it the 'parity of reasoning' assigned as the mode of geometrical proof.

HAMILTON regards the whole controversy of Nominalism and Conceptualism as 'founded on the ambiguity of the terms employed. The opposite parties are substantially at one. Had our British philosophers been aware of the Leibnitzian distinction of Intuitive and Symbolical Knowledge; and had we, like the Germans, different terms, like *Begriff* and *Anschauung*, to denote different kinds of thought, there would have been as little difference of opinion in regard to the nature of general notions in this country as in the Empire. With us, Idea, Notion, Conception, &c., are confounded, or applied by different philosophers in different senses. I must put the reader on his guard against Dr. Thomas Brown's speculations on this subject. His own doctrine of universals, in so far as it is peculiar, is self-contradictory; and nothing can be more erroneous than his statement of the doctrine held by others, especially by the Nominalists.'

In some parts of his writings, Hamilton expresses the Nominalistic view with great exactness; while in others, and in his Logical system generally, he admits a form of Conceptualism. (See passages quoted in Mill's *Hamilton*, chap. XVII.) He considers that there are thoughts such as 'cannot be represented in the imagination, as *the thought suggested by a general term*' (Edition of Reid, p. 360). He also holds that we have *a priori* abstract ideas of Space and Time, a view difficult to reconcile with Nominalism.

JAMES MILL introduced some novelty into the mode of describing the idea corresponding to a general term. Suppose, he says, the word *foot* has been associated in the mind of a child with one foot only, it will in that case call up the idea of that one, and not of the other. Suppose next, that the same name '*foet*' begins to be applied to the child's other foot. The sound is now associated not constantly with one thing, but sometimes with one thing, and sometimes with another. The consequence is that it calls up, *sometimes the one and sometimes the other*. Again, the word '*man*' is first applied to an individual; at first, therefore, it calls to mind that individual; it is then applied to another and another, and thus acquires the power of calling up any one or more of a large number indifferently. The result is that the word becomes associated with the idea of a *crowd*, a complex and indistinct idea. Thus the word '*man*' is not a word having a very simple idea, as was the opinion of the Realists; nor a word having no idea at all, as was the view of the Nominalists; but a word calling up an indefinite number of ideas, by the power of association, and forming them into one very complex, and indistinct, but not therefore unintelligible, idea.

In this mode of stating the nature of the general idea, the author has brought into view one part of the operation, not previously laid stress upon; the fact that the general name brings to mind the particulars as a *host*, which is an important part of the case. In making general affirmations, we must be perpetually running over the particulars, to see that our generality conflicts

with none of them; this constitutes the arduousness of general or abstract reasoning. Still, exception has been taken to the phrase 'a complex and indistinct idea' applied to the association with a general name; and a more guarded expression is desirable. The author's meaning is, first, that the name recalls not one individual, but many, and secondly, that a certain indistinctness belongs to our conception of the crowd. Both statements, with some explanation, are true. We do recall a number of individuals, in a rapid series; we can hardly be said to have them all before us at a glance, that would happen only if we had actually seen an assembled host; we pass from one to the others by rapid transitions. In the second place, as a consequence of the rapidity of the transitions, and of our examining the individuals only with reference to one point, we may be said to have an indistinct, or partial image of each; it being the tendency of the mind, in rapid thinking, to economize attention, by neglecting all the aspects of an object not relevant at the time. In speaking of what is common to birds, say 'feathers,' we glance hurriedly at a number of individuals, but we do not unfold to view the full individuality of each. The more complex a thing is, the greater the number of separate glances requisite to comprehend it, both at first and in the memory; we may therefore stop short at a partial view, but this is not to be confounded with an abstract idea in the meaning of Conceptualism.

SAMUEL BAILEY (Letters on the Human Mind, Vols. I., II.) has examined with great care the doctrine of general terms, being of opinion 'that a complete mastery of this part of mental philosophy furnishes a key for most of the difficulties besetting the subject, and throws a powerful light on all speculation whatsoever.' He makes full use of the nominalistic theory in refuting Innate Ideas.

According to him, there is no essential difference between what passes in the mind when *proper* names are heard, and when *general* names are heard. The peculiar feature, in the case of general names, may be stated to be, that there is possibly and frequently, but not necessarily, a greater range in the mental representations called up by any single appellation; still there is nothing but an individual image, or a group or a succession of individual images or representations passing through the mind. It must be obvious, on reflection, that this is, in truth, the only possible effect of general terms. We rank individual objects under a common name, on account of their resemblance to each other in one or more respects; and when we use such an appellation, the utmost that the nature of the case allows us to do, whether the name has been imposed by ourselves or others, is to recall to our own minds, or to those of our hearers, the whole of the single objects thus classed together. This is an extreme case, which, no doubt, may happen; but the result is usually far short of such a complete ideal muster, and we recall only a very inconsiderable part, or even sometimes only one, of the objects covered by the general term. It also appears that, if the ideas thus raised up

are sometimes vague and indefinite, the same qualities frequently characterize the ideas raised up by proper names, and attend even the perception of external objects.

B.—*The Origin of Knowledge—Experience and Intuition,*
p. 188.

The dialogues of PLATO present a number of different views of the nature and origin of knowledge. One of the most characteristic, the doctrine of *Reminiscence*, as set forth in the *Phædrus*, *Phædon*, and *Menon*, supposes the soul in a pre-existent state to have lived in the contemplation of the Eternal Ideas, and, when joined to a body, to have brought away slumbering recollections of them, revivable by the impressions of sense; all cognition, but especially the true, consists in such awakening of the mind's ancient knowledge lying dormant. This is a highly poetical presentation of the later doctrine of *Innate Ideas*. In the *Republic*, with the same fundamental conception of the origin of knowledge, he distinguishes its different grades: *Cognition* of Intelligibles is opposed to *Opinion* of Sensibles, and again each of them includes a higher and lower form—*Cognition* is *Nous* or *Dianoia* as it is direct or indirect, and *Opinion* may be *Belief* or mere *Conjecture*. The most explicit discussion of the question, What is knowledge? is in the *Theætetus*. There, while at the end he does not pretend to have given any settlement, in the course of the argument against the reduction of knowledge to sense-perception, he advances a peculiar theory. When the mind perceives sensible qualities like hardness, heat, sweetness, &c., it perceives them not *with*, but *through*, the senses. This at birth and equally in all: but some few, by going over and comparing simple impressions of sense, come to be able to apprehend, besides existence (essence and substance), sameness, difference, likeness, unlikeness, good, and evil, &c., where the apprehension is by the mind, of itself alone, and without any aid of bodily organs. This is a remarkable view, because, as has been observed, he supposes these cognitions to be developed only out of the review and comparison of facts of sense, and only by a select few—two points wherein he is at variance with the common supporters of native mental intuitions (See Grote's *Plato* II., p. 370, *seq.*).

We shall next advert to ARISTOTLE's opinions in regard to the existence of a class of primary or self-evident truths, claiming a right to be believed on the authority of Common Sense, without either warrant or limit from experience.

Sir William Hamilton (in his *Dissertations on Reid*, Appendix, p. 771-773) enrolls Aristotle with confidence among the philosophers that have vindicated the authority of Common Sense, as accrediting certain universal truths, independent of experience, and imposing a necessity of belief, such as experience never can impose. Yet, of all the Aristotelian passages cited by Sir W.

Hamilton to establish this position, only one (that from the Nicomachean Ethics, X., 2, p. 772, marked *f.* by Hamilton) has any real force; and that is countervailed by numerous others that he leaves unnoticed, as well as by the marked general tenor of Aristotle's writings.

In regard to Aristotle, there are two points to be examined—

1. What position does he take up in respect to the authority of Common Sense?
2. What doctrine does he lay down about the first *principia* or beginnings of scientific reasoning—the *ἀρχαὶ συλλογιστικαὶ*?

I.—That Aristotle did not regard Cause, Substance, Time, &c., as Intuitions, is shown by the subtle and elaborate reasonings that he employs to explain them, and by the censure that he bestows on the erroneous explanations and shortcomings of others. Indeed, in regard to Causality, when we read the great and perplexing diversity of meaning which Aristotle (and Plato before him in the *Phædon*) recognizes as belonging to this term, we cannot but be surprised to find modern philosophers treating it as enunciating a simple and intuitive idea. But as to Common Sense—taking the term as above explained, and as it is usually understood by those that have no particular theory to support—Aristotle takes up a position at once distinct and instructive; a position (to use the phraseology of Kant) not dogmatical, but critical. He constantly notices and reports the affirmations of Common Sense; he speaks of it with respect, and assigns to it a qualified value, partly as helping us to survey the subject on all sides, partly as a happy confirmation, where it coincides with what has been proved otherwise; but he does not appeal to it as authority in itself trustworthy or imperative.

Common Sense belongs to the region of opinion. Now, the distinction between matters of Opinion on the one hand, and matters of Science or Cognition on the other, is a marked and characteristic feature of Aristotle's philosophy. He sets, in pointed antithesis, DEMONSTRATION, or the method of Science—which divides itself into special subjects, each having some special *principia* of its own, then proceeds by legitimate steps of deductive reasoning from such *principia*, and arrives at conclusions sometimes universally true, always true for the most part—against RHETORIC and DIALECTIC, which deal with and discuss opinions upon all subjects, comparing opposite arguments, and landing in results more or less probable. Contrasting these two as separate lines of intellectual procedure, Aristotle lays down a theory of both. He recognizes the last as being to a great degree the common and spontaneous growth of society; while the first is from the beginning special, not merely as to subject, but as to persons—implying teacher and learner.

Rhetoric and Dialectic are treated by Aristotle as analogous processes. Of the matter of opinion and belief, with which both of them deal, he distinguishes three varieties:—1. Opinions or

beliefs entertained by all. 2. By the majority. 3. By a minority of superior men, or by one man in respect to a science wherein he has acquired renown. It is these opinions or beliefs that the rhetorician or the dialectician attack and defend; bringing out all the arguments available for or against each.

The Aristotelian treatise on Rhetoric opens with the following words:—'Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic; for both of them deal with such matters as do not fall within any special science, but belong in a certain way to the common knowledge of all. Hence every individual has his share of both, greater or less; for every one can, up to a certain point, both examine others and stand examination from others; every one tries to defend himself and to accuse others.* To the same purpose Aristotle speaks about Dialectics, in the beginning of the *Topica*:—'The Dialectic Syllogism (he says) takes its premises from matters of opinion: that is, from matters that seem good to (or are believed by) all, or the majority, or the wise; either all the wise, or most of them, or the most celebrated.'—Aristotle distinguishes these matters of common opinion or belief, from three distinct other matters. 1. From matters that are not really such, but only in appearance; in which the smallest attention suffices to detect the false pretence of probability, while no one except a contentious Sophist ever thinks of advancing them. On the contrary, the real matters of common belief are never thus palpably false, but have always something deeper than a superficial show. 2. From the first truths or *principia*, upon which scientific demonstration proceeds. 3. From the paralogisms, or fallacious assumptions (*ψευδοπαρήμυρα*), liable to occur in each particular science.

Now, what Aristotle here designates and defines as 'matters of common opinion and belief' (*τὰ ἐνδοξα*), includes all that is usually meant, and properly meant, by Common Sense; 'what is believed by all men or by most men.' But Aristotle does not claim any warrant or authority for the truth of these beliefs, on the ground of their being deliverances of Common Sense, and accepted (by all or by the majority) always as indisputable, often as self-evident. On the contrary, he ranks them as mere probabilities, some in a greater, some in a less degree; as matters whereon something may be said both *pro* and *con*, and whereon the full force of argument on both sides ought to be brought out, notwithstanding the supposed self-evidence in the minds of unscientific believers. Though, however, he encourages this dialectic discussion on both sides, as useful and instructive, he never affirms that it can, by itself, lead to certain scientific conclusions, or to anything more than strong probability on a balance of the countervailing considerations. The language that he uses in speaking of these deliverances of common sense is measured and just. After distinguishing the real common opinion from the fallacious simu-

* Aristot. Rhetor. I. 1. Compare Sophist. Elench., p. 172, a. 30.

lations of common opinion set up (according to him) by some pretenders, he declares, that in all cases of common opinion there is always something more than a mere superficial appearance of truth. In other words, wherever any opinion is really held by a large public, it always deserves the scrutiny of the philosopher, to ascertain how far it is erroneous, and, if it be erroneous, by what appearances of reason it has been enabled so far to prevail.

Again, at the beginning of the *Topica* (in which books he gives both a theory and precepts of dialectical debate), Aristotle specifies four different ends to be served by that treatise. It will be useful (he says)—

1. For our own practice in the work of debate. If we acquire a method and system, we shall find it easier to conduct a debate on any new subject, whenever such debate may arise.

2. For our daily intercourse with the ordinary public. When we have made for ourselves a full collection of the opinions held by the Many, we shall carry on our conversation with them out of their own doctrines, and not out of doctrines foreign to their minds; we shall thus be able to bring them round on any matter where we think them in error.

3. For the sciences belonging to philosophy. By discussing the difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily discriminate truth and falsehood in each separate scientific question.

4. For the first and highest among the *principia* of each particular science. These, since they are the first and highest of all, cannot be discussed out of *principia* special and peculiar to any separate science; but must be discussed through the opinions commonly received on the subject-matter of each. This is the main province of Dialectic: which, being essentially testing and critical, is connected by some threads with the *principia* of all the various scientific researches.

We see thus that Aristotle's language about Common Opinion or Common Sense is very guarded: that, instead of citing it as an authority, he carefully discriminates it from Science, and places it decidedly on a level lower than science, in respect of evidence: yet that he recognizes it as essential to be studied by the scientific man, with full confrontation of all the reasonings both for and against every opinion; not merely because such study will enable the scientific man to study and converse intelligibly and efficaciously with the vulgar; but also because it will sharpen his discernment for the truths of his own science; and because it furnishes the only materials for testing and limiting the first *principia* of that science.

II.—We will next advert to the judgment of Aristotle respecting these *principia* of science; how he supposes them to be acquired and verified. He discriminates various special sciences (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, &c.), each of which has its own appropriate matter, and special *principia* from which it takes its departure. But there are also certain *principia* common to them all: and these he considers to fall under the cognizance of

one grand comprehensive science, which includes all the rest: First Philosophy or Ontology—the science of *Ens* in its most general sense, *quatenus Ens*; while each of the separate Sciences confines itself to one exclusive department of *Ens*. The geometer does not debate nor prove the first *principia* of his own science: neither those that it has in common with other sciences, nor those peculiar to itself. He takes these for granted, and demonstrates the consequences that logically follow from them. It belongs to the First Philosopher to discuss the *principia* of all. Accordingly, the province of the First Philosopher is all-comprehensive, co-extensive with all the sciences. So also is the province of the Dialectician alike all-comprehensive. Thus far the two agree; but they differ as to method and purpose. The Dialectician seeks to enforce, confront, and value all the different reasons *pro* and *con*, consistent and inconsistent: the First Philosopher performs this too, or supposes it to be performed by others—but proceeds farther: namely, to determine certain axioms that may be trusted as sure grounds (along with certain other *principia*) for demonstrative conclusions in science.

Aristotle describes in his *Analytica* the process of demonstration, and the conditions required to render it valid. But what is the point of departure for this process? Aristotle declares that there cannot be a regress without end, demonstrating one conclusion from certain premises, then demonstrating those premises from others, and so on. You must arrive ultimately at some premises that are themselves undemonstrable, but that may be trusted as ground from whence to start in demonstrating conclusions. All demonstration is carried on through a middle term, which links together the two terms of the conclusion, though itself does not appear in the conclusion. Those undemonstrable propositions, from which demonstration begins, must be known without a middle term—that is, *immediately* known; they must be known in themselves—that is, not through any other propositions; they must be better known than the conclusions derived from them; they must be propositions first and most knowable. But these two last epithets (Aristotle often repeats) have two meanings: First and most knowable *by nature* or *absolutely*, are the most universal propositions: first and most knowable *to us*, are those propositions declaring the particular facts of sense. These two meanings designate truths correlative to each other, but at opposite ends of the intellectual line of march.

Of these undemonstrable *principia*, indispensable as the grounds of all demonstration, some are peculiar to each separate science, others are common to several or to all sciences. These common principles were called Axioms, in the mathematics, even in the time of Aristotle. Sometimes indeed he designates them as Axioms, without any special reference to mathematics: though he also uses the same name to denote other propositions, not of the like fundamental character. Now, how do we come to know these undemonstrable Axioms and other immediate propositions or

principia, since we do not know them by demonstration? This is the second question to be answered, in appreciating Aristotle's views about the Philosophy of Common Sense.

He is very explicit in his way of answering this question. He pronounces it absurd to suppose that these immediate *principia* are innate or congenital,—in other words, that we possess them from the beginning, and yet that we remain for a long time without any consciousness of possessing them, seeing that they are the most accurate of all our *cognita*. What we possess at the beginning (Aristotle says) is only a mental power of inferior accuracy and dignity. We, as well as all other animals, begin with a congenital discriminative power called sensible perception. With many animals, the data of perception are transient, and soon disappear altogether, so that the cognition of such animals consists in nothing but successive acts of sensible perception. With us, on the contrary, as with some other animals, the data of perception are preserved by memory; accordingly our cognitions include both perceptions and remembrances. Furthermore, we are distinguished even from the better animals by this difference—that with us, but not with them, a rational order of thought grows out of such data of perception, when multiplied and long preserved. And thus, out of perception grows memory: out of memory of the same matter often repeated, grows experience—since many remembrances of the same thing constitute one numerical experience. Out of such experience, a farther consequence arises—That what is one and the same, in all the particulars, (the Universal or the one alongside of the many) becomes fixed or rests steadily within the mind. Herein lies the *principium* of Art, in reference to Agenda, or Facienda—of Science, in reference to Entia.

Thus these cognitive *principia* are not original and determinate possessions of the mind—nor do they spring from any other mental possessions of a higher cognitive order, but simply from data of sensible perception: which data are like runaway soldiers in a panic—first one stops his flight and halts, then a second follows the example, afterwards a third and fourth, until at length an orderly array is obtained. Our minds are so constituted as to render this possible. If a single individual impression is thus detained, it will presently acquire the character of a Universal in the mind: for though we perceive the particular, our perception is of the universal (i.e., when we perceive Kallias, our perception is of man generally, not of the man Kallias). Again, the fixture of these lowest Universals in the mind will bring in those of the next highest order; until at length the Summa Genera and the absolute Universals acquire a steady establishment therein. Thus, from this or that particular animal, we shall rise as high as Animal Universally: and so on from Animal upwards.

We thus see clearly (Aristotle says)—That only by Induction can we come to know the first *principia* of demonstration: for it is by this process that sensible perception engraves the Universal

on our minds.* We begin by the *notiora nobis* (Particulars), and ascend to the *notiora naturā* or *simpliciter* (Universals). Some among our mental habits that are conversant with truth, are also capable of falsehood (such as Opinion and Reasoning): others are not so capable, but embrace uniformly truth, and nothing but truth—such are Science and Intellect (*Noûs*). Intellect is the only source more accurate than Science. Now, the *principia* of Demonstration are more accurate than the Demonstrations themselves—yet they cannot (as we have already observed) be the objects of Science. They must therefore be the object of what is more accurate than Science: namely, of Intellect. Intellect and the objects of Intellect will thus be the *principia* of Science and of the objects of Science. But these principles are not intuitive data or revelations. They are acquisitions gradually made: and there is a regular road whereby we travel up to them, quite distinct from the road whereby we travel down from them to scientific conclusions.

The chapter just indicated in the *Analytica Posteriora*, attesting the growth of those universals that form the *principia* of demonstration out of the particulars of sense, may be illustrated by a similar statement in the first book of the *Metaphysica*. Here, after stating that sensible perception is common to all animals, he distinguishes the lowest among animals, who have this alone; then, a class next above them, who have it along with phantasy and memory, and some of whom are intelligent (like bees), yet still cannot learn, from being destitute of hearing; farther, another class, one stage higher, who hear, and therefore can be taught something, yet arrive only at a scanty sum of experience; lastly, still higher, the class men, who possess a large stock of phantasy, memory, and experience, fructifying into science and art.† Experience (Aristotle says) is of particular facts; art and science

* Aristot. Anal. Post. II., p. 100, b. 2, ὁῦλον δὲ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ; also Anal. Post. I., p. 81, b. 3, c. 18,—upon which passage, Waitz, in his note, explains as follows (p. 347): ‘Sententia nostri loci hæc est. Universales propositiones omnes inductione comparantur, quum etiam in iis, quæ a sensibus maxime aliena videntur, et quæ (ut mathematica, τὰ ἐξ ἀραιρίσσεως) cogitatione separantur a materia quacum conjuncta sunt, inductione probentur ea quæ de genere (e.g. de linea, de corpore mathematico) ad quod demonstratio pertineat prædicentur καθ’ αὐτὰ et cum ejus natura conjuncta sint. Inductio autem iis nititur quæ sensibus percipiuntur: nam res singulares sentiuntur, scientia vero rerum singularium non datur sine inductione, non datur inductio sine sensu.’

† Aristot. Metaphys. A. I. 980, a. 25, b. 27, φρόνιμα μὲν ἀνὲν τοῦ μαθηάνειν, ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν, οἷον μέλιττα, καὶ εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζώων ἐστίν.

We remark here the line that he draws between the intelligence of bees, depending altogether upon sense, memory, and experience—and the higher intelligence which is superadded by the use of language; when it becomes possible to teach and learn, and when general conceptions can be brought into view through appropriate names.

are of universals. Art is attained, when out of many conceptions of experience there arises one universal persuasion respecting phenomena similar to each other. We may know that Kallias, sick of a certain disease—that Sokrates, likewise sick of it—that A, B, C, and other individuals besides,—have been cured by a given remedy; but this persuasion respecting ever so many individual cases, is mere matter of experience. When, however, we proceed to generalize these cases, and then affirm that the remedy cures all persons suffering under the same disease, circumscribed by specific marks—fever or biliousness—this is art or science. One man may know the particular cases empirically, without having generalized them into a doctrine; another may have learnt the general doctrine, with little or no knowledge of the particular cases. Of these two, the last is the wiser and more philosophical man; but the first may be the more effective and successful as a practitioner.

In the passage above noticed, Aristotle draws the line of intellectual distinction between man and the lower animals. If he had considered that it was the prerogative of man to possess a stock of intuitive general truths, ready-made, and independent of experience, this was the occasion for saying so. He says the exact contrary. No modern psychologist could proclaim more fully than Aristotle here does, the derivation of all general concepts and general propositions from the phenomena of sense, through the successive stages of memory, association, comparison, abstraction. No one could give a more explicit acknowledgment of Induction from particulars of sense, as the process whereby we reach ultimately those propositions of the highest universality, as well as of the highest certainty; from whence, by legitimate deductive syllogism, we descend to demonstrate various conclusions. There is nothing in Aristotle about generalities originally inherent in the mind, connate although dormant at first and unknown, until they are evoked or elicited by the senses: nothing to countenance that nice distinction eulogized so emphatically by Hamilton (p. 772, a. note): '*Cognitio nostra omnis à mente primam originem, à Sensibus exordium habet primum.*' In Aristotle's view, the Senses furnish both *originem* and *exordium*: the successive stages of mental procedure, whereby we rise from sense to universal propositions, are multiplied and gradual, without any break. He even goes so far as to say that 'we have sensible perception of the Universal.' His language undoubtedly calls for much criticism here. We shall only say that it discountenances altogether the doctrine that represents the Mind or Intellect as an original source of First or Universal Truths peculiar to itself. That opinion is mentioned by Aristotle, but mentioned only to be rejected. He denies that the mind possesses any such ready-made stores, latent until elicited into consciousness. Moreover, it is remarkable that the ground whereon he denies it, is much the same as that whereon the advocates of intuitions affirm it—viz., the supreme accuracy of these axioms. Aristotle cannot believe

that the mind includes cognitions of such value, without being conscious thereof. Nor will he grant that the mind possesses any native and inherent power of originating these inestimable *principia*.^{*} He declares that they are generated in the mind only by the slow process of induction, as above described; beginning from the perceptive power (common to man with animals), together with that first stage of the intelligence (judging or discriminative) which he combines or identifies with perception, considering it to be alike congenital. From this humble basis, men can rise to the highest grades of cognition, though animals cannot. We even become competent (Aristotle says) to have sensible perception of the Universal: in the man Kallias, we see *man*; in the ox feeding near us, we see *animal*.

It must be remembered that when Aristotle, in this analysis of cognition, speaks of Induction, he means induction completely and accurately performed; just as, when he talks of Demonstration, he intends a good and legitimate demonstration; and just as (to use his own illustration in the *Nicomachean Ethics*), when he reasons upon a harper, or other professional artist, he always tacitly implies a good and accomplished artist. Induction, thus understood, and Demonstration, he considers to be the two processes for obtaining scientific faith or conviction; both of them being alike cogent and necessary, but Induction even more so than Demonstration; because if the *principia* furnished by the former were not necessary, neither could the conclusions deduced from them by the latter be necessary. Induction may thus stand alone without demonstration, but demonstration pre-supposes and postulates induction. Accordingly, when Aristotle proceeds to specify those functions of mind wherewith the inductive *principia* and the demonstrated conclusions correlate, he refers both of them to functions wherein (according to him) the mind is unerring and infallible—Intellect (*Noûs*) and Science. But, between these two, he ranks Intellect as the higher, and he refers the inductive *principia* to Intellect. He does not mean that Intellect (*Noûs*) generates or produces these principles. On the contrary, he distinctly negatives such a supposition, and declares that no generative force of this high order resides in the Intellect: while he tells us, with equal distinctness, that they are generated from a lower source—sensible perception,

* Aristot. Anal. Post. II. 19, b. 26, εἰ δὲ ἔχομεν αὐτὰς, ἀποπορὸν συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως λαμβάνειν—ὁμοίῳ τοῖον ὅτι οὐτ' ἔχειν οἶον τε, οὐτ' ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχουσι ἐξ ἡ ἔγγινεσθαι. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μὲν τινα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ' ἔχειν ἢ ἔσται τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ' ἀκριβήαν. See *Metaphys.* A. 993, a. 1.

Some modern psychologists, who admit that general propositions of a lower degree of universality are raised from induction and sense, contend that propositions of the highest universality are not so raised, but are the intuitive offspring of the intellect. Aristotle does not countenance such a doctrine: he says (*Metaphys.* A. 2, 982, a. 22) that these truths furthest removed from sense are the most difficult to know of all. If they were intuitions, they would be the common possession of the race.

and through the gradual upward march of the inductive process. To say that they originate from sense through Induction, and nevertheless to refer them to Intellect (*Noûs*) as their subjective correlate—are not positions inconsistent with each other, in the view of Aristotle. He expressly distinguishes the two points, as requiring to be separately dealt with. By referring the *principia* to Intellect (*Noûs*), he does not intend to indicate their generating source, but their evidentiary value and dignity when generated and matured. They possess, in his view, the maximum of dignity, certainty, cogency, and necessity, because it is from them that even Demonstration derives the necessity of its conclusions; accordingly (pursuant to the inclination of the ancient philosophers for presuming affinity and commensurate dignity between the Cognitum and the Cognoscens), they belong as objective correlates to the most unerring cognitive function—the Intellect (*Noûs*). It is the Intellect that grasps these principles, and applies them to their legitimate purpose of scientific demonstration; hence, Aristotle calls Intellect not only the *principium* of Science, but the *principium principii*.

In the *Analytica*, from which we have hitherto cited, Aristotle explains the structure of the syllogism and the process of demonstration. He has in view mainly (though not exclusively) the more exact sciences, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, &c. But he expressly tells us that all departments of inquiry are not capable of this exactness; that some come nearer to it than others; that we must be careful to require no more exactness from each than the subject admits; and that the method adopted by us must be such as will attain the admissible maximum of exactness. Now, each subject has some *principia*, and among them definitions, peculiar to itself; though there are also some *principia* common to all, and essential to the march of each. In some departments of study (Aristotle says) we get our view of *principia* or first principles by induction; in others, by sensible perception; in others again, by habitual action in a certain way; and by various other processes also. In each, it is important to look for first principles in the way naturally appropriate to the matter before us; for this is more than half of the whole work; upon right first principles will mainly depend the value of our conclusions. For what concerns Ethics, Aristotle tells us that the first principles are acquired through a course of well directed habitual action; and that they will be acquired easily, as well as certainly, if such a course be enforced on youth from the beginning. In the beginning of the *Physica*, he starts from that antithesis, so often found in his writings, between what is more knowable to us, and what is more knowable absolutely or by nature. The natural march of knowledge is to ascend from the first of these two termini (particulars of sense) upward to the second or opposite*—and then to descend downward by demonstration or deduction. The fact of motion he

* See also Aristot. *Metaphys.* Z. p. 1029, b. 1-14.

proves (against Melissus and Parmenides) by an express appeal to induction, as sufficient and conclusive evidence. In physical science (he says), the final appeal must be to the things and facts perceived by sense. In the treatise *De Cælo*, he lays it down that the *principia* must be homogeneous with the matters they belong to: the *principia* of perceivable matters must be themselves perceivable; those of eternal matters must be eternal; those of perishable matters perishable.

The treatises composing the *Organon* stand apart among Aristotle's works. In them he undertakes (for the first time in the history of mankind) the systematic study of significant propositions enunciative of truth and falsehood. He analyzes their constituent elements; he specifies the conditions determining the consistency or inconsistency of such propositions one with another; he teaches to arrange the propositions in such ways as to detect and dismiss the inconsistent, keeping our hold of the consistent. Here the signification of terms and propositions is never out of sight: the facts and realities of nature are regarded as so signified. Now, all language becomes significant only through the convention of mankind, according to Aristotle's express declaration; it is used by speakers to communicate what they mean, to hearers that understand them. We see thus that in these treatises the subjective point of view is brought into the foreground; the enunciation of what we see, remember, believe, disbelieve, doubt, anticipate, &c. It is not meant that the objective point of view is eliminated, but that it is taken in implication with, and in dependence upon, the subjective. Neither the one nor the other is dropped or hidden. It is under this double and conjoint point of view that Aristotle, in the *Organon*, presents to us, not only the processes of demonstration and confutation, but also the fundamental *principia* or axioms thereof; which axioms in the *Analytica Posteriora* (as we have already seen) he expressly declares to originate from the data of sense, and to be raised and generalized by induction.

Such is the way that Aristotle represents the fundamental principles of syllogistic demonstration, when he deals with them as portions of logic. But we also find him dealing with them as portions of Ontology or First Philosophy (this being his manner of characterizing his own treatise, now commonly known as the *Metaphysica*). To that science he decides, after some preliminary debate, that the task of formulating and defending the axioms belongs, because the application of these axioms is quite universal, for all grades and varieties of *Entia*. Ontology treats of *Ens* in its largest sense, with all its properties *quatenus Ens*, including *Unum*, *Multa*, *Idem*, *Diversum*, *Posteriorius*, *Prius*, *Genus*, *Species*, *Totum*, *Partes*, &c. Now, Ontology is with Aristotle a purely objective science; that is, a science wherein the subjective is dropt out of sight, and no account taken of it,—or wherein (to state the same fact in the language of relativity) the believing and reasoning subject is supposed constant. Ontology is the most

comprehensive among all the objective sciences. Each of these sciences singles out a certain portion of it for special study. In treating the logical axioms as portions of Ontology, Aristotle undertakes to show their objective value; and this purpose, while it carries him away from the point of view that we remarked as prevailing in the *Organon*, at the same time brings him into conflict with various theories, all of them in his time more or less current. Several philosophers—Heracleitus, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Protagoras, had propounded theories which Aristotle here impugns. We do not mean that these philosophers expressly denied his fundamental axioms (which they probably never distinctly stated to themselves, and which Aristotle was the first to formulate), but their theories were to a certain extent inconsistent with these axioms, and were regarded by Aristotle as wholly inconsistent.

The two axioms announced in the *Metaphysica*, and vindicated by Aristotle, are—

1. The Maxim of Contradiction—It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; It is impossible for the same to belong and not to belong to the same, at the same time and in the same sense. This is the statement of the Maxim as a formula of Ontology. Announced as a formula of Logic, it would stand thus—The same proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time; You cannot both believe and disbelieve the same proposition at the same time; You cannot believe, at the same time, propositions contrary or contradictory. These last-mentioned formulæ are the logical ways of stating the axiom. They present it in reference to the believing or disbelieving (affirming or denying) Subject, distinctly brought to view along with the matter believed; not exclusively in reference to the matter believed, to the omission of the believer.

2. The Maxim of Excluded Middle—A given attribute either does belong, or does not belong to a subject (i.e., provided that it has any relation to the subject at all); there is no medium, no real condition intermediate between the two. This is the Ontological Formula; and it will stand thus, when translated into Logic—Between a proposition and its contradictory opposite there is no tenable halting ground. If you disbelieve the one, you must pass at once to the belief of the other; you cannot at the same time disbelieve the other.

These two maxims thus teach—the first, that we cannot at the same time *believe* both a proposition and its contradictory opposite; the second, that we cannot at the same time *disbelieve* them both.*

* We have here discussed these two maxims chiefly in reference to Aristotle's manner of presenting them, and to the conceptions of his predecessors and contemporaries. An excellent view of the Maxims themselves, in their true meaning and value, will be found in Mr. John Stuart Mill's *Examination of the Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton*, chap. xxi. p. 462-479.

Now, Heraclitus, in his theory (a theory propounded much before the time of Protagoras and the persons called Sophists), denied all permanence or durability in nature, and recognized nothing except perpetual movement and change. He denied both durable substances and durable attributes; he considered nothing to be lasting except the universal law or principle of change—the ever-renewed junction or co-existence of contraries, and the perpetual transition of one contrary into the other. This view of the facts of nature was adopted by several other physical philosophers besides.* Indeed it lay at the bottom of Plato's new coinage—Rational Types or Forms, at once universal and real. The maxim of Contradiction is intended by Aristotle to controvert Heraclitus, and to uphold durable substances with definite attributes.

Again, the theory of Anaxagoras denied all simple bodies (excepting *Noûs*) and all definite attributes. He held that everything was mingled with everything else, though there might be some one or other predominant constituent. In all the changes visible throughout nature, there was no generation of anything new, but only the coming into prominence of some constituent that had before been comparatively latent. According to this theory, you could neither wholly affirm, nor wholly deny, any attribute of its subject. Both affirmation and denial were untrue: the real relation between the two was something half-way between affirmation and denial. The maxim of Excluded Middle is maintained by Aristotle as a doctrine in opposition to this theory of Anaxagoras.†

Both the two above-mentioned theories are objective. A third, that of Protagoras—*Homo Mensura*—brings forward prominently the subjective, and is quite distinct from either. Aristotle does indeed treat the Protagorean theory as substantially identical with that of Heraclitus, and as standing or falling therewith. This seems a mistake; the theory of Protagoras is as much opposed to Heraclitus as to Aristotle.

We have now to see how Aristotle sustains these two Axioms (which he calls 'the firmest of all truths and the most assuredly known') against theories opposed to them. In the first place, he repeats here what he had declared in the *Analytica Posteriora*—that they cannot be directly demonstrated, though they are themselves the *principia* of all demonstration. Some persons indeed thought that these Axioms were demonstrable; but this is an error, proceeding (he says) from complete ignorance of analytical theory. How, then, are these axioms to be proved against Heraclitus? Aristotle had told us in the *Analytica* that axioms were derived from particulars of sense by Induction, and apprehended or approved by the *Noûs*. He does not repeat that observation here; but he intimates that there is only one process

* See Grote's Plato—vol. I., ch. 1, p. 23-33.

† Grote—Plato, &c.—ch. 1, p. 49-57.

available for defending them, and that process amounts to an appeal to Induction. You can give no ontological reason in support of the axioms, except what will be condemned as a *petitio principii*; you must take them in their logical aspect, as enunciated in significant propositions. You must require the Heracleitean adversary to answer some question affirmatively, in terms significant both to himself and to others, and in a proposition declaring his belief on the point. If he will not do this, you can hold no discussion with him: he might as well be deaf and dumb: he is no better than a plant (to use Aristotle's own comparison). If he does it, he has bound himself to something determinate: first, the signification of the terms is a fact, excluding what is contrary or contradictory; next, in declaring his belief, he at the same time declares that he does not believe in the contrary or contradictory, and is so understood by the hearers. We may grant what his theory affirms—that the subject of a proposition is continually under some change or movement; yet the identity designated by its name is still maintained,* and many true predications respecting it remain true in spite of its partial change. The argument in defence of the maxim of Contradiction is, that it is a postulate implied in all the particular statements, as to matters of daily experience, that a man understands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that, if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to inform and guide those who hear it. If the speaker both affirms and denies the same fact at once, no information is conveyed, nor can the hearer act upon the words. Thus, in the *Acharnenses* of Aristophanes, Dikæopolis knocks at the door of Euripides, and inquires whether the poet is within; Kephisophon, the attendant, answers—'Euripides is within and not within.' This answer is unintelligible; Dikæopolis cannot act upon it; until Kephisophon explains that 'not within' is intended metaphorically. Then, again, all the actions in detail of a man's life are founded upon his own belief of some facts and disbelief of other facts; he goes to Megara, believing that the person whom he desires to see is at Megara, and at the same time disbelieving the contrary: he acts upon his belief, both as to what is good and what is not good, in the way of pursuit and avoidance. You may cite innumerable examples both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the Heracleitean must go through like other persons; and when, if he proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly, the Heracleitean Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech, and simply pointed with his finger.†

* This argument is given by Aristotle, *Metaph.* Γ. 1010, a. 6-24, contrasting change *κατὰ τὸ πᾶν* and change *κατὰ τὸ πῶς*.

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The maxim of Contradiction is thus seen to be only the general expression of a postulate implied in all such particular speeches as communicate real information. It is proved by a very copious and diversified Induction, from matters of experience familiar to every individual person. It is not less true in regard to propositions affirming changes, motions, or events, than in regard to those declaring durable states or attributes.

In the long pleading of Aristotle on behalf of the maxim of Contradiction against the Heraecliteans, the portion of it that appeals to Induction is the really forcible portion: conforming as it does to what he had laid down in the *Analytica Posteriora* about the inductive origin of the *principia* of demonstration. He employs, however, besides, several other dialectical arguments, built, more or less, upon theories of his own, and therefore not likely to weigh much with an Heraeclitean theorist; who—arguing as he did that (because neither subject nor predicate were ever unchanged or stable for two moments together) no true proposition could be framed but was at the same time false, and that contraries were in perpetual co-existence,—could not by any general reasoning be involved in greater contradiction and inconsistency than he at once openly proclaimed.* It can only be shown that such a doctrine cannot be reconciled with the necessities of daily speech, as practised by himself, as well as by others. We read indeed one ingenious argument whereby Aristotle adopts this belief in the co-existence of Contraries, but explains it in a manner of his own, through his much employed distinction between potential and actual existence. Two contraries cannot co-exist (he says) in actuality: but they both may and do co-exist, in different senses—one or both of them being potential. This, however, is a theory totally different from that of Heraclitus: coincident only in words and in seeming. It does indeed eliminate the contradiction: but that very contradiction formed the characteristic feature and key-stone of the Heraeclitean theory. The case against this last theory is, that it is at variance with psychological facts, by incorrectly assuming the co-existence of contradictory beliefs in the mind: and that it conflicts both with postulates implied in the daily colloquy of detail between man and man, and with the volitional preferences that determine individual action. All of these are founded on a belief in the regular sequence of our sensations, and in the at least temporary durability of combined potential aggregates of sensations, which we enunciate in the language of definite attributes belonging to definite substances. This language, the common

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* This is stated by Aristotle himself (*Metaph. F. 1011 n. 15*) οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν βίαν μόνον ζητοῦντες ἀδύνατον ζητοῦσιν· ἐναντία γὰρ εἶπαι ἀξιοῦσιν, εὐθὺς ἐναντία λέγοντες. He here indeed applies this observation immediately to the Protagoreans, against whom it does not tell—instead of the Heracliteans, against whom it does tell. Indeed, the whole of the reasoning in this part of the *Metaphysica*, is directed indiscriminately and in the same words against Protagoreans and Heracliteans.

medium of communication among non-theorizing men, is accepted as a basis, and is generalized and regularized, in the logical theories of Aristotle.

The doctrine here mentioned is vindicated by Aristotle, not only against Heraclitus, by asserting the Maxim of Contradiction, but also against Anaxagoras, by asserting the Maxim of Excluded Middle. Here we have the second *principium* of demonstration, which, if it required to be defended at all, can only be defended (like the first) by a process of Induction. Aristotle adduces several arguments in support of it, some of which involve an appeal to induction, though not broadly or openly avowed; but others of them assume what adversaries, and Anaxagoras especially, were not likely to grant. We must remember that both Anaxagoras and Heraclitus propounded their theories as portions of physical philosophy or of Ontology; and that in their time no such logical principles and distinctions as those that Aristotle lays down in the *Organon*, had yet been made known or pressed upon their attention. Now, Aristotle, while professing to defend these Axioms as data of Ontology, forgets that they deal with the logical aspect of Ontology, as formulated in methodical propositions. His view of the Axioms cannot be properly appreciated without a classification of propositions, such as neither Heraclitus nor Anaxagoras found existing or originated for themselves. Aristotle has taught us—what Heraclitus and Anaxagoras had not been taught—to distinguish separate propositions as universal, particular and singular; and to distinguish pairs of propositions as contrary, sub-contrary, and contradictory. To take the simplest case, that of a singular proposition, in regard to which the distinction between contrary and contradictory has no application—such as the answer (cited above) of Kephisophon about Euripides. Here Aristotle would justly contend that the two propositions—*Euripides is within*—*Euripides is not within*—could not be either both of them true, or both of them false: that is, that we could neither believe both, nor disbelieve both. If Kephisophon had answered, Euripides is neither within, nor not within, Dikæopolis would have found himself as much at a loss with the two negatives as he was with the two affirmatives. In regard to singular propositions, neither the doctrine of Heraclitus (to believe both affirmation and negation) nor that of Anaxagoras (to disbelieve both) is admissible. But when in place of singular propositions, we take either universal or particular propositions, the rule to follow is no longer so simple and peremptory. The universal affirmative and the universal negative are *contrary*; the particular affirmative and the particular negative are *sub-contrary*; the universal affirmative and the particular negative, or the universal negative and the particular affirmative, are *contradictory*. It is now noted in all manuals of Logic, that of two contrary propositions, both cannot be true, but both may be false; that of two sub-contraries, both may be true, but both cannot be false; and that, of two contradictories, one must be true and the other false.

THE SCHOOLMEN. In the mediæval period the question as to the Origin of Knowledge was thrown into the shade by the question as to the nature, and mode of existence, of Universals. Nevertheless, the different sides were each supported. On the one hand, the extreme experience-hypothesis was reduced to the formula often quoted since, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*; on the other, we can see by the argument of Aquinas against the theory of knowledge *per species*—*omnium intelligibilium rationes, animæ naturaliter inditas*, that some did not shrink from the extreme statement of the opposed view.

It was at the close of the scholastic period, when the question of the universals was considered as settled against Realism (henceforth driven to assume masked forms) and their subjective character, whether in the sense of Nominalism or Conceptualism, was held to be established, that the problem of the Origin of such general ideas *before* or *in* experience, started into full importance. During the whole course of modern thought it has held a first place among philosophical questions.

DESCARTES heads the modern movement in philosophy, and in him we must look for the terms wherein the question was anew propounded. First, however, it is well, even if it were not in his case necessary, to indicate shortly his *general* philosophical position.

1. Proceeding on the analogy of mathematics, he began by seeking a principle, or principles, of indubitable certainty, whereon to rear a universal system of knowledge unimpeachable at every point:—There is, he declared, not a single thing that I am not able to doubt or call in question, save the fact of my own doubting. But doubting is thinking, and in thinking is implied being or existing: *I am, I exist*, is, therefore, a proposition necessarily true every time I pronounce or conceive it; *Cogito ergo sum* or *Ego sum res cogitans* is to me the one thing absolutely and for ever certain. And not only do I thus know *that* I am, but, at the same time, *what* I am—a *thinking being*. Although as yet nothing more, this I know with perfect clearness and distinctness.

2. Next he sought how to pass beyond this primal certainty—the simple consciousness of self as a thinking being:—I find in me an idea of perfection, or of an all-perfect being called God. Like everything else, such an idea must have its cause, for I apprehend, again with perfect clearness and distinctness, that, out of nothing, nothing can come. Now, as every cause must involve at least as much reality as there is in the effect, an imperfect being like myself cannot be the cause of such an idea of perfection. Wherefore it must be derived from a higher source, from such an all-powerful and perfect being as it portends, who has stamped it as his mark upon my mind: not to say that already in the very idea of such a perfect being the attribute of existence is implied as necessary to his perfection. Besides self, therefore, I now know that God exists, and that he must be the real cause of my own existence.

3. In the *Veracity* of God, in this way proved to exist, he now

found a guarantee of the existence of other beings, and of a material universe:—Formerly, no mere thought of mine sufficed to prove the existence of other beings or external things; for anything I knew, I dreamed, or was the victim of a constant deception. But now that I know an all-perfect God to exist, I can be certain that everything is as he has constituted me to apprehend it, when, that is to say, the apprehension is perfectly *clear* and *distinct*. Thus, clearly and distinctly apprehending Bodies to be real external substances, *i.e.*, independent existences with real attributes of Figure, Size, and Motion, modes of one universal and inseparable property—Extension, I can be sure that they *are* such. Qualities of colour, sound, heat, &c., on the other hand, I can be equally sure do not, as such, belong to the extended objects; because, when clearly and distinctly apprehended, they are seen to be only varieties of motion in these.

4. The whole nature of Mind being thus understood, from the beginning, as expressed by the one attribute *Thought* (construed, however, as *Thinking Substance*), and the whole nature of Body, at the end, as summed up in the one attribute *Extension* (*Extended Substance*), he found in the union of Mind and Body in man—in man only, for he regarded the lower animals as mere *automata*—an explanation of all such phenomena of appetite, bodily feeling, and sensation (colour, sound, &c., just alluded to) as can be referred neither to Mind nor to Body, taken simply and apart.

Such are the main positions of Descartes. His doctrine of Intuition, in so far as it is developed, may now be presented in the following statements:—

1. His general method, styled Deduction, whether used in rearing the whole edifice of philosophy or applied to special problems, requires the positing of certain indemonstrable and self-evident truths, in regard to which he himself employs the term *Intuition*.

2. First among such intuitive principles, and apprehended with a *clearness* and *distinctness*, to the level of which every other truth should be raised, is the certainty of *Cogito ergo sum*. Another, which stands him in even better stead, is *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. Still other examples are: What is done cannot be undone; It is impossible that the same thing can at once be and not be. Such truths are 'eternal,' although in some men they may be obscured by prejudice.

3. Amongst Ideas he distinguishes (1) Innate, (2) Adventitious, (3) Factitious or Imaginary. The Innate, *e.g.*, the idea of self as existent, of God, &c., are so named because they neither come adventitiously by way of sense, nor have the character of voluntary products or fictions of the mind. The idea of God he describes as like 'the workman's mark left imprinted on his work.' But, at other times, he argues, like many of his successors, for little more than innate faculties or modes of thinking, instead of thoughts; pre-dispositions to conceive, instead of ready-made conceptions.

4. In the *Knowledge* of an object by sense-perception, there is more than a mere passive impression. What is real and constant in any object, as a piece of wax, under all conditions of sensible change—that it is a Substance, with attributes of Extension, Mobility, &c.—is perceived only *intellectually*, by direct *mental inspection* or *intuition*. To know such attributes implies the *conceiving* of an infinite possibility of variations of each, something quite beyond the scope of Sense, or of Imagination which waits on sense.

Before passing to Locke—the next great name in the general history of Intuition, it is necessary to take some account of others of his predecessors.

In the Cartesian school itself, as in Malebranche, the discussion of the question was too much complicated with the special difficulty of finding a theory of perception or knowledge to bridge the chasm fixed by Descartes between mind and matter, to permit of its being followed out here. But ARNAULD in the *Port Royal Logic*, Chapter I., has a short and simple statement, which, as it must have been known to Locke, may be briefly noticed.

1. As to the *nature* of Ideas, he emphasizes the same distinction between Image and Idea, Imagination and Pure Intellection or Conception, made by Descartes. Things can be clearly and distinctly conceived, whereof there is no adequate imagination, *e.g.*, a chiliogon; and others, of which there is no imagination possible at all, *e.g.*, Thought, Affirmation, God. This remembered, no more exact account can be given of what an Idea is, there being nothing more clear and simple to explain it by: 'It is everything that is in our mind when we can say with truth that we can conceive a thing, in whatsoever way it may be conceived.'

2. As to the *Origin* of Ideas, he contests the opinion of 'a philosopher of repute' (Gassendi), that all knowledge begins from sense, the rest being an affair of Composition, or Amplification and Diminution, or Accommodation and Analogy. [Gassendi, the contemporary and rival of Descartes, rejected the Innate theory most strenuously, and with an explicitness justifying the inference that, apart from Descartes' influence, it was a commonplace in the philosophy of the time: Locke's relation to him has often been remarked.] To this, Arnauld, in substance, objects, (1) that it is not true at all of certain ideas, and (2) that it is not properly true of any. First, The simple ideas of Being and Thought (involved in the proposition *Cogito ergo sum*) never entered by any sense, and are not compounded from sensible images; and the same is true of the idea of God: the mind has the faculty of forming such ideas for itself, and they cannot, without manifest absurdity, be referred to sense. In the next place, all that the impression on the sense effects, when it is this that does happen to arouse the mind, is to give the mind an 'occasion' to form one idea rather than another; and the idea has very rarely any resemblance to what takes place in the sense and in the brain.

In England, views in strong antithesis to Locke, were ad-

vanced by Cudworth, founding not upon Descartes, but upon the ancients; and, at a still earlier date (even than Descartes), by Lord Herbert of Cherbury.

CUDWORTH'S views, as explicitly set forth in the treatise on *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, were kept back from publication until after Locke's death. It will suffice, therefore, simply to remark (1) that (independently of Cartesian influence) he distinguishes between Sense and Fancy on the one hand and Intellection or the Innate Cognoscitive Power of the Soul on the other; (2) that he defines this power as a faculty the mind has of raising from within itself Intelligible Ideas and Conceptions of things, Intelligible Reasons of things (*Rationes*), &c.—e.g., Verity, Falsity, Cause, Effect, Genus, Species, Nullity, Contingency, Impossibility, Justice, Duty, 'Nothing can be and not be at the same time' (both as proposition and in every one of its words), &c.; (3) that he understands by knowledge of particular things the bringing and comprehending of them under such *Rationes*, and finds that 'scientific knowledge is best acquired by the soul's abstraction from the outward objects of sense, that it may the better attend to its own inward notions and ideas.'

LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY, in his book '*De Veritate*' (1624) maintains the doctrine of Innate Ideas, under the name of *Natural Instincts*. Instinct is the first of our faculties brought into play, as *Discursus* (the understanding) is the last; the senses, both external and internal, coming between them. It is the speciality of Instinct to work *naturaliter* (i.e. without *Discursus*); in the same way as minerals and vegetables have a faculty of self-preservation. *Notitiæ Communes* (nearly equivalent to First Principles) are the product of Natural Instinct. They are sacred principles, against which it is unlawful to contend, and are guaranteed by nature itself. If it be a common notion that Nature does nothing in vain, it is the same as if Nature herself spake—'I do nothing in vain.' The truth of Common notions is perceived *immediately*, at first sight, so presenting a contrast to the slow and uncertain steps of the Discursive faculty.

How, then, are those notions to be discovered? It is by 'our method,' which Herbert announces with great emphasis. There is no Philosophy or Religion so benighted but has its own special truth, mingled, it may be, with error; and the pure metal can be extracted from the ore by 'our method.' The great criterion, as he never wearies of repeating, is *universality*: what is accepted by all men must be true, and can arise from no source except natural instinct. Universal consent is to be gathered from laws, religions, philosophies, and books. Thus Religion is a common notion, for there is no nation or age without religion. The next thing to be considered is—what points are universally agreed to. This can be ascertained only by actually bringing together and sifting all religions. If this method (which is the only sure one) be considered too laborious, Herbert points out the easier mode of self-examination; if you examine your faculties, you will find God

and Virtue given as eternal and universal truths. Every truth is attested by some faculty, error by none.

But in this introspection, the distinction must be borne in mind between *veritas rei*, of which the *principium* is without the mind, and *veritas intellectus*, which depends on the mind alone; in fine, between propositions always and everywhere true, and propositions true only here and now. [This seems to be an approach, in everything except the name, to the criterion of *necessity* afterwards brought forward by Leibnitz.] The mind is not a *tabula rasa*, but rather a *closed book*, that opens on the presentation of objects. Until called forth by objects, the common notions are latent. It is folly to suppose that they are brought in with the objects; they exist independently, being placed in us by nature. Nor is it any real difficulty that we do not understand *how* those notions are elicited; as little do we understand how touch, or taste, or smell is produced.

All common notions are not independent of *Discursus*, but such as are may be determined by the following characters. (1) *Priority*. Instinct precedes *Discursus*, and as already observed, is in animals the faculty of self-preservation. In a house built with regularity, beauty of symmetry is observed by natural instinct, long before reason comes in with its estimate of the proportions of the parts. (2) *Independence*. When a common notion has been obtained by observation, it may be deducible from some prior truth. Thus 'Man is an animal' depends for its truth upon the ultimate principle, that whatever affects our faculties in the same manner, is the same so far as we are concerned. Only the ultimate or undervived truths are attributed to Nature's instinct. (3) *Universality* (excepting idiots and madmen). (4) *Certainty*. Those principles possess the highest authority, and, if understood, cannot be denied. (5) *Paramount Utility* (*Necessitas*). Without common notions, there would be no principle of self-preservation: they are therefore essential to the existence of the race or the individual. (6) *Immediacy*. The truth of them is seen, *nulla interposita mora*.

JOHN LOCKE. Locke discusses the subject of innato speculative principles in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, B. I., chaps. 2, 4. Innate principles are a class of notions stamped on the mind, which the soul brings into the world with it. Are there any such? Certainly not, if it is shown how men may reach all the knowledge they have without such ideas. For it would be absurd to say that colour was innate in a man that had eyes. Locke's refutation paves the way for the fundamental principle of his psychology, that all our knowledge and ideas arise from sense and reflection.

1. The first argument for innate ideas is that certain principles are admitted as true *universally*. To this Locke answers, that the argument breaks down, (1) if any other way can be pointed out whereby this universal assent may be attained. (2) There are no principles universally admitted. Take two that have a high title

to be considered innate: 'whatever is, is,' and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.' These propositions are to a great part of mankind wholly unknown. They are unknown to children and idiots, and so they are not universally accepted. It would be a contradiction to say, that those propositions are imprinted on the mind, without the mind being conscious of them. That an idea is in the understanding, can only mean that it is understood. Hence, if there were innate ideas, they ought to be present in children and in idiots, as well as in others.

2. To avoid those exceptions, the universality is affirmed with qualifications; it is said that all men assent to those principles when they come to the use of reason. This can only mean either, that the time of discovering those native inscriptions is when men come to the use of reason, or that reason assists in the discovery of them. (1) If reason discovered those principles, that would not prove them innate; for by reason we discover many truths that are not innate. Reason, as the faculty of deducing one truth from another, plainly cannot lead to innate principles. Reason should no more be necessary to decipher those native inscriptions, than to make our eyes perceive visible objects. (2) The coming to the use of reason is not the time of first knowing those maxims. How many instances have we of the exercise of reason by children before they learn that 'whatever is, is'! Many illiterate people and savages, long after they come to the use of reason, are altogether ignorant of maxims so general. Those truths are never known before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after during a man's life; and the same may be said of all other knowable truths. (3) If coming to the use of reason were the time of discovering the alleged innate notions, it would not prove them innate. For why should a notion be innate because it is first known when an entirely distinct faculty of the mind begins to exert itself? It would be as good an argument, (and as near the truth) to say that those maxims were first assented to when men came to the use of speech.

3. Another form of the argument is, that as soon as the propositions are heard, and their terms understood, they are assented to. Maxims that the mind, without any teaching and at the very first proposal, assents to, are surely innate. (1) But assent at first hearing is characteristic of a multitude of truths; such as, 'one and two are equal to three,' 'two bodies cannot be in the same place,' 'white is not black,' 'a square is not a circle,' &c. To every one of these, every man in his wits must assent at first hearing. And since no proposition can be innate, unless the ideas composing it be innate, then our ideas of colours, tastes, sounds, &c., will be innate. Nor can it be said that those propositions about concrete objects are drawn as consequences from the more general innate propositions, since the concrete judgments are known long before the abstract form. (2) Moreover, the argument of assent at first hearing supposes that those maxims may be unknown till proposed. For if they were ingrained in

the mind, why need they be proposed in order to gain assent? Does proposing make them clearer? Then the teaching of men is better than the impression of nature, an opinion not favourable to the authority of innate truths. (3) It is sometimes said that the mind has an implicit knowledge of those principles, but not an explicit, before the first hearing. The only meaning that can be assigned to implicit or virtual knowledge, is that the mind is capable of knowing those principles. This is equally true of all knowledge, whether innate or not. (4) The argument of assent on first hearing is on the false supposition of no preceding teaching. Now, the words, and the meanings of the words, expressing the innate ideas, have been learned. And not only so, but the ideas that enter into the propositions are also acquired. If, then, we take out of a proposition the ideas in it and the words, what remains innate? A child assents to the proposition, 'an apple is not fire,' before it understands the terms of the maxim, 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' and consequently before it can assent to the more general proposition. In conclusion Locke sums up: if there were innate ideas, they would be found in all men; there are no ideas found in all men, hence there are no innate ideas. He adds some further considerations by way of supporting this conclusion.

4. Those maxims are not the first known, for children do not know them. How explain such ignorance of notions, imprinted on the mind in indelible characters, to be the foundation of all acquired knowledge? Children distinguish between the nurse and the cat, without the aid of the maxim, that the same thing cannot be and not be—for that is a maxim wholly unknown to them. If children brought any truths into the world with them, such truths ought to appear early, whereas, being made up of abstract terms, they appear late.

5. Innate ideas appear least where what is innate shows itself clearest. Children, savages, illiterate people, being the least corrupted by custom or borrowed opinions, ought to exhibit those innate notions—the endowments of nature—with purity and distinctness. But those are the very persons most destitute of universal principles of knowledge. General maxims are best known in the schools and academies, where they help debate, but do little to advance knowledge.

6. In chap. 4, Locke examines some alleged innate ideas. As a proposition is made up of ideas, the doctrine of innate maxims will be decisively refuted, if it be shown that there are no innate ideas. Thus, in the maxim, 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' Locke asks whether the notions of impossibility and identity be innate. He illustrates the difficulties involved in the conception of identity. Is a man, made as he is of body and soul, the same man when his body is changed? Were Euphorbus and Pythagoras, who had the same soul, the same man, though they lived ages asunder? And was the cock, that shared the soul with them, the same also? In what sense shall

we be the same men, when raised at the resurrection, that we are now? The notion of identity is far from being clear or distinct; can it then be the subject of undoubted and innate truth? Again take the maxim, 'the whole is bigger than a part.' This has a fair title to be considered innate. But whole and part have no meaning, except as applied to number and extension. If the maxim be innate, number and extension must also be innate. [Locke stopped here, thinking the point too clear for argument. But Kant afterwards adopted the paradox, and upheld the *à priori* character of Space as the corner-stone of his metaphysical construction.] In like manner, Locke examines whether the ideas of *Worship* and *God* are innate. In respect of the idea of *God*, he argues the subject at great length, applying most of the considerations that tell against innate ideas generally. He also discusses whether *Substance* be an innate idea. This idea, he observes, we have neither by sensation nor by reflection, and nature might with advantage have given it to us. For substance is a most confused notion, and is only a something of which we have no distinct positive idea, but which we take to be the substratum of our ideas.

SHAFTESBURY, in England, attempted to turn the edge of Locke's objections by declaring (but before Locke, the same had been affirmed) that all that was contended for was better expressed by the words *Connate* or *Connatural* than by the word *innate*: it was true the mind had no knowledge antecedent to experience, but it was so constituted or predisposed as inevitably to develop, with experience, ideas and truths not explained thereby.

In Germany, LEIBNITZ set up an elaborate defence of the Innate Theory, and is commonly represented as having made a distinct advance in the discussion of the question by the exceptions he took to the criticism of Locke. These are reducible to two. (1) He charges Locke with neglecting the difference between mere *truths of fact* or *positive truths* that may be arrived at by way of Inductive Experience, and *necessary truths*, or *truths of demonstration*, not to be proved except from principles implanted in the mind. (2) He charges Locke further, with not seeing that innate knowledge is saved on simply making the unavoidable assumption that the intellect and its faculties are there from the first: 'the mind is innate to itself.' 'nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus.' His detailed objections are to be found in his posthumous work, *Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain*.

A passage in a letter of Leibnitz's to a friend, gives a good idea of the position he took up against Locke. He there says: 'In Locke there are various particular truths not badly set forth; but on the main point he is far from being right, and he has not caught the nature of the Mind and of Truth. If he had properly considered the difference between necessary truths, i.e. those which are known by Demonstration, and the truths that we arrive at to a certain degree by Induction, he would have seen that necessary truths can be proved only from principles implanted in the mind

—the so-called innate ideas; because the senses tell indeed what happens, but not what necessarily happens. He has also failed to observe that the notions of the Existent, of Substance, Identity, the True and Good, are innate to our mind for the reason that it is innate to itself, and within itself comprehends them all. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus.*

The *Nouveaux Essais* is a dialogue, continued through four books, corresponding to the books of Locke's essay, between Theophilus (Leibnitz himself) and Philalethes, a disciple of Locke. In Book I., Theophilus, after announcing that he has taken a new step in philosophy, and reached a point of view from which he can reconcile the discrepant views of former thinkers, declares that he goes beyond Descartes in accepting an innate idea of God; for rather all our thoughts and actions may be said to come from the depths of the soul itself without possibility of their being given by the senses. He will not, however, go into the demonstration of that at present, but content himself with making clear, on the common system, that there are ideas and principles that do not come from the senses, but are found within the mind, unformed by us, although the senses give us occasion to apprehend them. Locke, with all his power, failed to see the difference between *necessary truths*, whose source is in the understanding, and *truths of fact* drawn from sense, experience, and confused perceptions. The certitude of innate principles (such as, Every thing that is, is; It is impossible that a thing should be and not be at the same time) is not to be based on the fact of universal consent, which can only be an index to, and never a demonstration of, them: it comes only from what is in us. Even though unknown, they are not therefore not innate, for they are recognized as soon as understood. In the mind there is always an infinity of cognitions that are not consciously apprehended; and so the fact of their not being always apprehended makes nothing against the existence of (1) the pure ideas (opposed to the phantasms of sense) and (2) necessary truths of reason (in contrast to truths of fact) asserted to be graven on the mind. That the necessary truths of Arithmetic and Geometry exist thus *virtually* in the mind appears from the established possibility of drawing them forth out of a wholly untutored mind. But, in fine, the position to stand by is the difference that there is between necessary and eternal truths and mere truths of experience. 'The mind is able to know the one and the other, but of the first it is the source; and whatever number of particular experiences there may be of a universal truth, there can be no perpetual assurance of it, except its necessity is known by reason.' Elsewhere he mentions as things that the senses cannot give; 'Substance, the One, the Same, Cause, Perception, Reasoning;' but otherwise merely repeats in different words like the above.

When . . . e ready consent of the mind to certain truths is sufficiently explained by the general faculty of knowing, Theophilus replies as follows: 'Very true; but it is this particular relation of the human mind to these truths that

renders the exercise of the faculty easy and natural with respect to them, and causes them to be called innate. It is no naked faculty, consisting in the mere possibility of understanding them: there is a disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, determining our mind and making it possible that they should be drawn forth from it. Just as there is a difference between the figures given to stone or marble indifferently, and those that its veins mark out already or are disposed to mark out if the workman takes advantage of them.' Farther on, to the objection that there is a difficulty in conceiving a truth to be in the mind, if the mind has never thought of it, he adds: 'It is as if one said that there is difficulty in conceiving veins to be in the marble before they are discovered.' In these sentences Leibnitz's theory is nearly completed.

After Leibnitz has next to be noticed KANT; but his contribution to the history of the present question, as before in the case of Descartes, cannot be viewed apart from his general philosophical position. Although his whole system, on the speculative side at least, may be described as a theory of the Origin of Knowledge, it cannot be properly understood without some preliminary reference to other lines of thought.

1. Kant found himself unable to subscribe to the metaphysical *dogmatism* of the school of Wolff (joining on to Leibnitz) that presumed to settle everything without any question of the mind's ability to pronounce at once and finally. This on the one hand: on the other he was startled by the *scepticism* of Hume (joining on through Berkeley to Locke) with its summary assertion of the impotence of human thought. As between the two, he conceived the idea of instituting a *critical inquiry into the foundations and limits of the mind's faculty of knowledge*; in his famous work, 'The Critique of the Pure Reason' (1781).

2. As here implied in the word 'pure' used of Reason, or the general faculty of knowing, he contended for the inherence in the mind, before all experience, of certain principles of knowledge, which he called *a priori*; and thus far was at one with former supporters of Innate Notions. Farther, with Leibnitz in particular, he agreed in taking *necessity* and *universality* as the marks or criteria of cognitions never to be attained to or explained by experience. Cognitions universally and necessarily true, and these not merely *analytic* or verbal (where the predicate only sets forth the implication of the subject), but *synthetic* or real (in which there is an extension of knowledge) he found, as he thought, existing in abundance: in Mathematics such, for instance, as $7 + 5 = 12$; Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, &c.; in Pure Physics, The quantity of matter in nature is constant, Action and Reaction in nature are equal; while the whole of traditional Metaphysics was made up of such. Criticism of the foundations and limits of human knowledge took with him, then, the special shape of an inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of *synthetic cognitions a priori*.

3. In the peculiar solution that he gave of the old question of Innate Knowledge put into this new form, there can be traced the influence Hume had upon him from the opposite camp. Hume had meanwhile analyzed Causality into mere custom of sequence among the impressions of sense, and upon the untrustworthiness of such a purely subjective notion had based his general scepticism. Kant taking his stand upon the body of established mathematical truth (synthetic at the same time as necessary), rejected the sceptical conclusion; but accepting the subjective origin of the notion of Causality, proceeded to place all the native *a priori*, or non-empirical elements of knowledge in certain subjective or mental '*Forms*' destined to enfold, while requiring to be supplemented by the '*Matter*' of Experience.

4. The mind, therefore, in Kant's view, has no sort of knowledge antecedent to and independent of experience, as many philosophers have more or less boldly asserted: it has, before experience, nothing except the '*forms*' as the moulds into which the empirical elements that come primarily by way of sense are made to run; and unless this '*matter*' of experience is supplied, there is no knowledge of any kind possible. But when the '*matter*' is provided, and the '*forms*' are applied to their true and appropriate '*matter*'—there are, as will be seen, cases wherein this does, and others wherein it does not take place—the mind is then not bound down to its particular experiences, but can really conceive and utter universal and necessary (synthetic) truths that no mere experience could ever give.

The detailed exposition of Kant's theory falls under three heads.

I.—*Transcendental Aesthetic*. The impressions of sense are (passively) received as empirical '*matter*' into certain pure or *a priori* '*forms*,' distinguished by the special name of '*Forms of Intuition*.'

1. The data of the *internal* sense (joy, pain, &c.) fall into, or are received as, a series or succession, in *Time*: the data of the *external* senses are received, directly, as lying outside of us and by the side of each other, in *Space*; indirectly, in their influence upon our internal state, as a succession in *Time*.

2. As forms, *Space* and *Time* are of non-empirical origin; they cannot be thought away, as everything can that has been acquired. They are forms of *intuition*, in having nothing of the character of abstracted *concepts*.

3. If they were not *a priori*, there would be no foundation possible for the established (synthetic *a priori*) truths of Mathematics and Geometry resting upon the intuition of *Space*, nor for Arithmetic, which, consisting of the repetition or succession of units, rests upon the intuition of *Time*.

4. How are we enabled actually to construct the pure science of Mathematics, made up of synthetic truths *a priori*, is thus to be explained. Because the subjective forms of space or Time are mixed up with all our sense-perceptions (intuitions), and only such *phenomena* in *Space* and *Time* (not Things-in-themselves

or noumena) are ever open to our intuitive apprehension, we may pronounce freely *à priori* in all that relates to determinations of Space and Time, provided it is understood of *phenomena*, constituted by the very addition of these mental forms.

II.—*Transcendental Logic—Analytic.* Phenomena (constituted out of the 'matter' of sense as ordered in the Forms of Intuition) themselves in turn become 'matter,' which the mind, as spontaneously active, combines and orders in the process of Judgment, under certain 'forms,' distinguished by the special name of 'Categories of the Understanding.'

1. These are twelve in number, and discoverable from the common analysis of judgments in logic.

a. Three categories of QUANTITY: *Unity, Plurality, Universality* (as involved in Singular, Particular, Universal judgments respectively).

b. Three of QUALITY: *Reality, Negation, Limitation* (in Positive, Negative, Infinite judgments).

c. Three of RELATION: *Substantiality, Causality, Community or Reciprocal action* (in Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive judgments).

d. Three of MODALITY: *Possibility, Existence, Necessity* (in Problematic, Assertory, Apodeictic judgments).

2. Until a synthesis of intuitions (perceptions) takes place under some one of these pure or *à priori* concepts, there is no Knowledge, or, in the proper meaning of the word, Experience. The fact of such a synthesis makes all the difference between the mere perception of a particular sequence in the subjective consciousness, *e.g.* my having the sense of weight in supporting a body, and the objective experience, true for all, The body is heavy.

3. The reason, now, why we can farther say that no possible experience will not come under the Categories, as in saying that effects *must* have a cause—or, which is the same thing, why we are enabled to utter synthetic judgments *à priori*, objectively valid, regarding nature—is this, that without the Categories (forms of the spontaneous activity of the pure *ego*) there cannot be any experience at all; experience, actual or possible, is phenomena bound together in the Categories.

4. But, if we can extend our knowledge beyond actual experience because experience is constituted by the Categories of the Understanding, the extension is only to be to *possible* objects of experience, which are phenomena in Time and Space; never to Things-in-themselves or Noumena, of which there can be no sensible (intuitive) apprehension.

[Kant makes this apparent chiefly by the consideration, under the head of 'Schematism of the pure concepts of the Understanding,' of the conditions under which sensible phenomena can be subsumed under the Categories. But we must here forego the exposition of this, and of the system of 'Principles of the pure understanding' or (synthetic *à priori*) Rules for the objective use of the Categories, that follows. These, including (1) 'Axioms

of Intuition,' (2) 'Anticipations of Perception,' (3) 'Analogies of Experience'—Amid all changes of phenomena, Substance abides the same, All change obeys the law of Cause and Effect, Substances co-existing in space act and re-act upon each other; (4) 'Postulates of Empirical Thought'—are the *d priori* construction that the mind is able to make of a Pure Science, or Metaphysic, of Nature.]

• III.—*Transcendental Logic—Dialectic.* Besides the Categories of the Understanding, there are certain other forms of the thinking faculty, according to which the mind seeks to bring its knowledge to higher unities: these are distinguished by the special name of 'Ideas of the Reason' [Reason to be taken here in a narrow sense as opposed to Sense and Understanding].

1. The Ideas of the Reason are three in number: (a) The (psychological) idea of the *Soul*, as a thinking substance, immaterial, simple and indestructible; (b) The (cosmological) idea of the *World*, as a system or connected whole of phenomena; (c) The (theological) idea of *God*, as supreme condition of the possibility of all things, the being of beings.

2. These Ideas of the Reason applied to our Cognitions have a true *regulative* function, being a constant spur towards bringing our relative intellectual experience to the higher unity of the absolute or unconditioned: but they are not *constitutive* principles, giving any real advance of knowledge, for truly objective knowledge is only of phenomena as possible objects of experience.

3. Nevertheless, by a law of our mental nature, we cannot avoid ascribing an illusory objective reality to these Ideas, making thus a 'transcendent' application of the Categories to objects there can never be any possible experience of ('transcendent of experience' *versus* 'immanent to experience'): and by this 'natural dialectic of the Reason,' we become involved in a maze of deception or 'transcendental show,' as seen in the Paralogisms regarding the metaphysical nature of the soul, the Antinomies or contradictory and mutually destructive assertions regarding the universe, and the sophistical arguments for the existence of God—that make up Metaphysics.

(The acknowledged powerlessness of the *Speculative Reason* to find conditions for the validity of the synthetic judgments *d priori* of Metaphysics—to prove theoretically the existence of the soul, God, &c., Kant overcame by setting forth Immortality, Free-will, and God, as postulates of the *Practical Reason* or Moral Faculty; and the Ideas of the Reason then became of use in helping the mind to conceive assumptions that were *morally* necessary.)

Besides rousing Kant in Germany to undertake his *critical* inquiries, the general philosophical scepticism of Hume, evoked in Scotland a protest of a different kind, in the *believing* Common-sense doctrine of Reid. But of Reid's views there was a singular anticipation made by the Jesuit Père Buffier in 1724, in an attempt to refute another and earlier sceptical doctrine, developed out of the fundamental principle of Cartesianism.

FATHER BUFFIER. Buffier anticipated Reid, both in the doctrine of Common Sense, and in the easy way of bringing truths to it. He describes Common Sense as 'that disposition or quality which Nature has placed in all men, or evidently in the far greater number of them, in order to enable them all, when they have arrived at the age and use of reason, to form a common and uniform judgment with respect to objects different from the internal sentiment of their own perception, and which judgment is not the consequence of any anterior principle.' With respect to at least some first principles, men in general are as good philosophers as Descartes or Locke, for all that they have to decide is a matter of fact, namely, whether they cannot help making a particular judgment. But Buffier does not exclude Philosophy altogether; on the contrary, he gives some marks or tests whereby the dictates of common sense may be scientifically ascertained. (1) First principles are so clear that, 'if we attempt to defend or attack them, it cannot be done but by propositions which manifestly are neither more clear nor more certain. (2) They are so universally received amongst men, in all times and countries, and by all degrees of capacity, that those who attack them are, comparatively to the rest of mankind, manifestly less than one to a hundred, or even a thousand.' (3) However they may be discredited by speculation, all men, even such as disavow them, must act in their conduct as if they were true.

The truths that Buffier considers to belong to common sense are scattered through his book on 'First Truths.' The basis of all knowledge is 'the interior sense we each of us have of our own existence, and what we feel within ourselves.' Every attempt to prove this truth only makes it darker. In like manner, the idea of unity (personality) is a first truth. Our identity follows from our unity or indivisibility. In opposition to Malebranche, who asserts that mind cannot act upon body, Buffier maintains as a first truth, that *my soul produces motions in my body*.

Among first truths are included the following:—(1) 'There are other beings and other men in the world besides me. (2) There is in them something that is called truth, wisdom, prudence; and this something is not merely arbitrary. (3) There is in me something that I call intelligence or mind, and something which is not that intelligence or mind, and which is named *body*; so that each possesses properties different from the other. (4) What is generally said and thought by men in all ages and countries, is true. (5) All men have not combined to deceive and impose upon me. (6) All that I see, in which is found order, and a permanent, uniform, and constant order, must have an intelligence for its cause.'

What may hold the place of first truths in the testimony of the senses? Buffier's answer shows great laxity in the selection of first truths. (1) 'They (the senses) always give a faithful report of things as they appear to them. (2) What appears to them is almost always conformable to the truth in matters proper for men in general to know, unless some rational cause of doubt presents

itself. (3) It will be easy to discern when the evidence of the senses is doubtful, by the reflections we shall point out.' Another first truth is that a thing may be impossible although we see no contradiction in it. Again, the validity of testimony in certain cases, is a first truth; there are circumstances wherein no rational man could reject the testimony of other men. Also the free agency of man is a first truth; free will is 'the disposition a man feels within himself, of his capacity to act or not to act, to choose or not to choose a thing, at the same moment.'

DR. THOMAS REID. The word Sense, as used by Philosophers, from Locke to Hutcheson, has signified a means of furnishing our minds with ideas, without including judgment, which is the perception of agreement or disagreement of our ideas. But, in common language, Sense always implies judgment. Common Sense is the degree of judgment common to men that we can converse and transact business with, or call to account for their conduct. 'To judge of First Principles requires no more than a sound mind free from prejudice, and a distinct conception of the question. The learned and the unlearned, the philosopher and the day-labourer, are upon a level, and will pass the same judgment, when they are not misled by some bias.' A man is not now moved by the subtle arguments of Zeno against motion, though, perhaps, he knows not how to answer them.

Although First Principles are self-evident, and not to be proved by any arguments, still a certain kind of reasoning may be applied in their support. (1) To show that the principle rejected stands upon the same footing with others that are admitted. (2) As in Mathematics, the *reductio ad absurdum* may be employed. (3) The consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned, ought to have great authority with regard to first principles, where every man is a competent judge. (4) Opinions that appear so early in the mind, that they cannot be the effect of education or of false reasoning, have a good claim to be considered as first principles.

Reid asks whether the decisions of Common Sense can be brought into a code such as all reasonable men shall acquiesce in. He acknowledges the difficulty of the task, and does not profess that his own enumeration is perfectly satisfactory. His classification proceeds on the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. That a cone is the third part of a cylinder, of the same base and height, is a necessary truth. It does not depend upon the will and power of any being. That the Sun is the centre of the planetary system is a contingent truth; it depends on the power and will of the Being that made the planets.

I.—*Principles of Contingent Truth.* (1) Everything that I am conscious of exists. The irresistible conviction we have of the reality of what we are conscious of, is not the effect of reasoning; it is immediate and intuitive, and therefore a first principle. (2) The thoughts that I am conscious of are the thoughts of a being

that I call *myself*, *my mind*, *my person*. (3) Those things did really happen that I distinctly remember. (4) Our own personal identity and continued existence, as far back as we remember anything distinctly. (5) Those things do really exist that we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. [This is Dr. Reid's theory of the external world elevated to the dignity of a first principle.] (6) We have some degree of power over our actions and the determinations of our will. The origin of our idea of power is not easily assigned. Power is not an object of sense or consciousness. We see events as successive, but not the power whereby they are produced. We are conscious of the operations of our minds; but power is not an operation of mind. It is, however, implied in every act of volition, and in all deliberation and resolution. Likewise, when we approve or disapprove, we believe that men have power to do or not to do. (7) The natural faculties, whereby we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious. (8) Our fellow-men with whom we converse are possessed of life and intelligence. (9) Certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind. The signification of those things we do not learn by experience, but by a kind of natural perception. Children, almost as soon as born, may be frightened by an angry or threatening tone of voice. (10) There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion. (11) There are many events depending on the will of man, possessing a self-evident probability, greater or less, according to circumstances. In men of sound mind, we expect a certain degree of regularity in their conduct. (12) In the phenomena of nature, what is to be, will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances. Hume has shown that this principle is not grounded on reason, and has not the intuitive evidence of mathematical axioms.

II.—*Principles of Necessary Truth.* In regard to those, Reid thinks it enough to divide them into classes, and to mention some by way of specimen in each class.

1. Grammatical Principles. (1) Every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood. (2) Every complete sentence must have a verb.

2. Logical Principles. (1) Any contexture of words, that does not make a proposition, is neither true nor false. (2) Every proposition is either true or false. (3) No proposition can be both true and false at the same time. (4) Reasoning in a circle proves nothing. (5) Whatever may be truly affirmed of a genus, may be truly affirmed of all its species, and of all the individuals belonging to that species.

3. The Mathematical Axioms.

4. The Principles of Taste. Setting aside the tastes acquired by habit and fashion, there is a natural taste, that is partly animal and partly rational. Rational taste is the pleasure of

contemplating what is conceived as excellent in its kind. This taste may be true or false, according as it is founded on true or false judgment. If it may be true or false, it must have first principles. Natural taste is the pleasure or disgust arising from certain objects before we are capable of perceiving any excellence or defect in them.

5. First Principles in Morals. (1) An unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one. (2) A generous action has more merit than a merely just one. (3) No man ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder. (4) We ought not to do to others what we should think unjust or unfair to be done to us in like circumstances. [By endeavouring to make the golden rule more precise, Reid has converted it into an identical proposition.]

6. Metaphysical Principles. (1) The qualities that we perceive by our senses must have a subject (which we call body), and the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject (which we call mind). The distinction between sensible qualities, and the substance to which they belong, is not the invention of philosophers, but is found in the structure of all languages. (2) Whatever begins to exist must have a cause. (3) Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty, from marks or signs of them in the effect.

7. We may refer to some of the necessary truths regarding Matter. (1) All bodies must consist of parts. (2) Two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time. (3) The same body cannot be in different places at the same time. (4) A body cannot be moved from one place to another without passing through intermediate space.

We may add also some of the First Principles connected with the Senses. (1) A certain sensation of touch suggests to the mind the conception of hardness, and creates the belief of its existence. (2) The notion of extension is suggested by feelings of touch, but is not given us by any sense. (3) It is by instinct we know the part of our body affected by particular pains.

DUGALD STEWART. The chief point wherein Stewart departs from Reid in the treatment of the Fundamental Laws of Belief (as he prefers to call the dictates of Common Sense), is in regard to Mathematical demonstration.

1. *Mathematical Axioms.* On this subject Stewart follows Locke in preference to Reid. Locke observes that, although the axioms are appealed to in proof of particular cases, yet they are only verbal generalizations of what, in particular instances, has been already acknowledged as true. Also many of the maxims are mere verbal propositions, explaining only the meaning of words. Stewart quotes Dr. Campbell to the effect that all axioms in Arithmetic and Geometry are identical propositions—reducible to the maxim ‘whatever is, is.’ That one and four make five means that five is the name of one added to four. To this doctrine Stewart adheres so far as Arithmetic is concerned. In Algebra

and Arithmetic, 'All our investigations amount to nothing more, than to a comparison of different expressions of the same thing. But the axioms of Euclid are not definitions, they are universal propositions applicable to an infinite variety of instances. Reid said that the axioms are necessary truths; and so the conclusions drawn from them were necessary. But, as was observed by Locke, it is impossible to deduce from the axioms a single inference. The axioms cannot be compared with the first Principles of Natural Philosophy, such as the laws of motion, from which the subordinate truths of that science are derived. The principles of Mathematics are, not the axioms, but the definitions. 'Yet although nothing is deduced from the axioms, they are nevertheless implied and taken for granted in all our reasonings; without them we could not advance a step.' [In a note Stewart observes that by the Axioms he does not mean all those prefixed to Euclid, which include the definition of parallel lines. He considers it a reproach to Mathematics that the so-called Axiom regarding parallel lines has not been made the subject of demonstration.]

2. *Mathematical Demonstration.* Demonstrative evidence, the characteristic of mathematics, has arrested universal attention, but has not been satisfactorily explained. The true account of mathematical demonstration seems to be—that it flows from the *definitions*. In other sciences, the propositions we attempt to prove express facts real or supposed; in mathematics, the propositions assert merely a connexion between certain suppositions and certain consequences. The whole object is to trace the consequences flowing from an assumed hypothesis. In the same manner, we might devise arbitrary definitions about moral or political ideas, and deduce from them a science as certain as geometry. The science of mechanics is an actual instance, 'in which, from arbitrary hypotheses concerning physical laws, the consequences are traced which would follow, if such was really the order of nature.' In the same way, a code of law might consist of rules strictly deduced from certain principles, with much of the method and all the certainty of geometry. The reasoning of the mathematician is true only of his hypothetical circle; if applied to a figure described on paper, it would fail, because all the radii could not be proved to be exactly equal. The peculiar certainty of mathematics thus rests upon the definitions, which are hypotheses and not descriptions of facts.

Stewart considers that the certainty of arithmetic is likewise derived from hypotheses or definitions. That $2 + 2 = 4$, and $3 + 2 = 5$, are definitions analogous to those in Euclid, and forming the material of all the complicated results in the science. But he objects to the theory of Leibnitz, that all mathematical truths are identical propositions. The plausibility of this theory arises from the fact, that the geometrical notions of equality and of coincidence are the same; all the propositions ultimately resting upon an imaginary application of one triangle to another. As superimposed figures occupy the same space, it

was easy to slide into the belief that identity and equality were convertible terms. Hence it is said, all mathematical propositions are reducible to the form, $a = a$. But this form does not truly render the meaning of the proposition, $2 + 2 = 4$.

3. The other Laws of Belief resemble the axioms of Geometry in two respects: 1st, they do not enlarge our knowledge, and secondly, they are implied or involved in all our reasonings. Stewart advances two objections to the phrase—principles of common sense: it designates, as principles, laws of belief from which no inference can be deduced; and secondly, it refers the origin of these laws to common sense, a phraseology that he considers unfit for the logician, and unwarranted by ordinary usage.

Stewart defends the alleged instinctive power of interpreting certain expressions of the countenance, certain gestures of the body, and certain tones of the voice. This had been resolved by Priestley into associated experiences: but, for the other opinion, Stewart offers two reasons: (1) Children understand the meaning of smiles and frowns long before they could remark the connexion between a passion and its expression. (2) We are more *affected* by natural signs than by artificial ones. One is more affected by the facial expression of hatred than by the word *hatred*.

Another instinct adduced by Stewart, is what he calls the law of Sympathetic Imitation. This is contrasted with the intentional imitation of a scholar; it depends 'on the inimical powers connected with our *bodily frame*.' If we see a man laughing or sad, we have a tendency to take on the expression of those states. So yawning is contagious. 'Even when we *conceive* in solitude the expression of any passion, the effect of the conception is visible in our own appearance.' Also, we imitate instinctively the tones and accents of our companions. As we advance in years, this propensity to imitation grows weaker.

SIR W. HAMILTON. I.—*Common Sense*. All reasoning comes at last to principles that cannot be proved, but are the basis of all proof. Such primary facts rest upon consciousness. To what extent, then, is consciousness an infallible authority? *What* we are actually conscious of, it is impossible for scepticism to doubt; but the dicta of consciousness, as evidence of facts beyond their own existence, may without self-contradiction be disputed. Thus, the reality of our perceptions of solidity and extension is beyond controversy; but the reality of an external world, evidenced by these, may be doubted. Common Sense consists of all the original data of Consciousness.

'The argument from Common Sense is one strictly philosophical and scientific.' The decision is not refused to the judgment of philosophers and accorded to the verdict of the vulgar. The problem of philosophy, and a difficult one, is to discover the elementary feelings or beliefs. This task cannot be taken out of the hands of philosophers. Sometimes the purport of the doctrine of Common Sense has been misunderstood, and it has been

regarded as an appeal to 'the undeveloped beliefs of the unreflecting many.' Into this error fell Beattie, Oswald, and, in his earlier work, even Reid. But Hamilton alleges that Reid improves in his subsequent works, and that his treatment of Casuality with reference to the criterion of necessity, shows that he did not contemplate any uncritical appeal to Common Sense.

The criteria of the principles of Common Sense are these:—
1. *Incomprehensibility* [an inapt word for expressing that they are fundamental and not to be explained by reference to anything else]. 2. *Simplicity* [another name for the same fact]. 3. *Necessity*, and *Absolute Universality*. 4. *Certainty* [what is both necessary and universal must be certain. Hence in reality the four criteria consist of (1) the defining attribute of the principles, namely, that they are ultimate principles, and (2) the usually assigned attributes—Necessity and Universality].

Hamilton assigns historically three epochs in the meaning of Necessity:—(1) In the Aristotelian epoch, it was chiefly, if not exclusively, objective. (2) By Leibnitz, it was considered primarily as subjective. (3) By Hamilton himself, Necessity is farther developed into the two forms, *positive* and *negative* necessity; the application appears under the next head.

II.—*The Law of the Conditioned*. Necessity may be the result either of a power (*positive*), or of an impotency (*negative*) of the mind. In Perception, I cannot but think that I, and something different from me, exist. Existence is thus a native cognition, for it is a condition of thinking that all that I am conscious of exists. Other positive notions are the Logical Principles, the intuitions of Space and Time, &c. But there are negative cognitions the result of an impotence of our faculties. Hence the Law of the Conditioned, which is expressed thus:—'All that is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must.' Thus Space must be bounded or not bounded, but we are unable to conceive either alternative. We cannot conceive space as a whole, beyond which there is no further space. Neither can we conceive space as without limits. Let us imagine space never so large, we yet fall infinitely short of infinite space. But finite and infinite space are contradictories; therefore, although we are unable to conceive either alternative, one must be true and the other false. The conception of Time illustrates the same law. Starting from the present, we cannot think past time as bounded, as beginning to be. On the other hand, we cannot conceive time going backwards without end; eternity is too big for our imagination. Yet time had either a beginning or it had not. Thus 'the conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or poles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of the other.'

The chief applications of the Law of the Conditioned are to the Principles of Causality and Substance. Take first Causality.

Causality is the law of the Conditioned applied to a thing thought as existing in time. No object can be known unless thought as existent; and in time. Thinking the object, we cannot think it not to exist. This will be admitted of the present, but possibly denied of the past and future, under the belief that we can think annihilation or creation. But we cannot conceive an atom taken from the sum of existing objects. No more can we conceive creation. For what is creation? 'It is not the springing of nothing into something. Far from it:—it is conceived, and is by us conceivable, merely as the evolution of a new form of existence, by the fiat of the Deity.' We are therefore unable to annihilate in thought any object; we cannot conceive its absolute commencement. Given an object we know that as a phenomenon it began to be, but we must think it as existing previously in its elements. If then the object existed before in a different form, this is only to say that it had causes. Thus the law of the conditioned shows us that every phenomenon must have some causes, but what those causes are must be learned from experience. Granting his theory of Causality, Hamilton thinks that he is armed with a philosophical defence of the freedom of the will. He points out the contradictions of his predecessors, who held that *every* change had a cause, but excepted the changes of volition. If our moral consciousness give us freedom, and our intellectual consciousness give us universal causation, it follows that our faculty of knowledge is self contradictory. By regarding Causality as founded on an impotence of the mind, Hamilton thinks that such a negative judgment cannot prevail against the positive testimony of consciousness.

Hamilton has not applied the law of the Conditioned, with much detail, to the principle of Substance. The problem is—Why must I suppose that every known phenomenon is related to an unknown substance? We cannot think a phenomenon without a substance, nor a substance without a phenomenon. Take an object; strip it of all its qualities; and try to think the residuary substance. It is unthinkable. In the same way, try to think a quality as a quality, and nothing more. It is unthinkable, except as a phenomenon of something that does not appear; as, in short, the accident of a substance. This is the law of Substance and Phenomenon, and is merely an instance of the law of the conditioned.

JOHN STUART MILL. Mr. Mill's views on necessary truths are contained in his *Logic*, Book II., chaps. 5–7. He begins by asking why, if the foundation of all science is Induction, a peculiar certainty is ascribed to the sciences that are almost entirely deductive. The character of certainty and necessity attributed to mathematical truths is an illusion; and depends upon ascribing them to purely imaginary objects. There exist no points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight. In answer to this, it is said that the points and lines exist in our conceptions merely; but the ideal lines and figures are copies of actual lines and figures. Now a point is the *minimum visible*. A

geometrical line is inconceivable. Mr. Mill agrees with Dugald Stewart in regarding geometry as built upon hypotheses. The definitions of geometry are generalizations, obviously easy, of the properties of lines and figures. The conclusions of geometry are necessary, only as implicated in the suppositions from which they are evolved. The suppositions themselves merely approximate (though practically with sufficient accuracy) to the actual truth. That axioms as well as definitions must be admitted among the first principles, has been shewn by Whewell in his polemic against Stewart. Two axioms must be postulated: that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, and some property of parallel lines not involved in their definition. Regarding the foundation of the axioms, two views are held; one that they are experimental truths resting on observation; the other that they are *a priori* truths. The chief arguments in support of the *a priori* theory are the following:—

I.—In the first place, if our belief that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, were derived from the senses, we could know the truth of the proposition only by seeing or feeling the straight lines; whereas it is seen to be true by merely thinking of them. By simply thinking of a stone thrown into the water, we could not conclude that it would go to the bottom. On the contrary, if I could be made to conceive a straight line without having seen one, I should at once know that two such lines cannot enclose a space. Moreover, the senses cannot assure us that, if two straight lines were prolonged to infinity, they would continue for ever to diverge.

The answer to these arguments is found in the capacity of geometrical forms for being painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality. This enables us to make mental pictures of all combinations of lines and angles so closely resembling the realities, as to be as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as the realities themselves. If, then, by mere thinking we satisfy ourselves of the truth of an axiom, it is because we know that the imaginary lines perfectly represent the real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones, as we may from one real line to another. Thus, although we cannot follow two diverging lines by the eye to infinity, yet we know that, if they begin to converge, it must be at a finite distance; thither we can follow them in imagination, and satisfy ourselves that if the lines begin to approach, they will not be straight, but curved.

II.—The second argument is, that the axioms are conceived as universally and necessarily true. Experience cannot give to any proposition the character of necessity. The meaning of a necessary truth, as explained by Dr. Whewell, is a proposition the negation of which is not only false but inconceivable. The test of a necessary truth is the inconceivableness of the counter proposition. The power of conceiving depends very much on our constant experience, and familiar habits of thought. When two things have often been seen and thought of together, and never in any

instance seen or thought of separately, there is an increasing difficulty (which may in the end become insuperable) of conceiving the two things apart. Thus, the existence of antipodes was denied, because men could not conceive gravity acting upwards as well as downwards. The Cartesians rejected the law of gravitation, because they could not conceive a body acting where it was not. The inconceivability will be strongest where the experience is oldest and most familiar, and where nothing ever occurs to shake our conviction, or even to suggest an exception. It is thus, from the effect of constant association, that we are unable to conceive the reverse of the axioms. We have not even an analogy to help us to conceive two straight lines enclosing a space. Nay, when we imagine two straight lines, in order to conceive them enclosing a space, we repeat the very experiment that establishes the contrary. For it has been shown that imaginary lines serve as well for proving geometrical truths as lines in actual objects.

Dr. Whewell has illustrated in his own person the tendency of habitual association to make an experimental truth appear necessary. He continually asserts that propositions, known to have been discovered by genius and labour, appear, when once established, so self-evident, that, but for historical proof, we should believe that they would be recognized as necessarily true. He says, that the first law of motion might have been known to be true independently of experience, and that, at some future time, chemists may possibly come to see that the law of chemical combination in definite proportions is a necessary truth.

The logical basis of Arithmetic and Algebra. In Chapter VI., Mr. Mill examines the nature of arithmetic and algebra. The first theory that he examines is founded upon extreme Nominalism. It asserts that all the propositions in arithmetic are merely verbal, and that its processes are but the ringing of changes on a few expressions. But how, if the processes of arithmetic are mere substitutions of one expression of fact for another, does the fact itself come out changed? It is no doubt the peculiarity of arithmetic and algebra that they are the crowning example of symbolical thinking—that is, reasoning by signs, without carrying along with us the ideas represented by the signs. Algebra represents all numbers without distinction, investigating their modes of combination. Since, then, algebra is true, not merely of lines and angles like geometry, but of all things in nature, it is no wonder that the symbols should not excite in our minds ideas of any particular thing.

Mr. Mill denies that the definitions of the several numbers express only the meaning of words; like the so-called definitions of Geometry, they likewise involve an observed matter of fact.

Arithmetic is based upon inductions, and these are of two kinds: first, the definitions (improperly so called) of the numbers, and, secondly, the axioms—The sums of equals are equal; The differences of equals are equal. The inductions are strictly true of all objects, although a hypothetical element may be involved; the unit

of the numbers must be the same or equal. One pound added to one pound will not make two pounds, if one pound be troy and the other avoirdupois. Mathematical certainty is certainty of inference or implication. Conclusions are true hypothetically; how far the hypothesis is true is left for separate consideration. It is of course practicable to arrive at new conclusions from assumed facts, as well as from observed facts; Descartes' theory of vortices being a pertinent example.

Criticism of Spencer's Theory. Mr. Spencer agrees with Mr. Mill in regarding the axioms as 'simply our earliest inductions from experience,' but he holds that inconceivableness is the ultimate test of all belief. And for two reasons. A belief held by all persons at all times ought to rank as a primitive truth. Secondly, the test of universal or invariable belief, is our inability to conceive the alleged truth as false. I believe that I feel cold, because I cannot conceive that I am not. So far Mr. Spencer agrees with the intuitive school, but he differs from that school in holding the fallibility of the test of inconceivableness. It is itself an infallible test, but is liable to erroneous application; and occasional failure is incident to all tests. Mr. Spencer's doctrine, therefore, does not erect the curable, but only the incurable limitations of the conceptive faculty into laws of the outward universe.

Mr. Spencer's arguments for the test of inconceivableness are two in number. (1) Every invariable belief represents the aggregate of all past experience. The inconceivableness of a thing implies that it is wholly at variance with all that is inscribed on the register of human experience. Mr. Mill answers, even if this test of inconceivableness represents our experience, why resort to it when we can go at once to experience itself? Uniformity of experience is itself far from being universally a criterion of truth; and inconceivableness is still farther from being a test of uniformity of experience. (2) Whether inconceivability be good evidence or bad, no stronger evidence is to be obtained. In Mr. Spencer's use of the word 'inconceivable,' there is an ambiguity whence has been derived much of the plausibility of his argument. Inconceivableness may signify inability to get rid of an *idea*, or inability to get rid of a *belief*. It was in the second sense, not in the first, that antipodes were inconceivable. It is in the first sense that we cannot conceive an end to space. In Mr. Spencer's argument, inconceivable really means unbelievable. 'When Mr. Spencer says that while looking at the sun a man cannot conceive that he is looking into darkness, he means a man cannot *believe* that he is doing so.' Now, many have disbelieved the externality of matter, even although they may have been unable to *imagine* tangible objects as mere states of consciousness. One may be unable to get rid of the idea of externality, and nevertheless regard it as an illusion. Thus we believe that the earth moves, and not the sun, although we constantly conceive the sun as rising and setting, and the earth as motionless. Whether then we mean by inconceivable-

ness, inability to get rid of an idea or inability to get rid of a belief, Mr. Spence's argument fails to be convincing.

HENRY L. MANSEL. Mr. Mansel has examined the subject of Intuition in his *Prolegomena Logica*, Chap. III.—VI., and in his *Metaphysics*. He takes up four kinds of necessity: mathematical, metaphysical, logical, and moral. He, to a great degree, follows Kant and Sir W. Hamilton.

I.—MATHEMATICAL NECESSITY. Mr. Mansel adopts the criterion of Necessity, enounced by Leibnitz. Whatever truths we must admit as everywhere and always necessary, must arise, not from observation, but from the constitution of the mind. Attempts have indeed been made to explain this necessity by a constant association of ideas, but associations, however frequent and uniform, fail to produce a higher conviction than one of mere physical necessity.

1. *The Axioms of Geometry*. The axioms of Geometry contain both analytical and synthetical judgments. (the distinction corresponding to Mill's verbal and real propositions).*

It is upon the synthetical judgments that the dispute turns. Are those axioms *a priori*, or derived from experience? Mr. Mansel says that Mr. Mill's argument contradicts the direct evidence of consciousness, and, however powerful as an *argumentum ad hominem* against Dr. Whewell, fails to meet the real question at issue. 'What is required is to account, not for the necessity of geometrical axioms as *truths* relating to objects without the mind, but as *thoughts* relating to objects within.' 'Why must I invest imaginary objects with attributes not contained in the definition of them? I can imagine the sun remaining continually fixed in the meridian, or a stone sinking 99 times and floating the 100th; and yet my experience of the contrary is as invariable as my experience of the geometrical properties of bodies.' Why then do we attribute a higher necessity to the axioms of Geometry? The answer is taken direct from Kant. It is because space is itself an *a priori* notion, not derived from without of the mind. The author here

played by imagination in empirical and in necessary judgments. In empirical judgments, its value depends upon the fidelity of its adherency to the original. Geometrical truths, on the other hand, are absolutely true of the objects of imagination, but only nearly true of real objects. The reason is, that the truths of physical science depend on experience alone, but geometry relates to the figures of that *a priori* space, which is the indispensable condition of all experience.

2. *Arithmetic*. Arithmetic is richly, as geometry is scantily,

* Analytical judgments are: 'The whole is greater than its part,' 'If equals be added to equals, the sums are equal;' 'Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.' Synthetical judgments are: 'A straight line is the shortest distance between two points;' 'Two straight lines which, being met by a third, make the interior angles less than two right angles, will meet, if produced.'

supplied with *a priori* principles. 'It is not by reasoning we learn that two and two make four, nor from this proposition can we in any way deduce that four and two make six.' We must have recourse in each separate case to the senses or the imagination, and, by presenting to the one or to the other a number of individual objects corresponding to each term separately, *envisage* the resulting sum.*

No number is capable of definition. Six cannot be defined as $5 + 1$. In this view of Arithmetic, Mansel remarks that he differs from Leibnitz, Hegel, and Mill. [It is not proper to put Mill along with Leibnitz in this connexion.]

II.—METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY. Metaphysics, as well as Mathematics, has been regarded as possessed of Synthetical judgments. Two are selected for examination, the Principles of Substance and Causality.

1. *The Principle of Substance* is that all objects of perception are qualities that exist in some subject to which they belong. Reid said a ball has colour and figure, but it is not colour and figure; it is something that has colour and figure,—it is a substance. Berkeley thought it more consonant even with common sense to reject this imperceptible support of perceived attributes. Hume observed that, as we are conscious of nothing but impressions and ideas, we may as well throw away the barren figment of Mind. In opposition to this, Reid appealed to the Principle of Substance as a dictate of common sense. But are we conscious of substance? Reid and Stewart have again and again conceded that we are not; they have consequently abandoned the only position from which a successful attack could be made on either Berkeley or Hume. Mr. Mansel therefore, after Maine de Biran, affirms that we are immediately conscious of *Self* as substance. The one intuited substance is myself, in the form of a power conscious of itself. The notion of substance, thus derived, may be applied to other conscious beings, but not farther. In regard to physical phenomena, we have no *positive* notion of substance other than the phenomena themselves. Mr. Mansel is thus unable to prove substance against Berkeley, but he nevertheless complains that Berkeley denied, instead of merely doubting, the existence of matter. In conclusion, it is not a necessary truth that all sensible qualities belong to a subject. 'Nor is it correct to call it a fundamental law of human belief; if by that expression is meant anything more than an assertion of the universal tendency of men to liken other things to themselves, and to speak of them under forms of expression adapted to such likeness, far beyond the point where the parallel fails.'

* In a note, Mr. Mansel adds, 'The real point at issue is not whether 4 and $2 + 2$ are at bottom identical—so that *both being given*, an analysis of each will ultimately show their correspondence; but whether the former notion, definition and all, is contained in the latter. In other words, whether a man who has never learned to count beyond two, could obtain 3 , 4 , 5 , and all higher numbers, by mere dissection of the numbers which he possesses already.'

2. *The Principle of Causality*.—Whatever begins to exist must take place in consequence of some cause. Hume and Brown regard cause as mere invariable sequence. This theory of causation confounds two facts. That every event must have some antecedent or other, is one thing; that this particular event must have this particular antecedent, is a very different thing. The uniformity of nature is only a law of things, an observed fact, the contradictory of which is at any time conceivable. This portion of the principle of causation is not a necessary truth. But that every event must have some antecedent or other is a necessary truth. For we must think every event as occurring in time, and therefore as related to some antecedent in time. Thus far Mr. Mansel adopts the theory of Sir W. Hamilton.

The analysis that resolves causation into mere temporal antecedents is, however, imperfect. To complete the notion of cause, we must add the idea of *productive power*. Reid was unable to meet Hume's theory of causation, as he was unable to meet his theory of substance, and in both cases for the same reason. He denied a consciousness of mind as distinguished from its states and operations. Hume showed that volition had no power to move a limb, for paralysis might supervene, and the supposed power of volition would be destroyed. Mr. Mansel seeks for an intuition of power. 'The intuition of Power is not immediately given in the action of matter upon matter; nor yet can it be given in the action of matter upon mind, nor in that of mind upon matter; for to this day we are utterly ignorant how matter and mind operate upon each other.' Where, then, is such an intuition to be found? *In mind as determining its own modifications*. 'In every act of volition, I am fully conscious that it is in my power to form the resolution or to abstain; and this constitutes the presentative consciousness of free will and of power.' The idea of power is thus a relation between ourselves and our volitions (not our movements). Can any similar relation exist between the heat of fire and the melting of wax? It cannot be said that there is; and thus Causality, as applied to matter, is a negative notion. The only positive meaning of cause is either some antecedent or an invariable antecedent. Mr. Mansel (in this respect following Hamilton) draws attention to the fact that by breaking through the objective necessity of Causality, a door is opened for the admission of free-will.

III.—LOGICAL NECESSITY consists of the three laws of thought, the well-known principles of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. The discussion of those laws, however, falls more within the province of logic.

IV.—MORAL NECESSITY. Moral judgments are necessary, as, e.g., ingratitude and treachery must at all times be worthy of condemnation. (For the theory of duty, see ETHICAL SYSTEMS, Mansel.)

C.—*On Happiness.*

The highest application of the facts and laws of the mind is to Human Happiness. The doctrines relative to the Feelings have the most direct bearing on this end. It may be useful to resume briefly the various considerations bearing upon Happiness, and to compare them with the maxims that have grown up in the experience of mankind. We shall thus also supply an indispensable chapter of Ethics.

Happiness being defined the surplus of pleasure over pain, its pursuit must lie in accumulating things agreeable, and in warding off the opposites. The susceptibilities of the mind to enjoyment should be gratified to the utmost, and the susceptibilities to suffering should be spared to the utmost. It is impossible to contest this general conclusion, without altering the signification of the word. Still, the practical carrying out of the maxim, under all the complications of the human system, bodily and mental, demands many adjustments and reservations.

If the enumeration of Muscular Feelings, Sensations, and Emotions be complete, it contains all our pleasures and pains. It is unnecessary to repeat the list in detail. On the side of PLEASURE, we have, as leading elements:—Muscular Exercise, Rest after exercise; Healthy Organic Sensibility in general, and Alimentary Sensations in particular; Sweet Tastes and Odours; Soft and Warm Touches; Melody and Harmony in Sound; Cheerful Light and Coloured Spectacle; the Sexual feelings; Liberty after constraint; Novelty and Wonder; the warm Tender Emotions; Sexual, Maternal and Paternal Love, Friendship, Admiration, Esteem, and Sociability in general; Self-complacency and Praise; Power, Influence, Command; Revenge; the Interest of Plot and Pursuit; the charms of Knowledge and Intellectual exertion; the cycle of the Fine Arts, culminating in Music, Painting, and Poetry, with which we couple the enjoyment of Natural Beauty; the satisfaction attainable through Sympathy and the Moral Sentiment. In such an array, we seem to have all, or nearly all, the ultimate gratifications of human nature. They may spread themselves by association on allied objects, and especially on the means or instrumentality for procuring them, as Health, Wealth, Knowledge, Power, Dignified Position, Virtue, Society, Country, Life.

The PAINS are mostly implied in the negation of the pleasures. Muscular fatigue, Organic derangements and diseases, Cold, Hunger, ill Tastes and Odours; Skin lacerations; Discords in Sound; Darkness, Gloom, and excessive glare of Light; ungratified Sexual Appetite; Restraint after Freedom; Monotony; Fear in all its manifestations; privation in the Affections, Sorrow; Self-humiliation and Shame; Impotence and Servitude; disappointed Revenge; baulked Pursuit or Plot; Intellectual Contradictions

and Obscurity; the *Æsthetically Ugly*; Harrowed Sympathies; an evil Conscience.

As summed up in groups or aggregates, we have the pains or evils of Ill Health, Poverty, Toil, Ignorance, Meanness and Impotence, Isolation, and general Obstruction, Death.

Looking at human nature on the whole, we may single out as pleasures of the first order, Maternal love, Sexual love, Paternal love. Friendship, Complacency and Approbation, Power and Liberty newly achieved, Relishes, Stimulants, Warmth after chillness, and the higher delights of the ordinary Senses. In the absence of any considerable pains, a small selection of these gratifications, regularly supplied, would make up a joyful existence.

There are various practically important distinctions among our pleasures. In the first place, a certain number are *primary* susceptibilities of the human constitution; as the organic pleasures, the simpler gratifications of the five senses, the appetite of sex, and the elementary emotions. Others are *cultivated* or acquired, or are incidental to a high mental cultivation; as the higher susceptibilities to Fine Art, the affections and tender associations, the pleasures of knowledge. While cultivation may thus enlarge the sphere of pleasure, it necessarily creates new susceptibilities to pain; the absence or negation of those qualities rendered artificially agreeable must needs be painful.

Another distinction of importance is between the pleasures that appear as *appetite*, and those that are *desired* only in consequence of gratification. The natural appetites are well known; to refuse the objects of these is to inflict suffering. Other pleasures, if unstimulated, are unfelt: the rustic, inexperienced in the excitement of cities, has no painful longings for their pleasures; not through the want of susceptibility, but from there being no craving for such things prior to actual tasting. Human beings cannot be contented without the gratification of natural appetites; as to the privation of other pleasures, mere ignorance is bliss.

While it is a property of pleasure generally to prompt to effort and to desire without limit, there are certain circumstances that neutralize this tendency. One of these is the occurrence of pain at a certain stage, as when appetite palls by exhausted irritability. Another mode of quenching the insatiability of the pleasurable is found in the soothing tendency of the massive pleasures; a gentle and diffused stimulus is quieting and soporific. These constitute an important exception to the law of pleasure, and give birth to our serene and satisfying enjoyments, as warmth, affection, and the forms of beauty suggestive of repose. But Fine Art also contains, and glories in, ways of stimulating unbounded desire, under the name of the Ideal.

A farther mode of classifying pleasures is into—(1) those that are productive of pleasure to others, as the sympathies and benevolent affections, and all the pleasurable associations with virtuous conduct; (2) the gratifications that all may share in, as most of the Fine Art pleasures; (3) those that are in their nature attain-

able by all, but are consumed by the user, as many material agencies—food, space, house furniture, and, with a certain qualification, love, which, in the actual, is limited in quantity; (4) pleasures where a single person is gratified at the expense of others, as in power, dignity, and fame. The one extreme is identified with the harmony and mutual sympathy of human beings, the other with rivalry and mutual hostility.

The leading circumstance of Happiness—the accumulation of whatever can yield pleasure and remove pain—is qualified, in the first place, by the Law of RELATIVITY, as formerly explained. The operation of this law has a number of pregnant consequences, more or less taken into account in men's practice.

1. Absolute and entire Novelty of Sensation is necessary to the highest zest of any pleasure. A newly attained delight—a mother's first child, a first love, is beyond what can ever be realized again.

2. Every pleasure must be remitted in order to maintain its efficacy. Only for a certain limited time can the thrill of any delight be maintained; the stimulus then requires to be withdrawn for a period corresponding to the intensity of the effect.

3. In order to maintain a considerable flow of delight, each person must possess a variety of sources of pleasure; and the more that these differ in kind, or the more complete the alternation, the greater the happiness. It is hopeless to attain much enjoyment by playing upon any single string, however acute may be its thrill.

4. The reaction from pain is a source of great delight; as in restoration to health, the dispersing of a deep gloom or melancholy, the recovery from panic, the quenching of a long-repressed appetite. It is not true, however, that all pleasure demands to be preceded by pain; mere remission is enough to dispose us for the gratifications of food, exercise, music, or society. The distinction between the two kinds of pleasures is an important one; the last are our best and purest delights, although the first may by virtue of previous suffering be very intense.

5. Alternation is of great avail in lightening the pains of toil. When exhausted by one kind of work, we may yet be capable of some other, until such time as the system generally is worn out. The change, however, must be real: as in passing from mental work to bodily exertion; from reflection to expression; from abstract speculation to business; from science to fine art; from isolated action to co-operation with others.

6. The same emotion may be prolonged in its resonance by mere change of subject. The elation of the sublime is renewed in passing from one vast prospect to another, as in journeying through Alpine scenery.

7. The extension of our Happiness depends upon the acquiring of tastes, or susceptibilities of delight, in addition to what we have by nature. This will be again alluded to among the bearings of education on happiness.

The relations of Happiness to HEALTH are of great importance, but somewhat complicated in the statement.

Health must be defined as not simply the absence of physical pain, or derangement, but also a certain amount of vigour both for action and for sensibility. The healthy condition is not in itself a pleasure, except in the moments of recovery from illness, or of invigoration after depression.

It is manifestly essential that each one should have vigour sufficient to bear up against all unavoidable labours and burdens; without this, life must be a perpetual sense of oppression.

There is a still closer connexion between health and happiness, in the fact that certain physical functions of the nerves, and of some other special organs, are expressly allied to our sensibility. The human system has many sides, and many functions; and of the mental manifestations, there are three distinct departments, corresponding to the divisions of the mind. Now, happiness is not the immediate result of either Volition or Intelligence, but of *Feeling*, or the Emotional side of our being. A natural endowment for emotion, and great vigour and freshness in the organs concerned in emotion,—partly the Brain, and partly the Digestion, and the Secreting processes formerly shown to be related to feeling—make the physical basis of susceptibility to pleasure; hence the conservation of all these functions is the kind of health that directly bears on happiness.

It is well known that there are great differences in diseases, as respects their influence on the tone of enjoyment. Certain forms of nervous derangement, indigestion in most of its varieties, enfeebled circulation, are immediate sources of mental depression; on the other hand, the brain may be far on the road to paralysis, the heart may be in a state of degeneration, the lungs may be forming tubercles, the kidney affected with a mortal disease, while as yet but little diminution has taken place in the aptitude for enjoyment. In the one class of ailments, happiness is impaired almost from the first; in the other, the loss appears in shortened life. In the first case, there is a self-correcting reminder; in the second, a fatal sense of security, which as yet mankind have never learned to surmount by an effort of the reason.

As a general rule, hardly any employment of one's means and resources is so advantageous as the maintenance of a high state of vigour, both in the body in general, and in the organs of emotional sensibility in particular. Better to surrender many objects of pleasure, than to impair the organs of pleasure; few stimulants in a highly conditioned system are preferable to a greater number in an exhausted state of the sensibility. The rule may not be without exceptions; a less degree of health, coupled with one's supreme gratification, is more desirable than the very highest degree without that. One may be happier in the town, although healthier in the country. But, on the whole, the tendency is to undervalue the element of physical freshness in our pursuits, not to see that the loss of physical tone, consequent on the excess of

toil, is a chief cause of our disappointment in attaining the objects of our toil. The man that has made his fortune, and sacrificed his zest for enjoyment, is an unsuccessful man.

The problem of health necessarily involves all the special precautions against the known injuries and ailments. It involves the still more comprehensive purpose expressed generally by the proportioning of Expenditure to means of Support;—that is to say, the limitation of exhausting agencies—labour, irregularities, excesses; and the husbanding of sustaining and renovating agencies—nutrition, air, regimen, and all the hygienic resources. It is farther desirable that the economical adjustment of waste and supply should be commenced from our earliest years, and not, as usually happens, after a conscious reduction of vigour has roused the individual to a sense of imminent danger. There is a known proportion of labour, rest, nourishment, and exciting pleasure, suited to the average constitution, and compatible with the full duration of life; on this each one is safe to proceed at the outset, until the specialities of constitution are known. Any one presuming by virtue of youthful vigour and the absence of immediate bad consequences, to abridge the usual allowance of food, of sleep, of rest, of bodily exercise, and not at the same time owning any counterbalancing sources of renovation, is perilling life or happiness.

The special bearings of **ACTIVITY** and Occupation on Happiness, have been almost exhausted under the emotion of Plot-interest and Pursuit. Irrespective of the necessity of productive labour or industry, a great deal is constantly said respecting occupation as such, with a view to happiness. Some of our pleasures are pleasures of Activity, as bodily and mental exercise in the fresh condition of the system, and the putting forth of special energies and endowments; these are enhanced either by yielding valuable products, or by gratifying the pride of superiority to others. But the all-important feature of occupation is the æsthetic tendency of pursuit, already dwelt upon. Whatever may be the number or variety of our passive enjoyments, we cannot fill the day with these; the greatest compass of emotional susceptibility would be exhausted by a succession of pleasurable stimulants, with uninterrupted self-consciousness. The alternation of the object-regards with the subject-states is indispensable to avoiding the ennui of too much conscious excitement; and this is most readily supplied in the engrossment of pursuit. By spending the larger part of the day in the indifferentism of a routine occupation, we are prepared, during the remainder, to burst out into flashes of keen self-consciousness. The fewer our pleasures, the more needful for us to have a deadening occupation to fill the time, to banish self-consciousness when it could only be painful.

The explanation of the use of Activity to happiness implies the limitation. If the susceptibility to pleasure—the emotional temperament—be highly developed, and the sources of pleasure numerous and unexhausting, the portion of life deadened by

occupation and pursuit may be proportionally contracted, to give scope to the wakened sensibilities—the full consciousness of enjoyment.

Happiness is materially affected by KNOWLEDGE, or an acquaintance with the course of nature and of humanity. The characteristic of knowledge is accuracy, certainty, precision; its highest form is expressed by Science.

That a knowledge of the order of nature is requisite, for extracting the good, and neutralizing the evil, agencies, is plain enough. But the wide compass of the knowable cannot be overtaken by one mind; there is a division of labour; each department having its experts, relied on by the rest of the community. What kind and amount of knowledge it is advisable for *all* to possess, with a view to happiness, may not be easily agreed upon. The following considerations are offered on this point.

1. The acquisition of knowledge in any considerable amount, or to any great degree of precision, is toilsome, costly, and unpalatable to the mass of mankind; so that to dispense with it makes a clear gain, provided the want is fraught with no serious results. By favourable accidents of situation—such as a lot with few complications and risks, a ready access to skilled advisers, an aptitude for enduring the commoner hazards, a surplus of worldly means to remedy blunders, and general good fortune,—a small amount of acquired knowledge may answer all the ends of life. Ignorance implies large dependence on others, and on the accidents of things; and, according to circumstances, is blissful or tragic in its issues.

2. On the supposition that one is willing to pay the cost of acquisition, for the greater command and certainty of the means of happiness, the subjects directly applicable to the end appear to be these. In the first place, there should be a familiarity with our Bodily Constitution; a knowledge still more requisite when as parents, guardians, teachers, we have the control of the lives of others. In the next place, the elements of Physical and Chemical science, besides their direct bearing on the physiology of the human frame, have many collateral applications in everyday life, as in matters relating to cleanliness, warmth, clothing, purity of the air, cookery, &c. In the third place, some knowledge of the Mind, whether attained by observation, by theory, or by both conjoined, is of value in appreciating character and dispositions, and in the guidance and management of those about us. Fourthly, knowledge of the course of Affairs in the world generally, arrived at by observation and by historical and political studies, is essential to the guidance of our footsteps in the society we live in. Fifthly, whatever studies lead to an accurate estimate of Evidence, are of the highest import; their application extending much beyond our own happiness. A large number of our decisions must be made upon evidence that is only Probable; and to find out where the preponderance lies, needs either practical or scientific training. The aptitude for judging according to the

reasons of things, if it were more widely possessed, would be seen to ramify in endless ameliorations of the lot of humanity. Besides the success that would attend expectations so based, it is in the nature of such reasonings to command *agreement* among different minds, and thereby conduce to harmonious co-operation, where at present the rule is distraction and discord.

The poetical and romantic pictures, cherished for the sake of our aspirations and ideals, are directly opposed to the conditions of the knowledge now depicted, and add to our difficulties, both in attaining it, and in putting it in practice. Yet, as these ideals, although they should be moderately indulged in, cannot be expelled from human life, it is a point of some moment, to know what is their exact bias, and to make allowance for that, when we have to quit fancy for the domain of fact. Now, the exaggerating tendencies of artistic embellishment, to be guarded against, relate mainly to the possibilities of happiness; giving an overstrained account of what human nature can do, and can enjoy. The romancist uniformly oversteps the limitations of the human faculties, and throws out lures to make us attempt too much; an exact knowledge of the physical and the mental laws, and of that crowning aspect of them, the general law called Correlation or Persistence of Force, is the best counteractive.

3. In knowledge of the kind now specified, lies the means of conquering the happiness-destroyer, Fear. For the sake of this great victory, Epicurus thought the sacrifice of religion not too much. No other source of courage is comparable to knowledge; it teaches what fears are baseless, without sapping the wise precautions against evil.

4. When the attainment of such knowledge as is now specified, is a special liking or individual taste, the concurrence is one fortunate for happiness to self, and a power of good for all around. Each highly-cultivated intelligence, combining exactness with extent of acquirement, is a luminous body thrown out on the dark ways of human life.

The bearings upon Happiness, of EDUCATION or Training, in its widest compass, are next to be noted, the special department of high intellectual culture having been now sufficiently adverted to.

1. Whatever training and instructions can do to fit us for our necessary avocations and labours, adds to our happiness. The pains of labour are alleviated by a good early training to the work. The horseman that has been habituated to the saddle from childhood, is not only more efficient, but more at ease than the late learner. Pitt's training in oratory under his father, contributed alike to his greatness, and to his enjoyment of the exercise of speaking.

2. A training to inevitable restraints, if commenced from early years, and sustained without intermission, triumphs over all uneasiness. Such is the submission of the soldier born in the army, and the habituation of the priest to his artificial mode of life.

It is on this principle, that the child carefully trained to prudential and moral restraints, and so secured against the relapses of the neglected offspring of vice and poverty, is placed, by that fact alone, on a vantage ground of happiness.

3. The amusements and amenities of life are only enjoyed to the full after special training. Even our games, sports, and pastimes, must be the subject of instruction; while the exercise and enjoyment of the Fine Arts—Music, Painting, Elocution—involve the cost of special masters. What are termed accomplishments are artificial and refined pleasures; they are a pure addition to the sum of enjoyment, and have no other meaning.

A very large mass of human pleasure is mixed up with our sociability; and much of our education consists in fitting us for intercourse with others; the end being to reduce the friction of uncultivated minds associating together, and to increase the pleasures of co-operation, sympathy, and affection.

An acquaintance with foreign languages may be classed among the means of pleasure. For people generally, they are the luxuries of education. The ancient tongues introduce us to a large fund of novel impressions; the languages of our contemporaries open an additional field of fresh and varied interest. It may be doubted, however, if the cost of the acquirement is repaid, in the majority of cases, by the advantage.

4. Tastes may be formed and strengthened by education, and every taste that there are means to gratify, is a part of happiness. An instructor, or a companion, may foster in us a taste for plants, for conchology, for antiquities; the meaning of which is that these several objects find a greater response of joyful feeling. Whether such an acquirement is desirable on the whole depends on circumstances; the education thus bestowed must occupy a space in one's life, and may possibly exclude some more valuable acquisition.

Education with a view to the maximum of happiness is a very different thing from education to greatness, or the maximum of efficiency for some important function. For happiness, tastes and accomplishments should be widely extended; even if there be one leading taste, it should not be exclusive; the law of relativity forbids the highest enjoyment to the monopoly of the mind with a single subject. Yet such monopoly is the condition of the greatest vigour of the faculties for some one end. The man that towers in science, in art, in statesmanship, in business, needs to be so engrossed with his subject, as to be excluded from variety of interests; he may have the reward of his greatness in moments of triumphant superiority, but he is liable to periods of protracted ennui.

As there is a natural constitution fitted for happiness, so there is an education possessing a like fitness.

There can be no very great happiness without paying regard to INDIVIDUALITY. The ideal state is the gratification of each taste, and the exercise of each faculty, in exact proportion to their degree of prominence. If the natural sociability be great, the

opportunities should correspond; if little, there should be an exemption from society. Many persons have some one prevailing bent, which being gratified makes happiness in itself, and which being refused leaves a blank not to be otherwise filled up. Sokrates declared that he would rather die than give up his vocation of cross-questioning. Faraday was miserable till he was placed in Davy's laboratory. Human beings differ so much, that the very same lot may be felicity to one and wretchedness to another.

The individuality that is not to be satisfied without a disproportionate share of worldly advantages being put out of the account, the most important circumstance is a fitting Occupation. To ascertain betimes the most decided bent and aptitude of each person, and to find a career suited to that, is the prime requisite of a fortunate lot. Next to a harmonizing avocation is the choice of Recreations and tastes, which may infuse gladness into the hours of leisure, the holiday weeks, and the years of retirement. This, well thought of, and prepared for, by early choice, by education and fostering, will make oases in the desert waste of an unattractive profession.

The existence of unsatisfied DESIRE is, so far as it goes, unhappiness. An effort of judgment must pronounce whether we should endeavour to suppress a desire impracticable, or retain it either as a goal of pursuit or as an ideal longing. Forced contentment is the result of the first alternative; activity in actual, or in imaginary pursuit, is the second.

If an object is attainable by efforts not out of proportion to its value, we naturally pursue it. Contentment in the midst of wretchedness, squalor, poverty, is no virtue.

The indulgence in Ideals is a nicer question. Without giving some scope to our longings for higher fortunes and greater excellence, we should feel that we were cribbed, cabined, and confined; while such longings are liable to unfit us for seizing the actual. One of the most prudent and systematic of livers, Andrew Combe, pled for a moderate indulgence in fiction; there is neither possibility nor propriety in excluding poetry and romance from the class of open pleasures. Ideals are a kind of *stimulants*, and the wisest will always differ as to the limits of their employment; although there can be little doubt as to which is the safe side.

We are next to consider the relation of Happiness to WEALTH, or worldly abundance and advantages. At first sight, this would seem a simple matter. Not merely the terms of the definition of happiness, but all the conditions now considered, suppose a certain amount of worldly means; health, knowledge, education, individuality, are not to be obtained except at some expense; and are attainable in higher degrees according to the resources at our disposal. The general rule is apparently what is expressed in the remark of Sydney Smith, that he was a happier man for every additional guinea that came to him. Such at least is the deliberate judgment of the great mass of mankind, and the guiding principle of nearly all their labours; some may be industrious from other

motives, but the general multitude labour for money. And scarcely any limit is admitted to the pursuit; it would seem as if, at no pitch of pecuniary fortune, farther acquisition were considered futile.

Some of the consequences of this principle in its naked and unqualified aspect are undoubtedly grave and unpalatable to contemplate. Whoever would wish to believe in something like equality among human beings, must revolt at a doctrine which proportions enjoyment to wealth, and assigns to the millions of mankind a lot incompatible with any tolerable share of happiness. Moreover, the prize offered to cupidity, in the statement of such a principle, cannot but seem dangerous to the safety of possessions, and the order of society. Accordingly, moralists in every age have sought to invalidate the doctrine, by a counter statement of evils attaching to the possession of great riches. With some truth, a vast amount of exaggeration and rhetoric has been infused into the attack on opulence. That the rich are not perfectly happy is a fact, that they are not happier than the poor is an untenable position. Wealth multiplies the pleasures and alleviates the pains of life; and if it brings any evils peculiar to itself, it also brings remedies.

The most obvious temptation of wealth, coupled with idleness, is to immoderate indulgence. Another is the aiming at too many excitements, which necessarily entails troubles in management, as well as expenditure. A certain aptitude for business is necessary to smooth the possession and enjoyment of wealth; there may be individuals so devoid of this turn as to feel acutely the disadvantages; but, in their case, poverty is equally hopeless. To observe the limitations of the human powers, both in labour and in enjoyment, is not as yet the virtue of any class, while it is practicable only to a certain grade of abundance.

There are vices of the rich that mar their happiness; but most of them are also vices of the poor. So there are virtues of the poor favourable to happiness; all which are equally possible, and still more fruitful, to the rich. That prime requisite, Health, is very imperfectly secured in the lowest grades even of respectable citizenship. The public registers have demonstrated that mortality and disease diminish at every rise in the scale of wealth. The difference in the means of . . . is no less strongly in favour of the super-

The relationship of Happiness to VIRTUE, or Duty, is difficult to state with impartiality and precision. Here too we encounter the fervid views of the oratorical moralist, sanctified by the usage of all countries. It has been often laid down, that happiness, full and complete, is found in duty and in nothing else.

In order to see whether this assertion admits of being verified, it is necessary to approach the question from the other end. We must begin with the clear and undeniable fact, that duty, or virtue, is a sacrifice or surrender of something agreeable, from a regard to the interests of others; as when we pay our share of public burdens,

and restrain our desires for what is not our own. It is the essential of such acts to be painful; although, under certain circumstances, they may become agreeable. It would be a self-contradiction to maintain that acts of virtue are, from their very nature, and at all times, delightful; virtue in that case would not be virtue; being swallowed up in pleasure, it would be viewed simply as pleasure, and often disapproved of, as excessive and tending to vice.

We have already seen, under what limitations benevolence is a source of pleasure [p. 244]; the main condition being reciprocation, in some form or other. There is nothing necessarily self-rewarding either in benevolence or in duty. As regards duty, the principle of reciprocation also applies; when our abstaining from injury to other persons insures their abstaining from injury to us, we have the full value of our self-denial. It is the endeavour of society to secure this kind of reciprocity, and not only so, but to make each one's abstinence indispensable to their immunity. Virtue then becomes happiness, not by nature, but by institution. If a man can reap the advantages of society without paying the cost, he is happy in his vice, and would be less happy in his virtue.

It is one of the effects of moral training to create revulsion of feeling to whatever society deems wrong; vice is clothed with painful associations, and virtue is the only road compatible with happiness. Such essentially is Conscience. The person trained to a high intensity of these feelings is unable to take delight in things really delightful, if they are forbidden by conscience, echoing society.

The only remaining circumstance that spoils the happiness of doing wrong is the existence of a certain amount of sympathy, or natural disinterestedness, in each one's constitution. The effect of sympathy is, to make one shrink from the infliction of obvious pain, and to neutralize, in some degree, the pleasure of following out a natural bent at the expense of misery to others.

But for these three circumstances,—sure retribution, the associations of moral training, and a fund of natural sympathy—the neglect of duty would, to all appearance, be the direct road to happiness. If we look to the facts, and not to what we wish and endeavour to bring about, we find that the happiest man is not the man of highest virtues, but he that can obtain social reciprocity and immunity, at a moderate outlay. To realize the greatest happiness of virtue, we should be careful to conform to the standard of the time, neither rising above nor falling beneath it; we should make our virtues apparent and showy, and perform them at the least sacrifice to ourselves: we should have our associations with duty, as well as our natural sympathies, only in a moderate degree of strength.

It is thus in vain to identify virtue with prudence, that is, with happiness. Duty is in part, and only in part, coincident with enjoyment. To form men to the highest virtues, we must appeal to other motives than their happiness, to the sources of disinterested conduct so often alluded to. It will then appear that

very great virtue is often opposed to happiness; the applause bestowed on the sublimely virtuous man is by way of making good a deficiency.

The happiness of RELIGION, in its relation to a future life, is not comparable to any of the enjoyments of this life. But as experienced through the sensibilities of our common nature, it may be not improperly brought into the comparison. The religious affections grow up like any others: they are more or less favoured by natural constitution, cherished by exercise, and echoed from all venerated objects and symbols. The religious fears are overcome by the same laws of our being as any other fears. The resulting happiness is the predominance of the affections over the fears. The pleasures of devotion have their fixed amount, in each individual, like the pleasures of knowledge or of fine art.

The securing of Happiness in any considerable degree, supposes METHOD, or a plan of life, well conceived, and steadily adhered to. This is only to apply to the crowning end, what is necessary in the subordinate pursuits of Health, Wealth, or Knowledge. Each one must choose what pleasures to follow out, what desires to suppress, what training to undergo, so as on the whole to make the most of one's individual lot. Misconceptions of ends, ignorance of means, succumbing to passing impulses, are fatal to success in all pursuits; the victim of such weaknesses loses the game, or must be saved by some other power.

It has to be admitted, however, that the stretch of energy requisite to compass so large an end, costs a great deal to the system; it is a heavy per centage deducted from the realized happiness. There are not a few instances where enjoyment is attained without any plan at all, the accidents being favourable; just as many persons have health, or wealth, without a thought of one or other; being all the happier that thought can be dispensed with.

Some individualities are so unfitted for prudential foresight, that they must either come under the sway of others or be left to the accidents. A being of a higher order, looking before and after, will desire a plan, and endeavour to abide by it. Forming an estimate of life as a whole, such a being has a settled tone of mind corresponding to that, not being much elated nor much depressed, by the fluctuations on one side or the other. If attainable by the individual, this settled and balanced estimate is worthy of the highest endeavours. It might be artificially aided, by diary or record, which would recall to mind, more forcibly than the best memory, the tenor of life in the long run, to quell the exaggerations of the passing moods.

D.—*Classifications of the Mind.*

THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

1. THOMAS AQUINAS.

First, Powers preceding the Intellect.

I.—VEGETATIVE. 1. *Nutrition*; 2. *Growth*; 3. *Generation*.

II.—EXTERNAL SENSES (five in number).

III.—INTERNAL SENSES. 1. *Common Sense* (the sense that compares and distinguishes the objects of the several senses); 2. *Imagination*; 3. *Æstimatoria* (discerning in objects what is not revealed by the senses, as the enmity of the wolf to the sheep); 4. *Memory* (including *Reminiscence*).

Secondly, The Intellect—comprising, 1. *Memory* (the retention or conservation of *species*); 2. *Reason*; 3. *Intelligentia* (properly an act of the intellect); 4. both *practical* and *speculative Reason*; 5. *Conscience*.

2. HERBERT OF CHERBURY.

His classification is mixed, and we give it as it stands, including Emotions as well as Intellect.

I.—NATURAL INSTINCT (explained under the history of Intuition, Appendix B).

II.—INTERNAL SENSE. 1. *Incorporeal* (having no physical antecedents, as joy, love, hope, trust); 2. *Corporeal*, arising from the *humores* (hunger; thirst, lust, melancholy, &c.); 3. *Objective feelings* (*ab objectis inveni*), including certain pleasures and pains derived from external objects; 4. *Mixed Sense*.

III.—EXTERNAL SENSES, not confined absurdly to five; for there are as many senses as there are *differentiæ* in the objects of sense.

IV.—DISCURSUS, which is the faculty of intellect proper.

3. GASSENDI.

I.—SENSE.

II.—PHANTASY.

III.—INTELLECT. 1. *Apprehension of God or Spirits*; 2. *Reflection*; and 3. *Reasoning*.

4. THOMAS REID.

1. *External Senses*; 2. *Memory*; 3. *Conception* or Simple Apprehension; 4. *Abstraction* (Nominalism and Realism); 5. *Judgment* (First Truths); 6. *Reasoning* (Demonstration and Probable Reasoning); 7. *Taste*.

5. DUGALD STEWART.

1. *Consciousness*; 2. *External Perception*; 3. *Attention*; 4. *Conception*; 5. *Abstraction*; 6. *Association of Ideas*; 7. *Memory*; 8. *Imagination*; 9. *Reasoning* (taking up *Logie*).

6. THOMAS BROWN.

I.—EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS. 1. *Sensation*; 2. *Organic States*.

II.—INTERNAL AFFECTIONS. 1. *Intellectual States*. (1) Simple

Suggestion (the laws of Association); and (2) Relative Suggestion (Comparison, Resemblance). 2. *The Emotions* (given in detail afterwards).

7. SIR W. HAMILTON.

Sir W. Hamilton enumerates six faculties:—1. *Presentative* (the Senses and Self-consciousness); 2. *Conservative* (mere retention in the memory); 3. *Reproductive* (depends on the Laws of Association); 4. *Elaborative* (Abstraction and Reasoning); 5. *Representative* (Imagination); 6. *Regulative* (the faculty of *a priori* truths).

8. SAMUEL BAILEY.

I.—DISCERNING. 1. *Through the Senses*; 2. Not through the Senses (*Introspection*).

II.—CONCEIVING, having ideas or mental representations. 1. *Conceiving without individual recognition*; 2. *Conceiving with individual recognition*; 3. *Imagining*, or conceiving under new combinations.

III.—BELIEVING, 1. *On evidence*, and 2. *without evidence*.

IV.—REASONING, 1. *Contingent*, and 2. *Demonstrative*.

9. HERBERT SPENCER.

Mr. Spencer defines *cognitions* as the *relations* subsisting among our feelings, and classifies them as follows; 1. *Presentative cognitions* (localizing sensations); 2. *Presentative-representative*, perception of the whole from a part (as when the sight of an orange brings to mind all its other attributes); 3. *Representative*; including all acts of recollection; 4. *Re-representative*, the higher abstractions formed by symbols, as in Mathematics.

10. For the sake of comparison, we may add the classification adopted in the present volume. I.—THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE INTELLECT. 1. *Muscularity*, and 2. *The Senses*. II.—THE INTELLECT. 1. *Discrimination*, or the sense of difference; 2. *Similarity*, or the sense of agreement; and 3. *Retentiveness*.

THE EMOTIONS.

1. REID.

His Active Powers are divided into three parts:—

I.—MECHANICAL PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. 1. *Instinct*; 2. *Habit*.

II.—ANIMAL PRINCIPLES. 1. *Appetites*; 2. *Desires* (Power, Esteem, Knowledge); 3. *Affections* (Benevolent and Malevolent; Passion, Disposition, Opinion).

III.—RATIONAL PRINCIPLES. 1. *Self-love*; 2. *Duty*.

2. DUGALD STEWART.

I.—INSTINCTIVE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. 1. *Appetites*; 2. *Desires* (Knowledge, Society, Esteem, Power, Superiority); 3. *Affections* (Benevolent and Malevolent).

II.—RATIONAL AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. 1. *Prudence*; 2. *Moral Faculty*; 3. *Decency*, or a regard to character; 4. *Sympathy*; 5. *the Ridiculous*; 6. *Taste*.

3. THOMAS BROWN.

I.—IMMEDIATE, excited by present objects. 1. *Cheerfulness* and *Melancholy*; 2. *Wonder*; 3. *Languor*; 4. *Beauty*; 5. *Sublimity*; 6. the *Ludicrous*; 7. *Moral feeling*; 8. *Love and Hate*; 9. *Sympathy*; 10. *Pride and Humility*.

II.—RETROSPECTIVE. 1. *Anger*; 2. *Gratitude*; 3. *Simple Regret and Gladness*; 4. *Remorse and its opposite*.

III.—PROSPECTIVE. 1. The *Desires* (Continued Existence, Pleasure, Action, Society, Knowledge, Power, Affection, Glory; the Happiness of others, Evil to others); 2. *Fears*; 3. *Hope*; 4. *Expectation*; 5. *Anticipation*.

4. SIR W. HAMILTON.

Sir W. Hamilton has, first, Sensations (the five senses and organic sensations) and, secondly, the Sentiments or internal feelings. These are divided as follows: I.—THE CONTEMPLATIVE, subdivided into, 1. Those of the subsidiary faculties, including (1) those of *self-consciousness* (Tedium and its opposite), and (2) those of *Imagination* (Order, Symmetry, Unity in Variety); 2. Those of the *Elaborative Faculty* (Wit, the pleasures of Truth and Science, and the gratification of adapting Means to Ends). *Beauty* and *Sublimity* arise from the joint energy of the Imagination and the Understanding.

II.—THE PRACTICAL feelings relate to, 1. *Self-Preservation* (Hunger and Thirst, Loathing, Sorrow, Bodily pain, Anxiety, Repose, &c.); 2. *The Enjoyment of our Existence*; 3. *The Preservation of the Species*; 4. Our Tendency towards *Development and Perfection*; and 5. The *Moral Law*.

5. HERBERT SPENCER.

Mr. Spencer's classification runs parallel to his arrangement of the intellectual powers. 1. *Presentative feelings*, ordinarily called Sensations; 2. *Presentative-representative feelings*, including the simple emotions, as *Terror*; 3. *Representative feelings*, such as those roused by a descriptive poet; 4. *Re-representative feelings*, such as Property, Justice.

6. KANT.

I.—SENSUOUS, coming through—1. *Sense* (Tedium, Contentment), or 2. *Imagination* (Taste).

II.—INTELLECTUAL, from 1. the *Concepts* of the Understanding; and 2. the *Ideas* of the Reason. He takes the *Affections* and *Passions* under the Will.

7. HERBERT.

Herbart, and his followers Waitz and Nahlowsky. *First, Feelings Proper*. I.—FORMAL. 1. The *general or elementary feelings* (Oppression and Relief, Exertion and Ease, Seeking and Finding, Success and Defeat, Harmony and Contrast, Power and Weakness); 2. the *Special or complicated feelings* (Expectation, Astonishment, Doubt, &c.).

II.—QUALITATIVE. 1. *Feelings of Sense*; 2. *higher or Intellectual feelings* (Truth and Probability); the *Æsthetic*; the *Moral*; the *Religious*.

E.—*Meanings of certain Terms.*

CONSCIOUSNESS. This may be considered the leading term of Mental Science; all the most subtle distinctions and the most debated questions are unavoidably connected with it. The employment of the word in this treatise has been, as far as possible, consistent with the views maintained as to the fundamental nature of Perception and Knowledge.

Some advantage may be gained by a brief review of the various significations of the term. In popular language, two or three gradations of meaning may be traced. In one class of applications, consciousness is mental life, as opposed to torpor or insensibility; the loss of consciousness is mental extinction for the time; while, on the other hand, a more than ordinary wakefulness and excitement is a heightened form of consciousness. In a second class of meanings, the subjective state, as opposed to the objective, is more particularly intended; when a person is said to be morbidly or excessively conscious, there is indicated an excessive attention to the feelings and the thoughts, and a slender amount of occupation with outward things. It is this meaning that determined Reid and Stewart to apply the name to the distinctive faculty of the mental philosopher, in cognizing operations of the mind.

If, as is generally maintained, the second meaning be too narrow, there is no alternative but to abide by the first or more comprehensive meaning. In this case, the term is the widest in mental philosophy; nay more, if consciousness is the only possible criterion of existence, it is the widest term in the vocabulary of mankind. The sum of all consciousnesses is the sum of all existences.

Consciousness, then, is divided into the two great departments—the OBJECT consciousness, and the SUBJECT consciousness; the greatest transition, or antithesis, within the compass of our being. When putting forth energy, as in muscular exertion, and in the activity of the senses, we are objectively conscious; in pleasure or pain, and in memory, we are subjectively conscious.

Great as is the contrast of the two modes of activity, there are designations that mix and confound them; the chief of these is the term 'Sensation,' next to be adverted to.

A singular position, in the matter of Consciousness, has been taken up by Sir W. Hamilton, and by the Germans almost universally; namely, that Consciousness as a whole, is based on the knowing or intellectual consciousness, or is possible, only through knowledge. 'We feel only as we *know* that we feel; we are pleased only as we know that we are pleased. It is not the intensity of a feeling that makes the feeling; but the operation of cognizing or knowing the state of feeling.'

It must be granted that we cannot have any feeling without

with it either in place or time.' The Compound embrace (1) Co-existent qualities; (2) Cause and Effect; (3) Order.

7. Beattie has—1. *Resemblance*, 'one event or story leads us to think of another that is like it'; 2. *Contrariety*; 3. *Contiguity or Vicinity*, 'when the idea occurs of any place with which we are acquainted, we are apt to pass, by an easy and quick transition, to those of the adjoining places, of the persons who live there, &c.'; 4. *Cause and Effect*. [The statements of Gerard and Beattie are very imperfect.]

8. Hartley has only *Contiguity*, which he expresses thus, 'Sensations are associated when their impressions are either made precisely at the same instant of time, or in the contiguous successive instants.' Association is thus synchronous or successive.

9. James Mill follows Hartley's statement. 'Our ideas spring up or exist in the order in which the sensations existed, of which they are the copies.' He properly objects to making causation a distinct principle, but is unsuccessful in his attempt to resolve Resemblance into Contiguity. *Contrast* arises generally from a *vivid conjunction*.

10. Dugald Stewart (herein following Reid) observes that the causes of Association are so diverse that they can hardly be reduced to a few heads, but enumerates as obvious modes of connection, *Resemblance* (including *Analogy*), *Contrariety*, *Vicinity* in time and place; he adds as less obvious modes, *Cause and Effect*, *Means and Ends*, *Premises and Conclusions*.

11. Thomas Brown mentions *Contiguity*, *Resemblance* (including *Analogy*), and *Contrast*, but thinks they may be reduced to one expression; all Suggestion (his word for Association) may depend on prior co-existence, or on immediate proximity of feelings (not of objects).

12. Sir W. Hamilton gives the following as *general laws* of mental succession. I.—The Law of *Associability* or *Possible Co-suggestion*:—All thoughts of the same mental subjects are associable, or capable of suggesting each other. II.—The Law of *Repetition* or *Direct Remembrance*:—Thoughts co-identical in modification, but differing in time, tend to suggest each other. III.—The Law of *Redintegration*, of *Indirect Resemblance*, or of *Reminiscence*:—Thoughts once co-identical in time, are, however different as mental modes, again suggestive of each other, and that in the mutual order which they originally held.

His *Special Laws* are those:—1. The Law of *Similarity*;—Things—thoughts resembling each other (be the resemblance simple or analogical) are mutually suggestive. Since resembling modifications are, to us, in their resembling points, *identical*, they call up each other according to the Law of Repetition. 2. The Law of *Contrast*. 3. The Law of *Coadjacency*, embracing Cause and Effect, Whole and Parts, Substance and Attribute, Sign and Signified.

meaning of which is that the more the mind is subjectively engaged, the less the objective attention, and conversely.

3. In Sensation, past experiences are inextricably woven with a present impression; a circumstance tending to confuse the boundary line between Sense and Intellect. When we look at a tree, the present consciousness is not the bare result of the present stimulation, but that combined with a sum total of past impressions. In short, the mind's retentiveness overlays all present effects; and what seems sensation is an actual stimulation mixed with memory.

Farther, as in Sensation we must be conscious of Agreement and of Difference, which are also intellectual functions, it is clear that there cannot be such a thing as Sensation (in the cognitive meaning) without processes of the Intellect. Hence the question as to the origin of our Ideas in Sense, is charged with ambiguity; yet many of the arguments in favour of Innate Ideas are founded on the supposition that the experience of the Senses excludes such intellectual elements as Likeness, Unlikeness, Equality and Proportion; whereas it is impossible to exclude such attributes from the perceptive process.

PRESENTATION and REPRESENTATION. These words are made, by some metaphysicians, the starting point in the exposition of the mind. The phenomena indicated by them have been fully recognized in the present work, although under other names.

'Presentation' and 'Intuition' are applied to signify the cognition of an object present to the view, in all its circumstances, and definite relationships in space, and in time: it is the full present actuality of sensation. In looking at a circle drawn on paper before us, the mental cognition is in the highest degree individual or concrete; it is a *presentation*, or *intuition*. But when, after seeing many circles, we form an abstract or general conception of a circle, embodied although that may be in an individual, we are said to possess a *representation*, or to be in a state of *representative* consciousness. So far, the distinction coincides with the distinction between the concrete, in its extreme form of present individuality, and the general or abstract.

The distinction equally holds in subjective cognitions. An actual fit of anger is presentative; the reflecting on it, when past, is representative. The one is an *intuition*, the other a *thought*.

The Presentative or Intuitive knowledge is also termed *Immediate*; the Representative is *Mediate*; the one is known in itself, the other through something else. The individual circle looked at is known by an immediate act; the general property is known mediately through some concrete circle or circles. Sensation is thus contrasted with Perception; the sensation is what is actually felt; the perception is the additional something that is suggested. Colour is sensation; distance (in the Berkeleyan view) is perception, representation, or thought.

Hamilton applies the distinction, as already seen (p. 208), in distinguishing the theories of External Perception. His own view

having some knowledge of it; it is the nature of mental excitement to leave some trace of itself in the memory. Farther, any strong emotion calls attention to itself; it may also, however, lead attention away to the object cause, and diminish the subjective consciousness. On any view, the knowledge or attention, although an accompaniment of the state, is not its foundation. If this were so, the increase of the cognitive act would be the increase of the feeling; whereas the fact is the reverse; the less that we are occupied in the properly intellectual function, the more are we possessed with the feeling proper.

It is most accordant with the facts, to regard Feeling as a distinct conscious element, whether cognized or not, whether much or little attended to in the way of discrimination, agreement, or memory. The three functions of the mind are so interwoven and implicated that it is scarcely, if it all, possible to find any one absolutely alone in its exercise; we cannot be all Feeling, without any share of an intellectual element; we cannot be all Will, without either feeling or intellect. The nearest approach to isolation is in the objective consciousness, which, in the moment of its highest engrossment, is an exclusively Intellectual occupation.

SENSATION. The concurrence of various contrasting phenomena in the fact expressed by Sensation, renders this word often ambiguous.

1. In Sensation, there is a combination of physical facts, with a mental fact. Thus, in sight, the physical processes are known to be—the action of light on the retina, a series of nerve currents, and certain outgoing influences to muscles and viscera; while the mental phenomenon is the feeling, or subject state accompanying these. The word is properly applicable, and should be confined in its application, to the strictly mental fact.

2. In the great contrast of the object and the subject consciousness, the word Sensation is applied to both the one and the other. This is owing to the repeated transitions between the two in actual sensation. In looking at a beautiful prospect, the mind passes, by fits and starts, from the one attitude to the other; while engrossed with the extent, figure, distance, and even with the colours of the scene, the attitude is objective; when conscious of the pleasure, the attitude is subjective. Now, the word Sensation applies to both attitudes; unless when put in contrast to Perception, which, in its reference, is purely objective. In this last case, Sensation is limited to the pleasurable or painful accompaniment of the state.

The contrast of Sensation and Perception is thus the contrast between the sensitive and the cognitive, intellectual, or knowledge-giving functions. Hence Perception is applied to the knowledge obtained both directly and indirectly through the exercise of the Senses; the one is called immediate perception, and the other mediate, or acquired perception.

It is with reference to this contrast, that Hamilton enunciates his law of the universe relative of Sensation and Perception; the

other thinking beings; in this alone consists personal identity'-- (Essay, Book II., chap. 27).

Locke has been attacked on various grounds. First, by Butler and others, for holding that consciousness *makes* self; the objectors holding the view first stated, that the personality is something prior to and apart from the consciousness, as truth preceedes and is distinct from the knowledge of it. Reid considers it very strange that personal identity should be confounded with the evidence that we have of our personal identity, that is, with consciousness. We must be the same, before we are known to be the same. Self is one thing; the cognizance of self another thing.

In the second place, Locke's view has been supposed to lead to the absurdity that a man may be, and not be, at the same time, the person that did a particular action, namely, something that has entirely passed out of his consciousness. Consciousness is fugitive: personality is enduring and consecutive. This objection might have been fenced by introducing the *potential* or *possible* consciousness along with the actual. Any experience that has ever entered into our mental personality retains a link, stronger or feebler, with the present, and is within the possibility of being reproduced.

Another criticism is that consciousness is confounded with memory. Locke, however, understood consciousness in a large meaning, as containing the memory of the past, as well as the cognizance of the actual or present. Yet he ought to have adverted to the distinction between present and remembered states, as vital in this question. The best metaphysicians agree that the question at issue involves the nature of our *belief in memory* (see, among others, Brown, Lect. XIII.). We have certain states that we call present, actual, immediate, as in the consciousness of a present light, sound, or taste. We have another class of experiences when these effects are no longer supported in the actual, but remembered, or retained in the ideal; with them is involved the belief that they are not merely what they are now, but are also the remains or products of former states of the kind termed actual; that they somehow represent an experience in past time, as well as constitute an experience in present time.

This memory and belief of the past is not fully exhausted by its mere contrast with the present; there is further contained in it, the orderly sequence or succession of our mental states. Each item of the past is viewed as preceding some things also past, and as succeeding others. The total past is an orderly retrospect or record, wherein everything has a definite place.

Thus the fact of unbroken succession enters into identity in the mental personality, as well as into the identity of a plant, or animal, a society, or a nation. The mind, however, is self-recording, and preserves its history from an early date; the identity prior to each one's earliest recollection of self, is only objective, like a tree; the parents and others are the testimony to the succession of the individual in the years of mental incompetency.

is Presentationism; he holds that the consciousness of external reality is *immediate* like the consciousness of colour, touch, or resistance.

Presentation thus corresponds to Sensation in the third meaning above given; a mode of consciousness, however, which is supposable only, and not a matter of fact. What we believe to be a present sensation is, in reality, a complicated product of past and present impressions, a resultant of numerous shocks of difference and of agreement.

PERSONAL IDENTITY. Much controversy has been raised on the question as to our personal or continual identity. Some of the difficulty arises from the ambiguity of the words Sameness, or Identity. There are degrees of sameness; we call two trees the same, merely because they are of one species. The sort of identity, or amount of sameness, intended, under personal identity, is when we call an individual tree the same throughout its whole existence, from germination to final decay. A human body is called the same, or identical, through its whole life, in spite of important diversities; for not only are the actual particles repeatedly changed, but the plan, or arrangement, of those particles is greatly altered in the different stages. A block of marble, a statue, a building, retain a much higher identity, than a plant or animal.

In living beings, therefore, unbroken continuity is the feature of the sameness. The English nation is called the same nation down from the Saxon times. The identity of the United States of America would probably be counted from the date of the Independence, which shows that an unbroken political system is the idea that we form of national identity.

It is, however, in the mind, or subjective life, that the question of sameness is most subtle and perplexed. There are different modes of expressing the identity of a being endowed with mind. One is the notion of a persistent *substance* distinct from, and underlying all the passing moods of consciousness—of feeling, thought, and will; a permanent thread, holding together the variable and shifting manifestations that make our mental life. Of such a substance there can be no proof offered; it is purely hypothetical, but the hypothesis has been found satisfactory to many, and has been considered as self-evident or intuitively certain. Berkeley, in repudiating a substratum of matter, maintained this hypothetical groundwork of mind. Hume declined both entities; resolving matter and mind alike into the sequence of conscious states.

Locke expressed the fact of identity as the 'consciousness of present and past actions in the person to whom they belong.' Person 'is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking being, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking.' 'For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and is what makes every one to be what each calls 'self,' and thereby distinguishes self from all

of each object: what is also called in Aristotelian, and likewise in common language, the Essence.

The Substance of Body, or matter generally, would thus be what is common to all Body—Inertia.

With respect to Mind, the question of Substance is the question of Personal Identity in another shape. The same theorists that assume a persistent unknown something as underlying all consciousness, with a view to Personal Identity, would call this entity, the Substance of Mind, and the known functions of Mind, its qualities or attributes. According to the other view, the Substance of Mind is the three fundamental and defining attributes; those powers or functions, which, being present, constitute mind, and in whose absence we do not apply the name. They are Feeling, Volition, and Intellect; these may vary in degree to an indefinite extent, but in some degree they must be conjoined in everything that we call mind.

A second mode of justifying the current antithesis of substance and quality, without assuming an inconceivable entity, is to call the *total* of any concrete, the Substance, and each one of its properties mentioned singly, a Quality, or attribute. Of the total conjunction of powers, called gold,—weight, hardness, colour, &c., are the qualities in the detail.

It has been previously seen in what acceptations Substance was used by Aristotle. Locke regards the idea of Substance as a complex idea, the aggregate of the ideas of the distinctive attributes. Of substance in general, he allows an obscure, vague, indistinct idea, growing out of the relationship of supporter and support, a general relative notion. If we call any qualities modes or accidents, we imply a correlative subject or substratum, of which they are modes or accidents.

Reid says:—‘To me, nothing seems more absurd than that there should be extension without anything extended, or motion without anything moved; yet I cannot give reasons for my opinion, because it seems to me self-evident, and an immediate dictate of my nature.’ Hamilton considers that his Law of the Conditioned is applicable to explain Substance and Accident. We are compelled, he says, to pass beyond what appears the phenomenal to an existence absolute, unknown, and incomprehensible. But this compulsion is not itself an ultimate fact of mind; it grows out of the principle of the Conditioned, from which also springs our belief of the law of Cause. (Reid, p. 935.)

It has been made a question, whether Space and Time are Substances. Cudworth, Newton, and Clarke, held that they are attributes, and imply a substance, which must be God.

According to Fichte:—‘Attributes synthetically united give substance. and substance analyzed gives attributes; a continued substratum, or supporter of attributes, is an impossible conception.’

The Belief in Memory may probably be regarded as standing at one remove from an ultimate law of the mind, namely, the law that connects Belief with our Spontaneous and Voluntary Activity (p. 377).

Full recollection of anything assigns it its point in the stream or succession. This is the difference between memory and imagination: both are ideal as opposed to present actuality: they are faculties of the concrete as opposed to abstraction; but memory can, and imagination cannot, find a determinate place for its objects in the continuous record of the mental life.

SUBSTANCE. This word may be viewed, says Hamilton, either as derived from 'subsistendo,' what subsists by itself, or from 'substando,' what subsists in its accidents, being the basis of qualities or attributes. The two derivations come to the same thing.

Common language has always set forth the contrast of substance and quality or attribute. But as everything that we know or can conceive may be termed a quality, or attribute, if all qualities are supposed withdrawn, there is nothing left to stand for substance. Gold has the qualities of weight, hardness, ductility, colour, &c.; what then is the substance 'gold'? Matter has the property 'Inertia'; what is the substance?

One way out of the difficulty is to postulate an unknown, and unknowable entity, underlying, and in some mysterious way holding together, the various attributes. We are said to be driven by an intuitive and irresistible tendency, to make this assumption; which intuition is held to justify us in such an extreme measure. There is an unknowable substance-matter, the subject of the attribute inertia, and of all the special modes of the different kinds of matter—gold, marble, water, oxygen, and the rest. The same hypothetical unknown entity, is expressed in another antithesis—the *noumenon* as against the *phenomenon*; what is, in contrast to what appears.

Another way out of the difficulty is to regard the common language as itself unguarded and inaccurate, and as demanding qualification and adjustment. Instead of treating all the energies of a thing as attributes predicable of an unknown essence, a distinction is made between the fundamental, constant, ineradicable attributes, and those that are variable, fluctuating, or separable. Thus, as regards 'matter,' the property 'inertia' is fundamental and irremovable; the properties—colour, transparency, hardness, elasticity, oxidation, &c., are variable and fluctuating. 'Inertia' would then be the 'substance' of matter in general; this, together with a certain specific gravity, colour, ductility, &c., would be the substance of gold. Such a rendering comes much nearer to the popular apprehension of substance, than the impalpable and unknown entity. A thing is substantial that resists, as a stone wall; a piece of gauze, a column of smoke, a ghost, are called unsubstantial; they have little or no resisting power.

In this view, substance corresponds with the defining property

the text. They may get us over the shock of failure by their own peculiar efficacy in counteracting and obliterating any painful impressions. When we are actively disposed, we overlook and disregard the obstacles to our activity. When a result is very agreeable to us, we merge and forget the hostile experiences, and proceed as if the uniformity had been complete. Whether the shocks of disappointed expectation shall generate a doubting turn of mind, or shall be made light of and leave a disposition to expect too much, depends greatly on these active and emotional forces, and in some measure upon the education of the intellect. The details of this complex influence are furnished in the text, allowance being made for the correction indicated in this Note.

Note on the chapter on BELIEF, p. 371.

In the chapter on Belief, I have given what I now regard as a mistaken view of the fundamental nature of the state of Belief, namely, to refer it to the Spontaneous Activity of the System. I consider the correct view to be, that belief is a primitive disposition to follow out any sequence that has been once experienced, and to expect the result. It is a fact or incident of our Intellectual nature, although dependent as to its energy upon our Active and Emotional tendencies.

The several agencies in Belief may be enumerated in the following order:—

1. The primitive tendency to expect that what has been will be again. The mere fact, that a stone dropped into a pool of water makes a splash and a series of waves, is accompanied with the expectation that the same sequence will recur. The mind proceeds in a track once formed; and if it is capable of any inference, or of any resolution founded on that, repeats the act in perfect confidence of the result.

The nice point in the situation is the full assurance based on a single trial. Repetition scarcely adds anything to the primitive confidence growing out of the first occurrence of the event. The efficacy of Repetition belongs to a later stage.

2. Suppose next, what happens in a great number of our primitive expectations, that we encounter a failure, in other words, a breach of sequence. A stone is thrown in what seems to be water, but makes no splash, and no waves. This failure, or interruption, produces a mental shock, a breach of expectation, a disappointment, which unhinges and discomposes the mind. It is in point of fact destructive of the prior state of expectation; that state cannot be renewed without a roundabout process. In some instances, we find that we have made a mistake of identity: as when we took ice for water; in other instances there is a flat contradiction, as when we expect to-morrow's sun to rise as bright as to-day's.

It is not the number of instances that gives us our confident expectation; it is the *unbroken uniformity*. The occurrence of two cases for and none against, is a case of full belief; the occurrence of ten cases for and one against, leaves a shaken and imperfect confidence, or else no confidence at all.

It becomes a serious part of our education to surmount, reconcile, and accomodate, these interrupted sequences; and we fall upon various modes of effecting the end. There are some methods of a purely rational kind; as, for example, when we set ourselves to discover the reasons of the discrepancy and find that it is only apparent. Another way is to surrender entirely certain sequences as having no validity whatever. At this stage repetition is useful as a test to discriminate the accidental from the persistent sequences.

3. Our active and emotional tendencies operate as stated in

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